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INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
THE PROBLEM
The American system of public education reflects 
a conviction that the people of the nation recognize the 
significance of an educated public. Through the adoption of 
the tenth amendment to the Federal Constitution education 
became one of the powers reserved to the states. Since the 
development of the first state constitutions provisions re­
lating to public education have been reflected in the organic 
documents of the various states— of the 128 constitutions 
adopted from 1776 to 1929 there were only 13, one of which 
was Louisiana's first in 1812, that did not provide for public 
education in some form.^ Then, the public school may be con­
sidered as a creature of the state and subject to the govern- 
ment thereof.
It is only natural to expect the heterogeneity of 
Louisiana's population to have affected her educational atti­
tudes. France, Germany, Spain, England, and the United States
Ijohn M, Matzen, State Constitutional Provisions for Educa* 
tlon (New York, 1931), p. 1.
Bjoakim F. Weltzin, The Legal Authority of the American 
Public School (Grand Forks, 1930), p, 1,
were the chief sources of early immigration to the state* In 
all those nations, except the United States, the courts are 
subsidiaries to the crown or the legislative bodies* In France, 
legislation enacted by the National Assembly is held valid by
g
every tribunal throughout the republic. "In Germany, the 
courts are required to enforce without question the legislative 
will, repugnancy to the constitution offers no excuse to do 
otherwise."^ In Spain the same relation exists between the 
courts and the law-making bodies.® According to Sir William 
Blackstone, in England "what the parliament doth, no authority 
upon earth can undo."® In the United States, the courts, under 
the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, began to exercise 
in the early nineteenth century the authority of passing on the 
validity of legislative acts whether those acts were based on 
the constitution or on established practice. These two con­
flicting theories as to the relationship between the courts 
and the legislative bodies have affected the educational poli­
cies of the state. The acquiescent attitude of the people in 
accepting the educational enactments without questioning is
^Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution (London, 1908),p. 153.
^William B. Bizzell, Judicial Interpretation of Political 
Theory (New York, 1914), p. 27.
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (Philadelphia, 1889), 1, bk. Ï, p.“Tl7.
^William B. Bizzell, 0£. oit.. pp. 5-46.
4evidence that the European theory of Judicial and legislative 
relationships was prominent in Louisiana during its formative 
period.
Those early immigrants from Europe brought not only 
different conceptions of government but also the parent coun­
tries' philosophy that education is a product of the Church, 
especially of Catholicism, which was the legalized and dominant 
religion of France and Spain. This theory, which was firmly 
established in Louisiana during its formative period, influ­
enced the development of educational policies, particularly 
those concerning the establishment of public schools.
That Louisiana has developed abiding faith in public 
education during the past century may be indicated by the facts 
that for the first thirty-four years of the state's history 
there was only #1,100,637,75, or an average of $38,371.70 
yearly, spent by the state for parish schools and subsidised
p
academies, while during the school year of 1930-1931 alone
the state and parishes spent #20,902,364.00 for the maintenance 
of public schools^ and |4,838,224.00 for the school building 
pr o g r a m , o r  a total of $25,740,588.00 for public school 
purposes. The latter total had to be secured through various 
forms of taxation and bond issues which required the calling 
of many elections, the making of contracts, and many other
®Edwin W. Fay, The History of Education in Louisiana 
(Washington, 1898), p.
^State Department of Education of Louisiana. Elahtv-fourth 
Annual Report, for the Session 19^2^3 (Ëaton feouge. 1Q55), p7 14.
lOlbid.. p# 16.
legal procedures. The spending of that amount so as to offer
proper educational opportunities for 663,169 educable children^^
12 1 
to be taught by 12,887 teachers in 2,924 schools throughout
the state demanded both the Judicious development and the prac­
tical application of an Intricate public school system.
The above comparison is but one indication of the 
vast enterprise that Louisiana's system of public education 
has become. In the functioning of that enterprise, where much 
capital and many people of different interests are involved, 
there may be expected to have arisen many questions of law and 
procedures about which men have differed. Research studies 
reveal that many of these differences, not only in Louisiana 
but also in other states, have been adjudicated by the courts 
in order to determine the law. It has been estimated that
1 case of 150 cases tried in the lower courts reaches the state
14
supreme courts. In 1927 there were 231 school cases settled
15in the supreme courts of the various states. Accepting the 
former ratio and latter count as correct and considering 
Louisiana as an average state, there should have been in 1927
Instate Department of Education of Louisiana. Eighty-second 
Annual^keport. for the Session 1930-31 ( Baton RouSeT ”1931)". 
pp. 142-143.
ISlbld.. p. 30.
1 *»
pp. 98-101.
G, K. Jarvis, "Recent Supreme Court Decisions on 
Teacher Contracts," School and Society. XXIV (1926), p. 153.
15
Richard B. Thiel, "An Analysis of the Nature and Frequency 
of Supreme Court Cases in School Law for the Calendar Year of 
1927," Journal of Educational Research. XIX (1929), p. 178.
aapproximately 760 eontroversial school questions that found 
their way to the courts for adjudication, 5 of which should 
have been continued to the supreme court of the state for 
final disposition. By actual count, Louisiana In 1927 brought 
before its supreme court 7 cases involving 26 different points 
of law and received from its attorney general 19 opinions on 
public school questions.
Since the courts and the attorneys general, by means 
of decisions and opinions as based on organic and statutory 
enactments and established rights, have the responsibility of 
deciding what the law is, and since the law is the final author­
ity, their interpretations may be accepted as influential in 
the shaping of public school policies. The study herein pre­
sented is an attempt to discover the law governing the free 
public school system of Louisiana and to designate those basic 
policies which were dominant in the development of that system.
This study presents for the first time Louisiana's 
interpretation of her educational law. It la submitted with 
the anticipation that it may prove a contribution to those 
educators in general and school administrators in particular 
who may attempt to solve the present and future problems of 
the state's public school system.
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
To indicate how broad or how limited may be a problem 
which deals with the legal bases of public school policies a 
few related studies are cited. Otto T. Hamilton, in 1927,
attempted to discover the law governing the ourriculum of the
American public school as revealed by the facts of oases and
the decisions of judges in the higher courts of all the states 
16of the Union* A study completed by Fred H, Barber in 1928 
was an attempt to determine the educational policies of Tennessee 
as revealed by the state's constitutional provisions and the 
decisions of its supreme c o u r t , I n  1932 Jennings B. George 
presented a study purporting to show the development of public 
school policies in Mississippi as revealed by judicial inter-
Tflprobations of the state's constitutions and statutory laws.
In the same year Carl G. Leech published the results of an 
investigation which sought to ascertain the constitutional 
and legal provisions for the establishment of public education 
in Hew Jersey, in as much as such principles are implied in 
the state's constitutions, statutory laws, and court decisions, 
Thus, it may be seen that in related problems the limitations 
have ranged from one phase of education in all states to all 
phases in one state, some having for their legal bases judicial 
interpretations of the law, some including constitutional in­
fluences, and others adding statutory enactments and opinions 
from the states’ legal counselors.
l^Otto T. Hamilton, The Courts and the Curriculum (New York, 
1927),
Fred H, Barber, The Constitutional and Le&al Basis of Public- 
Sehool Administration tn Tennessee (Chfcago,1926),
Jennings B, George, The Influence of Court Decisions in 
Shaping Sehgol Policies in Mississippi' ’Washvlile, 1938) *
l^Car! G. Leech, The Const1tutional and Legal Basis of Education 
in Hew Jersey (Philadelphia, 1932).
6This study of the publie school policies of Louisiana 
confines itself to the interpretations of the state's organic 
and statutory laws as rendered primarily by her supreme court.
In the absence of decisions by the supreme court, rulings by 
the state court of appeal and by the attorneys general have 
been used. Also, in the few cases where the state supreme 
court decisions were not final the interpretations by the United 
States Court were obtained.
PROCEDURE
In the preparation for this research study, approxi­
mately a year was spent in an intensive survey of the material 
in any way related to the development of education In the state.
One product of this general investigation was a problem showing
20the developments of education in Louisiana prior to statehood.
A résumé of this problem appears as the historical foundation 
for the present study.
Work on this study proper began with a systematic 
collection of all proceedings indicating the development of 
educational policies in the state's organic law as found in the 
Official Debates and Journals of the nine Louisiana consti­
tutional conventions. This information was taken in typewritten 
form and filed.
Martin L. Riley, The Development of Education in Louisiana 
Prior ^  Statehood (unpubiTsbed MS*, Louisiana £>iate University, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1936),
a search of the various digests there was com­
piled a bibliography of cases pertaining to public education 
in Louisiana. To facilitate the work of analysis, the principal 
oases— those listed in the digests under the topics, "Public 
Education" and "Schools and School Districts"— were typewritten. 
Supplementary cases were located by examination of the cases 
listed under the cross-references in the digests, those re­
ferred to in the cases previously collected, and those listed 
under the various principal cases in Shepard's Louisiana 
Citations through the December, 1934, Supplement. This system 
was continued with the supplementary oases until the oases 
referred to were in no way connected with the public schools. 
Some of the oases thus located were typewritten while others 
less related to schools were briefed.
Next there were listed from all the reports of the 
attorneys general the opinions concerning public education.
These opinions, which were in the form of letters written to 
individuals in answer to questions on educational law, were 
typewritten and filed as separate notes.
Â search was then made for previous studies bearing 
on the subject. Notes and citations therefrom were collected 
and added to the files.
In the work of analysis, cases or briefs were care­
fully read, a name was assigned to each, and a first grouping 
of the cases was made; this led to the eight major divisions 
of the study.
Each case or brief was then reread and all major and 
minor points therein were listed. These phases were classified
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according to the major divisions and organized within the sub­
divisions which they established.
Opinions of the attorneys general were next classified 
according to the divisions and subdivisions set up by the 
supreme court decisions, additional subdivisions being made 
when necessary.
The material on each major topic from all sources—  
constitutional conventions, supreme court decisions, opinions 
of the attorneys general, and any other source whatever— was 
organized and presented as a chapter of the study.
Liberal use has been made of clear and concise quo­
tations, but in a limited study of this nature there was not 
space to permit their use on all issues found in the constitu­
tions, statutory laws, court decisions, or attorney generals' 
opinions; however, enough have been presented to enable the 
reader to interpret for himself some of the pertinent under­
lying policies involved in the law governing Louisiana's 
system of public schools.
Each chapter which presents one of the eight major 
divisions is concluded with a summary of the issues and trends 
that seem to indicate the development of educational policies 
according to the data confined therein. The last chapter at­
tempts to reveal the law governing the free public school sys­
tem of Louisiana by pointing out in the study as a whole those 
salient issues and trends which have appeared fundamental in 
shaping the educational policies of the state.
The chapters, determined mainly by the classification 
of the supreme court decisions into topics, as explained, and
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composed of ell data similarly classified, are presented 
under the following titles:
I. Introduction.
II. prostate Foundations of Public school Policies.
III. Public Education as a state Function.
IF. Public school Support through Land Grants.
7. Public school Support through General Funds.
VI. Public school support through special Funds.
VII. Educational Control by Nonprofessional Agencies.
VIII. Educational Control by Professional Agencies.
IX. School Districts and Property.
X. Administration of Pupil personnel and the Curriculum.
XI. Conclusions.
CHAPTER II
PRESTATE E0DNDATI0N3 OF PUBLIC SCHOOL POLICIES
CHAPTIJÎ II
PRESTATE FOÜRDATIONS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL POLICIES
In the study of educational policies of the state 
of Louisiana it is significant to note that many of the 
existing theories of today antedate the period of state- 
hood. From the beginning there seems to have been felt the 
need for a power higher than the administrative officials 
of the educational institution themselves to settle contro­
versial issues 9 whether that power was the crown of France 
or Spain or the territorial legislature under the United 
States, Likewise, at an early date those interested in 
education found themselves incapable at times of inter­
preting satisfactorily the standards set up and contracts 
entered into; consequently, the Superior Council and the 
Cabildo--the judicial bodies of the French and Spanish 
periods, respectively— and the governing authorities of the 
territorial period rendered frequent interpretation of the 
then existent educational practices. Those theories, 
decisions, and interpretations, forerunners of the work of 
the supreme court of today with respect to education, have 
a natural presentation according to the various govern­
mental periods which the territory of Louisiana had before 
the state came into existence in 1812.
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BSOIîmiNQS UNDER IHE FRENCH DOMINION
From the time of the first French settlement on the 
Crulf Coast In 1699 to the transfer of this territory to Spain 
by the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762 the French Government 
prescribed and enforced the controlling policies of her 
Louisiana colony. The Church, which dominated educational 
thinking in the mother country, was similarly influential in 
the new province— that is, the religious organisations 
assumed responsibility for the training of the youth.^
During this period many families of wealth sent 
their sons to the mother country for college training, but 
the education of the girls and of those boys who were unable 
to attend college in France presented e serious problem.&
The school of this period which demanded most 
attention from the French crown, through its immediate 
governing body— the Company of the Indies, was the petit 
collège established at New Orleans by Father Raphael, the 
Capuchin Superior, in a letter written, September 15, 1725, 
to the Abbé Raguet, Ecclesiastical Director of the Company, 
Father Raphael stated that a director and an assistant had 
been employed— the one to instruct advanced pupils, the 
other to teach beginners.^
^Biographical ^nd Historical Memoirs of Louisiana (Chicago, 
1892), I, p. ïoà.
^Dunbar Rowland, and Albert Q. Sanders, Mississippi provincial 
Archives, 1701-1729, French Dominion (Jackson. 1929), II, 
pp. 50B-5O?;
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The founder of this school advocated the theory of 
state support and state-controlled ourrioulim— or the equiv­
alent thereof— when he recommended that no fees be charged 
for admission and that the Company furnish for the new under­
taking an ample supply of catechisms, primers, elementary 
books, grammars, and other material for advanced work.^ 
Anticipating the Company's interest in this undertaking, 
Raphael conferred with Sieurs de Lery and de la Frénière, 
outstanding men of the colony. The three agreed to purchase 
conjointly a small house from Monsieur Langloy at the price 
of three thousand livres to accommodate the pupils,5 about 
fifteen in number, who were in the colony and eligible to 
enter^^ The presence of a struggle to determine which 
theory of support— private or public— should dominate Is 
evidenced by Father Raphael's statement to Abbé Raguet, May 
16, 1726, as followss
**1 am only embarrassed about the payment 
of the house where school is conducted. Those who 
promised me to advance money for It, seem to disown 
their word, fearing lest they should not be reim­
bursed and not wishing to make outlays In favor of 
the public. I beg you, Sir, to honor me with your 
protection In this matter, for if I should be forced 
to abandon the house, this institution, so necessary 
and useful, will be surely ruined.**”
4lbid. p. 514.
^Claude L. Vogel, The Capuchins in French Louisiana 
(1722-1766) (New York, 19281, pp. 70*^1.
®Dunbar Rowland, and Albert G. Sanders, 0£. cit., p. 508,
^Claude L. Vogel, o^. cit.. p. 71.
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In reply, Father Raphael was advised to discuss the problem 
with Governor Perier and Monsieur de la Chaise of Hew Orleans 
with a view of Interesting local authorities in paying for 
the building or of compelling the defaulters to fulfill their 
promise and, If necessary, of asking the Company to assume
the obligation.8
1787 an interpretation of the Company's contract 
with respect to schools was sought from the Superior Council 
by Monsieur Langloy, when he brought before that body a suit 
to compel Father Raphael to pay the three thousand livres as 
a past due obligation* The hesitation of the Council itself 
to interpret in favor of public support is revealed by the 
various reversals of decisions. The developments of the 
case, as given in a research study of the Capuchins,9 were 
the following. In the first hearing, October 27, 1727, the 
Council held that Father Raphael was acting only as an agent 
for the Company, which by virtue of its contract was to 
provide churches, schools, and other religious establishments 
in the colony, and that therefore Raphael was exonerated from 
the obligation. In July, 1730, the case was reopened and 
that time Father Raphael was ordered to pay Langloy the sum 
of three thousand livres for the house he was using for a 
school. Again, April, 1731, Father Raphael presented his 
plea of defense, explaining that, since he was acting in the 
capacity of an agent for the Company, the duty of paying for
Gibld.
*2M1. pp. 71-74.
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the sohoolhouse devolved not on him but directly on the 
Company or indirectly on the inhabitants of the colony.
Three months later the case was still pending and apparently 
against Father Raphael, for in July, 1731, he addressed 
Monsieurs Brusle and Bru of the Superior Council, reiterating 
his reasons for not being held personally responsible for 
the pending debt and reading from a letter received from the 
Company of the Indies in 1727 excerpts concerning the school 
as follows s
"The establishment of the school concerns 
the inhabitants only, since it is for the education 
of their children, it is just that they contribute 
to the payment of the house they have chosen for 
the school. The Company is willing to enter for 
one fourth, considering it not proper that estab­
lishments. be made without Its having a share 
therein."10
The two gentlemen promised to take the matter up again with 
the Council for a final settlement, and since neither the 
court record nor Father Raphael refers to the matter again, 
it is assumed that the Company ultimately agreed to liquidate 
the obligation. And so, it seems that finally the theory 
of public support, through the Company, was upheld by the 
Council and agreed upon by those in controversy*
The assumption of education as a responsibility of 
the colony was earnestly sought by Governor Jean Baptiste le 
Moyne de Bienville, who felt "that the prosperity and even 
the existence of the Colony depended, In a great measure, in 
establishing educational institutions for the young.
lOlbia.. p. 73.
Teresa Austin Carroll, The Uraullnes in Louisiana. 
1727-1884 (New Orleans, 1886), p. e T
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Through hie Influence and the work of Father de Beaubois, 
the Jesuit Superior* the Ursulinee of Houon were contracted 
with to send nun® to the colony to care for the sick and to 
educate the girls especially. The Ooiapaay's recognition of 
the Importance of education is stated in the Preamble of the 
Treaty with the Ursulinee as follows:
The Company having considered that the 
most solid foundations of the Colony of Louisiana 
are the establishments which tend to the advance­
ment of the Glory of God, . . . and wishing again, 
by a new establishment equally pious, to relieve 
the poor sick and provide at the same time for the 
education of young girls, has agreed to and 
accepted the offer® which have been mado to it by 
ulsters Marie Tranchepaln . .
By way of support, the "Company agreed to maintain six nuns
including the superior; to pay their passage and that of four
servants to servo them during their voyage; and moreover to 
pay the passage of those who, from whatever motive, would 
wish to return to F r a n c e * A n o t h e r  indication of support 
by the government is found In a letter written by Governor 
perler to the Company of the Indies, November 3, 1728, la 
which it was stated: *»/tS for the orphan girls, we put thorn 
with the nuns for the sum of one hundred and fifty livres 
that we pay them per year for each of them, * . * Vïhen the
^%enry Renshaw, "The Louisiana Ursulinos," Louisiana 
Historical Society publications. II (December, 1901), p. 57. 
Translation from "Traité de Ma Compagnie des Indes avec les 
ürsulines," which is included in the article*
^^Holoise H. cruaat, "The Uraullnes of Louisiana," Lauisiuna 
Historical Quarterly. XI (1919), p. 9. Explanation in footnote: 
•^ Taken from 'Hoiation das premieres uraullnes a la Nouvelle 
Orleans et de leur établissement en cette ville par la 
reverende Uere de Tranohepaln, supérieure.’"
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hospital is built we shell put the boys la it also whom we
shall be able to place as apprentices at a certain age with
workmen for their time, As a further step, the colony in
1740 budgeted twelve thousand livres for the support of the
twelve nuns and their o r p h a n s . 15 partial control by the
Company, to recompense for partial support, was assured when
"it was agreed that one of the nuns would be overseer of the
hospital, that she would supervise all temporal needs, and
would render account once a month to Messrs. the Officers;
. • • that there would be one for the school for the poor,
. . In the contract the Oompmy agreed that the nuns could
take girl boarders when It did not interfere with their
stated obligations,!? and in approving the treaty the King
of Prance promised the Religious his protection and safe- 
13guard* In July of 1737 the Ursulines had occasion to 
request the superior Council to interpret those agreements 
when they sued to collect from the estate of M. St. Julien 
the sum of four hundred forty-nine livres and ten sols for 
the board of a mulâtress which the said St. Julien had placed
!^unber Rowland, and Albert G* Sandora, op. cit., pp. 591, 
601-602.
!5Mary Teresa Austin Carroll, 0£. cit., p. 10.
!*H0loiae H. Cruzat, loo, cit.
!®R«verend Henry c. Sample (ed.), The Ursulines jn Hew 
Orleans and Our Lady of Prompt S u c c o r A  Reoorî of Two 
5enrurTei7 *lTSPr-TUS& TNe” ttric’,'TUS5 r, p p . T T ^ r r y F T ---
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in their oare. The attorney for the vacant estate demanded 
the return of the mulatress, whereupon the nuns presented 
their bill before releasing the girl. The claim was sustained, 
the debt was ordered paid, and the mlatress was released 
from the Convent.!^ Those instances are sufficient to show 
that with the Ursuline educators there was beginning to be 
put into practice the theory of public support and control.
The establishment of a government school had long 
been earnestly sought by Bienville, end in a communication 
addressed to the French government, June 15, 1742, he gave 
proof that there existed an educational consciousness for a 
higher institution of learning in the colony. However, this 
memorial was disregarded by the French government because it 
felt that a colony of about thirty-five hundred inhabitants 
spread over such an Immense territory was not ready for that 
type of institution.20
With regard to private schools and apprenticeships, 
two of the educational institutions giving tlie most returns 
during the French period, the Company assumed no responsibility 
of support or control, but through its superior Council 
assured those institutions their just rights and protection.
One such case dealt with the breaking of a dontract between 
Madame Hoffman end Sieur Dupare, Madam© Hoffman apprenticed
!^Reeords of the Superior Council of Louisiana (MS., 
Archives of the Louisiana Historical society, Cabildo, Hew 
Orleans), No. 2110, July 29, 1737, pp. 8577-8579.
BOoharles Gayerre, History of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1903) 
I, pp. 521-522.
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a young slave to Sieur Dupare for a stipulated period of time. 
The trade master agreed to teach the boy a trade, and also, 
reading and writing. Madam© Hoffman sued Dupare for a return 
of the boy before the end of the stipulated time because of 
non-fulfillment of the contract.2!
Thus, when the whole of the almost three-fourths 
century of French rule in the Louisiana territory Is considered 
there is evidence of the beginnings of partial support and con­
trol of educational institutions by the public, attempts to 
promote the theory of the right and duty of the public to 
establish educational institutions, and the function of a 
judicial body as an Interpreter for education.
DISVSLOPMSNTS DURING THE SPANISH REGIME
Soon after the passing of Louisiana to Spanish con­
trol in 1762 there seems to have been initiated by the 
government of the mother country a very definite move to 
establish, support, and control a system of schools. The 
King's resolves, as stated in a letter from the Minister of 
the Indies to Governor Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, July 17, 
1771, were: "to establish schools in the Province of Louisiana
in order that the Christian doctrine, elementary education, 
and grammar may be taught, . • .«22 pefinlta and detailed
2!Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, August 9, 
1741.
22])avid K. Bjork (ed. and trans.), "Documents Relating to 
the Establishment of Schools in Louisiana, 1771," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XI (1924-1925), p. 562.
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provisions for control by the government were contained in 
the contract, as Is illustrated by the tenth section, which 
read:
I, Don Manuel Andres Lopez d© Armesto, 
as Director, to whom the other three are to be 
subordinate, shall prescribe for them the method 
and rules for literary exercises and piety; shall 
watch over the progress of the pupils, conduct of 
the teachers, and supply their vacancies in ease of 
sickness or any other unforeseen accident so that 
the movement may maintain the good order of this 
great important work; and my salary and remuneration 
siiell be a thousand pesos yearly paid the same as 
each one of the others mentioned above.**
Not only did the Spanish government thus introduce the practice
of establishing public schools but also it provided definitely
for curriculum control by specifying the subjects to be taught,
emphasizing the teaching and spread of the Spanish language,
and sending a supply of books for the beginning of a library
and other books to be sold to the pupils at cost.2^ %n this
undertaking there was no trace of compulsory education—
rather. Governor Unzaga guarded against any attempts at
forcing parents to patronize the government schools; he sought
attendance through presenting the educational facilities as
a great opportunity made possible by the government.
A further step in control— that is, supervision by 
the Spanish educational director of the colony— was taken in 
1800 by the Governor when in granting a license to Don Luis 
Francisco L© Fort of France he stated;
B^ ibid., p. 566. 
2^Ibid., pp. 561-569.
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The license for which he has petitioned has been 
conceded to him in order to start « public school, 
in this city, with the object to teech the Latin,
English and French languages, and the parts of 
Mathematics and the rest which he stipulates in 
his memorial, for the utility and benefit that 
can result to the public as the Senor Director 
explains in his information, to whom it is 
entrusted to watch over its fulfillment as also 
that a Christian end polite education be given to 
the pupils, as is suitable to them#25
Public support of the schools established under the 
French rule was continued by the Spanish crown, especially 
those directed by the Ursulines. A pension was granted the 
convent "for the support of two of the nuns, probably those 
who taught the free school#"25 Governor Don Estevan Miro’s 
report of 1785 listed seven hundred twenty dollars for the 
support of six nuns and three hundred sixty dollars for the 
care of twelve orphan girls*2?
To the various existing types of educational 
institutions the government, through its Judicial body, the 
Cabildo, gave protection and interpretation in controversies 
arising from time to time. Illustrating this form of service, 
the attorney for the Ursulines forced collection and resumption 
of payment to the convent of a yearly pension which had 
defaulted for twelve years.28 Another case concerned a private
2%enry P. Dart, "Public Education in New Orleans in 1800," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XI (1928), p. 246.
2%other Mary Austin Carroll, "Education in Louisiana in 
French Colonial Days," Essays, Educational and Historic (New 
York, 1899), p. 47.
2?Franpois-Xavier Martin, The History of Loulslana (New 
Orleans, 1882), p. 242.
28spanish Judicial Records of Louisiane (MS., Archives of 
the Louisiana Historical Society, Cabildo, New Orleans), No. 
10711, June 18, 1770, pp. 96994-96997.
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tutor* In 1779 Pedro Flouard filed suit against Francisco 
Knae to collect forty-two pesos and four reales for service 
rendered in teaching his children to read and write, in 
refusing to pay, Ense testified before the Court that Flouard 
failed to remain In his home a full year, a requirement 
stipulated in the contract; the teacher's reply was that he 
could not remain because he was not properly fed. The 
plaintiff's j^tition praying that his bill be ordered paid 
was g r a n t e d . 29 Also, as a means of protection to both the 
master and the youth who was to be trained, apprenticeship 
contracts were placed on record with the judicial body.
v^roa the foregoing educational activities during 
Spanish rule in the territory, it seems that the foundation 
for the establishment of schools by the public was laid, that 
support by the public was increased, that governmental control 
extended itself to include the setting-up of the curriculum, 
the naming of books to be used, and supervision, and that 
the governing body continued to interpret contracts and 
administer justice to those in controversy concerning teaching 
and learning.
EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS WHILE A TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES
When Louisiana became a territory of the United 
States in 1803 its most serviceable educational institutions
29Ibid., No. 3699, May 14, 1779.
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which had survived from the Spanish regime were the ursuline 
Convent, private schools, tutors, and academies. To the 
first of those, in particular, the United States promised 
protection without interference from civil authority*^0 The 
schools established, supported, and controlled by the Spanish 
government seem to have met with little permanent success.2! 
in fact, as a result of the efforts of all types of educa­
tional institutions, not more than half of the inhabitants, 
as shown by a survey made in 1803, were supposed to be able 
to read end write, of whom not more than two hundred, perhaps, 
were able to reed and write legibly.52
The progress of education during the eight years of 
territorial govemment by the United States consisted, not 
mainly in the establishment and support of schools, or in the 
development of policies by Judicial interpretation, but in 
the promulgation of educational theories by the inhabitants 
themselves throu^ their representative bodies. During the 
period it was not variances of opinion which demanded settle­
ment by a court that were of significance— rather, the 
signifioant struggle was within the territorial legislature 
itself where eduoqtlonal policies, many of which were to carry 
over to the state, were being formulated as a product of the 
composite attitudes of the people of the territory.
SÛReverend Henry C. Sample, OB. elt., pp. 59-61.
^^Dunbar Rowland (ed^), Official Letter Books of W. C. Ç. 
Claiborne, 1801-1816 (Mad 16^x7'1917)"f
52American state Papers: pooument®, Legislative and
Executive, of the 'tfongress o ft be UnlTe d~S ta t e s. ~ Mis oellane ous 
(Washington, 18&4), I, p. 355.
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To Governor William C. C. Claiborne, as is revealed 
by his various messages and activities, is due much of the 
oredit of promoting the cause of public education. He 
stressed continuously to the people, especially the territorial 
assemblies, the significance of establishing a system of free 
public schools under the direction of the government. The 
various legislative responses show the gradual development 
of an educational consciousness which led to the acceptance 
of the theory that education is a state function. The first 
step, the passage of "An Act to Institute an University in 
the territory of Orleans," approved April 19, 1805,55 
provided for the establishment and the control, through a 
board of regents, of a college at New Orleans and. a number 
of academies throughout the territory— in substance, it 
authorized an elaborate state system of institutions of 
secondary and college rank. The curriculum, the district, and 
pupil personnel were incorporated in this first act, for the 
board was authorized to establish "within each county of 
this territory, one or more academies for the instruction of 
youth, in the French and English languages, reading, writing, 
grammar, arithmetic, and geography"5^ and "such a number of 
academies in this territory as they may Judge fit, for the 
instruction of the youth of the female sex in the English 
and French languages, and in such branches of polite litera­
ture and such liberal arts and accompliahments as may be
55Act_s Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council 
of the Te^rritory of Orleans, l#i, "An aoT T o instliute~an 
university in iheTerritory of Orleans," ch. xxx.
5%bid., sec. 4.
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suitable to the age and sex of the pupils*
Concerning the policy of support, without which 
there could have been no permanence to establishment or con­
trol, there was much struggling. The act of 1805, which 
placed establishment and control In the hands of the public, 
through its agent, provided that the system be supported by 
lotteries.56 This, however, did not prove satisfactory, and 
8 0 in 1807 the particular section was repealed, but there 
was no provision for other means of support.5?
AS yet the system of public education established 
had not provided for that which the masses needed most—  
namely, elementary education. In 1806 the legislature 
authorized the establishment of elementary schools in the 
various counties,5® but not until 1808 did it provide the 
means of establishment, which was a parish school board whose 
duty was to determine the mode, place, and amount of tuition 
money for the education of youth, in the manner which to them 
should appear most convenient.5® As may be seen, this act
55lbld., sec. 5.
56jbid., sec. 8.
5?Acts Passed at the Second Session of the First legislature 
of tte Territory o f  leans, X8677 ^An Act to repeal 'tn© eigbth 
secfïon of the Act of legislative Council, entitled, 'Ah 
Act to establish an University within the territory of Orleans, 
and for other purposes,'" oh. vli.
5®Acts Passed at the First Session of the First Legislature 
of the Territory oF Orleans. 1806, "An Act to provide for the 
6stebltshment of publie free schools in the several counties 
of the Territory," oh. iv.
59Acts Passed at the First Session of the üocond Legislature 
of the Territory of Orleans,' lëgë. '"An Act to pro^de for the 
means of estabilshihg public schools in the parishes of this 
Territory," ch. vii.
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made no provision for public support by the Territory, 
support having been oared for in the control phase. Even 
that provision for support was weakened in 1609 when there 
was passed an act permitting individuals to decide for themf* 
selves whether or not they wished to pay the tuition fee set 
up by the parish school board*
So uncertain seemed definite provision by the 
people of the Orleans Territory for adequate support of 
public schools that Governor Claiborne besought Congress to 
provide some form of financial aid which would enable the 
Territory to establish seminaries of learning in the various 
counties**!
Finally, in 1611, the legislature accepted the 
responsibility of financing a program of public education by 
providing for the College of New Orleans an initial and an 
annual appropriation. To each of the twelve counties there 
was an appropriation for the establishment and maintenance of 
one or more schools therein, control was further strengthened 
by the placing of the execution of the lew In the power of the 
regents of the University in cooperation with a board of 
administration for each county.
*^Acta Passed at the Second Session of the Second Lcgis- 
latureoF the ÿerrTtory of 3'flean s, iëûUT Act to expie In 
the Act entitled, *"An AcT^to pfbvfde for the means of estab­
lishing public schools in the parishes of this Territory,'" 
ch. XX*
*!charles Oayarré, 0£* cit*, IV, pp. 224-225.
^^Acts Passed at the Second session of the Third Legis­
lature o? the ŸêrrTtory of of leans, iaiT7 "An Act supple 
ffl®ntafy*To an act entltied*, *An Act to institute an univer­
sity in the territory of Orleans,'" oh. xviii.
fid
Thus, it is seen that the Territory of Orleans, through 
Its body politic, was possessed with an educational consciousness 
which led it to provide early for the establishment and control 
of a system of public education, but which permitted it to 
shift and evade the burden of support until 1811, when that 
obligation was acknowledged by the legislature in an act 
appropriating money to aid in the construction and maintenance 
of public educational institutions.
From the foregoing brief survey of the early 
development of the law concerning public education through 
regal orders, interpretation by judicial bodies, and legis­
lative enactment, it may be concluded that in Louisiana 
prior to statehood there were laid the foundations for the
power of the state to establish, to support, and to control
%
a system of free public schools, and there was established 
some law concerning school districts, the teaching and 
learning personnel, and the organization and administration 
of the curriculum.
CHAPTER III
PDBLIC EDUCATION AS 'A STATE EUKCTIOK
CHAPTER III 
PUBLIC EDUCATION AS A STATE FUNCTION
Louisiana's policies of education inherited from 
her territorial periods were primarily products of the Church 
or private institutions, with a specific trend toward govern­
mental interest in the development of secularized education, 
Governor William C. C, Claiborne, who served as the highest 
official during both the territorial and early state periods, 
was an ardent advocate of the theory that, since an educated 
public contributes to the general welfare of a republic, the 
state should provide educational facilities for its youth.
The assumption is made that education in Louisiana 
has been accepted as a state function. The purpose of the 
present chapter is to determine whether the educational pol­
icies as based upon the provisions of the organic law and
established by judicial interpretations have revealed that
Louisiana's theory of education allocates It as a responsi­
bility of the state.
LEGAL IÎÆPLICATIONS
Education as a Reserved Power of the State
The theory of public education as a function of the
state was legally recognized by the Articles of Confederation
31
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two years prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution.
This implication was embodied in the Ordinance of 1787, which 
was the first law providing for a territorial form of govern­
ment. Article III of that compact declared that: "Religion,
morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government 
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education 
shall forever be encouraged." This portion of the document has 
proved a potential factor in Influencing the development of 
legal bases for ublic schools in the various states of the 
Union
The presence of an educational consciousness vdien 
the National Constitution was being formed is evidenced by 
the discussions of leaders, such as Charles 0. Pinckney,
James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris, relative to the possi­
bility of giving Congress educational powers, if such powers
Z
were expedient or necessary.
Since there is no direct mention of education in the 
Federal Constitution, one may reasonably ask by what right the 
state assumes the responsibility of public education.
Through the adoption of the Tenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution in 1791, provisions were made whereby;
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
!Joaklm F. Ueltzin, The Legal Authority of the American 
Public School (Grand ForEs”7 1930), p. 31.
2
Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year 
1698-63 TWa8hin>rton. 1898). II. pp. 1293-1295.
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nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." In interpreting this amend­
ment Chief Justice Morrison R. Wait© said, "The Government of 
the United States is one of delegated powers alone. Its 
authority is defined and limited by the Constitution. All 
powers not granted to it by that instrument are reserved to 
the States or the people."® Since education was not one of 
the delegated powers, it became one of the powers reserved to
■4. ' 5the states solely as a function of the ’overnment* The
underlying theory accepted by legal opinion is that; "'Education
belongs to the state. It is no part of the local self-government,
inherent in the township or municipality except so far as the
Legislature may choose to make it such.'"^ Therefore, the
establishment, support, and control of schools passed "to the
people of the different states to handle, or to neglect, in
7any manner which they saw fit,"
Early Statehood Provisions
When it is considered that Governor Claiborne, a 
staunch advocate of education, and the Honorable Julien
3
United States, Flff. In Err., v .  William Cruiksbank 
et al., (1876) 92 U. S. 551.
4
Earvey G . Voorhees, The Law of the Public School System 
01' the United States (Boston, 1916T, p* 5.
5
Fred Engelhardt, Public School Organization and Adminis­
trât ion (Boston, 1931), p. 563.
^Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public School 
as a State Institution {Bloomington, 192ST7 p. 30.
7
Ellwood P. Cubberley, State School Administration (Boston,
1927), p. 10.
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Poydras, su educational philanthropist, were dominant person­
alities in the Constitutional Convention of 1812, it is difficult 
to explain why public education received no mention in the 
state's first organic law, A partial explanation may be 
attributed to the fact that:
, . . the need for free schools had not as yet been 
brought home to the Convention members who were 
all men of means, representatives of that class 
who were able to employ private tutors for their 
children or patronize private schools of which 
there were quite a number besides those taught by 
the nuns and members of the priesthood. Many 
of the wealthy parents sent their sons to.schools 
in France or to those in northern cities such as 
Philadelphia or Baltimore.®
This silent attitude manifested by the delegates of Louisiana's
first constitutional convention in providing for a system of
free public schools is reflected by similar assemblies throughout
the Nation— of the 23 states that formed the Union in 1820 only
13 made any organic provisions for public education,^ end in
1916 New York's Constitution was still silent on this subject.
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional pro­
visions for education, the legislature proceeded to create 
machinery for the purpose of establishing public schools 
throughout the state« ü  These provisions were expanded by
®Henry S, Chambers, A History of Louisiana (Chicago, 1925),
I, p. 565,
®Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States 
(Boston, 1934), p, 94.
!®Hcrvey C. Voorhees, o^. cit., pp. 5-6,
l^Acts of Louisiana: 1819, "An Act to amend the several laws
enacted on the subject of Public Schools within this state, and 
for other purposes," pp. 52-54; 1820-21, "An Act to extend and 
improve the system of Public Education in the State of Louisiana,"
pp. 62-60.
35
the acts of 182?!^ and 1833,!® Thus, statutory law alone 
furnished the legal bases of public education in Louisiana 
until its Constitution of 1845.
Organic Policies
An Interest in free public schools was reflected in 
a constitutional convention In Louisiana for the first time 
on August 12, 1844. At that date e committee on education 
was appointed to make a survey of the educational status of 
the state and to "report whether any, and if any, what pro­
visions ought to be made by the constitution upon the subject 
of education and the promotion and encouragement of liter­
ature."!* Approximately six months later this committee 
submitted Its recommendations to the Convention. Chairman 
G. Mayo’s lengthy report indicated that the committee assumed 
education to be a function of the state, as may be seen by 
the following:
AS it is through the medium of education 
that the intellectual faculties of man are cultivated, 
and his physical and mental powers regulated and per­
fected, the subject would appear to Justify as much 
attention and care as any other thnt can engage the 
attention of the legislator.
The necessary steps ought first to be taken 
to place within the reach of the mass of the children
Acts of Louisiana, 1827, "An Act to provide for the support 
end administration of parish schools and for other purposes,"
pp. 80-88.
IS
Acts of Louisiana, 1833, "An Act supplementary to the sev­
eral acts relative to Public Education," pp. 141-144.
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throughout the state, such an education as will fit 
them for the higher branches, and In such a manner 
as to place all on an equal footing in the enjoyment 
of the benefits to be derived from the funds of the 
State. This would create a laudable ambition between 
those whose progress and advancement would fit them 
for the higher schools; and thus the higher as well 
as the lower would be supported. The progress of 
the child in the acquisition of a substantial edu­
cation, would emulate the parent; parents would 
encourage each other; and when the spirit of education, 
could be fairly put into operation, it is believed 
that it would here, as it has done in many of the 
States of the United States, and in Prussih end 
Germany, carry with it public opinion, which in this 
country is all that is necessary to sustain any 
measure that promises to be permanently useful.
Any system that may be organized, not 
calculated to enlist the feelings and receive 
the cordial approbation and support of a majority 
of the citizens, cannot be relied upon to effect 
the object desired, viz; that of furnishing to 
the greatest number of the rising generation, upon 
equal terras, the best education that the resources 
of the State, and of its citizens generally, will 
justify.
The cultivation of the mental faculties 
for the promotion of wisdom, morality and virtue, is 
amongst the first duties of a state. The chief 
object of constitutions and laws being to render its 
citizens secure in their lives, liberty and property, 
the importance of a good education to each individual, 
to every community, and to the State, cannot be too 
highly valued. It is certainly of too great value 
to be estimated by any pecuniary consideration.
Where a right direction is given to the 
young and tender mind,>correct principles incul­
cated and impulses given, morality, virtue and 
reason commence their reign, and with the necessary 
culture fit their possessors to bo useful to them­
selves, ornaments to society, and safe-guards to 
the State. The strength of the State aiid the hap­
piness of its people increase with the increase of 
useful knowledge. Without knowing their rights and 
duties men become dangerous to the state, nuisances 
to the community, and burdensome to themselves.
By laying the foundation of a system susceptible of 
being carried into practical operation, and which 
will secure to the rising generation the means by
37
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which they mey be educated.
Section 2 of the report proper proposed to erhod^r in the state's
organic I; w the folXovtingî
The legislature shell encourage the 
institution of common schools throughout the State 
for the promotion of literature and the arts and 
solenoes, and shall prosrid© means for that purpose 
end for their support.
After an interval of slightly more than two months the report
was called from the table# For the section pertaining to
the institution of schools, the following substitute was offered:
"'The legislature shall establish throughout the State a system
of free schools, for the education of all the children of the
people of the State, and shall provide the means for that
17
purpose, and for their support.*" There were some In the 
convention who were opposed to any provisions for public 
education and others who were very reluctant to make It 
mandatory tbmt the legislature should provide for the establish­
ment of fro© public schools, as is indicated by the spirited
discussions between them m  à the advocates of the proposed 
18
section. Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions as 
finally adopted were: "The legislature shell establish free 
Public Schools throughout the State, and shall erovlci® means
Ibid.. pp. 316-318. 
l*Ibld.. p. 310.
^'ibld.. p. 902.
18
Ibid.. pp. 903-007.
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for their support by taxation on property or otherwise#”^®
Bvidently, the delegates chosen to revise the state's 
organ! 0 law in 1858 were satisfied with the constitutional 
sanction of a public school system as provided by the framers 
of the previous document» for they incorporated that feature 
in article 136 of the Constitution of 1858 and added thereto 
a provision for the distribution of the funds previously 
authorised*®^
When the question of circumscribing the state's 
responsibility toward education was being considered by the 
writers of the Constitution of 1864 there were underlying 
currents of conflicting issues growing out of the war for 
Southern independence* Provisions for educational oppor­
tunities for the children of the white and colored races 
presented a difficult problem* In the first report on schools 
made by Alfred G* Hills» chairman of the committee on public 
education» it was proposed: "The General Assembly shall
establish free public schools throughout the state for all 
children * • • but all schools for colored children shall 
be separate and distinct from schools for white children.
This report brought the question of providing public schools 
for colored children to an issue end much time was consumed In
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1646» art# 134*
BOjournal of the Convention to Form a New Constitution 
for the steVe of Louisiana. 168^ p* 067
®^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention 
for the Revriion aiCT^AmenlEFnt^ of this ConaFlTui’ion of 1;lie 
sRte of Louisiana *
39
diseuseions over the extension of the state system to include
gg
colored children* Some even sought to change "shall" to
"may" so that the matter of establishing public schools for
colored children might be left to the discretion of the legis- 
83
lature* Notwithstanding the conflicting opinions concerning 
the state*s acceptance of the responsibility of educating a 
special race, the compromising article as adopted required 
that; "The Legislature shall provide for the education of all 
children of the State, between the ages of six and eighteen 
years, by maintenance of free public schools by taxation or 
otherwise*"®^
Apparently, the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention of 1867-1868 were controlled by radicals who be­
lieved that the children of both races should attend school 
in the same institutions. Soon after the committee on educa­
tion was organized it was Instructed by resolutions and 
ordinances to provide that all the children of the state shall 
"attend school in the same schoolhouses,"®^ that no munici­
pality "shall make any rules or regulations contrary to the 
spirit and intention" of the constitution, end that
22Debates in the Convention for the Révision and Amendment 
of the 6onititutlon of the ^tate of Louisiana. l A R . pp. 13ë'. 
T43“ 76, 483, 50i*
83
Ibid.. p. 161*
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1864, art. 141.
®^Offioial Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention for 
Framing a Constitution for, tj^ State of Louisiana. 1867-1868. 
p. l i *
2*ibia.
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educational opportunities be offered to all children without
S7
regard to race or color. Even the committee itself was
S0
divided over these controversial issues# Further evidence 
of a strong sentiment in the convention to make ample pro­
visions for the colored children was indicated in a pro­
posed resolution which directed the legislature to establish 
at least six public schools in every parish for all children
between six and twenty-one years of age without distinction
89
as to race or color. These conflicting opinions were
30
perplexing problems throughout the convention. Not­
withstanding the several attempts of a conservative group 
to provide for the establishment of separate schools for the 
two races, the staters function with respect to education 
was specified as follows:
The General Assembly shall establish 
at least one free public school in every parish 
throughout the State, and shall provide for its 
support by taxation or otherwise. All children of 
this State, between the ages of six (6) and 
twenty-one (2l) shall be admitted to the public 
schools or other instituions of learning sustained 
or established by the State, in conmion, without 
distinction of race, color or previous condition.
There shall be no separate schools or institutions 
of learning established exclusively for any race 
by the State of Louisiana#
No municipal corporation shall make any 
rules or regulations contrary to the spirit and 
intention of article one hundred and thirty-five 
(135).31
p. 45. 
p. 60. 
p. 154.
®°rbld., pp. 94, 107, 200-202.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1868, arts. 135-136
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The delegates in the Constitutional Convention of 
1879 found that the power of the state to establish public 
schools was no longer an issue. Since the two previous conven­
tions reflected the views held by radical reoonstruotionists, 
vdio were determined to establish a unitary system of public 
schools, regardless of race or color, It is difficult to 
understand «diy this convention, which was dominated by 
Louisiana Democrats, assumed such a tolerant attitude toward 
the children of different races. Superintendent Thomas E. 
Harris says that it might have been because of anticipated 
interference from Congress.&& The proposal of a new phase 
of the state's ftinction demanded attention at this time— it 
was the inclusion of high schools as a part of the approved 
s y s t e m . 55 Herein, the advocates were attempting merely to 
be consistent with the established policy of the famous 
Kalamazoo case.54 Excerpts from the report advocating the 
public high school reveal some of the grounds of support of 
the new move to be;
It is true, that but a comparatively 
small number of children attend the high schools 
of our cities and towns, but wherever well managed, 
their uplighting, infiniting influence is felt in 
every school of lower grade and. by every pupil.
The high school is the sun that gives light and
5®Thomas E. Harris, The Storv of Public Education in 
Louisiana (New Orleans, 1924), p. 52.
55offiolal Journal of the Proceeding# of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Louisiana. 1879. p. 168.
5^harles E. Stuart and others v. School District No. 1 of
the Village of Kalamazoo and others, (1874) 30 Mich. 69.
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Apparently, the majority of the framers of the constitution 
considered the implication of organic sanction sufficient to 
legalize the high school, as is indicated by the provisions;
There shall be free public schools es­
tablished by the General Assembly throughout the 
State for the education of all the children of the 
State between the ages of six and eighteen years; 
and the General Assembly shall provide for their 
establishment, maintenance and support by taxation 
or otherwise. And all moneys so raised, except 
the poll tax, shall be distributed to each parish 
in proportion to the number of children between 
the ages of six and eighteen years.
The establishment of public schools wüs not an issue
in the Convention of 1896, for it was practically unanimous
that there should be provision for "free public schools for
37
the white and colored races” in separate institutions. A
new feature was given legal recognition when the system was
extended downward to include kindergarten children from four
38
to six years of age. Further evidence that education is a 
function of the state was the provision; "The General Assembly 
shall not pass any local or special law . . .  Regulating the 
management of public schools, the building or repairing of
39sohoolhouses, and the raising of money for such rurposes."
The Constitutional Convention of 1913 was called on 
the condition that only certain phases of the previous consti­
tution would be considered. Public Education was one of the 
subjects which were to remain intact, as may be seen by the
56
Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art, 224.
37
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State ofTouistana. 1698, p. 290.
58
Constitution of Louisiana, 1098, art, 248. 
art. 48.
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president'a statement to the convention: "You are not to
change existing laws relating to , . , the educational system 
of the State; . • ."40
The framers of the Constitution of 19SI were in 
accord with the policies adopted by previous constitutional 
conventions, for they made no essential changes in the organic 
law pertaining to the establishment of free public schools. 
This harmonious attitude indicates that the state's power and 
duty to establish a system of free public schools had been an 
accepted policy for many years. Organic sanction was given 
to secondary education as a part of the public school system, 
which phase had formerly been implied through the offering of 
educational opportunities to all adolescent youth. This 
recognition was expressed in the following terms: "The ele­
mentary and secondary schools and the higher educational 
institutions shall be so coordinated as to lead to the stand­
ard of higher education established by the Louisiana State 
University and Agricultural and Mechanical C o l l e g e . " 4 2
Thus, it may be seen that according to the Federal 
Constitution, education was one of the undelegated powers, 
which were reserved by the states to be exercised at their 
discretion. That the populace of Louisiana was conscious of 
the state’s responsibilities to provide education for its
40offioial Journal and Calendar of the Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention of the State of louiaïana. 1?T5,
p p .  1 1 - 1 2 .
4^Con8titution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12.
4 % b i d . ,  sec. 2.
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youth i® evldmioed by the fact that her legislature, f cting 
on Its established rights, made provisions for free public 
schools before her organic laws authorized them* However, 
since 1845 the state's constitution® have made it mandatory 
that a system or free public schools be established throughout 
the state. Sot only has this policy been upheld, but also 
the system has been expanded to include children of color, the 
kindergarten, and the secondary school*
. JUDICIAL INTEWiCTATims
Public Schools as State Institutions
General bases. It has been stated that in an effort
to define the function of public schools in organized society:
• . # the courts have been forced by necessity to 
formulate a theory of education based upon what 
they deem to be fundesœntal principles of public 
policy* In legal theory the public school is a 
state institution* * , * The function of the 
public school, in legal theory at least, Is not 
to confer benefits uvon the individual aa such; 
the school exists as a st^te institution because 
the very existence of civil society denands it*43
"The doctrine that education Is a function of the state la well
44
established in American law,"
One theory for the establishment of 0 public school 
system as a function of government is that It is not the child
43
Newton Edwards, The, Ootprte and the Public Schools (Chicago, 
1933), p* 1.
44
Ira M, Allen, The Teacher's Contractual Statua (New York,
1928), p. 4.
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which is the direct beneficiary of its service, but that the
system "was brought into being in order to promote the general 
45welfare." Numerous opinions to this effect have been found, 
for example: "'The primary purpose of the maintenance of the
common school system is the promotion of the general intelli­
gence of the people constituting the body politic and thereby
to increase the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens,
46
upon which the government of society depends.'"
The theory of public education in Louisiana is 
expressed by its State Department of Education as follows;
For more then one hundred years public 
education has been recognized as one of the most 
important functions of the State Government. It 
is the keystone of the arch upon which rests the 
superstructure of our democracy. The framers of 
our Federal Constitution left the responsibility 
for public education to the States. Whether this 
was wise or unwise, the fact remains that each 
State has met this responsibility in its own way 
by setting up a school system and providing funds 
for its support. The theory underlying public 
instruction as a state function has its basis in 
the fact that the maintenance and perpetuation of 
our democratic Institutions necessarily rests upon 
an educated citizenship. If this theory is sound—  
and we all accept it— then, the success of our 
Government and the continuance of our social insti­
tutions depend upon the efficiency end success of 
the public school system. It is the foundation of 
our future generations. We must train our youth, 
through these public institutions, i n  the hope 
and belief that such training wijl fit them for the 
responsibilities of citizenship.*
^^Hermann fi. Sohroeder, op. cit.. p. 23,
* ® I b l d . ,  p .  2 4 .
State Department of Education of Louisiana. Eighty-fourth 
AnnueT"tteport, for the Session 1932-33 ( Éaton RouRe. 1933 ). p . 31
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In the same ooaneotion, one of the state’s supreme court 
Justices has said:
Education is one of the functions of government; 
and the public school system is a department of 
the governmsnt. Education insures domestic tran­
quility, provides for the common defense, promotes 
the general welfare, and it secures the blessings 
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. The 
State of Louisiana from the earliest time has 
made provision for the support of education, begin- 
ning^gith the Constitution of 1845, arts# 135 and
In 1931 the supreme court handed down a decision^® 
in which it was necessary to define the status of public edu­
cation, In the language of the court, it was stated;
. . .  it may be observed that the public school 
system of the state is a state institution# This 
is obvious from Section 1 of Article IS of the 
Constitution which provides that; "The educational 
system of the state shall consist of all free pub­
lic schools, and all institutions of learning 
supported in whole or in part by appropriation of 
public funds#""®
This ruling upheld former decisions in maintaining that edu­
cation is a function of the state.
Land grants to the state# The granting of school 
lands by the Federal Government to the various states further 
establishes that education is a state function. In this 
connection, the supreme court of Louisiana has said:
^®Herold et al# v. Parish Board of School Directors et al#, 
(1915) 136 La. 1042-1043.
49state ex rel# Wimberly v# Barham et al# State ex rel. 
Gray v. pipes et al, state ex rel# white v. Mason et al, 
(1931) 173 La. 488, 137 So, 862#
SOlbid., 173 La. 494,
®^The State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public schools 
of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La, Ann# 92,
7 So. 674,
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The sixteenth section of every town­
ship of the public lards of the United States have, 
from the adoption of the Constitution, been reserved 
from rublic sales, for the maintenance of public 
schools in the township; and this reservation has , 
always been considered a grant to the State in which 
it lies, on the admission of the State into the 
Union# It must amount to a grant; because Congress 
have no power under the Constitution, to administer 
property for the purposes of education, within the 
limits of a sovereign State; . # #52
School tax as _a state tax# Another indication that 
education is a state funot'on is the school law pertaining to 
taxation# "Many citizens, including Ejany school officers, seem 
to have difficulty in grasping the idea that school taxes are 
state taxes, even where they are levied locally, hot so with 
the courts# They do not lose sight of the fact that taxes
levied for school purposes are levied in support of a State
53school system#” In 1896 Louisiana made provisions for parish,
municipal, and public board taxes for ell purposes whatsoever
54
not to exceed ten mills yearly# %ien a railroad company
refused to pay such tax under its exei pticn rights from ordl-
55
nary taxes, its claim was upheld by the court# The status
of a tax so levied was established ss follows;
Indeed, the fact that the tax is in aid of 
the rublic schools shows conclusively thet it is a 
mere ordinary tax# How could a tax In aid of the 
public schools be a special assessment when the 
maintenance of the public schools is one of the 
most ordinary of the ordinary chorees of our rovem- 
ment, and, by the > ost elenentary principles,
52Robert 'î-rl^nd et al. v, Thomas M. Jackson et al., (1852) 
7 La, Ann. ?8#
53Hermann H. Gohroeder, o£. cit.. p# 58#
54
Constitution of Louisiana, 1888, art. 832#
55Louisiana &, N. W# R, R. Co# v# State Board of Appraisers 
(Board of School Directors of Parish of Natchitoches et al#, 
Interveners), (1908) 120 La# 471, 45 So. 394#
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our government must have recourse to ordinary taxa­
tion for meeting its ordinary charges, and cannot 
have recourse to special assessment, and if, as 
is well settled in our jurisprudence, the limi­
tations of the Constitution upon taxation do not 
apply to special assessments, the situation would 
he that for meeting its ordinary charges our 
government could levy unlimited taxes simply by 
pretending that they were special assessments# If 
the present tax were a special assessment, the 
situation would be that, notwithstanding the 
limitation placed upon taxation in the Constitution, 
the Legislature could authorize the parishes to 
levy unlimited taxes in aid of the public schools*
No one would pretend that the Legislature could do 
anything of the kind*^®
The construction and maintenance of public schools 
are ordinary charges of the government which must be sup­
ported by ordinary or general taxation and not relegated to
any special assessment upon any particular class of tax- 
57
payers#
Thus, in various decisions which have designated the 
support of public schools as one of the ordinary charges of 
the state, it has been definitely implied that public 
education is a function of the state*
Municipal and parish power indicative of state
function# The state legislature's power relative to the
jurisdiction of parishes and municipalities in the support
of public schools is a further indication that education is
a function of the state# It has been explained that:
• • • when a municipal body, or a county, or a 
school district, levies taxes for school purposes, 
the tax so levied is a State and not a municipal,
120 La. 473.
57
Guaranty Bank k  Trust Co# v# Ward Lumber Co., (1926) 
161 La# 803, 109 So# 496#
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county or di strict tax, although it be levied end 
collected by municipal or county or district 
officers* The feet that a tax is levied and collected 
for the state by these agencies of the state 
appointed for that purpose does not deprive it of
its character as a state tax."®
This teat was made when the board of directors of the public
schools of New Orleans attempted to have enforced a leg-
go
islative act which purposed to compel the city to make 
certain appropriations for the s c h o o l s , i t  was pointed out 
that the legislature was required to provide for the support 
of the system of schools^! and to authorize parishes to levy 
taxes within certain limits for assistance in that respect.
In furtherance of that provision, parochial authorities were 
empowered to raise such tax at their d i s c r e t i o n , I n  the
same statute, provision was made for the city of New Orleans,
which is also the parish of Orleans, to appropriate from the 
revenue derived from her constitutional tax levy an amount 
sufficient, according to her discretion, for school purposes, 
but later in the section the exercise of that power was 
circumscribed by the designation of a minimum l i m i t * T h e  
city, acting according to the authority of its charter
®%eimann H# Sohroeder, o£* oit*, p. 59,
®^Acts of Louisiana, 1868, No* 81, sec* 71.
^The State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public Schools of 
New Orleans v* City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La* Ann* 92, 9 
So. 674*
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 224,
^^IblA., art.*229.
^^Acts of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 54.
^^Ibid*, sec. 71.
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end under the assumption that the amount it should budget to 
public education was discretionary, allocated an amount not 
in keeping,with the statutory direction. It was held that 
the city was acting within its constitutional rights and that 
the legislative enactment defining such limits was uncon­
stitutional, for "if by the terms of the Constitution, or by 
fair implication from them, it appears that the Legislature 
can not compel the city to make any appropriation for school 
purposes, It irrestibly follows that the Legislature is 
not permitted to do so, either by special or general legis­
lation, or by an amendment of the charter,
In support of this decision reference was made to 
a former case involving the same question of discretionary 
power with respect to the levying of a school tax in the 
parishes. There It had been held that legislation upon ed­
ucation must have constitutional authority, because public 
education is a responsibility of the state.
Definitely the court, in the case at bar, held that 
education is a state function when it said: "The system of 
public education in Louisiana is a State Institution, and as 
such, is placed under the control and protection of the state 
by the very terms of the Constitution."®^
®®The state ex rel. Board of Directors of Public Schools
of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La. Ann. 100.
®®State ex rel. Parish Board of School Directors v. Police 
Jury, (1888) 40 La. Ann. 755, 6 So. 25.
®?The State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public schools of
New Orleans v. City of Hew Orleans, (1890) 42 Le. Ann, 100.
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The amiulment of &n ordinance of one of the city
corporations which purposed to provide for the creation and
68
maintenance of a high school again established that public 
education is a responsibility, not of the municipality, but 
of the state* This privilege of providing for a school was 
not authorized in the city's charter but was attempted to be 
executed under the provision of the general welfare clause.
In keeping with its policy of decrees on this subject, the 
court maintained that the controlling act which permitted a 
city corporation to revise its charter did not authorize the 
incorporation of the power to levy a tax for the maintenance 
of a high school when that power had not been rranted origi­
nally in its charter. With reference to the allocation of 
powers pertaining to education Justice Samuel D. Mclnery saidi
Public education is declared by the Constitution 
to be an affair of the State, and it assumes the 
whole responsibility of public education.
The subject of educ&tion is an important matter, 
and it is so treated by the State, as it seems to 
be jealous of the exercise of the power by sub­
ordinate political corporations, as it has not. 
granted local self-taxation for this purpose*
School officers as state officials. The officers 
of the public schools "are state officers. Consequently, they 
may be selected in any manner that the legislature may
dO
A, T. Nelson et als. v. Mayor and Selectmen of the Tcv: 
of Homer, (1896) 48 La. Ann. 258, 19 So. 271.
go
Ibid.. 48 La. Ann. 259-260.
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determine* They may be eXeoted by the people, be appointed 
by the courte, or be selected by any other agencies which 
policy may dictate#*?® "And even though such officers are 
locally elected, they are the agents of the state, not of the 
locality#
Judicial decisions in Louisiana have upheld the theory 
that since education is a state institution,?^ its officers, 
whose duties concern the entire state or the general public in 
a limited territory, are state officers.?& For example, it 
has long been an established policy to consider the boards of 
school directors an important feature in the system of public 
education established by the state, and to expect them to serve 
as official agents of the state in the administration of that 
system.?^ The state superintendent of public education as an 
officer of the state not only is assured legal advice in 
matters pertaining to his official duties, but has no authority 
to appear in court except through the attorney general or 
district attorney of his vicinity#?® In a case, which
? ^Newton Edwards, 0£. oit.. p. 7#
^^enaann H. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 55*
?^he State ex rel. Board of Directors of Public schools of 
New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La* Ann. 92,
7 SO. 674.
?®State ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel.
Gray v. pipes et al. State ex rel. white v. Mason et al. (1931) 
173 La. 486, 137 So. 868.
?^The School Board of Union Parish v. J# E. Trimble, (1881)
33 La. Ann. 1073.
?®Edwin H. Fay, Superintendent of Public Education v. Allen 
Jumel, Auditor, and E. A# Burke, Treasurer, (1883) 35 La. Ann. 
368.
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sought to determine the official status of the perish super­
intendent, the appellants’ presentation of the theory 
that the "’educational system of a state is one of the most 
vital instruments of ita sovereignty’"?? was endorsed, and 
It wee held that the perish superintendent "is an officer of 
the greatest importance to the educational Interests of this 
state.
High school support by taxation legalized. Twenty-
eight years after the famous Kalamazoo c s b o, which first
legalized the support of high schools by taxation, the supreme
court of Louisiana was called upon to detormina the legal
status of the high school in rolatlon to the public Gohool
system. The right to establish and support the high school
as an integral feature of the system was questioned in the
Andrus case,?® where taxpayers objected to the use of a
portion of the school fund for h l ^  schools, oleiming that
all of it should be u&ed for the support of the elementary
schools. In the court’s answer the right to establish and
support high schools and their existence as a part of the
state system of public education were maintained û b follows;
The "high school" is well known in the public 
school system of this state, and in the legislation 
and literature concerning that system as an insti­
tution in which scholars from the various common
?®stete ex rel. Smith et el. v, Theus, District Attorney,
(1905) 114 La. 1097, 38 Bo. 870.
^^Ibld., X U  Lb . 1103,
?8ibld.
Andrus St al. y . Board of Directors of Parish of St,
Landry, (1902) 108 La, 386, 32 So. 420.
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sohools complete their public aohool education; 
and, if no other language had been used, the 
authority conferred upon the parish boards to 
establish "high schools" would suggest the idea 
of schools having a sphere of usefulness dif­
ferent from, if not wider than, that of the 
common schools of a single district* The 
language of the law is, however, "central, or 
high, schools," thus making "high schools" and 
"central schools" synonymous terms, and leaving 
no room for reasonable doubt that It was the
intention to authorize the parish boards to
establish not only such district schools as they 
might see proper, but with the concurrence of the 
state board, and upon the conditions specified, 
to establish central schools for higher education, 
to which the district schools may serve as feeders*
And the authority to establish such schools, 
considered in connection with the general power 
and discretion vested In the school boards, carries 
with it the authority to maintain them from the 
general school fund*®®
Junior colleges an extension of secondary education*
That Louisiana has legalized as a part of her state system
the upward extension of secondary education in the form of the 
Junior college is evidenced by statutory law,®^ legal opinion, 
and decisions of the supreme court* In the McHenry case®® 
the school board of Ouachita Parish had proceeded to establish 
a Junior college district for the purpose of submitting to 
the qualified electors therein the question of levying a 
tax for the construction and maintenance of a Junior college 
at Monroe* Promulgation had been declared in favor of the 
tax. To prevent the school board from executing the levy
®®Ibid., 108 La. 592-595.
®^Acts of Louisiana, 1928, No, 173.
®^Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1928, io Aprri"3oTT93?—  4 9g:------------------
®®McHenry et al. v. Ouachita Parish School Board, (1929) 
169 La. 646, 125 So. 841.
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their action was attacked on grounds of unoonstitutionality 
of the controlling act*
The supreme court ruled in favor of the defendants, 
the parish hoard, in reversal of the district court decision* 
This opinion on a new phase of the state school system es­
tablished several bases of the policy that the state's responsi­
bility for public education may extend to include the junior 
college.
The constitution made mandatory the proper co­
ordination of the public schools so as to lead to the
84
standards of higher education but left to the legislature 
the method of effecting this. The response of that body 
was Act. No. 173 of 1928 which provided for the establishment 
of junior colleges In parish-wide districts under the 
governing authority of the parish school board. Such 
junior colleges are differentiated from the higher Institutions 
of learning, as they "have no legal existence or status what­
ever, except in connection with £ state high school, are purely 
local institutions, are maintained by local taxation, and
are created for the sole nurpose of supplementing the course
85
of studies prescribed in the high schools of the state."
Further, the court established the status of the junior
college in relation to the high school;
"Junior Colleges" are mere super-high 
schools, and not institutions of higher learning
®^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec* 2.
85
McHenry et al. v, Ouachita Parish School Board, (1929) 
169 La. 655.
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of the state# For these reasons, a special tax 
may be levied under Act No# 173 of 1928 for the 
construction and maintenance of a "Junior College" 
as validly as for the construction and maintenance 
of a schoolhouse for any state public high school*®®
In the decree the constitutionality of the act
creating parish Junior colleges was upheld; thereby their 
existence as a part of the state public school system was 
legally recognized,
public schools as continuous institutions. When 
a parish school board ordered by resolution that certain 
schools be closed for a year, this being their discretionary 
method of changing to e fiscal year basis in accordance with 
recent enacted legislation, they were met with the judicial 
demand to open the schools in question and the decree that 
public schools are continuous Institutions*®? In dealing 
with the question of the closing of the schools the court 
established some of its policies in relation to the schools 
as follows:
we are dealing here with new and ex­
perimental legislation, public education is 
a state institution, fostered by the state, and 
for which the state is required by the consti­
tution to provide*
We cannot assume that legislation, 
impossible in its enforcement, without disaster 
to the public school system of the state, has 
been adopted. Laws are presumed to be constructive
®®Ibid., pp. 658-659*
®^State ex rel. Day et al. v. Rapides Parish School 
Board, (1925) 158 La* 251, 103 So. 757.
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and not destructive, when relating to the insti­
tutions, which it is the duty of the state to 
protect*
It is therefore clear that neither the 
state hoard of education nor the state Législature 
Intended any sudden and drastic action by parish 
school boards that might eventuate in the closing 
of the public schools for an entire year, prior 
to July 1, 1928, as the result of the enforcement 
of the provisions of the act of 1922,®®
Herein the court held that the public schools are 
not only a function of the state government, but also that 
their operation must be continuous by sessions, although 
their closing for a year seemed a practical way of assuring 
a sound financial basis.
SUMMARY
The theory that education is a function of the 
state is reflected both by legal implications and judicial 
interpretations.
Legal Implications
The legal implications which seem to show that 
education is a function of the state are principally the 
following:
1, The Ordinance of 1787 recognized the state 
as the governing authority of public education.
®®Ibld., 188 La. 284-285.
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£• In the Federal Constitution education was one 
of the undelegated powers and was thereby reserved as a state 
function.
3. It is obvious that Louisiana's populace was 
cognizant of the state's educational responsibilities, for 
the legislature, acting on its prerogatives, provided for 
public schools long before the organic law made this action 
mandatory •
4. Since 1845 the constitutions of the state have 
embodied the underlying principles of public education and 
have required the legislature to provide for a system of 
free public schools throughout the state.
5. The framers of the constitutions during the 
period of Reconstruction emphasized the establishment of 
educational facilities for all children of school age without 
regard to race or color.
6. Since the Constitution of 1879 educational 
provisions have been made for all children of school age 
with a separation of the white and colored races.
Judicial Interpretations
On the theory that the welfare of a democratic 
society depends on an educated populace, the state declares 
through Judicial interpretations the following;
1. The primary purpose of the public school is to 
promote the general intelligence of the people and thereby 
increase the efficiency of the state's citizenry.
ÔO
2# The public schools are state institutions, since
education is a function of the government•
3. The granting of school lands to the state by the
Federal Government further establishes that education is a 
responsibility of the state.
4. Taxes for the support of public education, 
whether levied by a municipality, a district, a parish, or 
the state, are classified as ordinary taxes.
5. Since education is a public function, ail school 
officers are agents of the state.
6. The right to establish and support high schools
as a part of the state system of public education is recog­
nized.
7. Recently the junior college has been considered 
as an extension of secondary education and, therefore, in­
cluded in the free public aohool system.
8. Public schools are continuous institutions by 
sessions and the officials are not permitted to interfere 
with this continuity.
CHAPTER 17
FDBLZC SCHOOL SOFFOHT THROUGH LARD GRANTS
CHAPTER K
PDBLIO SCHOOL SUPPORT THROUCB LAND GRANTS
The legal basla of public aohool finance Is estab­
lished on the theory that education for a democracy le 
indispensable.^ If education Is a function of the state—  
and It has been reasonably shown that the state has the 
power to establish free public schools throughout its 
doalnlon— It logically follows that the state has power to 
provide for its support. "Where the power to do any given 
thing Is granted by the law, the means whereby this power 
may be exercised is likewise granted*"® The avenues through 
which Louisiana supports her public schools have been divided 
— for treatment by chapters in this study— into three groups: 
land grants, general funds, and special funds. In presenting 
each group the purpose is to show the legal basis of public 
school suppprt as revealed by judicial interpretations of the 
organic and statutory laws pertaining to that particular 
source* In dealing with such legal aspects, an attempt is
^Arthur B, Moehlman, Public School finance (Chicago, 
1927), p. 6.
Estate of louisiana ex rel, Warren Easton v. Treasurer 
of Board of School Directors of New Orleans, (1906) 3 Orl, 
App* 391.
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made to bring out pertinent Issues and dominant policies 
which the state has pursued in the financing of her free pub­
lic schools* The present chapter treats the first phase—  
that is, support of the public schools through land grants.
SCHOOL LANDS AND THEIR PROCEEDS
Development as Source of Revenue
The principle of Federal aid for the support of 
public schools antedates the period of statehood. The court 
has explained the origin of this support as follows:
"The practice of setting apart section 
No. 16 of every township of public lands for the 
maintenance of public schools is traceable to the 
oardlnance of 1765, being the first enactment for 
the disposal by sale of the public lands in the 
western territory. The appropriation of public 
lands for that object became a fundamental princi­
ple by the ordinance of 1787, which settled terms 
of compact between the people and states of the 
northwestern territory, and the original states, 
unalterable except by consent• One of the articles 
affirmed that 'religion, morality, and knowledge, 
being necessary for good government and the happi­
ness of mankind,' and ordained that 'schools, as a 
means of education, should be forever encouraged,*”®
The Constitution of the United States gives Con­
gress the power to sell or otherwise dispose of her public 
lands. Relative to the exercise of this power with Louisiana 
lands the court has said:
3
Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of 
Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La, 32,
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Shortly after the cession of Louisiana to the 
United States, by the eleventh section of an act 
of Congress, approved the Slst of April, 1806, 
the President of the United States was authorized 
to offer for sale, such of the public lands lying 
in the Western District of the Territory of Orleans, 
as were surveyed, with the exception of sections 
sixteen, «diioh, in the language of the act, "shall 
be reserved, in each township for the support of 
schools within the same."^
Thus, since 1806, the sixteenth sections in Louisiana have
been set apart for public school support.
The principles underlying the designation and as­
signment of sixteenth sections have been legally interpreted 
as follows:
"Until the survey of the township and the 
designation of the specific section, the right of 
the state rests in eompaot-^binding, it is true, 
the public fai^, end dependent for execution upon 
the political authorities# Oourts of justice have 
no authority to mark out and define the land # # . 
subject to the grant# But when the political 
authorities have performed this duty, the compact 
has an object, upon sdiidi it can attach, and if 
there is no legal impediment the title of the 
state becomes a legal title# . # #" Cooper v,
Roberts, 18 How. 179, 15 L. Ed. 338.
A survey made by the government must be 
held conclusive against any collateral attack in 
controversies between individuals. After a survey 
of the township has been made by the proper United 
States authorities, and section 16 of a named town­
ship has been made and placed, the said section 
becomes the property of the state for school pur­
poses from the date of such survey.^
Robert Garland et al# v. Thomas M. Jackson et al., (1852) 
7 La. Ann. 66.
®Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Orleans 
V# New Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La. 33.
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Some of the early steps taken by the state to 
realize results from its lands reserved for school support 
were legislative resolutions to Congress emphasizing the 
necessity of making the school lands available for purposes 
of support,& and urging additional grants’^ and special pro­
visions® to meet the particular needs of louisiana, as 
expressed in one of the resolutions:
Whereas on account of the peculiar topog­
raphy of the State of Louisiana, the sixteenth 
section assigned in every township for the use of 
public schools is so often located on marshes and 
other lands of no value that about one-fifth of 
the lands appropriated for primary instruction, are 
to be considered as entirely worthless; and whereas, 
in oonseqpence of other townships being completely 
covered by private claims, it is estimated that 
about thirty-eight th cue and acres more are lost to 
the state, for want of public lands to apply to 
school purposes: therefore,
Be it resolved by the Senate and House 
of Représentât^ es of tne S^ate of Loul si ana 7 In 
general assemtiy^conveneT. that our senators anî 
représentâtIves in congress be and are hereby 
requested to obtain from congress the passage of 
a law giving to this state, in all oases where 
the sixteenth section in any township is composed 
of worthless land, or where that section or any 
part thereof is covered by previous valid title, 
the right of selecting and entering, for the 
benefit of primary schools, the seme quantity of 
public land, to be located in the same township, 
or, in default of good land therein, in such ad­
jacent townships as may furnish lands not yet 
appropriated, and of more value.
Be it further resolved. &c., That our 
senators anH representatives are moreover requested 
to unite their best exertions to obtain a law from
®Aota of loul8iana, 1820-gl, "A Resolution," pp. 130-132. 
^Ibid., 1835, "Resolution,” pp. 5-6.
8'Ibid.: 1839, Resolution No. 11; 1845, No. 54,
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congress giving the general assembly of this state 
power and authority to rent, lease or sell as may 
be deemed expedient or necessary, the sixteenth 
sections of school lands situated therein.9
By Congressional enactment in 184310 Louisiana's 
legislature was authorized to provide for obtaining revenue 
from the school lands through sales thereof. In 1845 the 
state's constitution provided for the development and pro­
tection of this means of school support:
The proceeds of all lands heretofore 
granted by the United States to this State for 
the use or support of schools, and of all lands 
which may hereafter be granted or bequeathed to 
the State, and not expressly granted or bequeathed 
for any other purpose, which hereafter may be dis­
posed of by the State, • • • shall be held by the 
State as a loan, and shall be and remain a per­
petual fund, on which the State shall pay an 
annual Interest of six per cent; which interest 
together with all the rents of the unsold lands, 
shall be appropriated to the support of such 
schools, anà this appropriation shall remain 
inviolable.il
Since the state acquired complete title to all 
school land grants through the final approval in 1873 of the 
official surveys, it has been held that the legislature from 
that date was free to provide for the administration of the 
school lands as it saw fit.12
°Ibld.. 1841-42, No. 48.
^^Acts of Congress, 1842-43, "An Act to authorize the 
Legislatures of the States of Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
and Tennessee, to sell the lands heretofore appropriated for 
the use of schools in those States," oh. xxxiii.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art. 135.
^ ^ y e r  ▼. State, (1986) 168 La. 146, 121 So. 604.
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Constitutional provisions pertaining to the six­
teenth sections remained unchanged from 1845 to 1879. It 
is reasonable to assume that much of the school land was 
disposed of during this interval of thirty-four years.
That practically all proceeds from the sales of such lands 
were lost during the War for Southern Independence and Re­
construction is common knowledge.1^ Evidence for this 
assumption is added by the provisions of the Constitution 
of 1879 to the effect that:
The debt due by the State to the free 
school fund is hereby declared to be the sum of 
one million one hundred and thirty thousand eight 
hundred and sixty-seven dollars and fifty-one 
cents in principal, and shall be placed on the books 
of the Auditor and Treasurer to the credit of the 
several townships entitled to the same; the said 
principal being the proceeds of the sales of lands 
heretofore granted by the United States for the 
use and support of free public schools, which amount 
shall be held by the State as a loan and shall be 
and remain a perpetual fund, on which the State 
shall pay an annual interest of 4 per cent from 
the first day of January, 1880, and that said 
interest shall be paid to the several townships 
in the State entitled to the same, in accordance 
with the act of Congress, Ho. 68, approved February 
15, 1843, and the bonds of the State heretofore 
issued, belonging to said fund and sold under act 
of the General Assembly Ho. 81, of 1872, are here­
by declared null and void, and the General Assembly 
shall make no provision for their payment, and may 
cause t h ^  to be destroyed.14
Further provisions for securing permanency to this 
source of revenue were made by the Constitutional Convention 
of 1921:
^®Thomas H. Harris, The S'torv of Public Education in 
Louisiana (Mew Orleans, 1924T, p. 49.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 253.
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Where sixteenth sections or indemnity 
lands granted by Congress for public school purposes, 
have been erroneously sold by the State, or paid by 
the State as fees for services rendered, such 
deficiencies shall be properly adjusted, and the 
fund, so derived, shall be credited to the several 
townships and be treated as a loan to the State on 
which it shall pay four per cent per annum Interest, 
The Legislature shall enact all necessary laws to 
carry this section into effect.
The debt due by the State to the free 
school fund arising from the sale of lands granted 
by Congress for school purposes shall remain a 
perpetual loan to the State on which it shall pay 
to the several townships four per cent (4^) per 
annum interest.I®
Disposition of School Lands
In 1843 Congress authorized the Louisiana legislature 
to provide for the sale of the sixteenth section lands and 
the conveyance of a fee simple title to the purchasers*^®
% e  legislature made the first provisions therefor by Act 
No, 321 of 1855 in which the manner of sale and the dis­
position of the proceeds were prescribed. For the 
inhabitants of the township wherein the section is located 
the state became the trustee, both of the lands and of the 
proceeds from their sale, and in transactions the state or 
its legalized representative is charged with the disposition.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art, 12, secs* 18-19,
^^Aots of Congress, 1842-43, "An Act to authorize the 
Legislatures of the States of Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, 
and Tennessee, to sell the lands heretofore appropriated for 
the use of schools in those States," oh, xxxiii, sec, 1,
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State am trustee. The trusteeship of the state was 
recognized by the Congressional Act of 1843 to the extent that 
the legislature warn authorised to provide for the sale of the 
lands reserved to the aohools and for the Investment of the 
money arising from such sales in some productive fund, of 
which the proceeds were to he forever applied to the use and 
support of the schools, under the provision that no sale was 
to he made without the consent of the inhabitants of the town­
ship in question* Although Inconsistency of assumptions is 
indicated when Congress gave a qualified permission to sell 
sixteenth sections after the lands had ceased to belong to 
the United States, this gift of the school lands to the state 
has been held a b s o l u t e * % e  state had the power to sell 
the lands without the consent of Congress. Ho attack on the 
validity of a sale can be sustained if the basis of complaint 
is only that the sale was not made in the manner prescribed 
by the Congressional Act of February 15, 1845.^® He who has 
bought school land under the laws of the state la decreed the 
rightful owner in contest with a claimant holding e patent 
shown to have been issued erroneously by the Federal Govern­
m e n t ,  ^ 9 The United States parted vdth the title when the land
James Cooper, Plaintiff in Error, v. Enoch C, Roberts, 
(1653) IB How. 173, 15 L, M ,  538: State of Alabama, Plaintiff in 
Error, v. Sudle r^hmldt, (1913) 832 U, 3. 158, 54 S. 0, 501,
56 L* Bd* 555.
^State of Louisiana, by School Board of Parish of Tangipahoa, 
V, William Tf Joyce Co. et al., (1919) (Cîr. Ct. of App.) 861 
Fed # 186#
^^Oullen McCastle v. J. J* B* Chaney et al*, (1876) 88 La*
Ann. 720.
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m s  selected by the state as school land; the title remained 
in the state until the time of the sale. However, one who 
has been in possession without legal title may rightfully 
expeot reimbursement for improvements from one to whom the 
land must be surrendered after legal purchase.®^
Court decrees concerning who have the right to stand 
in Judgment for a sale of school lands have followed the 
policy of recognizing the state aa trustee. When one pur­
chaser excepted to the right of the state treasurer to sue 
for the rescission of a sale, this right of the state treas­
urer, to whom the notes were made payable, was maintained
In refusing to uphold the right of a parish board to 
represent the state in a land suit in 1860, Chief Justice Thomas 
C. Manning, with relation to a previous decision v/hlch had recog­
nized this right of a particular school board,reasoned:
Can the Board of School Directors of any 
parish represent the State in a like case without 
her authority? The plaintiff cites School Directors 
V, Anderson, 26 Ann, 796 as conc].usive, but it is 
against him. That suit was on the part of the 
Board for Carroll parish, and the court maintained 
the right on the ground that legislative authority 
had been expressly given, by a law on the subject 
which was restricted to Carroll parish, Sees, Acts 
1861, p. 99, though we are inclined to think if the 
language of that Act had been scrutinized, it would 
have been found deficient for that purpose,28
2°ibia.
*^3obert A, Hunter, State Treasurer, y, Robert W. Williams 
et alse, (1861) 16 La, Ann. 129.
^School Directors, etc., v. R. K, Anderson, Administrator, 
et al,, (1876) 28 La. Ann. 739.
^Board of School Directors of Concordia v. Albert C. Ober, 
(1880) 92 La. Ann. 419.
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With reference to the state's safeguarding this power of 
trustee he added:
The title to this land has never been in 
the parish Board of School Directors. The title 
was in the State under the donation of the general 
government, and she held it for a specific purpose, 
with authority to sell the lands, and a Mandate to 
hold the proceeds and iznrest them for the benefit 
of the schools* No doubt she could confer authority 
on the parish Boards of Directors to sue in her 
stead, but she has not done It* On the contrary the 
State has seemed very tenacious of this power, and 
we think rightly, considering the position of 
trustee in which she stands to this fund* Never 
has she by a general act given the parish Boards 
the power to sue in such case in their n a m e s * 2 4
Consequently, the court ruled that the board of school directors 
of a parish is without authority to bring suit for the reven­
dication of school lands unless empowered to do so by a
legislative act. Thus, to the state the power of trustee 
has been reserved.
By Act No* 158 of 1910 the state transferred to 
the parish school board part of its power to stand in Judgment
concerning school lands as followss
That the several school boards of the 
various parishes of this state be and they are 
hereby authorized and empowered to contract with 
and employ on the part of the state of Louisiana, 
attorneys at law, to recover for the state, damages 
for trespass to the sixteenth section known as 
school lands the title to which is still in the 
state, each of said boards to have authority, 
to make said contracts for the lands situated 
in its own parish and no others; and the several 
school boards shall also have authority to sue 
for and recover the sixteenth section known as 
school l a n d s . 2S
®4ibid.* pp. 419-420♦
^®Acts of Louisiana, 1910, No* 158, sec. 1.
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but reserved that:
Suit in all sueh cases shall be brought 
in the name of the state of Louisiana, and the 
attorneys, employed as aforesaid, shall sue for 
the value of all timber cut and removed from any 
such lands, as well as any end all other legal 
damages caused by any such trespass.
In 1915 the court interpreted this latter act to the 
effect that the board of directors was without authority to 
bring suit to recover school lands in its own name. In the 
case in reference the board of directors of the public schools 
of the parish of Orleans brought suit against the New Orleans 
Land Compemy2? to recover fractional section sixteen, as 
belonging to the public schools of said parish. This suit 
was filed prior to the passage of the act of 1910. Judgment 
was obtained in the trial court and in the first hearing of 
the supreme court, but on application for rehearing the 
judgments were set aside with the following explanation;
Hence it appears that, since the present 
suit was filed, the state has by the Act No, 156 
of 1910, given to the parish boards of school 
directors authority to employ attorneys and to sue 
for and recover the sixteenth sections to which the 
state has not legally parted with its title, and to 
recover damages for trespass on sixteenth sections.
But the Legislature was careful to provide that 
the attorneys are to be employed on the part of 
the state of Louisiana; that damages for trespass 
on the sixteenth sections, the title to which is 
still in the state, are to be recovered for the 
state; that the suit, in all such cases, shall be 
brought in the name of the state of Louisiana; and 
that vAatever sums are recovered in such suits 
shall be paid into the state treasury, to be 
credited by the auditor and treasurer to the town-
26
Ibid.. see. 3.
Board of Directors of Publie Schools of Parish of Orleans 
T. Hew Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La. 32, 70 So. 27.
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ship in which the land is situated, in the same 
manner as theretofore provided by law for the 
proceeds of the sale of sixteenth sections.
The plaintiff had no authority or right 
of action to sue to recover a school section or 
sixteenth section of land when this suit was filed, 
that is, before the passage of the act of 1910; 
and, under the terms of that statute, the plaintiff 
has authority now to bring the suit only in the 
name of the state of Louisiana.2®
When this suit came through the courts later under
correct title of the state, recognition was given to it.^®
Also, the residents and alleged taxpayers in a
township in whom is vested the title of the sixteenth section
have the authority to stand in judgment, according to a
decision handed down in 1892 when the residents of a sixteenth
section in St. Tammany Parish were heard in a suit to annul
an illegal sale of the section*®®
In various decisions the court has endorsed the
trusteeship of the state and protected the schools* rights in
their lands by decreeing certain transactions vhen pertaining
to school lands as not permissible. In the case of State v.
Hew Orleans Land Company^^ several rulings pertaining thereto
were handed down. Where an asylum for destitute orphan girls
had transferred its lands to the drainage board and ultimately
to the City of Hew Orleans, trustee of the drainage board,
and some of which lands were sixteenth section, the court
^Ibid.. 138 La. 57-50.
®^State V. New Orleans Land Co., (1918) 145 La. 858, 79 So. 
515.
®®Edwin Telle et al. v. The School Board of St. Tammany 
Parish et als., (1892) 44 La. Ann. 365, 10 So, 801*
SI
state T. N«r Orleans Land Co., (1918) 143 La. 858, 79 So.
515.
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said: "To our mind it is very plain that the asylum could
not transfer the land of the state or of the public schools 
in payment of any debt it might owe, and that the fact that 
the debt was due in part for the drainage of this land could 
not make any d i f f e r e n c e , T h e  defense argued also that al­
though the land did belong to the schools, it was liable to 
the drainage assessment by Act No* 165 of 1858, creating the 
drainage board, but the court replied, * .we are very 
clear that the state's property and the property held by the 
state as trustee for the schools was not intended to be em­
braced in said act;"®® and, "This state property could not 
have been seized and sold under said act of 1858, and still 
less could it be transferred by the asylum or by any other 
stranger to the title,"®4 Oonoeming the diverting of the 
land from its trust purpose the court held plainly;
. . .  for, until the decision of the Land Department 
awarding this land to the schools and rejecting the 
claim of the state to it shall have been set aside, 
the land must be held never to have belonged to the 
state, and hence to have never been subject to be 
alienated by her, either by direct deed or through 
the medium of an estoppel, as land belonging to her.
And, of course, holding this land es trustee of the 
schools, she could not divert it from the schools, 
its trust purposes, and transfer it to the drainage 
board for drainage purposes; it could no more do 
that through the medium of an estoppel than by 
direct act of donation.®®
143 La. 063. 
p. 864.
p. 867.
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In answer to the defendant's plea of prescription acquirendi 
causa against the state, there was further protection in the 
decision:
Inherent in the state's title to such school land 
is a condition Imposed by the act of Congress (Act 
Feb. 15, 1643, o, 33, 5 8tat, at L« p, 600) that 
the state cannot alienate same without the consent 
of the inhabitants of the township in which the 
land is situated. If, then, the state cannot 
alienate same by express statute to that effect 
without such consent, she is in no better position 
to do go by her laws of prescription acquirendi 
causa.36
Thus, the court has upheld the policy that the lands 
reserved for the benefit of schools are under the trusteeship 
of the state or its legalized representative, are subject 
to exceptions pertaining to state property, and that this 
property must be dealt with only as legislation directs and 
as the Judicial body of the state and of the nation interpret.
Legal methods of authorizing sales. The act of 
Congress donating the sixteenth section to each township for 
the maintenance of the schools provided that the sale of 
those sections be made only with the consent of the inhabitants 
of the township. Legislative acts administering that right 
required elections to be held to ascertain the will of the 
voters of the township, specifying that "Polls shall be open 
at the most public places in the township after advertisement 
of thirty days.”3^ The definiteness of this was confirmed in 
St. Tammany Parish when the court annulled the sale of a
®^Bdwln Telle et al. v. The School Board of St, Taminany 
Parish et als., (1892) 44 La. Ann. 369.
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sixteenth section partly o n the grounds that the advertisement 
was not made as required and that the election was not held*®® 
Consistency in the policy relative to the sale of 
school lands is indicated hy the frequent advice of the attorney 
general to the effect that no legal sale of the whole section 
or parts thereof may he consummated without the approval of 
the voters concerned.®^ This pertains also to a disposition 
for such purpose as a right of way— the accepted public land 
method of a grant by the governor and register of the state 
land office is not sufficient,40 Elections for determining 
the will of the people should be conducted by the parish school 
boards and only legal voters should participate .41 However, 
idien "the majority of the voters in a township give their 
consent and approval to the sale of such sixteenth section 
lands, . . .in ease of the failure to sell the land when 
first offered for sale, the land may be again offered at 
public auction without another election.*4# Similarly, this 
provision holds for the auctioning of timber#43
These regulations do not pertain to those sections 
idiieh are uninhabitable by reason of their being swamp or 
sea marsh or which for any other reason do not contain any
38
Ibid.. 44 La, Ann. 365, 10 So, 801*
39,
Vsy X .  X » x e ,  y  * « W V  X .  X V b - X .  W
May 1, 1930, to April SO, 1938, p. 476.
Opinions of the Attorney Seneral of Louisiana; May 1, 1980, 
to to I, Iÿâ'87"p7T59: May 1, ld24, to May 1, 1986, p. 485;
May 1, 1928, to May 1, 1924, p. 673.
41
Ibid.. May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 446. 
*^Ibid.. May 1, 1906, to May 1, 1908, p. 888.
43
Ibid.. May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1928, p. 290.
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legal voters* In these situations the school hoard is 
Inrtrusted to make proper application to the auditor of pub­
lic accounts, who in hie discretion may determine whether or 
not a sale should he made and authorized accordingly*44
W o *  isËÊ » M b ftOTyslagd mlw* got y a U d , 
At first the minimum price at which the lands could be sold 
was fixed by the legislature at #1*25 per acre* In 1857 
additi<mal provisions were made;
Be it further enacted, &c*, That if a 
majority of the votes taken in a township shall 
give their assent to the sale of the lands afore­
said, it shall be appraised by three sworn appraisers 
selected by the Treasurer and Recorder of the parish; 
then they shall be sold by the Parish Treasurer at 
public auction, before the court-house door, or by 
the Sheriff, or an auctioneer to be employed by the 
Treasurer at his expense, to the highest bidder, 
in quantities not less than fbrty acres; but in no 
case at a less sum than one dollar and twenty-five 
cents per acre, . * *49
The necessity for the appraised value to be received was
established idien the court set aside a sale, explaining;
Unless it were the intention of the 
legislature that the land should not be sold for 
less than the appraised value, there would be no 
object in enacting that it should be appraised*
Neither would there have been any reason for 
amending the Act of 1855, by requiring that it 
should be a p p r a i s e d *46
The same ruling was handed down in 1892 when no title was
declared to the adjudioatee of a sixteenth section which was
^^ i d . :  May 1, 1906, to May I, 1900, p* 289; May 1, 1908,
to May 1, 1910, p* 802} /ïtey 1, 1910, to May 1, 1918, p* 585*
^Jlctè of Louisiana, 1857, No* 859, sec. 34*
^®School Directors, &o*, v* Nicholas D* Colcnen, (1859)
14 La* Ann* 106,
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bought in 1687 at less than #1*25 per a c r e . 47 However, this 
decision w&e criticized a few years later by the same court 
for not having taken cognizance of the revised statute of 1870, 
which superseded all previous acts and by which the "manner, 
terms, and conditions of the sale of school lands" were re­
stated and no mention was made of a minimum price— only was 
the land to be appraised and sold to the highest b i d d e r . 4 ®
In the latter case the policy of sale at the appraisal price, 
regardless of the amount thereof, was upheld.4#
Recovery of lands. After the custom of selling 
school lands was fairly well established, a question which 
soon presented itself was; May a legitimate sale of school 
lands be dissolved or rescinded for cause and the lands 
recovered by a school board?
The court had occasion to answer this in the Hunter 
case.®® There the defendants were in possession of school 
lands legally sold January 20, 1851, and secured by notes made 
to the state treasurer. In February, 1861, the plaintiff, 
state treasurer of that date, sued to demand payment of the 
notes, and In the event of non-payment, rescission of the
47Edwin Telle et al. v. The School Board of St. Tammany 
Parish et als., (1892) 44 La, Ann. 365, 10 So. 801.
Acts of Louisiana, 1855, No. 321, sec. 34; Revised Statutes 
of Louisiana, 1870, sec. 1316; Acts of Louisiana, 1858, Ho. 267, 
sec. 2; Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1870, sec. 2960.
49Board of Directors of Parish of Livingston v, Lanier et 
al., (1906) 117 La. 307, 41 So, 583.
®®Robert A. Hunter, State Treasurer, v. Robert W. Williams 
6t als., (1861) 16 La, Am, 129,
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sale. The oourt's order was that the sale be rescinded and 
that the said lands be restored b y the defendants to the law­
ful authorities of the state for the benefit of the schools 
of the district to which they belonged*®! As settlement of 
another suit for dissolution of sale and recovery of rent 
because of defaulted payments®® the court decreed a restitutio 
in integrum— "The vendor returns the portion of the price 
paid, with interest from the date of payment, and the vendee 
returns the thing with its revenues*"®® To this point, there 
was judgment dissolving the sale and giving rent for the 
cultivated land at specified rates during different periods 
less certain amounts— cash payments with interest, and the 
cost of clearing land and making ditches and levees— leaving 
a balance of #1,016.00 in favor of plaintiffs; also, it was 
ordered that plaintiffs recover rent on sixty acres of land 
at eight dollars per acre from 1875— the date of calculations 
by the lower court— to date of delivery to p l a i n t i f f s . ® 4
The state is estopped to recover school lands from 
professed owners who claim title through mesne conveyance by 
transfer recorded prior to the state’s record of a judgment 
annulling the original sale and retroceding the land to the 
state. This was the substance of a decree rendered when the
p. 130.
School Director*, etc., ▼. B, K. Anderson, Administrator, 
•t al., (1876) 28 La. Ann. 730.
®*Ibid.. p. 741.
®*Ihid.
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State sought to reecver a sixteenth section after It had 
delayed fifty-eight years in recording a judgment which can- 
celled the original sale for want of failure to meet payments, 
and had placed of record a deed of conveyance, thereby converting 
the land into private property# Also, the state was held not 
entitled to collect the unpaid balance on the land vdien it 
had pe»itted more than ten years to expire before reinsoribing 
the vendor's lien in the mortgage office#®®
Likewise, prescription runs against the state when 
it seeks action on notes for the deferred purchase price of 
school lands.®® On the other hand, when the state brings 
action in due time the court recognizes the mortgage on the 
land and orders enforcment through the seizure and sale of 
the land to satisfy the matured notes outstanding.®^
After the state has sold a sixteenth section of land, 
it is estopped to recover that land through contesting the 
title of the owner on the grounds of illegalities or irregu­
larities la the original sale# In this connection the state 
must conform to estoppel in the same manner as if it were a 
private individual, and the fact that it represents the 
interest of the inhabitants of the township in which the 
section is located does not affect the estoppel#®®
®®State ex rel# Board of School Directors v# Brooklyn 
Cooperage Co., (1030) 170 La. 531, 188 So. 470#
®®y# Graham, Auditor, v. 0# W, & J. T. Tignor et al., (1871) 
83 La. Ann. 570.
®^May.r ▼. State, (1929) 168 La. 146, 121 So. 604.
®®Th. State of Louisiana ▼. Albert 0. Ober, (1882) 34 La. 
Ann. 359,
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After the state had all sohool land titles legalized 
In 1875 through an off lei al aooeptanoe of a survey of its 
lands hy Surveyor General E# W. Foster,®® efforts were made 
to reoover sixteenth seotions which had not been legally dis­
posed of. Action to recover results merely in nonsuit when 
there is not satisfactory proof that the land In question was 
ever selected as school lands,®® but with respect to definitely 
established claims the court has expressed, in no uncertain 
terms, the state’s right to recovery as follows:
The laws of the United States are clear 
to the effect that every sixteenth section in place, 
or part of a sixteenth section in place, belongs to 
the state of Louisiana, for school purposes, and the 
parish sohool board having the administration of the 
schools and the property intended for their benefit 
are entitled to institute suits for recovery of such 
sections of land found in the possession of third 
persons.®!
A very complicated suit of long duration and rehear­
ings on this subject was the one brought against the New 
Orleans Land Company to reoover a fractional section sixteen 
as belonging to the public schools of Orleans P a r i s h . T h e  
land in question had come into possession of the defendant 
by various transfers and sales, some of which involved colonial
®®Meyer v. State, (1939) 168 La. 146, 121 So. 604.
®®Barton’s Executrix v, Hempkin, (1841) 19 La. 508; Parish 
Board of School Directors v. Rosa B. Collins et al., (1881)
33 La. Ann. 434.
®^1Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Orleans 
V. New Orleans Land Co., (1915) 136 La, 37.
®®Ibid.. 138 La. 33, 70 So. 27; State v. New Orleans Land Co., 
(1918) La. 858, 79 So. 515; State of Louisiana, Petitioner,
V. New Orleans Land Company, (1918 ) 248 U. S. 577, 39 S. 0. 18,
63 L. Ed. 439.
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grants, but not any of ndiioh, aooordlng to the opinion of the 
ease, were in keeping with the authorized sale of a sixteenth 
seetion at the time of the transfers# The court ruled, and 
the Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition 
for a writ of eertiorari to the state court thereupon, that:
The said colonial grant and the titles 
following it extend, however, no further back than 
40 arpents from Bayou St. John, and therefore em­
brace only a part of the land in dispute. As to 
the remainder, the defendant has no title, and has 
no standing for contesting in any way the title of 
the schools. To the extent of this remainder, 
therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.®®
Thus, the state’s right to recover sohool lands 
lAich had not been secured In a legal statutory manner was 
upheld, but her power to reoover lands once secured through 
a colonial grant was denied.
Again, in 1931, it was maintained that the state’s 
claim to sixteenth sections for the benefit of schools does 
not control i^ diere certain prior rights of title prevail. The 
claim of the state was denied with respect to land formerly 
owned by A. B« Hoxsan and which was originally the Nicholas 
Verret colonial grant.®4 The court presented the conditions 
of this recovery thus;
The state cannot successfully claim a six­
teenth section, or sohool section, in this township, 
if the Nicholas Verret grant was a complete grant 
vdien the United States acquired the Louisiana Terri­
tory, or if the claim of Nicholas Verret, was there­
after made valid by the act of Congress confirming 
the grant and the statute of this state relinquishing 
the state’s claim.®®
®^State V. New Orleans Land Co., (1918) 143 La. 873-873.
®^State V. Bowie Lumber Co. (Rives et al., Warrantors), 
(1931) 148 La. 581, 87 So. 303.
*®Ibld., 140 la. 585,
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A litigation testing Governor Roman's title had found its 
way to the Supreme Court of the United States.®® With 
reference to the decree therein the court in the instant case 
said: "The decision therefore was nothing more nor less than
a judicial declaration that Gov. Roman's title was complete 
and did not need a decree of any court to confirm it."®^
By an act of Congress®® Governor Roman's title had been con­
firmed as far aa claims of the United States were concerned 
and by statute®^ Louisiana had relinquished any claim she 
might have had to the lend. The court's ruling was that the 
state's demand to reoover be rejected.
Recovery by the state is not held when the only 
charge against the validity of the sale of the land is that 
it was according to statutory enactment but not as prescribed 
by the Congressional Act of February 15, 1843,^^
The legality of attorneys' fees to the amount of one-
fourth of the land recovered was established when a transferee of 
the claims of the attorneys in the Mew Orleans Land Company case, 
supra. secured a ruling in favor of partition by licitation—
one-fourth to the plaintiff and three-fourths to the
A A
The United States, Appellants, v, Armend PollerIn et al.
The United States, Appellants, v. A. B. Roman. The United 
States, Appellants, v. Carlos de Villemont's Heirs et al. The 
United States, Appellants, v. Jean B. Labranche's Eeirs.
(1851) IS How. fi, 14, L. Ed. 28.
®^State V. Bowie Lumber Co. (Rives et al., Warrantors),
(1921) 148 La. 593.
®®Acts of Congress 1853-54, "An Act for the Relief of A. B. 
Roman of Louisiana," ch. xovi.
®^Act8 of Louisiana, 1855, No. 114.
^^State of Louisiana, by Sohool Board of Parish of Tangipahoa, 
V. William T. Joyce Co, et al., (1919) (Gir. Ct. of App.) 261 
Fed. 128,
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s t a t e . I n  answer to the state's attack that the acts under 
which the plaint iff sou^t relief were in conflict with the 
Congressional Act of 1843 the court said:
It is clear, therefore, regardless of 
anything that may have been said to the contrary 
in State v. Hew Orleans land Co*. 143 La, 668,
70 So* 515, that a complete legal title vested 
in the State of Louisiana after the survey of
1871-72 and its official approval in 1873, and
that the Act of Congress of February 16, 1843,
was no legal impediment to the subsequent passage 
by the state Legislature of Acts 158 of 1910 
end Act 184 of 1928, which are constitutional 
and valid*?:
Sale of timber* The courts have upheld the policy 
that the sale of timber on sixteenth section sohool lands is 
under similar jurisdiction to the sale of the land itself. 
Provisions for the latter were made in 1885 and 1858*^®
An interpretation of the effect of these statutes on the sale
of timber was sought in a mandamus suit to compel the presi­
dent of the school board to sign a deed conveying all the 
timber on a certain section to relator, pursuant to a resolu­
tion of said board selling the timber to the relator at 
private sale*?^ It was argued that the board had the right 
to gather the fruits of the soil by being in the position of 
a usufructuary, but the court said that no such right had 
been conferred by statute and that the board is merely an 
agent of the state, «diioh holds the title in trust for the 
school district. In rendering decision the court sustained
^ h la y t tT  r .  state, (1929) 188 la. 148, 121 So. 604.
9fi
Ibid.. 188 la. 163.
^*Aeta of loHialana: 1856, No. 321, aaoa. 32-35; 1888,,
Ro. 267, MO. 2.
^*8tate ex rel. Eopkine ▼. stark, (1904) 111 la. 594, 35 So. 760.
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the refusal of the president to sign the instrument of sale, 
daareaing;
The sixteenth section cannot he sold 
without the approval of a majority of the legal 
voters of the township, and the sale must be at 
public auction* To hold that a parish school 
board has implied power to sell at private sale 
or otherwise all the timber on the section, 
constituting in this and other oases almost the 
entire value of the tract, would be to nullify 
the statutes*”®
Prior to the passage of Act No* 129 of 1908, which 
authorised the sale of the timber without the sale of the land, 
it was the policy of the legal advisers of the state to uphold 
the theory that the school lands and the timbers thereon were 
inseparable and that one could not be disposed of without the 
other#?® The same policy of strict adherence to statutory 
provisions was followed in a case in 1912 when there was the 
decree that the attempted sale by a sohool board of the right 
to "cut and pull" the timber on a sixteenth section was abso­
lutely and incurably n u U  and conveyed no title vdiatsoever*
In addition, the vendee was held to be a possessor in bad 
faith end liable to the state for the value of the manufactured 
product of the timber less the cost of logging and manufacture#* 
Very similar liability was demanded of another company which 
contracted with an unauthorized board, except It was specified
75
State ex rel# Hopkins v# Stark, (1904) 111 La* 595#
?®Oplnlons of the Attorney General of Louisianai May 1, 
1906, to May 1, 1908, pp. 21^ 5, àl6; Way 1, Ï9ti8Ï to May 1, 
1910, p. 180.
^^State V. F. B, Williams Cypress Co#, Limited, (1912) 
131 La. 62, 56 So. 1033#
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that the value of the produot would date to the time of 
removal of the timber*^®
79Further interpretation of the act of 1900 has been 
rendered to the effect that "whatever may be said of the land 
in the school sections, the timber, apart from the land, could 
not, legally, have been sold without the consent of a majority 
of the legal voters, residing, not in the parish where the 
timber may be situated, but in the township, obtained at an 
election called for that purpose, . . The power of the
parish sohool board goes no further than to permit it to take 
the sense of the legal voters, When the vote is affirmative 
a report is made to the auditor, who authorizes the board to 
make the sale. The action of a parish treasurer in making 
such a sale and in deducting a commission therefor was held 
unauthorized and void.®!
Actions for the recovery of the value of timber 
illegally out from school lands are properly brought, under 
Act No. 158 of 1910, In the name of the state by the district 
attorneys of the respective parishes from which the timber 
was removed, assisted by special counsel employed by the 
respective boards of directors.®®
^®State V. Rathbone et al., (1919) 144 La. 855, 61 So. 534. 
^^Aots of Louisiana, 1900, No* 129.
®%tate V. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co., (1919) 144 La. 570 
®!lbid., 144 La. 559, 80 So. 722.
®®Ibid.
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Various statutes®® have attempted to transfer to 
the perish sohool hoard the power to authorize the sale of 
timber on sixteenth seotions. These have often been decreed 
unconstitutional, as being in conflict with the act of Con­
gress providing that none of the sixteenth sections shall be 
sold without the consent of the inhabitants of the township 
concerned.®* A change in the statutory provision to ecoord 
with legal opinion was made in 1922 and has been upheld thus:
section 30 of Act 100 of 1922 is the 
last expression of the Legislature upon this 
subject. . . .  It provides that all elections 
to authorize the sale of Sixteenth Section lands 
or of timber on Sixteenth Section lands shall be 
conducted by the Parish School Boards. It there­
fore follows, we think, that the timber upon a 
Sixteenth section could not be sold until the 
inhabitants of the particular township in which 
the section is located have held an election and 
the majority authorize the sale thereof.®®
The state's legal advisers have agreed in maintaining
that the funds derived from the sale of school lends shall
be paid Into the free school fund of the state treasury to
the credit of the particular township, but they seem to
®®ACt8 of Louisiana: 1916, No* 180, sec. 69; 1918, No. 142.
®*State ex rel. Hopkins v. Stark, (1904) 111 La. 694, 36 So. 
760; State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., Limited, (1912) 131 La* 
62, 58 So. 1033; Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: 
May 1, 1918, to MayT7Ttaïï7 “ 75^7W  17 TUSCr," T o HayTTTUss. 
pp. 742, 745, 753; May 1, 1922, to May 1, 1924, pp. 665, 667;
May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1923, p. 248.
®®OPinions of the Attorney General of Louisiane, May 1, 1928, 
Aprli âïïTi^oTT.""515.........................
®®Ibid: June 1, 1912, to May 1, 1914, p. 594; May 1, 1920,
MayTT 1988, p. 737; May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 425.
to 
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have differed®? oonoeroing the oonstitutlonality of acts which 
sought to provide that the proceeds from the sale of timber 
should be credited to the account of the current school fund 
of the parish rather than to the free sohool fund. Much 
opinion has charged unconstltuttonality, and most recent 
opinion,®® as based on section 50 of Act No. 100 of 1988, 
holds that money from the sale of timber and of the land must 
continue to be deposited in the state treasury and placed at 
Interest for the benefit of the particular township.
Lease. That the state has a right to lease its 
sixteenth section lands was evidenced In a case where a later 
board sought to dissolve a Mfty-year lease of the fractional 
part of a sixteenth section which had been made by an earlier 
board in 1636 in conformity with the law. In rendering the 
decision. Justice Isaac T. Preston said:
Tbe land is now in the possession of the 
defendants under that lease, and the plaintiffs, 
the present trustees, bring suit to reoover it, and 
la effect, to annul the lease. They cannot do it.
The State of Mississippi leased their sohool lands, 
acquired In the same manner for a term of ninety- 
nine years, end the Supreme Court of that State 
held the leases to be valid. The laws under which 
the defendants hold the lease, however unwise, ex­
pressly gave power to the trustees to lease the 
land for that term. They conflicted with no act 
of Congress, or the Constitution of the United 
States. The lessees acquired a vested right in 
the lease, by bidding for it at public auction, on 
the terms prescribed by the Legislature, and paying 
the price; and it would be a violation of our 
Constitution to deprive them of It.®®
May l, l.gO, to May 1, 1922, pp. 738-738.
®®Ibld.. May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1928, p. 425.
®®Robert Garland at al. v , Thomas M. Jaokson et al., (1852) 
7 La. Ann. 69.
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The decree was that there he Judgment for the defendants. The 
legal counselors of the state have been consistent In main­
taining the theory that the law granting the right to dispose 
of said lands through sales generally included the right to 
lease said school lands or to lease or sell the oil and mineral 
rights t h e r e o n . T h e  statutory provisions of 1922 with 
respect to leases have been upheld to this extent:
Section 30 of Act 100 of 1922 is the last 
expression of the Legislature upon this subject.
It provides that Parish School Boards have author­
ity to rent sixteenth section lands, or lease the 
mineral rights of same by a resolution of the Board 
and without the authority of a vote of the electors 
of the township in which such lands are located,
Much controversy among the state's counsel seems to 
have arisen concerning which school fund should receive the 
money derived from lease of the land and of oil and mineral 
rights, and there does not seem to have been consistency of 
opinion that such income should be transferred to the current 
school f x o A  of the parish rather than to the state free school 
f u n d A n  opinion, based on section 30 of Act No. 100 of 
1922, contends that these revenues are to go to the current 
school fund,93 while a slightly more recent one holds that the 
proceeds from the lease of mineral rights can not be delegated 
constitutionally to the current school fund of the parish.®^
90Oninlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana; June 1, 
1912, to kay"l, 19IÎ, p. 590; May 1, 1920,l;o i&y 1, 1922, 
p. 742; May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1928, p. 248.
*^Ibld.. May 1, 1988, to April SO, 1980, p. 515.
*^I5ld.i May 1, 1980, to May 1, 1928, p. 737; May 1, 1984, 
to May 1, 1926, p. 428,
®®Ibid,, May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 425.
94Ibid., May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1920, p. 248.
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Sixteenth Sections Which Are Not School Lands
Hot all sixteenth sections are reserved as school 
lands, The discrimination thereof is founded on the type of 
survey which officially located them. In upholding the 
governmental surveys against an attack upon their authority 
and correctness, Justice Walter B* Somerville explained them 
and their relation to schools quite completely as follows:
The United States government has provided 
for two methods of surveying lands in Louisiana.
One is known as the rectangular system of surveying, 
and is provided for hy the Act of Congress of i&y 
18, 1796, c. 29, 1 Stat. 464, which provides that 
each township shall he six miles square, subdivided 
into thirty«^six sections, each one mile square.
% e  sections are to be numbered respectively, 
beginning with Ho. 1, in the northeast corner, and 
proceeding west and east alternately through the 
township with progressive numbers, until 36 sections 
are surveyed.
If, in making this survey of the public 
lands in a township, a complete, or an approved, 
grant is found that overlaps a part of any section, 
the surveyor places this complete or approved grant 
on his map, and only the remainder of the section
not covered by the grant is public land.
The other method of surveying the lands 
in Louisiana is the survey of lots or tracts along 
watqr courses, etc. The United States government, 
by the Act of March 3, 1811, o. 46, sec, 2, 2 Stats.
662, authorizes the public lands on water courses, 
etc., to be surveyed and subdivided into tracts of
56 poles in front and 465 poles in depth.
The Act of i^y 24, 1624, c. 141, 4 Stat.
34, authorizes the President to direct the survey 
of lands fronting rivers, water courses, etc., by 
lots, 2 acres front by 40 acres in depth.
The tracts surveyed along water courses 
in accordance with the acts of 1811 and 1624 are 
commonly known as "lots” or "radiating sections” 
or "fractional sections.”
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The Department of the Interior of the 
United States has ruled that sections 16 when they 
are "radiating sections* or "fractional sections* 
or "lots," as they are indiscriminately called, 
which front on water courses, do not belong to the 
state for the benefit of the township for school 
purposes, but that only the sections or parts of 
sections that are rectangularly surveyed and are 
"in place” belong to the state for school p u r p o s e s .
The principle that fractional sections, radiating 
sections, or lots, number sixteen, were not the property of 
% e  schools was emphasized by the court in 1865 in the 
explanations
This defense must fall before the fact 
that the lot in question (16) is a radiating, or 
anomalous, or irregular lot, not in place, and 
that the general laws consecrating lot or section 
16 of townships to school purposes apply only to 
such lots as have been surveyed in square or 
rectangular lots or sections. Decision of Secretary 
of the Interior, July 23, 1860; of July 1, 1882;
Bartons vs. Hempkin, 19 L, 510; (Parish Board of 
School Directors v. Hollins) 33 Ann. 424. See 
also 4 Ala., Long vs. Brown, pp. 622, 627, 628;
18 How. 173, 177, 178, 181, 182 (15 L. Ed. 338);
Cooper vs. Roberts; Public Domain 1883, p. 227, 
indemnity selections; R« S. La. 2938; Sec. 14,
Act 75 of 1880.9*
Lack of authority of state to sell fractional sections 
as school lands. Again, in 1905, the court interpreted that 
fractional sections are not school lands. The land to which 
the title was in oonteat9? was alleged to have been secured by 
a sale made by the treasurer of the parish of Iberville under 
Act Ho. 250 of 1853, which provided for the reorganization of
^^Board of Directors of Public Schools of Pari^ of Orleans 
V. Hew Orleans Land Co., (1915) 138 La. 35-36.
Joseph H# Bres v. M. Louviere et ale., (1885) 37 La.
Ann. 738.
Q7
Laure et al. ▼. Wilson, (1905) 114 La. 699, 38 So. 522.
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public school lauds iu the state* It was described as school 
section sizteeu, but it was definitely established that it 
was a radiating or irregular section* The court's decree to 
the effect that the sale thereof as school lands carried no 
title was:
Fractional sections in fractional town­
ships did not pass to the state under the general 
grant by Congress of sixteenth sections for school 
purposes, and the sale of such a section by a 
parish treasurer, professing to sell school land 
under the authority of Act Ho* 250, p; 213, of 
1853, which authorized the sale of school land 
alone, conveyed no title.@8
Indemnity Lands
To assure equity in the school funds provided through 
the reservation of sixteenth sections "in place,” Congress, 
by a revision of related previous legislation, enacted in 
December, 1873, that:
%here settlements, with a view to pre­
emption, have been made before the survey of the 
lands in the field, which are found to have been 
made on sections sixteen or thirty-six, those 
sections shall be subject to the pre-emption claim 
of such settler; and if they, or either of them 
have been or shall be reserved or pledged for the 
use of schools or colleges in the State or Territory 
in v&ich the lands lie, other lands of like quantity 
are appropriated in lieu of such as may be patented 
by pre-emptors; and other lands are also appropriated 
to compensate deficiencies for school purposes, where 
sections sixteen or thirty-six are fractional in 
quantity, or where one or both are wantin^s by reason 
of the township being fractional, or from any natural 
cause whatever.9^
^Ibtd.. 114 La. 699.
**aerlse4 statut.* of the United State*, 1873-74, seo. 2275.
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Administration of indemnity lande and their proceeds, 
In response to the Federal provisions the state declared:
The Register of the State Land Office is 
required to ascertain in what townships in this 
State there are no reservations of school sections 
by reason of oonflie ting claims, or from any other 
cause, or when the reservation is less than contem­
plated by law; and In such oases It is made his 
duty, under the superintendence of the Governor, 
to apply for and, as soon as possible, obtain a 
location of any land or parts of land in lieu 
thereof.
When such locations can not be made, if 
dewed more advantageous to the State, the Register, 
with the assent of the Federal government is author­
ized to issue scrip for such lands, Which scrip 
shall not be sold for a less amount than $1.85 per 
aore.lOO
That the issuance of Indemnity certificates by the 
state was legal and of common practice is shown in the McEnery 
case,101 where a mandamus was issued to compel the Governor 
and the Register of the State Land Office to execute end 
deliver to the relator patents for certain lands, some of 
vdiich were Indemnity lands. The relator by contract with a 
previous governor had recovered certain school indemnity lands 
and was entitled to fifty per centum thereof. In reply to 
the Register's complaint that the state held those lands only 
in trust, the court called attention to several well-considered 
opinionslOB dealing with the legal destination of the title
^^^Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1880, secs. 2951-8958.
^^^%e State ex rel. John McEnery v. Francis T. Nioholls, 
Governor, et al., (1890) 42 La. Ann. 209, 7 So. 738.
^®®Board of School Directors of Concordia v. Albert G, Ober, 
(1880) 32 La. Ann. 417; Joseph R. Bres v. M. Louviere et als., 
(1685) 37 La. Ann. 736; Cullen MoCastle v. J. J. B. Chaney et 
al., (1876) 28 La. Ann. 780; and James M. Cooper, Plaintiff in 
Error, v. Enoch 0. Roberts, (1855) 18 How. 173, 15 L. Ed. 338.
94
to school Indemnity lands and snmarized therefrom:
The foregoing is deemed perfectly conclu­
sive as to the legal title of such lands being in 
the State, with the right of sale, and of making 
perfect and complete titles to purchasers from her, 
and the right of dedicating the proceeds of sale to 
the inhabitants of such townships as may be entitled 
thereto.ÏOS
As an expression of its views on the whole situation the court 
farther said;
On account of the great public importance 
of the question involved and the stress laid upon 
it in the argument of the Attorney General, we have 
dealt with it as res nova and examined it most care­
fully and thoroughly, and our conclusion is that the 
statute is broad enough and sufficiently ample in 
terms to authorize the contract in this respect 
between the relator and the Governor; that the laws 
of Congress, and the prior statutes of the State 
authorized the recovery and selection of the Indemnity 
school lands; that the right existed in, and the 
duty was imposed upon the State through appropriate 
legislative action, to make sale of them and dedi­
cate the proceeds to school purposes; and that the 
authority in the Legislature to confer upon the 
Governor the power to convey a part of said lands, 
when recovered, to such person as should aid in 
their restoration to the State, is likewise a m p l e .
The pertinent act in 1880105 provided that the holder 
of indemnity warrants might locate his claim on any lands 
belonging to the s t a t e ;  106 however, Act No. 103 of 1904 
changed this method of satisfying claims of unlocated lend 
warrants by providing for refunding to the holder of such
103^^ State ex rel. John McEnery v. Francis T. Nioholls, 
Governor, et al., (1390) 42 La. Ann* 219#
^^^Acts of Louisiana, 1080, No. 75, sec. 8.
^^*Onlnlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1.
1918,*toW“l7"l?S5,TrT9^
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olalms the orlgiml purchase price of the scrip.10? This act 
aeema to have been a eolation for the adjudioatlon of individ­
ual elaime, but in some instaneee it appears that townships 
had not reoeived their pro rata share of lieu lands. Act Ho. 
1S5 of 1918 purposed to remedy this condition by authorizing 
the register of the state land office "'Wien it is made to 
appemr from the records of his office and such other evidence 
as he may require that a township has not received from the 
State the School Indemnity Lands to which it la entitled* 
to issue warrants in the name of the President of the School 
Board of the deficiency,** Wiieh warrants may be located upon 
any vacant state lands subject to entry.1^®
When these indemnity lazWs have been properly 
allocated to the townships entitled to them, it has been the 
policy to apply the laws governing the sixteenth sections in 
place to them,109 except when special provisions were enacted, 
as is indicated by the following:
Hhile it is true that the Act of Congress of 
May 80th, 1686, provided that school indemnity lands 
Shall be held by the same tenure and upon the same terms 
as 16th section lands, this statute, as well as other laws 
was superseded by sections 8875 and 8876, tJ. 3, Revised 
Statutes, which latter placed no limitation on the State, 
but left it free to dispose of the lands according to 
appropriate legislation provided that the proceeds should 
be turned over to the schools in the township entitled to
the indemnity,
109,...^ J May 1, 1922, to May 1, 1924, p. 677} May 1, 1924,
to May 1^ 1926, p. 483.
.. May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 438.
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Thus, it may he seen that the principle of the 
legal standing of the state to administer indemnity lands 
end their proceeds, as based on Federal provisions, for the 
benefit of the schools in those townships entitled to such 
indenmitr claims has been consistently followed,
tttle to school lend lost through use of
serin therefor. When the state accepts and sells indminity 
scrip for a section of land or more in lieu of a fractional 
sixteenth seoticm in place, the state loses its vested title 
to the school land in that township, This was declared true 
in 1914 when a plaintiff's vendor, who had secured a part of 
a sixteenth section through patent directly from the United 
States after the state had accepted and sold indemnity warrants 
for more than the 640 acres, had his ownership established by 
the court's conclusion "that the Department of the Later lor, 
in passing upon the application of Thomas J, Hickman, decided 
correctly that the selection of additional school indemnity 
in excess of the area of section 16, T, 6 H, B, 3 W,, was an 
acknowledgment on the part of the state that it had no title 
to the sixteenth section in that townbhlp,”^^^ The land in 
question at the date of issuance of patent belonged to the 
United States; consequently, the holder of the patent was 
declared as having a legal title, free from any school land 
claim thereon.2-lB
^Biggie V. MbNeely et al., (1914) 136 La. 396. 
^ I b l d .. 136 La, 391, 65 So. 658,
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The Free School Fund
This fond was a natural consequence of the act of
Congress which granted the sixteenth section of each township,
or its equivalent, in the state as a permanent source of
revenue for the public schools. Congressional provisions for
the fund wares
That.the Legislatures of Illinois, Arkansas, Loui­
siana, and Tennessee, be, and they are hereby, 
authorized to provide by law for the sale and con­
veyance in fee simple, all or any part of the lands 
heretofore reserved and appropriated by Congress 
for the use of schools within said States, and to 
invest the money arising from the sales thereof in 
some productive fund, the proceeds of which shall 
be forever applied, under the direction of said 
Legislatures, to the use and support of schools 
within the several townships end districts of 
country for which they were originally reserved 
and set apart, and for no other use or purpose 
whatever; . « • and in the apportionment of the 
proceeds of said fund, each township and district 
shall be entitled to such part thereof, and no 
more, as shell have accrued from the sum or sums 
of money arising from the sale of the school lands 
belonging to such township or district.
That if the proceeds accruing to any township or 
district from said fund, shall be insufficient for 
the support of schools therein, it shall be lawful 
for said Legislatures to invest the same in the most 
secure and productive manner, until the whole pro­
ceeds of the fund belonging to such township or 
district shall be adequate to the permanent main­
tenance and support of schools within the same:
Acts of Congress, 1842-43, "An Act to authorize the Legis­
latures of the States of Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Tennessee, to sell the lands heretofore appropriated for the 
use of schools in those States,” oh. xxxill, secs. 1-3.
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The state*8 peeponae was to make statutory provisions 
for the establishment and administration of a "Free School 
Fuad,*114 A supplementary act in 1857 provided for the ascer­
tainment of the amount of the debt due the free school fund 
by the state and directed the issuance of bonds therefor in 
denominations of one thousand dollars. It declared such fund 
to be a perpetual trust of which the income only might be 
used,115 All the state's constitutions which have dealt with 
public education have sought to perpetuate this fund. In 
1879 the debt was recognized to be $1,150,867,51; the state 
promised to retain this as a perpetual trust and to pay there­
on ah annual rate of interest.H*
Perpetuity of fund. The legislature passed, in 1872, 
an act which sought to abolish the free school fund and ordered 
the bonds composing it to be sold by the auditor and treasurer 
of the state.11? Protection of the schools from such disposi­
tion of the fund was maintained in a case in which the board 
of liquidation, provided for In the Funding Act of 1874 as 
amended the next year,H® was sued for the collection of three 
of the said bonds possessed by the plaintiff. Unoonstitution- 
ality of the act of sale was decreed by the court in 1877 as 
follows:
^^Aots of Louisiana, 1855, No. 321, secs. 32-34, 36.
llGlbid.. 1057, No. 182, secs. 1-2, 8.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art, 235.
^^Aots of Louisiana, 1872, No. 81, secs. 3, 6.
^^®Ibid.; 1874, No. 3, secs. 1-2; Extra Session, 1875,
No. 11, see. 3.
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In our opinion this aot 81 of 1872 not 
only violates the act of Congress and the legis­
lation thereunder and the const!tut Ion, but was 
an aot of spoliation, intended and designed to 
deplete the treasury of every available asset or 
fund in it. These school bonds were supposed to 
be more salable than Auditor's warrants and cer­
tificates of indebtedness with which the state had 
been deluged; hence some device to get hold of 
them had to be concocted, and act 81 was the 
result. Some of these bonds were, it appears, 
not even negotiable; hence act 61 provides and 
directs that in such case the Auditor should in­
dorse them with words to the effect that they 
were hereafter payable to bearer.
The interest of these school-fund bonds 
was pledged for the payment of the interest annually 
due to tne several towhships for school lands sold.
The third section of act 81, directing the Auditor 
to annually estimate what would have been due to 
the free-school fund, if the same had not been 
abolished, and to levy and collect a tax to pay 
interest thereon, is not a compliance with the act 
of Congress, nor does it relieve the measure of the 
character we have already given it. We regard act 
81 as violating the faith and solem pledges of the 
State, that the State quoad those bonds was and Is 
a mere trustee, and that the acts of Congress and 
the legislative action thereunder created obliga­
tions on the part of the State, in favor of the 
inhabitants of the various townships and other 
beneficiaries, which the State is not at liberty 
"to abolish" at its pleasure.
We therefore regard the sale of these 
"free-schooi bonds" held by the re3ator to be null 
and void, and that he acquired no title to them by 
virtue of the pretended sale under section six of 
said act 81.11?
A year later the court upheld its policy of main­
taining the perpetuity of the free school fund « The Louisiana 
National Bank had liquidated twenty-nine free school bonds 
sold to it under the act of 1872; the liquidation had been 
zaade mainly with a warrant which the state had issued the
Hastate of Louisiana ex rel. T. J, Durant v. The Board of 
Liquidators, (1877) 29 La. Ann, 81.
100
bank for a previous loan for levee protection# The bank 
applied to the board of liquidation to fund the bonds or to 
issue consols for the amount of the warrant representing the 
loan. The court upheld the board's refusal to fund the bonds, 
since their sale had been decreed a nullity, but ordered the 
board to fund the claim evidenced by the warrant, explaining 
that the state is justly entitled to the possession of the 
school bonds but that it could not keep the money loaned by 
refusing to meet the claim of the warrant #1^^
Again, 1879, this policy of decreeing the unoonsti- 
tutionality of destruction of the free school fund was 
followed; in this instance the auditor and the secretary of 
state, the lawful custodians of the fund, were authorized to 
demand that the bonds vhich had formerly been a portion of 
the fund be returned to the state#1^1
Disposition of interest accrued. Various provisions 
have specified that the proceeds of the free school fund are 
to be forever applied to the parishes in terms of the sections 
or parts of sections lying therein# The policy of accepting 
these proceeds as school funds to be used by the parishes 
was endorsed udien there was judicial recognition of warrants 
which represented a portion of the interest on the free school 
fund, and Which had been sold by one parish to replenish Its
120The Louisiana National Bank v# The Board of Liquidation,
(1878) 50 La. Ann. 1356.
^^^3un Mutual Insurance Company v. Board of Liquidation 
(Secretary of State and Auditor, Interveners), (1879) 31 La# 
Ann. 175.
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school t r e a s u r y A l s o ,  the state's legal counselors have 
been consistent in advising that only the income from this 
fund may be used for school purposes.
That the interest on the free school fund is to be 
distributed to the parishes correctly, to the extent that 
mistakes after many years must be righted, if demand is made, 
was established in 1864. In the involved case one parish had 
received from the state for eight years annual payments of 
free s<Aool fund interest and had expended the majority of the 
total amount in the purchase of a lot and the construction of 
a sehoolhouse. % i s  course was pursued, although the recipient 
parish knew that the fund rightfully belonged to an adjoining 
parish Tdiere lay the township which the fund represented*
The court ruled that the plaintiff parish was entitled to re­
cover the money or the property to which it had been traced 
and which represented the fund.124
Prompted by the theory that education is a state 
function, Louisiana accepted in good faith the financial 
responsibility of her public schools. The lands set apart by
las
Ibid. ; State of Louisiana ex rel. T. J * Durant v* The 
Board o i Liquidators, (1877) S9 La# Ann. 77.
123‘^ ^Qpinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana; June 1,
1912, to May l~l^i4, p. 0^4; ifiay 1, 1524, to May 1, 1926, p. 428.
1£A
School Board of East Oarroll Parish v. School Board of 
Union Parish, (1684) 36 La. Ann. 806*
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the Federal Government f o r  the support of education in the 
eta te furnished one of the basic sources of public school 
revenue*
The dominant policies pursued in the administration 
of school lands and their proceeds appear to have been the 
following:
1. The theory of using public lands as a source of 
support for the state's educational system had its beginning 
with the Ordinance of 1787 which maintained that the dissemina­
tion of knowledge is necessary for good government and that the 
sixteenth sections of the public domain should be dedicated to 
the respective states for school purposes.
Zm School lands were one of the earliest sources of 
support for public schools in Louisiana; an act of Congress 
in 1806 reserved in the Western District of the Territory of 
Orleans the sixteenth section of each township for the support 
of public schools therein.
3. In 1043 Congress authorized the Louisiana legis­
lature to provide for the disposition of school lands. The 
Constitution of 1845 acknowledged this responsibility and made 
provisions whereby a permanent source of public school support 
was created.
4. According to the Federal Government provisions 
and the laws as interpreted by the courts, the state has bean 
consistently declared the legal trustee In the administration 
of school lands and their proceeds.
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5* The general policy has been that no school lands 
may be disposed of without the consent of the inhabitants of 
the township concerned. Special provisions govern those sec­
tions Tdiich are not inhabited* Regulations concerning the 
sale price of school lands have been determined by law; where 
the board of school directors fails to adhere thereto, the 
sale may be declared illegal.
6. School lands may be recovered when there is proof 
that the disposition was not according to the authorized method 
at the time of the transfer or when there is non-payment of 
notes therefor by the purchaser* Recovery, however, is sub­
ject to prescription and estoppel and to certain rights of 
priority of title through colonial grants.
7. In general, the disposition of timber on school 
lands and of the proceeds therefrom are governed by the same 
laws as the sale of the lands. Only since 1908 has there been 
legal sanction to the effect that timber could be disposed of 
separately from the land,
8. The school board of directors acting as an agent 
of the state m y  lease school lands, the income of which is 
delegated to the current school fund of the parish.
9* The topography of Louisiana has necessitated two 
types of official surveys; sections sixteen located by the 
rectangular survey— referred to as "in place"— are reserved 
for school purposes, but those surveyed along water courses—  
referred to as "lots" or "radiating sections" or "fractional 
sections"— do not belong to the state for the benefit of schools.
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10. as a result of confliotlng olalins or any 
other cause a township did not receive a sixteenth section or 
received only a part of it, indemnity lands were granted in 
lieu thereof and if such locations could not be made satisfac­
torily, there were provisions for the issuance of indemnity 
scrip with regulations governing its sale and redemption.
The law governing sixteenth sections seems to have been 
applied to all types of lieu lands,
11. The free school fund was the natural result of 
the Congressional provisions which reserved the sixteenth 
section of each township for school purposes and specified 
that only the products from such lands or the interest on 
the proceeds of land sales might be allocated to the respec­
tive townships.
12. The perpetuity of the free school fund was 
assured by the courts of the state when an attempt by the 
legislature in 1872 to abolish the public school fund was 
declared unconstitutional. In 1879 there was constitutional 
recognition of the debt which the state was due to the free 
school fund. This specified amount was #1,150,867.51, which 
the state promised to retain as a perpetual trust and on vhich 
it agreed to pay an annual rate of interest*
CHAPTER V
PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT THROUGH 03KERAL FUNDS
CHAPTER V
PUBLIC SCHOUL SUPPORT THROUGH GKMRAI^ ÏÜIÎDS
Public taxation for the maintenance of public 
funotiona is one of the established rights of a state.^ 
Since no public school system can be created and maintained 
without funds, and since the taxing of property is one of 
the chief sources of public revenues, any state may be 
expected to utilize the taxing power in its program of 
finances. This chapter proposes to present Louisiana's 
law in making provisions for the support of her public 
schools through the avenue of general funds.
THE SCHOOL FUND IN GENERAL
On the theory that a legislature may enact, for 
the general welfare of a state, any law which is neither in 
conflict with the Federal Constitution nor prohibited by the 
organic laws of the state, the Louisiana lawmakers proceeded 
to provide for the support of public education long before 
the constitution of the state made it mandatory. In Chapter 
III of this study it was shown that Louisiana accepted the 
thsory of her responsibility to finance a program of public
^Heriaann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public school 
as a state Institution {Bloomirigton19^877 P* 56.
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education. Duriiig early statehood money was appropriated 
for the construction of buildings end maintenance of schools 
and in many Instances financial aid was given to private and 
parochial schools.2 In 1833 the state was appropriating from 
#2.50 to #4.00 par month for each child enrolled in the various 
schools.5
Legal Foundations
In the Constitutional Convention of 1844-1845,
G. Mayo, chairman of the education committee, pointed out the 
necessity of embodying the underlying principles of public 
school support in the organic lew. He gave in support of 
his statement— **This state has for many years acted with a 
degree of liberality in making appropriations for the 
erection end support of colleges and academies, and for the 
education of indigent children^4^-the fact that from 1812 to 
1845 there had been spent by the state #1,710,559.40 for the 
support of an unregulated school system. He further empha­
sized the need of state aid for free public schools and said 
that the above ^facts are stated for no other purpose than 
to bring to view the disproportion in the expenditure, and
2gdwin W. Fay, The History of Education in Louisiana 
(Washington, 1898), pp. 6^-^7.
^Acts of Louisiana, 1833, "An Aot supplementary to the 
several acts relative to Public Education," sec. 6, p. 143.
^Official Report of Debates in the Louislana Convention, 
1844-45, p. Sl6•
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actual waste of public money for want of a well regulated 
system of education."® Mayo contended that the state should 
aot only establish public schools but should "provide means 
for that purpose and for their s u p p o r t , A n  effort was 
made to provide for the establishment of public schools with­
out their being "free*” One member opposed this by declaring 
that "in the word 'free* lay the whole gist of the matter"^ 
and adding that, if the proceeds of the public lends were 
insufficient to establish and maintain the schools, "he was 
fully willing that a tax of a half a million should be raised 
to sustain t h e m . A f t e r  considerable discussion as to 
whether the state should assume the obligation of maintaining 
a system of public education article 134 was adopted; this 
not only made it mandatory that free public schools be estab­
lished, but directed the legislature to "provide means for 
their support by taxation on property or otherwise."®
In keeping with this constitutional mandate, the 
state and its parishes adopted by 1847 the policy of supporting 
public education. By that time a levy of one mill on the 
property in the state, the proceeds from school lands, and 
fines and forfeitures were being collected as the chief
^Ibld., p. 519.
'ibid., p. 906.
Gibld.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art. 154.
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educational funds and distributed to the various parishes of 
the state according to the educable children therein from six 
to sixteen years of age*^®
The delegates in the Convention of 105S accepted 
the policy of public school support by the state without 
protest. The significant amendment to the previous consti­
tution was provision for the distribution of such funds to 
the effect that; " . . .  all moneys so raised or provided, 
shall be distributed to each Parish in proportion to the 
number of free white children between such ages as shall be 
fixed by the General Assembly.
It is obvious that the Constitutional Convention 
of 1864 was affected by different theories pertaining to the 
maintenance of education. Some members advocated state 
support for schools to be established for colored children,^® 
while others felt that all children, regardless of color, 
should attend the same tax-maintained schools.^®, some even 
thought that schools for colored children should be supported 
by taxes collected from colored people and that schools for 
white children should be supported by taxes collected from 
the property owned by white p e o p l e . T h e r e  was a strong
^AOts of Louisiana, 1647, Ho. 225, sees. 2-3*
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1852, art. 136.
^Debates ih the Convention for the Hevision and Amendment 
of the ConaFilEutlon olT iHe' siate of"%ouTsi a'na, l§o¥, p p . " 7 ^ ,  5 02.
ISlbld., PP* 494-502.
^^Ibid., p. 523.
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element which favored state aid for all private^® end parochial 
schools,while others regarded it the duty of the state to 
support only public schools.Notwithstanding the many 
controversial issues, the state refused to give financial aid 
to any educational institutions except public schools.^® as 
disposition of the question of support for schools for colored 
children, the legislature, in article 141, was directed to 
provide for the education of all youth "between the ages of 
six and eighteen years, by maintenance of free public schools 
by taxation or ot,horwlse."^^
Obviously, the Constitutional Convention of 1867- 
1868 was dominated by those who believed that schools main­
tained by public taxation should bo onen to all the children 
of all the people without color distinction, b^ lth the 
direction to the legislature to provide for the support of 
public schools, it was declared that, "There shall be no 
separate schools or institutions of learning, established 
exclusively for any race by the Stato of Louisiana" and no 
municipal corporation should violate even the spirit of the
law.20
po. 72, 476.
^^Ibld.. pp. 476, 489-502.
^'ibld., pp. 477, 529.
l®Constltutlon of Louisiana, 1884, art. 146. 
^^Ibld., art. 141.
SOlbld., 1858, arts. 135-136.
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The legislature in 1869 followed the policy of 
general support, as implied in the oonstltutlon adopted the 
year before, by raising the general state levy for public 
eduoation from one to two m i l l s . 21
In 1079 a liberal attitude was again reflected in 
the organic law to the extent that there was provision for 
the support of free public schools for all children of the 
state between the ages of six and eighteen y e a r s . 2 2  Another 
Interesting feature of this convention was an attempt to 
interpret what was meant by the public school fund;2® article 
229 explained it to consist of:
1. The proceeds of taxation for school 
purposes, as provided in this Constitution.
2. The interest on the proceeds of all 
public lands heretofore granted by the United States 
for the use and support of public schools.
3. Of lands and other property which may 
hereafter be bequeathed, granted or donated to the 
State, or generally for school purposes.
4. All funds or property, other than 
unimproved lands, bequeathed or granted to the state, 
not designated for other purposes.
6. The proceeds of vacant estates falling 
under the law to the State of Louisiana.**
Educational finance was not a controversial issue 
in the Constitutional Convention of 1890. Interest of the
2^Acts of Louisiana, 1869, No. 181, sec* 57.
22constitutlon o f  Louisiana, 1879, art. 224.
2®official Journal of the proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention or the State of Louisiana, 107^7 PP. l^ îi,
2*Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art* 829.
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people, however, wee demonstrated by the presentation of a 
petition from the oitizens of Rapides Parish which reoommended 
more liberal provisions for the support of public schools 
by special taxes and suggested that citizens of local districts 
should be permitted to tax their own property for school 
p u r p o s e s . 25 Q^e significant change was that the legislature 
was directed to provide for the enumeration of educable 
children as a basis for the distribution of the general 
school fund as described above and to appropriate at least 
"one and one-quarter mills of the six mills tax levied and 
collected by the state" for the support of public s c h o o l s . 2 5  
This remained intact until an amendment in 1918 which increased 
the rate to one and one-half mills.2?
The Constitutional Convention of 1981 seemed to 
assume a liberal attitude toward the support of public educa­
tion* Such attitude is reflected in a resolution introduced 
in the beginning of the convention which reads as follows;
Whereas, public institutions are of such 
vast importance in the regulation and perpetuation 
of civilization that no State can afford to neglect 
the importance of their support,
And whereas, that all such institutions 
as are provided for through the medium of taxation 
or other forceful means.
And whereas, the maintenance of all such 
institutions should be borne with equal ratio of 
burden on all taxable property of the state,
25official Journal of the Proceedings of the Const!tutIpnal 
Convention of the éiete of 'Louisiana, 1Ô9FT p* 58'."""'"
25constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 854.
2?constitution of Louisiana, 1913, art. 254, as amended by 
Act NO. 226 of 1918, adopted November, 1918.
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And whereas, our present mode of taxation 
are (alo) unintentionally discriminate in character, 
placing as It does a greater burden on the taxable 
property of many subdivisions that is not necessary 
to be borne by others, to wit, Special Taxes,
And whereas, the intention of the following 
resolution is not so much to raise the school fund 
In the aggregate but to equalize the burden of 
responsibility,
Therefore, be it resolved, That this 
Convention adhere to democratic principles by 
inserting into our tax laws a clause providing for 
a five mill general fund school tax to be dis­
tributed equally between the parishes of the state 
in proportion to the educable children between the 
age of six and eighteen in the respective parishes**®
This theory was put into practice in the embodiments of the
organic law to the extent of the provision that the public
school funds of the state shall consist of:
First, The proceeds of two and one- 
half mills of the taxes levied and colleoted by 
the state ; provided, that out of the portion of 
said taxes collected in the city of New Orleans 
fifty thousand dollars (#50,000.00) shall be 
paid annually to the Isaac Delgado Trade School.
Second, The proceeds of the poll tax, 
which shall be applied exclusively to the support 
of public schools in each parish in which collected, 
and shall be paid by the tax collector directly 
to the parish school board.
Third, The interest on the proceeds of 
lands heretofore or hereafter granted by the united 
States for school purposes, and the revenues 
derived from unsold portions thereof.
Fourth, All funds and the proceeds of 
lands and property, other than unimproved lands, 
heretofore or hereafter bequeathed, granted, or 
escheated to the state, not designated for any 
other purpose.
Fifth, Such other funds as the Legis­
lature may appropriate.
2®official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convent ion o f  the State of Lourslena. 19817 pp. 93-94“.
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All eo&ool fund®, except the poll tax 
and the Interest on proceeds of lands granted by 
the United states for the support of public schools* 
shall be distributed to each parish in proportion 
to the number of children therein between the 
ages of six and eighteen years. The Legislature 
shell proxide for the enumeration of eduoable 
children.
Levying and Collecting the Regular school Tax
The parish treasurer as collector of state school 
fund. As some of the public school funds come from the 
state, it is necessary for an official to be charged with 
the responsibility of collecting said fund, since the 
parish treasurer is the depositary of the school fund due 
his parish, it appears that he might have the right to 
demand payment from the state in case of default. In 1857 
a decision was handed down from the supreme court in which 
Judge H. M. Spofford, by quoting from the governing 
statute,50 held; ”»The sums due to each of the parishes 
in this state from the annual collection of the school 
tax, shell be paid quarterly to the treasurer thereof, by 
the State Tax Collector.#*51 In response to the parish 
treasurer's request, the court ordered the state tax 
collector to pay not only the amount due the parish school 
fund, which was In arrears, but also 20 per cent upon the 
principal as a penalty from e stated date.5%
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. IE, sec. 14.
50Revised Statutes of Louisiana, 1856, *Free Public Schools,* 
sec, 6, p. 191.
51j, B. Hendricks v. A, J. Bobo et al., securities of 
Barham, (1857) 12 La. Ann. 620.
52ibld.
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Provisions for looal levies. The state's right to 
support public education through the general school fund does 
not preclude municipalities, parishes and school districts 
from contributing to the general fund for the benefit of their 
respective territories, when authorized by the legislature.
In fact, the derivation of public school funds from looal 
tax levies has long been an established principle in Lou- 
i f i l a n a . 5 3  parish assistance was authorized by the act of 
18705* which gave police Juries the authority to levy a 
maximum of two mills in their respective parishes for school 
purposes, in 1879 looal tax levies were given constitutional 
recognition in the provisions that "every parish may levy a 
tax for the public schools therein, which shall not exceed 
the state tax; provided that with such tax the whole amount 
of parish taxes shall not exceed the limits of parish taxation 
fixed by this Constitution."55 Local levies for school 
purposes were optional with parishes and districts until 
1868, when a law was enacted to the effect that police 
Juries were required to appropriate annually as much as 
one and one-half mills of the parish assessment to the public 
schools.56 Organic sanction of legislative authority to
55^cts of Louisiana, 1820-21, "An Act to extend and improve 
the system of Public Education in the state of Louisiana," 
sec. 4, p. 54.
54ibid., Extra session, 1870, Wo. 6, sec. 46.
BSoonstitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 229.
56^ots of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 54.
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provide for looal ievia© was continued In 1898,5? and 
through the adoption of an amendment to the constitutif^ in 
1910 the police Juries of the various parishes were requited 
to levy and collect a three-mill tax annually for the use 
of schools in their respective parishes*5® The Constitution 
of 1913 made no changes in the r e q u i r e m e n t s , 59 an amend­
ment thereto in 1918 reduced the rate to one and one-half 
m il ls.However, this reduction was of short duration, 
for the Constitution of 1921 put the rate back to three mills 
except where the parish school board might certify to the 
police Jury that a smaller levy would be sufficient.
Const itutionality of local levies. Whether or not 
the "Act to establish Free public Schools in the State of 
Louisiana,gave the district board of school directors a 
right to levy and collect local taxes for the benefit of 
the schools in its district was a question decided by the 
court in 1852.45 specific ground of attack against 
the levy so laid was that the practice was in violation of 
article 127 of the Constitution of 1645, which declares,
5^0onstitutlon of Louisiana, 1898, art. 254»
58lbid., as amended by Act No. 257 of 1910, adopted 
November, 1910.
5®Constitutlon of Louisiana, 1913, art. 255.
4Qjhid., as amended by Act No. 218 of 1918, adopted 
November, 1918.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 15.
4^Acts of Louisiana, 1847, Ho. 225.
^^villeneuve Bordelon at el. v. Thomas H. & W. B. Lewis, 
(1852) 8 La. Ann. 472.
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"Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state."
In arriving at the decree the court referred to 
several decisions which had involved the constitutionality of 
special taxes for purpose© other than schools, but which 
involved the same principle as in the case at bar.^^ The 
following statement in the Lexington case was quoted as being 
equally applicable to Louisiana:
"Among these political ends and principles, 
equality, as far as practicable, and security of 
property against irresponsible power, are eminently 
conspicuous in our State constitution, but an exact 
equalization of the burden of taxation is unattain­
able and utopian."45
In the Providence case the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
"However absolute the right of an individual may 
be, it is still in the nature of that right, that
it must bear a portion of the public burthens;
and that portion must be determined by the legis­
lature. The interest, wisdom end Justice of the 
representative body, and its relations with its 
constituents, furnish the only security, whore there 
is no express contract against unjust and excessive 
taxation; as well as against unwise legislation 
generally.
By a comparison with the second Municipality case, there 
was the explanation that If the legislature had a right under
the act here in contest "to delegate the power of taxation
to the City of New Orleans, or one of its municipalities,
44^he providence Bank v, Aipheus Billings and Thomas G. 
Pittman, (1820) 4 Peters 514, 7 L. Ed. 959; City of Lexington 
V. Mcquillan, (1839) 9 Dane 513, 35 Am. Deo. 159; The Second 
Municipality of New Orleans v. Duncan, (1047) 2 La* Ann. 182.
45villeneuve Bordelon et al. v. Thomas H. & ?/. B. Lewis, 
(1852) 8 La. Ann, 472.
Ibid., p. 473.
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to promote publie education* as we have already determined, 
there is no good reason why the same power should not be 
delegated to school directors in the various parishes of the
State."47
To another ground of attack— that the tax was 
levied to liquidate the indebtedness of the board's pred­
ecessors in office— the court said:
" . . .  if no tax was imposed by the former directors, 
and the people of the district have had the benefit 
of the schools, they are bound In conscience to pay 
those expenses for which a tax might have been 
imposed, and they have suffered no irfjury by the 
delay which has been given them. Laws should 
receive a reasonable interpretation**4o
Since no evidence was submitted to prove that the 
tax was equivalent to spoliation, or the unlawful appropria­
tion of private property, the court advised that the only 
remedy the defendants had was the ballot box, if the conduct 
of the school directors was not in accord with their wishes. 
Hence, the constitutionality of local levies was upheld and 
there was recognized the legality of those which did not 
amount to spoliation.
The police jury's position In the levying of looal 
taxes. According to the interpretation of the law by the 
supreme court the levying of a parish tax for school purposes 
was at one time optional with the police Jury. When a school 
board sought a mandamus to compel the police jury to levy such 
a tax of one and one-half mills, under the provisions of 
flection 54 of Act No. 81 of 1888, the court held the act to 
be permissive only, as follows:
47lbld.
119
. . the section under consideration must be read 
ae meaning that the police Jurors of the several 
parishes, etc,, are authorized to levy, etc., and 
cannot he viewed as imposing upon them absolutely, 
the duty or obligation to levy the tax.
It consequently follows that the term 
used is not mandatory, but parmiasivo only, and 
that the propriety of the levy of tho tax is 
merely optional with police Juries, who. In 
their wisdom, may or not exercise the prerogative.**
In another ease, where a elmiler question was Involved, the
court bald that the legislature oarinot force e parish to
levy a tax for school purposes, but that it may authorize
it to do 8 0 , end that when such authorization is granted
and the pariah undertakes to levy and collect the tax,
the constitutional limits must be observed.
In 1902 the legislature saw fit to amend the pro­
visions on this subject to read, " . . .  no polio© Jury of 
any parish shall levy for the support of its schools less 
than one and one-quarter mills on the dollar of th© assessed 
valuation of the property t h e r e o f . Both the attorney 
general®^ and the supreme oourt^® have referred to this ©n- 
aotmant as being a mandatory charge to the polie© Jury to 
levy the tax as specified.
4^The state ex rel. parish Board of School Directors v. 
Police Jury, (1888) 40 La. Ann. 7&6.
5®The State ex rel. Board of Directors of public Schools 
of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (1890) 42 La. Ana.
92, 7 SO. 674.
5^Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, aoo. 63.
82
1908
^Onlnione of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
, to 1, 190S, p. 281.
5®wllliams et al. v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish, 
(1914) 135 L B b 448, 05 So. 004.
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The Constitution of 1898 had fixed the maximum limit 
of the levy by the police Jury at six mills with the provision 
that the whole amount of parish taxes should not exceed the 
constitutional m a x i m u m . A f t e r  another change in the speci­
fication of the minimum amount* the court Interpreted the 
police jury's duty in regard to the school levy in excess of 
the stated minimum as being discretionary:
The Constitution* as amended, agreeably to Joint 
Resolution No. 857 of 1910, p. 437, declares that 
the police Juries shall devote the proceeds of 
"at least three mills of the annual tax which they 
are empowered to levy" to the support of the public 
schools, and, under other provisions of law, con­
stitutional and statutory, they cannot devote more 
than 6 mills of sUch annual tax to that object.
They may, however, levy special taxes in addition 
to the annual tax, upon being specially authorized.
But whether they shell devote more than 3 mills of 
the annual tax to the schools is left to their 
discretion, subject to the condition that they 
ere bound to provide for the expense necessary to 
the discharge of the functions of their parishes 
as political corporations; . . .55
Opinions from the state's legal advisers have consistently 
maintained that the police Juries In the various parishes are 
required to levy the minimum tax as provided In the constitu­
tion.®* Thus, court decisions and opinions of the attorneys 
general have consistently upheld the policy that It is left 
to the discretion of the police Jury to determine the amount 
of the annual parish levy to be used for schools as long as 
minimum and maximum limits are observed.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 854.
®®Wllliams et al# v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish, (1914) 
135 La. 451?452.
®*Oplnions of tj^ Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1910, to May 1, iKS, p.^ 107; May Ï, 1^8,to May 1, 1980, 
p. 787.
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Essentiality of tax iQvy b© In budget, since 
the passage of Act No# 27 of 1908 a valid tax levy by the 
police jury must be included in the regular budget.6? a 
failure to conform to this statute was the principal issue 
pertaining to the school tax in a case entered in the courts 
in 1909 and which was subject to various remands and appeals.®® 
The pertinent feature of these litigations was to determine 
if a three-mill school tax which had been assessed on the 
property of Livingston Parish by the police jury but not 
included in the regular budget could be legally collected 
by the tax collector. A tax of four mills had been budgeted 
but the subsequent amount levied was seven mills. In ruling 
on this question Chief Justice Joseph A. Breaux cited many 
decisions on different phases of the budget showing that a 
tax to be collectable must be definitely stated in the budget, 
or in a supplementary budget.The statute under which the
57Ibid., May 1, 1908, to May 1, 1910, p. 163,
®®Howcott V. Smart, state and Parish Tax Collector, et al., 
(1909) 125 La. 50, 51 So. 64; Ibid., (1911) 128 La. ISO, 54 
So. 586; Ibid., (1912) 130 La."3^, 58 So. 515; Ibid., (1913) 
133 La. 6Srr'63 So. 281.
®^George K. Shotwell v. City of New Orleans et als., (1884) 
36 La# Ann. 938, approved The Parish Board of school Directors
V. The City of Shreveport, (1095) 47 La. Ann. 1310, 17 So.
823; State ex rel. Douglas v. Kennedy et el., (1908) 121 La. 
757, 46 So. 7 96; Nathan Lorie v. Bennett Hitchcock, Tax 
Collector, et el., (1874) 26 La. Arm. 154; Isaac Levy v. E. B. 
Mentz, Sheriff, et als., (1871) 23 La. iinn. 361; Police Jury 
of Jefferson Parish v, F. J. LaBarre, (1877-1880) Man. Unrep. 
Cas. 110; The parish of Lincoln v. J. G. Huey, (1878) 30 La. 
Ann. 1»44; swords, sheriff, v. Daigle, (1902) 107 La. 510,
32 SO. 94; Constant et al. v. Parish of East Carroll et al.,
(1901) 105 Le. 286, 29 So. 728.
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tax in question was imposed had not been adopted before the 
budget was advertised, but the court saw this as no reason 
for not Including the amount in a supplemental budget, or 
for passing the additional levy over in silence. Respon­
sibility of the perish was placed as follows:
. . . under the statute, the parish is responsible 
for this tax. It is a parish tax, and all such 
taxes should be budgeted. It is a part of the 
parochial affairs In charge of the police jury.
If these three mills on the dollar can be left out 
of the budget entirely, then there are other 
amounts which may as well be left out.*®
The court’s decree, as upheld by a rehearing on the 
final suit and as arrived at by parts in the various suits, 
declared the excess tax of three mills illegal and perpetually 
enjoined its collection* Thereby, it was definitely estab­
lished that a levy must be included in the adopted budget to 
be legal. A similar view was handed down by the attorney 
general in 1933**1
Collection of minimum tax on all property in parish 
mandatory. The city of Monroe refused to levy, collect, and 
deliver to the school board of its parish three mills of the 
annual tax which it was empowered to levy.*^ The court 
issued a mandamus to compel the city to turn over the amount 
in question, stating to the city that this was a debt imposed
*®Howcott V. Smart, state and Parish Tax Collector, et al,, 
(1911) 128 La. 155*
Clopinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1922, to May 1, 1?^, p. 44é.
*&State ex rel. Parish of Ouachita Board of school Directors 
V. City of Monroe et al., (1915) 132 La. 82, 60 So* 1025.
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by the constitution and must be paid, even if doing so meant 
the closing of its own school for the lack of funds or that 
the city would have to cease as a municipality. Thereby, 
the court forced adherence to the constitution and endorsed 
support to the schools according to legal provisions, regard­
less of the consequences to the debtor.
Many opinions from the state's attorneys have 
supplemented the Judicial decision by Insisting that under 
the law all incorporated cities and towns which ere exempt 
from the payment of parish taxes must levy, collect, and turn 
over to the parish school boards the minimum tax required to 
be levied in the parish for school purposes.*®
Necessity for proper and prompt delivery. The law 
governing the collection and delivery of parish taxes for 
school purposes provides, "The tax so collected shall be 
paid over by the collector of parish taxes to the Treasurer 
of the Parish Board of School Directors, and shall by them be 
apportioned, . . ."*4 Jefferson Perish a situation arose 
which involved an interpretation of this statute. The police 
jury had levied for the years 1801 and 1882 a tax of two 
mills for school purposes. The tax was collected by the 
sheriff of the parish but instead of paying the funds to the 
treasurer of the perish school board, as the law directs, he
*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1910, to May”1, 1911^ , pp. ÉVB,"^9; May 1, 191^,’To May 1, 
1920, p. 648; May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 536.
*^Acta of LoulDiana, Extra Session, 1877, No. 23, sec. 28.
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paid them to the parish treasurer who held them and refused 
to pay them to the school board treasurer. Thereupon, 
mandamus was applied for to compel the parish treasurer to 
comply with the law.*®
In reply to the claim that the parish treasurer
held the fhnda only as an agent of the police jury and could
not pay them put except in compliance with their resolutions
and warrants, the court held that this was generally correct
but did not apply to funds which are assigned by law to the
control and custody of other parish functionaries over which
the police jury had no right of control. The court maintained:
If the tax collector, through misconception of the 
law or otherwise, has paid over these funds to a 
parish official different from the one designated 
by the law, the duty to pay over the funds to the 
latter passed, with the funds themselves, to the 
official so receiving, and is a proper subject of 
enforcement by mandamus.**
A portion of the funds had previously been paid out 
under the direction of the police jury, and a mandamus was 
issued compelling the parish treasurer to pay the remainder 
in his possession to the parish school board. Thereby the 
Jurisdiction of the school board treasurer as custodian of 
the school funds of his parish was definitely upheld.
It appears that the police jury has not only the 
right to levy a parish school tax, but that the taxes 
collected are to be paid by the treasurer of the police jiury
*®The state of Louisiana ex rel. Gervais Leohe, District 
Attorney, et al. v. George Geier, Treasurer of Jefferson 
Parish, Left Bank, et al., (1885) 35 La. Ann. 1148.
66Ibid., p. 1149.
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to the sohool board oontinuously as they come In. This policy 
was upheld when the court sustained the claims of a certain 
school board against the parish polio© jury,*?
Since the money for the unpaid balance of the 
budget— the claim presented— was practically all in the 
possession of the police jury and since the taxes collected 
for the us© of the sohool board constituted a trust fund for 
which the police jury was liable, the court ordered that body 
to pay to the board of school directors the total sum demanded, 
with legal interest from Judicial order until paid. Apparently, 
no other decision from the court was necessary to establish 
this principle, for all opinions from the attorneys general 
on this subject are of the same theory,*® Thus, the inter­
pretations of the law have definitely upheld that all local 
school taxes must be given into the custody of the parish 
school treasurer and that the police jury is liable for the 
school fbnd while it is in its possession and for prompt 
delivery of it to the school board,
Minor Sources of the General school Fund
Tax levies furni^ the major part of the state and 
local school revenue but there are other sources that are 
herein considered minor but which furnish an appreciable 
amount of the revenue, some of these sources have their
*?Board of school Directors of Iberia Parish v. Police Jury 
of Iberia Parish, (1909) 135 La, 416, 49 So, b.
*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1920, to May p, 556.
186
origin in statutory enactment; others originated in the 
organic law. School lands and their proceeds, having been 
treated previously, are omitted from this group.
These minor revenues administered by the state 
include mainly the gasoline, severance, and malt tax. The 
gasoline tax*® pays to the credit of the state board of 
education approximately one-half cent on every gallon of 
gasoline sold retail. The state severance tax is a tax 
placed on natural resources taken from the soil or water.?® 
Certain fractional parts are distributed to the parishes 
from Tdilch the tax was collected, then the residue after 
distributions to certain prescribed funds have been made and 
the cost of free textbooks has been met is applied to the 
general school fund administered by the state.?^ The malt 
tax was provided by statute;?^ its proceeds are credited to 
the state board of education for discretionary distribution 
to parishes as e means of equalizing the cost of public sohool 
support.?®
Less important minor sources administered by the 
state are proceeds from vacant successions, the inheritance
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art, 6, sec. 22, as 
amended by Act No. 1 of 1950, Extra Session, adopted November, 
1930.
?®Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 10, sec. 21.
?^Acts of Louisiana, 1928, No. 100, secs. 1-2.
?% b i d ., 1930, No. 34.
?®Ibid., secs. 12-13.
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tax, and the revenue on tobacco, a s authorized by organic 
law,?4 the state does not merely keep the money from vacant 
successions on deposit but uses It and must refund it 
through legislative appropriation if a rightful possessor 
claims it.?® The entire revenue of the inheritance tax is 
allocated to the général school fUnd.?* The tobacco tax, 
having been authorized for a period of four years only,?? 
may be classified as a term tax. This was levied on all 
forms of tobacco at the rate of one cent on each ten cents 
or fractional part thereof of the retail price.?® The 
constitutionality of this tax was tested and upheld.?®
Minor school revenues administered locally include 
the poll tax, a fractional part of the state severance tax, 
and various fines and forfeited bonds. The poll tax as a 
source of sohool revenue was embodied in the organic lew in 
1868, with the direction: "One half of the funds derived
from the poll tax herein provided for shall be appropriated
?4constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 254.
?®Opinions_ ^  Attorney M  May, 1896,
to May, 1898, p. HO.
?*Constitutlone of Louisiana; 1898, art. 235; 1913, art. 
235; Acts of Louisiana, 1904, No. 45, sec. 1; Opinions of the 
Attorney General of Louisiana; May 1, 1904, to May Ï,. T^Oê,
p. 2li>; May 1, 19Ü5, tl) May 1, 1910, p. 249.
??Acts of Louisiana, 1926, No. 197, sec, 16.
?®Ibid., secs. 2, 7.
?®Lionel*s Cigar Store et al. v. McFarland, Supervisor of 
Public Accounts, (1927) 162 La. 956, 111. So. 341.
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exclusively to the support of the free public schools through­
out the state, end the University of New Orleans."®® However, 
by 1879 the people were willing to devote this source of 
revenue in its entirety to the public school fund, as is 
indicated by the organic provision;
The funds derived from the collection of 
the poll tax shall be applied exclusively to the 
maintenance of the public schools as organized 
under this Constitution, and shall be applied 
exclusively to the support of the public schools 
in the parish in which the same shall be collected, 
and shall be accounted for and paid by the col­
lecting officers directly to the competent school 
authorities of each parish.®^
To the parish from dhlch the state severance tax is collected 
ttere is paid not less than one-fifth on oil or gas and one- 
third on sulphur of the amount collected, with the provision 
that specified maximums are to be recognized and that dis­
tributions are to be made quarterly.®^ A severance tax 
collected in one parish must be paid to the police jury of 
that parish®® and credited to the general school fund therein.®* 
All fines and forfeited bonds in criminal cases must be turned 
over to the school board of the parish in which the offonse 
occurred,®* and no part is distributable to c municipal school
®®ConBtitution of Louisiana, 1868, art. 141.
®llbid., 1879, art. 227.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1926, No. 301.
®®Ooinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1932, % 'W r i T l ^ ,  — 9^5.--------------------
®*Ibid., May 1, 1932, to April 1, 1934, p. 788.
®*Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 64; Opinions of 
the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1914, to 'May~I,
me7 p.
129
fund.®* Another type of fines which goes into the local 
perish school fund is that levied for violations of state 
conservation laws.®?
By this enumeration it may he seen that the income 
from various minor sources constitutes a substantial part of
both the state and local public school fund.
Disposition of the public sohool Fund
Oustodiana of the sohool fund, a s  depositary of 
the school funds the parish treasurer is the guardian of all 
school funds paid in during his term of office,®® end to this 
effect his sureties are bound. In the Clements case, the 
court handed down a decision which held the sureties respon­
sible for the proper accounting of all school funds which 
had been handled by the parish treasurer regardless of whether 
his term of office bad ended or of what disposition had been 
made by the board.®®
The statute which established the office of treas­
urer of the public school funds of the parish®* made that
officer custodian of the school funds with the power of
®*Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana; May 1, 
1918, tcTTZay^l, 19#0, "p. 412; May Ï, lW2, to May 1, 1924, 
p. 397.
®?ActB of Louisiana, 1912, No* 127; Opinions of tjie Attorney 
General of Louisiana: June 1, 1912, to May 1, i W d , p.
May 1, 1^8» to April 30, 1930, p. 157.
88Acts of Louisiana, 1869, No. 121, sec. 36.
®®John Clements, President of the Police Jury of the Parish 
of Rapides, V. Eugene R. Biossat et als., (1874) 26 La. Arm. 243.
9*ùCts of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1870, No. 6, sec. 21.
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disbursing them exclusively on the warrants of the board of 
school directors, to whom he must render account semi-annually 
or "as often as required." This was held In a litigation 
dealing with an indictment charge of embezzlement.®^ Therein 
the interpretation of "treasurer" was given by the court as 
follows; "The entrusting of school funds to him 'as treas­
urer of the school funds' was necessarily on entrusting for 
the purpose of 'safe keeping or disbursement,' because, under 
the law, they could have been entrusted to him, as treasurer, 
for no other purpose."®®
The parish treasurer is custodian of the funds of 
the school board to the extent that his failure to account 
for the funds on demand classifies him as guilty of embezzle­
ment, regardless of the source of the money. When a treas­
urer of Winn Parish was convicted of embezzlement of the 
sohool funds, he was sentenced to pay a fine equal to the 
amount embezzled and to be confined at hard labor in the 
penitentiary for five years.®®
By section 65 of Act No. 232 of 1908, the parish 
superintendent of schools became in each parish (except the 
parish of Orleans) the treasurer of school funds and thus 
custodian thereof, as was held in an embezzlement suit In 
1926. Money entrusted to this officer as parish superin-
®^he state of Louisiana v. W. F. Lames, (1887) 39 La. 
Ann. 966, 3 So. 93.
92lbid.. 39 La. Ann. 989.
V. Mathis, (1901) 108 La. 203, 30 So. 834.
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tendent is entrusted to him as treasurer under the responsi­
bility and duty defined by statute.®*
Thus, regardless of what officer is custodian of 
the school funds, he must account for those funds according 
to the governing statute at the expense of punishment for 
embezzlement in case of failure in this respect.
Adherence to legal regulations required, parish 
school boards are compelled to dispose of the funds entrusted 
to them as directed by the law. in answer to a claimant who 
sued the president of a school board for the collection of a 
warrant practically seven years old,®* Judge W. 0. wyly 
reasoned as follows;
We do not see any cause of action against 
the defendant. He never employed the plaintiff to 
teach the public school he claims to have taught in 
the parish of Assumption in the years 1062, 1863, 
and 1864, for which the warrant was given, and the 
corporation of which he is president was not then 
in existence. Nor is it the successor of the school 
board which existed in that parish prior to the 
Constitution of 1868. It is well settled that the 
powers of corporations of this character extend no 
further than the provisions of the act creating 
them. Act No. 6, approved sixteenth of March, 1870, 
and act No. 8, approved twenty-fifth of February,
1871, which created the present public school system, 
will be searched in vain to find any authority con­
ferred on the defendant to settle claims of the kind 
declared on by the plaintiff. It Is made no part 
of his duty to pay the outstanding liabilities of 
former school directors, or any claims held by 
teachers prior to the acts of 1870 and 1871. on 
the contrary, the law in express terms provides 
that all such claims "shall be examined by the State
®*State V. Price, (1926) 161 La. 686, 109 So. 388.
®®F. a. Offut V. A. J. Aoheverra, President of the Board 
of school Directors, Parish of Assumption, (1872) 24 La. Ann. 93.
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Board of Public Education and referred by them to 
the next General Assembly." Section 51, Act No, Ô 
of extra session of 1870.®*
The Judicial conclusion was: "The school hoard ought not to
be compelled to apply the money confided to it to any other
purpose than that directed by law, and this court will not
require it to be done."®?
The treasurer of the school board must render account
for all school funds expended by him and his account is
acceptable only to the extent that it adheres to the legal
regulations in effect at the time. When one treasurer sought
to account for an expenditure by claiming that it had been
applied to a debt of the school board, although there had been
drawn no warrant by the president of the school board for
such expenditure, his explanation was held to be insufficient
account and Judgment for the amount was rendered against him
and his surety. However, it was provided that the treasurer
would be allowed to bring action in a different proceeding
to claim this amount. The court held that the school board,
not the treasurer, was to determine what application should
be made of funds.®®
This adherence has been consistently advised. In
1910 the Luchini case®® apparently showed that the sohool
board and the police jury of Caddo Parish had mutually agreed
, pp. 93-94.
''ibid.. p. 94.
®®Oharies K. Ealer, President, ©t al. v. Abraham Millspaugh 
et el., (1880) 32 La. Ann. 901.
®®Luehini et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1910) 126 La. 972, 
53 so. 68.
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that the former body would pay out of the school funds the 
rewards for convicted violators of the prohibition lew, since 
the money collected from the fines was to be turned over to 
the common school thnd. Chief Justice Breaux pointed out 
that sohool boards act under delegated powers and that the 
statute^** providing this source of revenue required the 
money to be expended for educational purposes only.
The seven-mill tax for schools in Orleans Parish 
is divided into two separate funds; the one, derived from 
five and one-fourth mills, is for any use in aid of the 
public schools; the other, derived from the remaining one 
and three-fourths mills, must be used exclusively for 
"purchasing, constructing, repairing, end maintaining 
buildings for public school purposes,"1*1 When the sohool 
board attempted to pay janitors' salaries from the levy of 
one and three-fourths mills, the court decreed the work 
of the Janitors not sufficiently "maintenance" to warrant 
payment of their salaries out of a fund constitutionally 
provided for "maintenance," which term means holding, keeping, 
or preserving the buildings in their existing state or 
condition,!*® \
The attorneys general, in handing down opinions on 
this subject, have brought practically to date the interpre­
tation that the disposition of the public sohool fund must
l**Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No, 814, sec. 64.
lOloonstitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 16.
!*®0rleans parish School Board v. Murphy, Commissioner of 
public Finance, (1924) 156 La. 935, 101 So. 268.
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not permit of diversion and must be according to controlling 
statutory law.1*®
Apportionment of school funds. From an early date 
tbs policy of the court seema to have been to adhere to strict 
interpretation of the governing law regerding the apportionment 
of sohool funds, not only in the initial distributions, but 
to the extent of making corrections of mistakes, where possible. 
One illustration of this was the reduction of the share of 
Orleans Parish in one distribution by the excess amount which 
it had received in a previous distribution, through a mistake 
in the treasurer's announcement of the sum to be distributed 
by the state. The parish complained of this action of the 
state superintendent of education but the court's answer was 
rejection of the plea.!** Another illustration of the same 
principle, but opposite circumstances, was the Judicial order 
that St. Landry Parish, which had received less per capita 
in one year than its pro rata share, be paid the lacking 
amount from the balance on hand for that year or, if necessary, 
from the revenues of succeeding years--the amount to be 
obtained by deducting on a pro rata basis from the shares of 
those parishes which had received an excess when the parish 
of St. Landry received a deficient amount.!** A similar
!*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1916, to m y  1* iWIS, p. 455; May 1, lOTS, to May 1, 1920, 
p. 636; May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 522; May 1, 1928, to
May 1, 1924, p. 422; May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 204.
! * * T h e  State ex rel. The Board of School Directors of the 
Parish of Orleans v. Edwin H. Fay, Superintendent of Public 
Education, (18B4) 36 La. Ann. 241.
10®Andru6 et al. v. Board of Directors of Parish of St.
Landry, (1902) 108 La. 386, 32 so. 420.
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principle of corrections in apportionment has been upheld by
the attorney general*!**
The right of precedence pertaining to central or
high schools in apportionment was upheld in the Andrus case,
supra 1 in the legal denial of the claim that all the funds
should be used for the support of the district schools, in
theorizing on the possibilities of distribution on the
pleaded basis, the court maintained that if:
• • • it be held that the central or high schools, 
as well as the district schools, must depend for 
their support upon the proportion of the school 
f\md allotted to the particular districts in which 
they are established, the results, as it seems to 
us, will be that the children in tlie less populous 
districts will be denied the advantages of the 
high-school education which it is the idea of the 
law to place within the possible reach of all the 
children of the parish, and, instead of being able 
to establish such schools when or where "necessary," 
the boards will be able to establish them only in 
populous and comparatively wealthy districts. We 
take it, therefore, that the law is to be construed 
as though it read:
"The parish boards shall distribute the school 
funds to the several districts in the parishes in 
proportion to the number of persons in such dis­
tricts between the ages of six and eighteen years: 
provided, said boards, with the sanction of the 
state board of education, end when suitable sites 
and buildings have been otherwise furnished, may 
establish such central, or high, schools as may be 
necessary, end, for their maintenance, may draw 
upon the general school funds before apportioning 
the same to the several school districts.
The gradual change in the policy of statutory pro­
visions for the apportionment of the parish school funds was
!**Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1910, to May“1, iH?, p. Sëô.
!*?Andrus et al. v. Board of Directors of Pariah of St. 
Landry, (1903) 100 La. 393.
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traced in the Martin ease!*® 1910* The claim therein was
for a shortage because the parish school funds had not been
distributed in proportion to the number of children of sohool
age, as required by section 7 of Act Ko* 81 of 1888. in
tracing the changes in the various statutes providing for a
system of public schools, the court showed that the provision
for apportionment according to the number of school children
in the several districts, as included in the act of 1888, was
repealed by implication through omission thereof in Acts Nos.
314 of 1902, 167 of 1904, and 49 of 1908. In the act of 1902
there was express repeal, since it contained provision for
repealing ell laws in conflict with itself, and the provision
of the 1868 act was definitely in conflict. Where the early
statute provided for apportionment according to the number
of children in the various districts, the later statute made
it obligatory upon the parish school board "to determine the
number of schools to be opened, the location of the school-
house s, the number of teachers to be employed, and their
salaries."!*® The weakness and unfairness of the 1868
statute was pointed to as follows;
. * . it deprived the looal authorities of a very 
necessary discretion in the apportionment of the 
school funds as between the races, with the result 
that in some parishes the colored children received 
the bulk of the school funds, although the whole 
of said funds, practically, had been contributed 
by the parents of the white children; and that it
!*®State ex rel. Martin et al. v. Webster parish Sohool Board, 
(1910) 126 La. 392, 52 So. 555.
!*®Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 8*
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also had the effect of making it impraotioable 
to maintain schools in the sparsely settled parts 
of the country.!!*
The court held that a "discretionary control of the sohool 
funds is absolutely necessory, because schools cannot be 
established end maintained wi thout funds. Discretionary 
control of the one necessarily carries with it discretionary 
control of the other."!!! The same policy was reflected In 
Act No. SI4 of 1912, which granted the sohool board discretion­
ary powers in the apportionment of the general school funds.!!® 
According to the interpretations which attorneys 
general have placed upon later legislation— section 9 of 
Act No. 120 of 1916,!!^ and section 21 of Act No. 100 of 1928—  
the lawmakers seemed to have changed the policy of apportionment 
from that of leaving the basis of distribution to the discretion 
of the parish board of school directors to that of specifying 
that there âiell be distribution so as to provide equal sessions 
for all schools in the parish. In the letter act it was 
provided that:
No special advantage shall be given out of the 
General school Funds to the High Schools . . .
Conanunities desiring better facilities and longer 
sessions than can be provided by a distribution
! ! * S t a t e  ex rel. Martin et al. v. Webster Perish School 
Board, (1910) 126 La. 597.
!!! l b i d .
!!®Opinions of tha Attorney General of Louisiana, June 1, 
1912, to May If lHî,~ p. SSÏ.
Ü ^Ibid», May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 417.
Ü ^ I b i d .  ; May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, pp. 204, 469; May 
1, 1928, to April 30, 1930, p. 543; May 1, 1932, to April 1, 
1934, p. 515.
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of the general funds giving equal session® to all 
schools shall secure same by voting special taxes 
or obtaining funds from other sources than the 
current or general funds*!!®
Disbursement of unwarranted tax already collected.
An unusual case Wdloh involved the disposition of taxes 
illegally collected was before the courts in 1896,!!* The 
municipal corporation of Shreveport had levied and collected 
annually a tax for sohool purposes, even to the extent of 
placing such tax in the budget and having partially disbursed 
it accordingly* subsequently, the city declined to make 
further disbursements to the school board on the ground that 
the authority for the tax was not included in the city charter* 
The plaintiff alleged that since the tax had actually been 
levied and collected, the schools should benefit therefrom.
In rendering the decision the court reasoned as follows:
It may be conceded for the argument that 
the city was altogether without authority to levy 
or collect the tax in question; but having already 
levied and collected it, the plaintiff has undoubtedly 
the right to institute suit for its recovery for 
school purposes. Forsooth, a tax that has been 
illegally or unwarrantably collected does not confer 
on the municipality the right to appropriate and use 
the fund collected at will#
In our conception It is of no consequence 
that the city charter conferred no such authority 
to levy and collect the tax. The taxes have been 
collected. The people have paid them without 
objection. The authority to tax is an accomplished
!!*Aots of Louisiana, 1922, Ho, 100, sec. El.
! ! ® T h e  Parish Board of School Directors v. City of Shreveport, 
(1895) 47 La. Ann. 21, 16 So. 563.
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faet. The funds are in the treasury and already 
destined to sohool purposes* This fund Is a quasi-" 
trust in defendant's hands, for the us© and benefit 
of the plalntlff.il?
The disposition of the suit was that it was remanded for 
trial. Again it came to the supreme c o u r t . A n  added 
defense by the defendant was that of prescription, but the 
court held that prescription would not protect the corpo­
ration in such liability. The claim was for the budgeted 
amounts from 1881 to 1891; evidence showed that the amounts 
for 1884, 1886, and 1891 had been paid In full to the school 
board and this deduction was made by the court. Otherwise, 
the first decree was controlling— that is, when a municipality 
has collected money from its taxpayers to meet a budget, the 
amount is a trust fund and the municipal corporation will be 
liable for any diversion from application to the purposes 
specified,
Proper issuance of warrants requirement for validity. 
Several times has the court been requested to interpret 
concerning the law on disbursement by warrants, end In every 
instance payment of warrants in any way or by any authority , 
other than that prescribed by law rendered the transaction 
void. Very early in the supreme court's hlstory^^^ treasurers
47 La. Ann. 24.
Parish Board of school Directors v. The City of 
Shreveport, (1895) 47 La. Ann. 1310, 17 So. 823.
^l^Ibi d.
iBOgtate ex rel. I, lîewman v. R, m . Lusher, Superintendent 
of public schools, (1877-1880) Man. iJnrep. Cas. 189,
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of the perish hoards of sohool directors were prohibited 
from pledging t ÎB school funds or warrants for a loan of 
money without proper authorization from the board of school 
directors, for, according to the decree, the governing 
statute so regulated, and such warrants were not coiomerolal 
paper.
The same point was at issue in 1902,121 qxiû again 
the court said the methods of disbursement prescribed by 
statute must be followed. The governing actl2& at that time 
provided that the treasurer shall pay out the school ÜUnde 
only on warrants drawn by the president and countersigned by 
the secretary of the parish school board. Concerning a 
treasurer who had violated this lew, the court reasoned:
*. . . but why the treasurer should take it upon himself, 
and why he should be permitted, in the face of a direct and 
positive prohibition of law, to pay out thousands of dollars 
for which the board has issued no warrants, we are unable to
u n d e r s t a n d . * 1 2 3
The drawing of warrants except against cash actually 
in the treasury is prohibited. Therefore, warrants drawn 
by a police jury in April, June, and July for the proportion 
of the parish taxes devoted to the school fund must be 
considered as drawn against the proceeds of the taxes levied
IBlAndrus et al. v. Board of Directors of Perish of St 
Lem dry, (1902) 108 La. 386, 32 so. 420.
122^0ts of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 59.
et el. v. Board of Directors of Parish of St. 
Landry, (1908) 108 La. 394.
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during the preceding year, for in those months the taxes of 
the current year are not even collectable, and much less
c o l l e c t e d . 1 2 4
The incurring and 11quidation of debts. The amount 
of debt which may be incurred by parish boards was delimited 
by statute in 1888 as follows;
That the different boards of directors 
shall not be empowered to make contracts or debts 
for any one year greater than the amount of revenue 
provided for according to this act, it being the 
intent hereof that parties contracting with said 
board, shall take heed that due revenue shall have 
been provided to satisfy Üie claim, otherwise they 
may lose end forfeit the same, and no action or 
execution shall be allowed in aid thereof, and 
that the board shall not exceed their powers in 
incurring the debt.128
Various interpretations of this provision were rendered in the
Andrus case,12^ chief of which were that since the calender
year basis of budgeting afforded very little revenue early in
the session, the borrowing of money to pay teachers* salaries
was Justifiable, and that in the financial records there must
be a clear distinction between the funds of one year and
those of mother.
An attempt to readjust the financial basis satis­
factorily was made in the 1922 actl2? which required schools
124papQerville state Bank v. Police Jury of Union Parish 
(Board of Directors of Public schools, interveners), (1915) 
138 La. 835, 70 So. 852.
Act8 of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 73.
l26Aadru8 et al. v. Board of Directors of parish of St. 
Landry, (1902) 108 La. 386, 32 so. 420.
127Aot3 of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 32.
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to arrange their finances^ ®o as to be on a fiscal year basis 
beginning July 1, 1928. The same act broadened the powor of 
the sohool board in borrowing money— in cases of emergency, 
loans could be made in excess of the budget of probable 
revenue, if authorized by a two-thirds vote of the entire 
membership of tbs b o a r d . ^28 ^he constitutionality of this 
act was upheld in a litigation occasioned by the attempt of 
one parish board to close certain schools for a session in 
order to adjust its finances to a fiscal year basis.^^9 
Also it was held that the board lacked authority to close 
the schools, even In case of emergency, but to the board the 
court pointed out the proper alternative in such cases—  
that is, the authorizing by a vote of two-thirds of its 
membership of loans in excess of its budget of probable 
revenues.
A similar policy of forbidding the borrowing of 
money in excess of the budget of probable revenues, except 
in case of emergency, has been upheld by the state's legal
council.150
The liquidation of general indebtedness legally 
incurred by a sohool board has been provided for by legis­
lative enactment. The Constitution of 1921 made provisions 
for enabling the various subdivisions of the state, through
126jbid.
iBOgtate ex rel. Day at al. v. Rapides Parish Sohool Board, 
(1925) 158 La. 251, 103 So. 757.
l^Oppinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1,
1928, to AprTl*30, l9S(i, p . bO-4; May 1, 1^327 to April 1, 
1934, pp. 317-319.
143
the voting of re fundi bonds, to pay or to extend their
indebtedness, bonded and otherwise, existing prior to 
January 1, 1921, so as to place those bodies upon a sound 
financial b a s i s . 151 legislature realized the need in
1928 of a similar provision to take care of the general 
indebtedness of subdivisions prior to January 1, 1929. 
Aocordlngly, it provided an enactment to the effect that;
. . the parish police Juries and school boards, 
and municipal corporations throughout the state, 
the City of New Orleans excepted, shall have the 
right and authority to dedicate, appropriate, and 
pledge not more than two (2) mills of the taxes 
respectively authorized to such police Juries, 
school boards end municipal corporations by the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Louisiana, 
for a period not exceeding twenty-five (2b) years, 
for the payment of any indebtedness, matured or 
unmatured, exclusive of bonded indebtedness, of 
such police Juries, parish school boards, and mu­
nicipal corporations, which may have been lawfully 
incurred prior to January 1, 1929.
That, for the purpose of evidencing such 
indebtedness, the governing authorities of such 
police Juries, parish school boards and municipal 
corporations shall have the authority to issue to 
any creditor, his representative or transferee, a 
certificate or certificates of indebtedness for 
the amount of the debt due said creditor; provided, 
that two or more debts may be combined and a cer­
tificate or certificates issued for the whole.
Such certificates shall be issued only when author­
ized by an ordinance or resolution, passed by the 
governing authority issuing them, and shall be 
secured by dedication, appropriation, and pledge 
of such portion of the taxes authorized respectively 
to such police Juries, pari ^  sohool boards, and 
municipal corporations by the Constitution and laws 
of the state of Louisiana, not exceeding two (2) 
mills, 8 8 may be provided by the governing author­
ity . . • They shall bear such rate of interest, 
not exceeding six (ô^) per cent, per annum, payable 
annually or semiannually, as may be fixed by said 
governing authority, shall run for a period not
ISlconstitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 14, sec. 14
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exceeding twenty-five (2b) yeers, and shall be raade 
payable at such times and places as may be determined 
by the governing authority.
Such certificates shall be executed and 
signed by the President and Secretary or Clerk of 
the police jury or sohool board, or by the Mayor, 
secretary or Clerk of the municipal corporation, 
issuing the same, or other o f f i c i a l s . p o s i t i o n s  
correspond to those mentioned; . ,
The constitutionality of this act was the point of 
contest in a suit to compel a bank to accept such certificates 
of indebtedness in exchange for school board notes which it 
held, as per an agreement previous to the issuance of the 
c e r t i f i c a t e s . ^^5 chief of the attacks on the constitutionality 
of the legislative act were that it sought to change the date, 
as named in the constitution, prior to which lawfully incurred 
indebtedness may be funded, and to authorize the funding 
without an election. To these the court replied;
It would be most unreasonable to construe 
this section as a perpetual prohibition against 
the funding of the general indebtedness of the 
subdivisions of the state out of the alimony tax, 
except for debts existing prior to January 1, 1921, 
and then only upon observance of the conditions 
prescribed in said section. A special election is 
not necessary in such a case, as no special tax is 
to be voted or is needed. Nor is there any 
necessity for obtaining the consent of the tax­
payer either to incur, or to pay out of an alimony 
tax, any indebtedness arising from the current 
expenses of a oolico jury, parish school board, or
municipality.154
^^^Aots of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1920, lio. 18, secs. 2-3.
^55Assumption Parish school Board v* Bank of Napoleonvllle, 
(1929) 168 La. 1118, 123 So. 802.
IB^Ibid., 160 La. 1124-1125.
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Thus, the court sanctioned the legislative provision 
for the liquidation of school debts and thereby held that It 
is sound public policy fbr police juries, parish school boards, 
and municipal corporations to fund into interest-bearing 
certificate6 their general indebtedness.
SUMMARY
The general school fund has been one of the chief 
sources of public sohool support end the policies which have 
governed its administration seem to be as follows;
1* Louisiana's belief in the support of education 
is evidenced by the fact that $1,710,559.40 was spent for 
this purpose before the organic law made any provisions for 
a public school system.
S. After much contest the Constitutional Convention 
of 1345 accepted the principle of state support of free 
public schools; by 1847 the source of this support was a tax 
of one mill on all property and the proceeds from fines and 
forfeitures.
3. The Constitutional Conventions of 1064 and 1867- 
1668 reflected the influence of Congressional Reconetructionists 
in their provisions for the support of public education for
all children regardless of color.
4. Since 1845 the state has edhered strictly to the
policy of giving financial eid to public schools only.
X4Ô
5. The ata te seems to have assumed a liberal attitude 
toward the support of her public schools, as is indicated by 
the Constitution of 1921, which provided that the general sohool 
fund shall consist of: (a) the proceeds from an ad valorem
tax of two and one-half mills levied and collected by the state; 
(b) the money derived from the poll tax; (o) the Interest on 
the proceeds of school lands or the revenues derived from those 
which remain unsold; (d) proceeds of lands bequeathed or 
escheated to the state; and (e) any funds that the legislature 
may designate,
6. The school treasurer for the parish is empowered 
to collect whatever money is due the parish from the state,
7. The policy of the state has been to delegate a 
portion of the responsibility of public sohool support to 
local authorities. In 1870 the police Juries were authorized 
to levy a maximum of two mills on all property in their 
respective parishes for the support of public schools. In 
1879 local levies were given organic sanction, and since 1888 
they have been compulsory,
8. The constitutionality of local levies has been 
consistently upheld by the courts; however, the levying must 
be in accord with the governing statute, end since 1908 a 
valid tax thus levied must be included in the budget,
9. Police Juries not only have the right to levy 
and collect the minimum tax on all the property of their 
respective parishes, but also when such money is collected 
they must deliver it promptly to their respective perish 
school treasurers.
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10. Appreciable support of public education is 
derived from minor sources. These sources administered by 
the state include the gasoline, severance, malt, inheritance, 
and tobacco (a term tax only) tax and proceeds from vacant 
successions. Such sources under local administration include 
the poll tax, a fractional part of the state severance tax, 
and various fines and forfeited bonds.
11. The parish school treasurer is custodian of the 
sohool fund and the courts have held him and his sureties 
responsible for his proper accounting of these public funds.
12. Parish school boards ere required to adhere 
strictly to the governing law in their disposition of public 
s^ool funds.
15. T'iQ policy of apportionment of school funds is 
that the distribution must be as specified by controlling 
legislation, even to the extent of correcting mistakes when 
a parish has received either more or less then its pro rata 
amount and o f requiring disbursement when a tax has been 
collected though illegally levied.
14. No school funds may be distributed except 
through the issuance of warrants as directed by law.
15. The policy of the state has been to hold current 
educational expenses within the bounds of the current revenues. 
When money is borrowed, the amount must not exceed the antic­
ipated rovenues for the year except in cases of emergency- 
then by authority of a two-thirds vote of the entire board
the amount may be greater.
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16. The courts hava upheld the legislative provision 
whereby local authorities may liquidate school debts by 
funding tham Into interest-bearing certificates.
CHAPTSE VI
FOELIC SCHOOL SDFPOST IHRODGH SPECIAL EDimS
CHAPTER VI
PDBUC SCHOOL SUPPORT THROUGH SPECIAL FUNDS
Looal autonomy is one of the fundamental prinoiples 
of the Ameriean Government. The levying of taxes by a state 
for the support of its public functions is a long established 
policy, but the delegation of the taxing power by the legis­
lature to the people of a subdivision of the state is of more 
recent origin. In this chapter an attempt is made to show 
Louisiana’s law of public sohool support throu^ the various 
types of funds authorized by the taxpayers of the sohool dis­
trict.
SCHOOL FUNDS AUTHORIZED BT TAXPAYERS
For more than a century Louisiana has theoretically 
legalized local autonomy in the support of public education.^ 
This power, delegated by the legislature to the qualified 
electors of a school district, was reluctantly accepted by 
the people until after the War for Southern Independence. An 
illustration of this permissive legislation was the law of 
1869 which gave the voters of each district the right to levy
parishes
of the 
means 
Territory,** ch. vii.
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a maximum of three mills for public school expenses in general.& 
The next year this act was amended so as to permit sohool dis­
tricts to levy by vote of the taxpayers a maximum of ten mills.® 
The principle of local taxation by the voters of a district 
to supplement the public school fund and provide for school 
buildings has been reflected in the constitutions of the state 
since 1879.^ From the beginning of the present century, par­
ticularly, local taxation has become one of the chief sources 
of public school revenue.
School districts from their beginriing were permitted 
to levy special taxes for the needs of the schools, but no 
feasible provisions were made whereby bends might he issued 
for building purposes until the 1906 amendment to the Constitu­
tion of 1898 permitted the property taxpayers of a school 
district to hold an election for determining their census 
with respect to levying a special tax upon which to issue 
bonds.® This modern method of cany in g out a building pro­
gram was greatly improved under the Constitution of 1921, 
which specified that school districts might issue bonds for 
"acquiring lands for building sites and playgrounds, and for 
purchasing, erecting, enlarging or improving school buildings 
and teachers' homes, and acquiring the necessary equipment
^Acts of Louisiana, 1969* No. 121, seo. 60.
®Ibid.. Extra Session, 1870, No, 6, sec. 27,
Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 209,
®Ibid.. 1898, art. 281, as amended by Act No. 122 of 1906, 
adopted November, 1906.
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•Bd fuzBishlBga therefor."®
That the people of Louisiana have oome to azeroiae 
the right of suffrage for the benefit of publie education in 
their respective districts may be indicated by the fact that 
in 1950-1931 special taxes for current operation of public 
schools amounted to $6,047,128 and for capital outlay, 
$5,279,428.7 It is reasonable to expect differences of opinion 
to arise concerning the law for ascertaining the will of the 
people of the various districts when an increase in educational 
facilities is sought through this autonomous privilege*
Legal Bases for Special Tax Levies Approved
The law governing the levying of special taxes which 
elections only can authorize can best be shown by those con­
tested elections vdiich were carried to the supreme court 
because of various alleged irregularities and which were de­
clared to be legal and the tax levy and other appurtenances 
pertaining thereto valid.
Const!tutionalitv of special taxes. The existence 
of the condition under which taxpayers in one district of a 
parish pay a special school levy differing in amount from that 
paid in another district of the parish seems to have been the 
basis of considerable misunderstanding among those who pay
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 14, sec. 14(b).
?State Department of Education of Louisiana. Eighty-fourth 
AiriwtiaT^eport. for ine Session 1932-53 \ Eat on %ugeT 1935 ).
p. 14.
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the taxes. The charge has been that such practice Is in viola­
tion of the constitutional right which assures unifcrmlty of 
taxation. In 1915® this issue came to the court for adjudication 
when one district which was created from a part of another voted 
a levy with the effect that the rate in the new district was 
higher than that in the old district. In the court's decree 
it was held that by article 281 of the Constitution of 1913, 
special recognition was given to school districts on matters 
pertaining to taxation for schools. Also, the constitutionality 
of such taxes, although they may be levied to different amounts, 
was upheld by the following explanation;
While article 225 provides that "taxation 
shall be equal and uniform throughout the territorial 
limits of the authority levying the tax," the several 
parish boards of directors of the public schools 
throughout the state are authorized to impose addi­
tional taxes for the support of the public schools 
in the school districts of the parishes. The property 
taxpayers in any one school district of a parish may 
authorize additional taxation within their district 
for additional support of the public schools, and 
for the purpose of erecting sohoolhouses in such 
district, although taxpayers in other sohool dis­
tricts, in the same parish, may not Impose upon 
themselves the same or an equal amount of taxation.
The objection of plaintiff, therefore, that the tax 
in district No. 50 is not equal and uniform with 
the tax imposed in sohool district No* 37, or other 
districts in Avoyelles parish, is not well founded.*
In 1930^® a very similar complaint was made to the effect that
by the enlargement of a sohool district and the laying of a
®Drouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools 
of Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So, 191*
*Ibid.. 136 La. 395.
lOwoodard et al, v. Bienville Parish School Board, (1930) 
169 La. 831, 126 So. 207.
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levy in the newly created district the property owners in the 
old area were subject to a higher levy than those in the newly 
added territory. Again, the court held this as not being in­
equality of amount of taxation within the meaning of the con­
stitution.
In the Gulf Refining caseH a parish tax, for school 
purposes had been voted by the people and assessed against 
certain oil held in storage by the appellant. This tax was 
contested on the ground that it constituted an abuse of the 
taxing power by taking the appellant’s property without due 
process of law for the benefit of persons, including property 
owners, other than the appellant. The Federal Court held not 
only that neither the appellant nor his property was discrimi­
nated against, but also that the tax was for a purpose which 
was beneficial to property and persons located in that dis­
trict and was not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that 
it may not have resulted in the same measure of benefit to 
the appellant or his property as to other persons or property 
located in the district.
When the creation of the Ouachita Parish Junior 
College was attacked on various grounds of unoonstitutionality 
of the supporting tax, the legality of a tax for the upward 
extension of secondary education was held.^® Such tax is not 
violative of the uniform taxation clause, for it is levied on
^^ulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Phillips, Tax Collector, 
Same v. Sandlin, Tax Collector. (1926) (Cir. Ct, of App.)
11 Fed. (2d) 967.
^^cHenry et al, v. Ouachita Parish Sohool Board, (1929)
169 La. 646, 125 So. 841.
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all taxable property in the district, which must compris© an 
entire parish. It falls within the classification of special 
taxes, as does the tax voted for a high school. The tax Is a 
local one voted for the support of a purely looal institution. 
Since the particular city, Monroe, was no longer exempt from 
general parochial taxation, the parish school board had author­
ity to tax property within the city for the support of the 
junior college of the parish. The statement of the purpose 
of the tax included, "’for acquiring, erecting, constructing, 
establishing, operating, and maintaining a Junior College in 
said Junior College District’";^® this was held to be not 
several purposes but practically a single proposition, since 
the purposes of construction and maintenance are essentially 
interwoven. The court’s conclusion was that the levy and 
assessment of the special Junior college tax "do not deny to 
plaintiffs the equal protection of the law, nor deprive them 
of their property without due process of law."14 Herein was 
legalized the support of parish Junior colleges by local taxa­
tion.
Necessity for limitations of levy to consider taxing 
areas as distinct entities. Frequent controversies have arisen 
over the constitutional limit of special taxation for school 
purposes, especially with regard to a subschool district tax 
in connection with a district tax, a district tax in connec­
tion with a parish tax, and tax on land lying in overlapping
169 la. 663, 
p. 664.
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districts.15 The Constitution of 1921 defines the limitation 
as follows:
For the purpose of constructing or im­
proving public buildings, school houses, roads, 
bridges, levees, sewerage or drainage works, or 
other works of permanent public improvement, title 
to which shall be in the public, or for the main­
tenance thereof, any political subdivision may 
levy taxes, in excess of the limitations otherwise 
fixed in this Constitution, not to exceed in any 
year five mills on the dollar for any one of said 
purposes, and not to exceed in any year twenty-five 
mills on the dollar, on any property, for all of 
said purposes; and for giving additional support to 
public schools, any parish, school district or sub- 
school district, or any municipality, which supports, 
or contributes to the support of, its public schools, 
may levy taxes, in excess of the limitations other­
wise fixed in this Constitution, not to exceed, in 
the aggregate, on any property, in any year, eight 
mills on the dollar; provided, no special tax 
authorized by this section shall run for a longer 
period than ten years, and provided further, that 
the rate, purpose and duration of any such special 
tax shall have been submitted to the resident prop­
erty taxpayers qualified to vote in the subdivision 
in which the tax is to be levied, and a majority of 
those voting, in number and amount, shall have voted 
in favor thereof. The provisions of this section 
shall not affect the validity of any tax levied by 
authority of an election held prior to the adoption 
of this Constitution.16
The limitations provided for were the bases of issues 
brought in 1925 by coBpanies having investments In districts 
and subschool districts of the parish of Webster.1? Due to 
the location of the lands the levy of a parish-wide two-mill 
school tax raised the total special levy on some of their
^®OT>lnlons of the Attorney General of Louis^iana; June 1, 
1912, to kaÿ“l, l9l4, p. 213; May 1, 19T87~tol^y 1, 1920, pp. 
313, 427.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art, 10, seo. 10,
^^Loulsiana & A, %r, Co. et al. v. School Board of Webster 
Parish et al., (1925) 157 La. 1046, 103 So. 318.
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property to twenty-seven mills and the total school tax to 
more than eight mills; on this basis they contested. The 
court pointed to errors in their contentions as follows:
(1) It was not correct to add the various levies in districts 
and subdlstrlots to determine whether or not the total special 
levy limit had been exceeded. In 1984 it had been explained 
that a "parish-wide school district and the smaller school 
districts within its limits are separate and distinct political 
subdivisions of the state, and may therefore exist at the same 
time, and independently of each other, for purposes of special 
taxation in giving additional aid to public schools."I® Like­
wise, the court here said, , . each subdivision shall remain 
unaffected In its right by the taxes imposed under the section 
by other political subdlvisicns in the same territory.
(8) The addition of levies in districts and subdistricts to 
determine whether or not the total levy for giving additional 
support to public schools exceeded eight mills was not proper. 
The possible outcome of such a method was pointed to by the 
court as follows:
If the interpretation contended for by plaintiffs 
is correct, the result would be, as we have here­
tofore indicated in discussing the 85-ml 11 limita­
tion that, because some enterprising school district, 
perhaps in a remote comer of the parish, had voted 
and was levying an 8-mill tax for the support of 
the schools, a parish wide school district or a 
parish in which the remote district is located, 
which saw the need for a parish wide tax for the
^%inton et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924)
155 La. 675.
^^Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. et al. v. Sohool Board of Webster 
Parish et al., (1925) 157 L#a. 1051.
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seme purpose, oould not vote and levy it. It seems 
obvious to ua that the oonstitutional oonvontion 
intended no such result,&0
(5) The inclusion of the eight-mill limitation for additional 
support to public schools in the limitation of twenty-five 
mills for all of such purposes was in direct violation of the 
plain words of the section of the constitution providing for 
both limitations.
This recognition of the distinct entity of districts 
was later manifested by the explanation to the school authori­
ties of West Carroll Parish that the levying of an eight-mill 
tax for the support of the public schools in the parish-wide 
district would not prohibit a similar levy a sub school 
district created out of a portion of the parish.21
In 1930 the theory of the distinct entity of dis­
tricts was again upheld when the court called to the attention 
of complainants tha% the tax in a certain old district was 
equal and uniform and that likewise it was equal throughout 
the district as e n l a r g e d . 22 The status of the new district 
was thus defined: "The enlarged district is a separate and
distinct legal entity from the several sohool districts as 
they existed before being merged into one."S3
pp. 1055-1056.
21Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. llay 1, 
1998, to April SOTToiO, p. 506.
^^oodard et al. v, Bienville Parish School Board, (1930) 
169 l a .  831, 126 So. 207,
*®Ibid., 169 La, 837.
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Again, in the year 1932, the eight-mill limitation 
of special sohool taxes was c o n t e s t e d # ^ 4  2n the instant case 
the excess resulted from overlapping districts and the theory 
established was that the total constitutional tax which may 
affect a parcel of property is limited only by ei^ht mills 
multiplied by the number of taxing districts having jurisdic­
tion over it*
Thus, in interpreting the limitations on special 
school taxes prescribed by the Constitution of 1921, the court 
has upheld definitely and continuously the policy of recog­
nizing each parish, school district, or subschool district 
as a distinct entity, the one having the privlege of levying 
taxes up to the limit regardless of such taxes levied by the 
others *
Levying and collecting the voted tax* Various con­
troversies have arisen concerning the levying and collecting 
of the tax voted for the benefit of the public schools and 
in the decisions thereof several principles governing this 
practice have been established as follows*
The title to the sohool property Involved in the 
levying of a special tax— for example, the lot on which a 
school building is to be constructed— must vest in the public* 
This principle was upheld when same taxpayers charged violation 
of this regulation but in which case evidence was accepted as 
showing that there was public ownership of the lot in question.
^^Delta Land & Timber Co. v. Beauregard Parish Sohool Board, 
(1932) 174 La. 357, 140 So. 502,
®®Baucum et al. v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1907) 
119 La, 632, 44 So. 289.
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There seems to he no final date on which a tax on 
the current aesesament may he voted and l e v i e d , I n  reply 
to the complaint that certain taxing ordinances were illegal 
because they Imposed taxes for a year that had already well 
elapsed, the court established this principle by stating;
We know of no statute %dilch forbids the 
levy of special school taxes on the assessment of 
the current year. It is the mandatory duty of the 
police jury, whenever a petition is presented by 
the required number of ta3q>ayers, to order a special 
election, and when the special tax is voted, to 
immediately pass an ordinance levying such tax, 
for the year or years designated in the petition 
of the taxpayers. Act 131 of 1696, p. 200; Act 
No. 174 of 1908, p. 327; Act No. 145 of 1904, 
p. 317.2?
Whether a formal resolution of the board of sohool 
directors is necessary to authorize the assessment of a tax 
was one of the questions in the Gulf Refining case.®® There­
in the secretary of the board directed, in writing, the tax 
assessor to assess a tax which had been duly authorized by 
the taxpayers. The attack was that the validity of the tax 
depended upon its formal levy by resolution of the board, 
but the Federal Court held that this was not necessary and 
that the action of the board sufficiently indicated its pur­
pose to have the voted tax assessed and collected.
2®Argyle Planting & Mfg. Co., Limited, v. Connely, Sheriff, 
et al., (1910) 125 La. 685, 51 So. 687.
87Ibid.. 125 La. 687.
2®Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Phillips, Tax Collector. 
Same v. Sandlin, Tax Collector. (1926) (Cir. Ct. of App.)
11 Fed. (2d) 967.
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The law pertaining to the oommission for collecting
speoial aehool taxes was established by the court In 1916*^^
The sheriff involved in the litigation had failed to turn
into the treasury a part o t the special sohool taxes %&iloh
he had collected. This amount was claimed by him as his
commission granted under article 120 of the Constitution of
1896, vdiich read in part: "The compensation of sheriffs as
tax collectors shall not exceed five per cent on all sums
collected and paid over." As a basis for its decision, the
court cited the controlling statutory law: ^
• • • provided further that no sheriff and ex 
officio tax collector shall receive any compensa­
tion for the collection of spécial school taxes 
except in parishes where the total amount of 
state, parish, levee end poll taxes and licenses 
collected do not amount to $50,000, Be it fur­
ther provided that in parishes where the col­
lection of state, parish, levee and poll taxes 
and licenses do not amount to $50,000, the 
sheriff and ex officio tax collector shall receive 
five per cent, on amount collected and actually 
paid into the state and parish treasury or to 
the authority designated to receive the same.®®
The total state, parish, poll, and license taxes, as deter­
mined by the court, exceeded $50,000, hence there was the 
interpretation that the sheriff should not be allowed 
commission on the special sohool taxes collected in the year 
in question.
Regulations in elections. Lay opinion in interpreting 
the constitutional and statutory provisions of regulations In 
electims to vote special sohool tax levies has been varied.
2®Board of Sohool Directors of Jackson Parish v. McBride, 
Sheriff, (1916) 138 La. 598, 70 So. 627,
30Acts of Louisiana, 1908, No. 161, seo. 1.
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In establishing the law pertaining to such elections, the 
court has pointed out the governing principles, the chief 
ones of which are here presented,
1, Voter# Qualified by election laws of the state.
In 1907®! it was judicially decided that those who vote at 
school tax elections must be duly qualified under the election 
laws of the state, including the general regulation pertaining 
to the payment of poll taxes* The court expressed its opinion 
with reference to the voter thus: "We think that he should
produce his poll tax receipt, as in every other election, 
nAether special or general, if not exempt on account of age,"®® 
Also attention was called to the direction in article 232 of 
the Constitution of 1896 that the tax "shall" be submitted to 
a vote of the property taxpayers entitled to vote under the 
election laws of the state— that one of those laws required 
a recognized voter to have paid liis poll tax for the two 
years preceding. A statute®® enacted later, 1921, was inter­
preted to require the payment of the poll tax as a prerequisite 
for voting in such elections.®4 In 1933 the qualifications 
were defined to include poll tax payment as follows: "The
actual present owner of the property on the day of the election, 
provided he possesses the other requirements to vote, that of
^^Gruner et al. v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1907)
119 La. 651, 44 So. 295.
S^Ibid.. 119 La. 553.
®®Acts Of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1921, No, 46, seo, 13,
^^Oninlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1922, 
to May 1, pT%9b.
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reslde&oe, registration, and poll tqx payments, can vote the 
proper^ *"35
In general, it seems that the dominant policy of the 
state has been to adhere to the general election laws in de- 
teimining who may be eligible to participate in special school 
tax elections,36 except that the property qualifications are 
fixed by special statutes®? and that permission to vote is 
granted to women who are the owners of property or widows who 
may be able to establish usufructuary interests in their 
deceased husbands’ property.®8
2. Reasonable onnortunitv to register sufficient.
To follow the letter of the law with regard to the registration 
of voters preceding special elections is sometimes very dif­
ficult and not possible, the court has admitted, therefore 
the interpretation which is practical is the one which has 
often been rendered. By Act No. 122, Extra Session, 1921, 
provision is made for: the registration of voters, pariah of
Orleans excepted, every four years, commencing on the second 
day of January, 1922; prohibiting registration during the 
thirty days immediately preceding a speoial, general, or pri­
mary election; and keeping the registrar’s office open for 
the thirty days, Sundays and legal holidays excepted, im­
®^Ibid*. May 20, 1958, to April 1, 1934, p. 362.
May 1, 1902, to M.y 1, 1904, p. 191; May 1, 1914, 
to May Ï, 1916, p. 438; May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 456.
®?Ibid.% May 1, 1910, to May 1, 1912, p. 296; May 80, 1932, 
to AprTTl, 1934, p. 362.
®®Ibld.: May 1, 1906, to May 1, 1908, p. 298; Méy 1, 1914,
to Way ly 1916, p. 438; May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 456.
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mediately preceding the cloelng of the regiatratlon rolls* 
Section 8 of Act Ho« £86^of 1910» governing the notice of 
epeoial elections» requires that after the resolution ordering 
the election is passed» notice of the election Shall he given 
for thirty days hy publication in a weekly newspaper once a 
week for four weeks» and if there be no newspaper in the par^ 
ish» then by posting the notice fbr that time* To fulfill 
the requirements of the act concerning registration it would 
be necessary for the notice of the special election to be 
published stmething more than sixty days prior to the date 
for holding the election» but the act governing the pub»» 
lication of the notice of election has not that requirement #
The court was presented the problem of clarifying 
these two seemingly conflicting statutes when some taxpayers 
in the parish of Natchitoches sought to annul an election on 
the ground that a sufficient time within which to register was 
not allowed those entitled to qualify in order to vote,89 
election in question was set for Ifdrch 18, 1986» and the first 
publication of notice was made February 5» 1986, It was shown 
that althou^ the voters were not permitted to register for 
the thirty days immediately preceding March 15» they could 
have registered at least every Friday and Saturday» with the 
exception of one Friday» which was a legal holiday, from Ian** 
uary 1» 1926» to February 5» 1986, those being the days, even 
sdien there is no election approaching, on which the registrar’s 
office was required to be open. Also there were from the day
^*Bonds et al, v, Natchitoches Parish School Board, (1987) 
164 La, 584, 114 So. 166.
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Of publication of the notice, February 5, to the day of the 
closing of the registration rolls, February 13» six legal days 
in which to register» for the registrar’s office was required 
to be kept open dally during that period. The court said!
**As a practical proposition» we think that this was sufficient 
time for the approximately 840 voters in the district to regis­
ter, even assuming that all of them» as property taxpayers» 
were entitled» on registering, to vote in the d i s t r i c t , I t  
was admitted, however » that this decision was not according to 
the letter of the law prescribing the length of time registra­
tion rolls were to be kept open preceding an election of this 
nature, but it was pointed out that the two statutes must be 
construed together to reach a fair interpretation. On that 
basis the court explained:
• • « idiat is meant is that the registrar, in such 
elections as the present, shall keep his office 
open for the 30 days immediately preceding the 
closing of the registration when he learns of the 
election in time to do so, after learning of it, 
during what remains of that period. The law is 
satisfied if the voters have had a reasonable 
opportunity to register. In this instance, we 
think they have, 41
3, Current assessment proper one for determining 
list of voters. When an attempt was made to annul an election 
on the grounds that it was held on the basis of the incomplete 
assessment rolls of the current year instead of on the completed 
rolls of the previous year, the court upheld the contentions
xaa
of those responsible for the e l e c t i o n T h e i r  defense was 
article 238 of the Constitution of 1898 which provided that 
those who were privileged to vote on questions of this nature 
were those property taxpayers of the school district entitled 
to vote under the election laws of the state. As judicially 
interpreted, the organic provision contemplated that the 
voter should be a property taxpayer at the date of election, 
which qualification could be shown only by an assessment,"^® 
The court admitted that had there been no assessment for 1905, 
the assessment of 1904 would have governed. There was judg­
ment for the defendants; it declared that "The transcription 
of the lists and the filing of the rolls cannot affect the 
assessment of property already made, and final unless re­
versed by judicial a c t i o n . * 4 4  Consequently, it was held that 
the names of the taxpayers and the valuations of property 
were properly taken from the current assessment,
4, Bases for the voting of property. The carrying 
of a special tax election depends upon the affirmative vote 
of the majority in number and amount of property valuation.
The officials in charge are called upon in practically every 
election to rule in some respect concerning the voting of 
property.
^^Flores et al, v. Police Jury of DeSoto Parish at al,, 
(1906) 116 La. 428, 40 So, 785,
^Ibid.
116 La. 430.
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The chief principle established by the courts in 
litigations on this subject seems to have been that one who 
votes property must be owner at the time of election. The 
court rendered this interpretation when there was contest 
because the oommissloners refused permission to vote to a man 
who was assessed with property the year before but who had 
sold said property at the time of the election. The court en­
dorsed the commissioners’ action as correct and dismissed the 
question by saying: *He was not the owner of that property
at the time of the election— he had sold the seme.”^ ® The 
same principle was maintained In 1983 in an opinion which 
declared that the property must be possessed at the time of 
election by the one who offers to vote*46 concerning the 
voting of partnership property the courts and legal advisers 
have upheld the correctness of permitting the individual mem­
bers to divide the easessment upon the assets of their firm 
and each to vote upon his pro rata Interest therein.4?
5. Mere error in judgment of ooml sa loners not 
sufficient cause alone for nullifying election. Commissioners 
at special tax levy elections have many detailed and widely 
varied rulings and decisiona to make in determining who may
4®smith V. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) ISS 
IrS • 1005.
4^0pinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 20, 
1932, vo Aprri'T[,'T^34, p. 568.
4Tsmith V. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 
La. 987, 52 So. 122; Opinions of the Attorney General of 
Louisiana: May 1, 19ÔÎ," lb May 1, p. 238T May 1, 1914,
to May 17 1916, p. 243; May 1, 1922, to May 1, 1924, p. 601.
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or a«y not vote. In this connection the court seems to have 
been eonslderate in oontests brought for its jurisdiction.
Brror in the judgment of the commissioners was charged by one 
plaintiff when he alleged that a number of persons trere in­
correctly permitted to vote* In the trial of the case^S 
defendant showed that some of the voters in question were 
legally authorized to vote and the court ruled, as it had 
done in other instances,49 that this mere error in judgment
was not sufficient cause within itself to annul the election.
In another charge the plaintiff admitted that the votes im­
properly received and improperly excluded would not have 
changed the result of the elections* Again, the court said 
that since the commissioners acted in good faith, the elections 
should not be set aside for their errors of j u d g m e n t . S O
Regulations in petitions, resolutions, and ballots.
A parish school board may order an election to vote a tax 
without being petitioned by the voters;51 if such board Is
petitioned by one-fourth of the qualified property taxpayers,
4®Snilth V. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 La. 
987, 52 So* 122.
4®Wldow Conant et al. v* L, Mlllaudon et al., (1050) 5 La. 
Ann. 542; C. C. Duson v. G. M. Thompson, (I860) 32 La. Ann.
861; H. MbKhlght v. A, V. Ragan, (1881) 33 La. Ann. 398; L, J. 
Luokey et al. v. Police Jury of Bienville Parish et al., (1894) 
46 La. Ann. 679, 15 So. 89.
^Florae et al. v. Police Juiy of Be Soto Parish et al., 
(1906) 116 La. 428, 40 So. 785.
®^Ouiniona of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1,
1930, t o^#Fri"?o7T:9%Tp. kF:-----------
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it must call the elaotioa.®^ Statutory provision as to the 
content of the petition semas to have ohanged from the object 
and the amount of the tax In 1696 to the object and the rate 
of the tax in 1904.55 The place and manner of recording a 
petition requesting the call of an election have not been 
specified by statute; the court has held that inclusion of 
such record in the minutes of the proceedings of the parish 
board of school directors fulfills all the requirements of 
the law in this respect.54 The board’s resolution which calls 
the election requested by the petition meets statutory require­
ments if it includes the rate, object, and purpose of the tax 
and the number of years it is to run, with the addition of 
the rate of interest to be paid when a bond issue election is 
being called.55 If a ballot has the form prescribed by the 
governing statute and gives the voters all the required in­
formation, there is no necessity for the proposed location of 
the school building to be stated on the b a l l o t . 5 6
Regulations in contesting special tax elections. 
Those who contest special tax elections must bring their suits
^^Ibid.2 Hinton et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924) 
155 iZT^ee, 99 So. 525.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1898, No. 131, sec. 2; Ibid., 1904,
No. 145, sec. 2; Baucum et al. v. Police Jury of dSlalborne 
Parish, (1907) 119 La. 532, 44 So. 289.
54rho$as et al. v. Board of School Directors of Parish of
Webster, (1915) 136 La. 499, 67 So. 345.
®5i>pouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of
^rish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So, 191; Thomas et
al. V. Board of School Directors of Parish of Webster, (1915) 
136 La. 499, 67 So. 345.
55BioWilliams et al* v. Board of Directors of Iberville 
Parish et al., (1911) 128 La. 422, 54 So. 928.
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within the time preeorihed for sueh action if their complaints
are to be considered by the court. When the plaintiffs in a
case®? involving this regulation objected to the defendants’
plea of prescription of three months on the ground that there
was no statute in force authorizing such prescription, the
court pointed to their error in reasoning as follows:
The same reasons which plaintiffs assign for urging 
that there is no prescription applicable to the case 
would carry with them as a result the destruction of 
any right of action in plaintiffs to contest the 
election held under authority of the police Jury on 
April 9, 1907, for the statute upon which plaintiffs 
base their right of action to contest the election 
limits in its second section the right of action to 
three months. If plaintiffs are forced (as they 
are) to invoke the statute to sustain their right 
to such an action, defendants have the undoubted 
legal right to resist such an action on the ground 
that it was not instituted within the time limit.®®
Thus, the court not only upheld the right of prescription, 
but also emphasized the preservation of the balance of power 
through the right of contest to carry with it the right to 
protect by prescription. The statute upon Wiich the action 
in the previous case was founded was Act No. 106 of 1892 based 
on the Constitution of 1879. When the seme objection— that 
this statute did not apply to elections held under the Consti­
tution of 1898— was later pleaded by other plaintiffs,®^ the 
court, after having reviewed all the statutes enacted since 
the adoption of the later constitution, said:
5?Folse et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1910) 125 La. 603, 
51 So. 658.
5®Ibld., 125 La. 617.
®*Waggner .t al. t . Polio. Jury of Pariah of Jefferson et 
al., (1910) 125 La. 863, 51 So. 1016.
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The General Assembly has never made any 
provisions for contesting elections held under 
article 232 of the Constitution, nor has passed 
any statute of limitations with respect to such 
elections. This Inaction can be explained only 
on the theory that the lawmaker considered Act No.
106 of 1892 as applicable to such elections.60
By these decisions the court upheld very definitely that those 
who charge irregularities in a special tax election must abide 
by the prescriptive provision in force at the time.
Also, the court has found it necessary to maintain 
some other regulations concerning a contest. After a plea 
is made, it must confine Itself to the specific grounds of 
contest• Upon this principle no heed was given a plaintiff 
who alleged that an inspection of the ballot box end its con­
tents, which he prayed to be brought into court and examined, 
would reveal other irregularities and illegalities.61
Upon those who contest rather then upon the court 
rests the responsibility of proving their contentions. Where 
plaintiffs charged irregularities in the content of the ballot 
boxes without producing the boxes in evidence and declared 
that elections were not held in two of the precincts without 
submitting any records to that effect, the court ruled that 
in the absence of proof to the contrary the election must be 
decreed as having been properly held.68 Plainly it said to 
the plaintiffs that the burden of proof was on them when they 
made accusations.
.. 125 La. 868.
*^Ëtaltb T. Parish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 La. 
987, 52 So. 122.
S^Bonds et al. t . Natchitoches Parish School Board, (1927) 
164 La. 584, 114 So. 166.
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Disposition of Funds Derived from Special Levies
When taxpayers feel sufficiently the need for better 
schools within their district their statutory right of expression 
to that effect is by means of special levies voted upon their 
property. Consequently, the levy which they authorize is for 
a specific purpose and they have protection in the legal theory 
that the fund so derived must be spent as directed by them.6®
F o r example, the court said in 1931, "When a special tax is 
voted to erect a public school building, the proceeds of such 
tax can be used for that and no other purpose.*@4 Also, the 
tax which is voted in one ward is considered as sacred to the 
use of that ward and is not to be diverted to the use of an­
other. 6® In this connection, the court has said:
It is clear . . .  that special taxes 
voted by a school district constitute a fund which 
is dedicated by law exclusively to the use of that 
particular district. 3uch special fund forms no 
pGLTt of the general or current school funds, and 
the only authority that a school board can exercise 
over such fund is to levy and pay it, when col­
lected, to the school district voting the tax.66
Expenditure in district of special maintenance tax.
In the disposition of this type of special tax voted to give 
"additional aid to the public schools," as usually expressed, 
the school authorities seem to have needed frequent assistance,
®®Oninions of the Attomev General of Louisiana. May 1, 1908, 
to May 1,19Ï0, p. SdS.
®%atkins V. Ouachita Parish School Board, (1931) 173 La. 267.
®®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1914, 
to May 1, ïiÎ6, p. 246.
®6HintOR et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924) 155 La. 675
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particularly, when a gnirplua has accumulated from the col­
lection of the tax so authorized. With the explanation that 
such action la in violation of the letter of the latr but in 
keeping with the spirit, school officials have been advised 
that a sufficient amount of the excess revenue might be used 
for putting down wells.®? With more hesitancy, and in case 
of a clear excess of funds beyond the mount needed for main- 
tenanoe, legal opinion has sanctioned the expenditure of such 
funds frr the building of schoolhouses.®® Other purposes for 
which the proceeds of this tax may be used include the defraying 
of the coat of pevlnr, the highway which abuts the property of 
the school®^ and the meeting of expenses arising from con- 
atmoting, equipping, or maintaining the plant and buildings 
at a new location of the school In the district— the latter to 
be expended from the balance accruing from the tax.?® Also, 
the surplus may be expended as necessary for tren.sportlng 
elementary children within the district to the elementary 
school therein.71
Effect of consolidation upon tax of original districts, 
The consolidation of school districts has presented the ques­
tion as to what disposition should be made of the funds of an 
old district after it consolidates with another. In reply to
S7Oninions of the Attorney General of loulslanq, May 1, 1906 
to May l.-ïSüa, pTWgv.
°^ Ibld.. May 1, 1016, to Wtigf 1, 1018, p. 448.
**Ibld.. Kay 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 441.
May 1, 1932, to April 1, 1934, p. 1008.
p. 288.
174
those who were oontempleting consolidating two districts and
edio wished to know if they might use for the new district the
special levies which were existent in the original districts
the attorney general advised:
. • • in the absence of expi*ess statutory authority, 
or a clear rule of jurisprudence, in Louisiana it 
is extremely doubtful whether special taxes previ­
ously voted for the express purposes of giving 
additional aid to the schools of a particular dis­
trict could be thereafter devoted toward maintaining 
schools of a thereafter consolidated district*72
The following reasoning was adopted in solving the 
problem nAcre two districts had been consolidated, with only 
one school to continue, and there had been voted In the district 
Of the discontinued school a special tax for building and im­
provements, which had acc’raîlated a fair sum. The money could 
have been used to improve or increase the buildings in the 
original district, and the board had authority to cell such 
buildings and reinvest the proceeds in the erection of a 
building at another location.?® In that way a bulldlnr in 
the consolidated district could have been made to derive the 
benefit of the fund. The attorney general saw this action to 
produce the same re milt as devoting the avails of the tax 
directly to the school in the consolidated district; there­
upon, he ruled, although admitting that there was not freedom 
from doubt, that the money could be used for the consolidated 
district.?* Very recently this opinion was upheld, when it
7fi
Ibid.* m y  1, 1926, to April 50, 1929, p. 297.
7S
Acts of Louisiana, 1922, No* 100, see* 20.
?^Ot>iniono of the Attorney General of loulsiane. Mcv 1. 1928. 
to Kby düV ïSsüT F T B # ;  --------------------
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was advised that the balance of funds belonging to the old 
district could be used in the consolidated district for all 
or any of the purposes for which the tax levied in the 
original district.?®
Expenditure through certificates of Indebtedness.
An attack on the method which a parish school board used in 
securing building funds brought before the court?# the issue 
as to whether or not the board "’had the right to so antici­
pate its revenues under the special tax, by borrowing money, 
pledging apportion of said tax and issuing certifieotes of 
Indebtedness, to the extent end under the terms of payment 
as set forth in the ordinance of the School Board*’"?? After 
having defined the status of the school board as that of a 
body corporate in law and a s the governing authority of the 
junior college district, in question, the court said with 
reference to the constitutional provision?® under which this 
action by the board was contonplated:
There is nothing in this article of the 
Constitution nor in Act 173 of 1928, the Junior 
college law under which the tax in the instant case 
was voted, which prohibits school boards from antici­
pating the revenues to be derived from the levi^  of 
suoh taxes or the pledging of them in advance of 
their collection in order to obtain funds with 
which to construct the buildings, nor is there any­
thing to indicate that it was intended that the
’^Ibld.. May 1, 1938, to April 1, 1934, p. 290.
’®Watkin8 V. Otiaohlta Parish School Board, (1931) 173 La. 
259, 136 So. 591.
173 La. 865.
^^Coostitution of Louisiana, 1981, art. 10, seo. 10.
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boards should postpone the erection of suoh 
buildings until sufficient funds for that purpose 
shall have been collected.?*
The statutory conditions under which this debt might be in­
curred were outlined as follows:
The anticipation of the avails of a 
special school building tax voted to run for a 
series of years to be collected annually and 
the issuance of certificates of indebtedness to 
be paid annually from the tax as collected, and 
the pledging of the tax to secure the payment of 
the certificates, is not violative of section 32,
Act 100 of 1922, as amended by Act 19 of 1926, 
where the aggregate amount of the certificates 
does not exceed the net avails of the tax and 
where the net proceeds of the tax collected each 
year are sufficient to pay the certificates, and 
all interest, as they mature*®®
In upholding this method of disposition of funds 
through certificates of indebtedness, the court decreed:
The proceeding taken by the board makes 
it perfectly clear that it did not intend by the 
issuance of these certificates and the borrowing 
of money to erect the building, to create a general 
outstanding indebtedness which it would be uncon­
ditionally obligated to pay out of its general 
revenues, but only to bind the board to the extent 
of its ability to pay from the revenues derived 
from the tax. These certificates are to be pay­
able only out of the avails of the tax with 
reference to which they are to be issued end the 
holders of them will be charged with legal notice 
that they are not unconditional obligations of 
the board.®!
Irregularities Sufficient to Nullify Special Tax Levies Proposed
The division here presented deals with the Issues 
involved in oases on contested elections which the courts
?®Watkins v. Ouachita Parish School Board, (1931) 173 La. 270. 
Q®Ibld.. p. 272*
®!lbid.. p* 274.
177
have seen proper to declare null and void* The prlnoiples 
pointed out by the court’s decision* herein may be taken 
cognizance of by those who wish to conduct their special 
school elections according to law; too, those who may feel 
that justice has not been meted out in the proceedings 
connected with an election have herein a partial guide to 
judicial endorsement of their allegations*
Practically all cases in this section involve 
several minor points each— most of which could be dismissed 
with a statement of the policy that irregularities and 
failure to comply with governing regulations render an 
election void; also, many of the points at issue appear in 
several cases. Since this is the condition, adjudications 
establishing the law are presented in groups and treated 
mainly by mere statements of the court’s ruling with the 
addition of facts Involved where the alleged violation is 
not sufficiently implied In the decision to clarify the 
ruling.
Unauthorized voting areas and amounts of levies *
In general the organic and statutory law and interpretations 
thereof have established that only those duly constituted 
school districts may vote additional taxes for school 
support * Both the parish precinct®® and the ward®® have 
been definitely decreed as not being acceptable voting
®®Regard et al. v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, (1906) 
117 La. 952, 42 So. 438.
to
®®Onlnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. M&y 1. 1926. 
April S’0“ i958, p . m i : ------------------------
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areas for this purpose. With respect to the parish as an area, 
it has been said recently, **. . .we think it clear that if 
the Parish . . . has been created into a school district in 
accordance with existing laws, that it could vote a special 
tax • • • for the support of the public schools of the par- 
l*h."84
Constitutional provision in 1921®5 fixed the maximum 
levy for special maintenance purposes at eight mills and for 
building purposes at five mills. Elections which violated 
these regulations by voting ten mills for the former®® and 
eight mills for the latter®? purposes, respectively, were 
consequently declared null and void, with the advice that the 
only rwnedy would be to hold other elections with oonstitu- 
tioneü. limits observed in the amounts of the levies. However, 
the provision was not retroactive— a larger tax voted prior 
to the adoption of this constitution was not affected thereby.®®
Ambiguous statement of purpose not permissible. If 
special tax levies are to withstand contest, the purpose for 
idiich the proceeds are to be used must be of an authorized 
nature and must be so stated in definite propositions that
H ay 1, 1988, to April 30, 1930, p. 507.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1981, art. 10, seo. 10.
Oninions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1. 1920. 
to h S s r p T ^ " *  ----
®?Ihid.. May 1, 1982, to May 1, 1924, p. 453. 
®®Ihid., p. 730.
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the taxpayer in voting for one phase will not be entrapped 
into approving another# In terms of the ordinance ordering 
a certain election, the proceeds were "to be used in issuing 
certificates of indebtedness and equipping the public school 
building in said district"; as expressed on the ballot, the 
use was for "issuing certificates of indebtedness to build 
and equip a public school building in said school district. 
Evidence showed that the purpose was to issue certificates 
as a means of securing money to pay the balance due on a 
building already practically built and to defray costs not 
disclosed to the taxpayer or to the courts, there being pro­
vision for a balance much more than sufficient to retire the 
indebtedness of the building. On the grounds that the pur­
pose was misleading, was not lawfully permitted, and had not 
been submitted in full to the taxpayers, the levy was declared 
void# In issuing its decree the court emphasized some of the 
fundamental policies it has upheld with respect to special 
levies as follows;
As we have seen, however, the law does 
not centupla te, or authorize, the incurring, by 
the school boards, in one year, of debts to be 
paid from the revenue of another year; nor does 
the constitutional grant of author!^, to levy 
special taxes for the additional support of the 
public schools and the erection of public school- 
houses, authorize such a tax for the payment of 
a debt already incurred, in disregard of the law 
Which requires the budgeting of both revenues 
and expenditures, and the keeping of the expen- 
diturcs of each year within Its budgeted revenue
Walmrortli et al, t . J’aokson Farleh School Board et al., 
(1981) 149 La. 264, 88 So. 815.
149 La, 273.
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Irregularities in petition. resolution, and notiee. 
When a petition tor a speoial election is properly presented 
to a police jury or municipal authorities by at least one- 
third of the property taxpayers, it designates in writing 
the object and amount of tax to be levied each year and the 
number of years it is to run.^! Upon the police juries or 
the municipal authorities falls the responsibility of levying 
each year a tax sufficient to pay the specified amount— the 
rate is only to an extent sufficient to realize the necessary 
amount# Consequently, the court has held that failure of the 
petition to specify the amount is sufficient error to annul 
the results of an election.G8
The resolution calling an election— which election 
according to statutory provisions in 1910®® is mandatory if 
petitioned ^  one-fourth of the qualified property taxpayers 
— is not valid if issued by minority board proceedings, and 
a tax voted at an election so called is null and void.®* The 
minority proceedings in the ease at bar resulted from a par­
tial attendance at the board meeting^ but the court did not 
see this as any justification of illegal action and expressed 
its policy thus:
The calling of the special meeting of 
the board of school directors to be held within a
^^Acts of Louisiana, 1896, No. 131, secs. 1-8.
®®Bennatt et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1904) 113 La. 60, 
36 So. 891.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1910, No. 856, seo. 8.
®*Pryor et al. v. Board of School Directors of Olaiborne 
Parish, (1917) 141 La. 301, 74 So. 1002.
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time too short to permit all of the members to be 
notified was not done with any improper motive in 
this instance. The purpose in hurrying the pro­
ceedings was to hold the election at the earliest 
date possible, in order to have the speoial tax 
extended upon the assessment rolls before they 
would be closed. But we have to deal only with 
the deed, not the motive. It will not do to sanc­
tion proceedings whereby a minority of the members 
of an executive board controlled its affairs by 
voting at a special meeting of which the members 
sdio did not vote against the proceedings were not 
allowed an opportunity to vote at all.”®
Another defect in resolutions which rendered an accompanying 
election null was the failure to describe the boundaries of 
the contemplated district in suoh manner that the location on 
an official parish map might be clearly determined.®®
Petitions, resolutions, and notices concerning 
special tax levy elections may have varying requirements 
according to the governing legislative acts, but idien they 
treat of the same things they must be consistent. In one 
case®? brought before the courts, the resolution ordering 
the election and the proclamation to be published named a 
certain schoolhouse as the polling place, but in the publi­
cation of the notice during the required thirty days®® no 
polling place was named and the voters were left to find it 
as best they could. Also, the resolution stated the rate of 
taxation to be used on the ballot as five mills but did not
141 La. 304.
**D.bll.uz at al. v. Board of Sohool Directors of 
Natchitoches Parish, (1917) 148 La. 147, 76 So. 590.
®?Capps et al. v. Parish Board of School Directors of Winn 
Parish, (1915) 138 La. 348, 70 So. 322.
®®Aets of Louisiana, 1910, No. 256, sec. 3.
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state the period of levy; the published notice of the election 
gave the rate as ten mills and the period as ten years. The 
court held that these inoonsistenoies were errors and omis­
sions amotmting to nonohservanoe of essential requirements 
and that they placed the election outside of the law under 
authority of tdiioh it was assumed to have been held; there­
fore, the election was declared as of no legal effect.
Similar omlseione— failure to designate definite 
voting place, the day, hour, and place when and where returns 
would be received, ballots counted, and result declared— were 
Bcasa of the principal reasons that a certain election held in 
1912 was rendered illegal.®® In a case in 1906 the failure 
of the police jury to publish its resolution ordering the 
election more than once, as provided In the governing act,100 
was declared an irregularity.!®!
Although the courts may have decided that as a whole 
an election was illegally and irregularly held and therefore 
rendered null and void, they often point out that certain 
allegations brought are Insignificant or not violative of any 
law or regulations. An illustration of this was the judicial 
reply to a complaint!®^ against a notice idiloh read, "’For 
the purposes of said elections the polling places will be
^^Davis et al. v. Board of Directors of Parish of Bienville, 
(1912) 150 La. 786, 58 So. 572.
^®®Aets of Louisiana, 1886, No. 35, sec. 1.
^^^egard et al. v* Police Jury of Avoyelles, (1906) 117 La. 
952, 42 So, 438.
!®^Slkins et al* v* Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
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the sehoolhouees of the respective school districts.’"!®®
It was shown In evidence that there was only one schoolhouse 
in each district. The court held that although the notice 
applied to two elections, it was explicit and not confusing 
and therefore was no fatal irregularity. In another case,!®* 
a similar minor irregularity was alleged to the effect that 
the resolution contained two propositions while the ballot 
contained only one. By interpreting "or" es having an explana­
tory meaning, equivalent to "in other words" and euoh phrases, 
singleness of the proposition in the resolution was established. 
However, the court criticized the resolution as not having 
ideal precision but accepted it as being sufficiently definite 
to serve the purpose.
Illegalities pertaining to election officials and 
the polls. Upon the police jury falls the responsibility of 
appointing one of the supervisors of an election; the other 
two members are the registrar of voters and a person appointed 
by the governor. The failure of a police jury to perform this 
duty is considered a disregard of policy and a lack of com­
pliance with law by a subordinate authority.!®® Although the 
appointment of a person other than a school board member as 
an election commissioner might be preferable, there Is no legal 
regulation!®® which disqualifies the sohool board member to serve
138 La. 211.
et al. ▼. Board of Directors of Public Schools for 
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 66 So. 629.
!®%hite Hall Agr. Co. et al. v. Police Jury of Concordia 
Parish et al,, (1911) 128 La. 668, 55 So. 11.
106
Elkins et al. v. Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
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in this capacity# The oommissionera and clerks of elections 
must be sworn to perform all the duties encumbent on them as 
such. The failure of these officials to take the oath in the 
manner prescribed by the governing statute!®? is classified 
as a most serious irregularity.!®®
Legislation pertaining to the time of the opening and 
closing of polls Is ordinarily considered directory— that is,
%Aen there are unsubstantial departures from the law, but this 
does not apply sdien the omissions are so radical that it may be 
proved that voters were thereby deprived of their votes suffi­
cient in number and amount to change the result of the elec­
tion, In a contest on this point it is not necessary that 
those 1 & 0  were deprived of voting specify the way in which they 
would have voted; only is It necessary to establish that the num­
ber was sufficient to have changed the results of the election.!^® 
A lack of necessary commissioners, officials, and voters is no 
Justification for irregular removal of the boxes from the polls 
by those in charge. In this connection the court has said*
Because a few voters at these two pre­
cincts declined to act as commissioners is no good 
or valid reason udiy these boxes should have been 
removed before the hour for closing the polls ar­
rived. Other voters appearing there might have
!®?Aets of Louisiana, 1910, No. 256, sec. 10.
^®®Oain et al. v. Vernon Parish School Board, (1918) 142 La,
744, 77 So. 584.
^®®Wiatley et al. v. La Salle Parish Sohool Board, (1924)
155 La. 797, 99 So. 603; TNhite et al. v. Livingston Parish
Sohool Board, (1927) 163 La. 266, 111 So. 700.
^®Whatley et al. v. La Salle Parish School Board, (1924)
155 La. 797, 99 So. 603.
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elected oosmilseioners and proceeded with the elec­
tion, had the boxe* been kept at the polling places, 
and made accessible to the voters.!!^
Violative JBSsag-feSfflS la a M  voting. Con-
o e m l %  proceedings at the polls where elections for the levy 
of speoial school taxes were being held the courts have had 
to deal with some major and many detailed problems allegedly 
violative of valid proceedings. From the reasoning In the 
various cases it appears that the court has striven to give 
always the interpretation that is fairest to all parties in­
volved and in so doing it has often disregarded minor irregu­
larities; on the other hand, the court seems to have been 
hesitant to establish precedent decisions which have a possi­
bility of being reversed in subsequent oases. Outstanding 
among those procedures iMilch have been declared violative by 
the courts are the following.
1• Failure to prepare list of voters correctly. The
statute concerning the list of voters, as Involved in the Elkins
case,l!B prescribes as follows:
That it shall be the duty of the registrar of voters 
to furnish the commissioners appointed to hold suoh 
elections with the lists of taxpayers entitled to 
vote in person or by proxy at such elections, to­
gether with the valuation of each taxpayer’s property 
as shown by the assessment roll last made and filed 
prior to each election: provided that, when any 
taxpayer’s name and valuation of property bh&ll be 
omitted from suoh list or erroneously entered thereon 
the commissioners of election shall have authority 
to receive affidavits of such taxpayer’s right to
White et al, v, Livingston Parish Sohool Board, (1927) 
163 La, 271.
^^Elkins et al, v. Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So, 99,
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vote and of the proper aaaeased valuation of his 
property, which affidavit shall be attached to 
auoh taxpayer’s ballot.!!®
Sridenoe disclosed that:
. . , a list of names without any valuation of 
property, was furnished by a deputy elerk of court 
to the local superintendent of the public schools, 
fdio copied it, and, with the assistance of the 
assessor, put the assessed valuation of the prop­
erty of each taxpayer on the copy of the list, 
and gave it to the commissioners of election.
After this unauthorized list or copy of the list, 
containing only 28 names, furnished by the deputy 
clerk of court, was delivered to the commissioners,
10 names were added with a pencil by an unauthor­
ized person. And it does not appear that the 
commissioners required any voter ^ose name was 
thus added to the list to furnish an affidavit of 
his right to vote,!!*
On the first hearing the court did not decree the election
null; it explained its decision thus:
There is very grave irregularity here, 
the like of idiioh might, in an election on a 
larger scale, give rise to endless difficulties 
and complications at the poll; but in the election 
in the small school district here in question (the 
total list including the names added in pencil 
coxsprising only 38 persons), where, doubtless, 
every voter was acquainted with every other voter 
and knew idiat property he had, no complications 
arose, but the voting went on as regularly as if 
the list had emanated from the true legal source 
and had been duly certified, and no harm was done. 
There is no allegation or contention that the 
defectiveness of the list had any influence at 
all upon even a single vote. Under these cir­
cumstances we can see no sufficient reason why 
the election should be set aside because of this 
irregularity. There is no contention that the 
persons whose names were added in pencil were not 
entitled to vote at the election, and, no sugges­
tion of fraud or ill practice, or of bad faith.ü ®
^^®Xcts of Louisiana, 1910, No. 256, sec, 6.
!!*Elkins et al. v. Board of Sohool Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 218.
!!®Ibid♦. pp. 213-214.
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In connection therewith several similar decisions were cited 
in idiich the results of an election were not set aside where 
votes irregularly received were later shown to be legal or 
were not sufficient to change the announced result of the 
election#!!® However, on a rehearing, seven months later, 
the court reversed its decree, explaining its action as 
follows:
On reconsideration of the plaintiff’s 
complaint, that the list of property taxpayers, 
hy which the commissioners were governed in con­
ducting this election, was made and furnished by 
an unauthorized person, we have concluded that, 
although no actual fraud has been shown in this 
case, our approval of the illegal or irregular 
proceedings by which this tax was imposed might 
establish an unwise and harmful precedent#
This illegality in the proceedings 
warrants the annulment of the tax#!!”
Very similar irregularities in the preparation of 
the list of voters and in allowing those with questionable 
rights to vote without attaching affidavits of their rights 
to their ballots were practiced in an election the results of 
idiich were brought for adjudication in 1918#!!® % e  court,
Smith V# Parish Board of Sohool Directors, (1910) 125 La# 
987, 52 So# 122; McWilliams et al# v# Board of Directors of 
Iberville Parish et al#, (1911) 128 La# 422, 54 So# 928; Endom 
et al. V. City of Monroe et al*, (1904) 112 La. 779, 36 So# 681; 
Flores et al# v# Police Jury of De Soto Parish et al#, (1906)
116 La# 428, 40 So. 786.
^?Sllclns et al. v. Board of School Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 217-218#
^®Cain et al. v. Vernon Parish Sohool Board, (1918) 142 La. 
744, 77 So. 584.
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in decreeing this election null, explained the serioueneea of 
such Tiolations thus:
Suoh a gross yiolation of the election 
law is so flagrant, and admits of suoh opportunities 
of fraud, idiere every provision of the law should 
be adhered to, so as to insure the solemn decision 
of the taxpayers at the election, that it vitiates 
the election, although no fraud is shown
8. Xrregularlties in ballots and balloting. When 
there is statutory prescription of the form of ballot to be 
used in special tax elections, this regulation must be met.
If a board disregards this and uses a form of its own devising, 
sueh violation is considered one of the grounds sufficient 
for annulling the election.!®®
Although statutory enactments concerning special 
school tax elections have changed from time to time, both 
these and the constitution have always contemplated that each 
elector shall do his own voting, without advice, suggestion, 
or interference from the commissioners or other persons. 
Exceptions for various groups have been made— for example,
Act No# 131 of 1896 permitted women taxpayers to vote by 
proxy. Gross abuse of voting rights was practiced et an 
election where the property valuations voted on, with the 
exception of two affirmative votes totaling $570 and 64 nega­
tive votes totaling $83,667, which had their valuations upon 
the ballots, were entered upon the tally sheets after the 
closing of the polls. The entry was made by one of the com-
Ü ^Ibld.. 142 La. 746.
!®®Davis et al. v. Board of Directors of Parish of Bienville, 
(1912) 130 La. 786, 58 So* 572.
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ml88lomer8#"^the other two having previously retired^-the clerk> 
and soae other persons; the amounts were ascertained, not from 
the then existent assessment rolls, hut from a proposed assess­
ment whleh one of the commissioners^ who was also a deputy 
assessor, had in his possession* One amount was filled in the 
next day by the clerk and an outsider, after conference with 
the voter. The statute in force at that time, Act î^ o* 151 of 
1698, did not specifically require that the amount of the prop­
erty valuation he expressed upon the face of tie ballot, but 
It was certainly Intended that the pecuniary vote should be 
determined by the voter, or at least by the public records, 
and not by the commissioners of election. In issuing its decree 
the court said that while no fraud was imputed to any of the 
parties concerned, in the Interest of Justice and from a proper 
regard for the principles of our government the result should 
not be allowed to s t a n d S i m i l a r  abuse but in a milder 
degree, perhaps, was the charge in a case about three years 
l a t e r . 122 Therein the voters placed their names upon the 
ballots, and the commissioners at the close of the election 
by reference to the assessment roll ascertained the amount of 
property voted by each. With respect to this the court said;
In com%)liance with the spirit of the law, 
the voter should, at the time he presents himself 
to vote, satisfy the commissioners regarding the 
amount of property he desires to vote. He should
^^Bennett et al. v. Staples et al., (1903) 110 La* 847, 34 
So. 801.
et al. v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, (1906) 117 La. 
9 6 2, 42 So. 438.
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specify or cause to be specified on hie ballot the 
property which he wishes to have counted as a part 
of his vote as a property taxpayer.
It seems that the legislature in 1910, having seen 
the trouble which had arisen from time to time over the proper 
method of deteimining the amount of property valuation voted, 
sought to reduce litigation thereupon and uncertainty of pro­
mulgation by incorporating in section Ü of Act Ho. 256 the 
requirement that the amount voted ^ould be stated on the 
ballot# The court upheld the letter of the law in that respect 
when, in correcting the returns of an election, it held that 
the amount voted must have been stated in the blank left on 
the ballot for that purpose but not ascertained by some in­
ference,1^4
3. Controversies pertaining to voting of property. 
for determining the valuation of property of those seeking to 
vote, the 1910 legislature made definite provision by specifying 
the last assessment roll as the legal b a s i s , ^^5 Concerning 
the establishment of the ownership of property there has been 
enacted no such definite and simple provision; therefore, to 
the commissioners and often to the courts is left the problem 
of determining who is entitled to vote as a "property taxpayer.” 
By the constitution and by legislative enactments the voters 
are required to be property taxpayers, and the meaning as In­
terpreted by the courts is that he who votes must be a property
123pbia,, 117 La. 956.
et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for 
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 68 So. 629.
^2^Aots of Louisiana, 1910, Ho. 256, sec. 4.
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taxpayer at the time of voting and not. merely assessed with 
the property he offers to vote.^2® Thus, often the commis­
sioners have the responsibility of determining ownership to 
property before permitting a vote thereon. The legislative 
aots have provided that affidavits establishing a claimed 
right to vote may be accepted by the commissioners for veri­
fication by proper authorities. Nevertheless, many disagreements 
have arisen at the polls concerning the amount individuals were 
entitled to vote and not infrequently^ some have found their way 
through the lower courts to the higher court for adjudication* 
Illustrations of this are the following decisions which have 
been pronounced in various cases.
The surviving spouse, whether husband or wife, who 
is the usufructuary of the property belonging to the community 
of acquêts and gains at one time existent, and in whose name 
it is assessed, is entitled to vote the same* This holds when 
the oecmunity is unsettled and when no proof is made that the 
community owes any d e b t s , ^ 2 7  However, a surviving husband may 
vote only cne-helf of an assessment in his name representing 
community property which was acquired by his deceased wife 
during marriage and v/hich estate has been settled; the other 
half vests in the heirs of his wife.128
Smith V, Perish Board of School Directors, (1910) 125 La* 
987, 52 So. 122; Elkins et al* v* Board of School Directors of 
Parish of Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
127peck et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for 
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 68 So, 629; Elkins 
at al. V. Board of School Directors of Parish of Union, (1915) 
138 La. 207, 70 So, 99.
^28peck at al* v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for 
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La. 334, 68 So. 629.
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A married woman la entitled to vote property asseased 
in her name where it is not shown that it waa acquired during 
the existence of the communit y,b ut her husband is not al­
lowed to vote such property except when properly authorized 
The etatute^®^ governing this authorization provides that bal­
lots voted by proxy shall be signed by both the taxpayer and 
her proxy; in one instance, however, the attachment of the power 
of attorney to the ballot was held as sufficient identification 
when the proxy had failed to endorse the b a l l o t , I f  the 
description on the assessment role indicates that property Is 
situated outside the district, parol evidence may be admitted 
to show error in the situs of the real estate,^®® The proper 
method of determining the value of a deduction, made necessary 
by an incorrect inclusion of a number of acres in a tract 
valued ^  globe, is— in the absence of proof of the assessed 
value of the particular acreage— by means of aggregation In 
terms of the average assessment per acre.l®*
That the adjudication of questions Involving property 
vote at special tax elections had become burdensome to the
^®*Bennett et al# v# Staples at al,, (1903) 110 la, 847, 34 
So, 801.
^®®Slkins et al, v. Board of School Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So. 99.
^^Acts of Louisiana, 1910, Ho, 256, see, 11.
^®Slkins et al, v. Board of School Directors of Parish of 
Union, (1915) 138 La. 207, 70 So, 99.
l®®Ibid.
^tpeck et al, v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for 
Parish of Catahoula, (1915) 137 La, 334, 68 So. 629.
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courts Is shorn hy the statement of Justice Olivier 0* 
Provosty in 1915, as follows:
Out of 76 votes cast at this election 24 
were contested, necessitating an investigation of 
the land titles of the voters, and, incidentally, 
examination and study of succession settlements, 
community of acquêts and gains settlements, and 
tutorship settlements, Fortunately for this court 
the number of contests was reduced by the sifting 
process through which they passed in the lower 
court to the comparatively few hereinabove consid­
ered, Would that the Constitution could be so 
amended as to preserve the courts from the burden 
of these tax election oases by letting the regis­
tration and assessment rolls be, in the absence 
of fraud, the sole and final tests of the qualifi­
cations of the voter; and would that political 
election cases could be relegated to some other 
more appropriate tribunal
Restrictions concerning promulgation of election
and the levying ordinance. Consistently the court has held
that the police jury is the authority to promulgate special
tax elections for schools. When an attempt was made to secure
the ruling that the secretary of state is the proper authority
for such promulgation, the response was;
This court has never held heretofore that the 
Secretary of State Is the officer should make 
the promulgation in special tax elections for 
schools, • • • In order to decide that the police 
jury is not the proper authority, but that the 
Secretary of state should make the promulgation, 
we would have to find that the general election 
law is all controlling, • • • We think that the 
promulgation by the Secretary of State in a gen­
eral election or in an election under a general 
law is one of those not applying to special elec­
tion laws.*®®
137 La. 348.
Hall Agp. Co. et al, ▼. FoUee Jury of Concordia 
Farlah at al., (1911) 128 La. 676.
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Also, the polios jury has no authority to delegate its power 
of promulgation; it must perform this duty Itself,1®? When­
ever a promulgation is contested and there is the claim that 
the attack is prescribed, the term of prescription must begin 
with the date of promulgation which is legally accepted, and 
idien the police jury has recognized one date of promulgation 
it ean scarcely be heard to claim another,^®^
In answer to the charge that a tax ordinance failed 
to specify the term, or designate the year, or years, for which 
the tax was to be levied, the court gave interpretation to the 
governing statute— sections 3 and 3 of Act No* 151 of 1698, as 
amended and re-enacted by Act No, 145 of 1904— as follows:
Construing the two sections together, we interpret 
them to mean that, immediately upon obtaining the 
authority of the taxpayers, by means of the special 
election, it was the duty of the police jury to levy 
the special tax so authorized, for the period of time 
specified in the petition of the taxpayers, with des­
ignation of the years included in such period; and 
thereafter, annually, in conformity with section 5, 
to levy and collect the tax for each of the years so 
designated* It would, of course, be impossible to 
hold that the police jury are not required to conform 
to the law, since they have no authority to act in 
the premises, at all, save to the extent, and in
the manner, that the law authorizes.1®#
Since it was sustained that the ordinance was lacking in the
respects alleged, the court decreed it void and of no effect.
Failure of tax consequent to failure of purpose,
The effect which the abolition of a district has upon the levy
128 La. 868, 58 So. 11.
^®®ïols* at al. ▼. Folio* Juiy and School Board of Iberville 
Parish, (1911) 128 La. 1086.
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lAiloh its taxpayers have authorized was established in 1911.140 
After the school board of Sabine Parish had consolidated three 
school districts into one high school district, it found that 
the ten-mill special levy voted would not be sufficient but 
failed in the passage of an additional five-mill tax necessary 
for support* The board, finding itself without the necessary 
funds for carrying out the high school project, and under im­
plied authority of the actl^l which empowered it to create the 
district, rescinded its action of creation. However, it et- 
tenpted to continue collecting the voted ten-mill levy until 
legally enjoined from so doing* The court pointed out that 
the power to abolish the district carries with it as a neces­
sary consequence the power to abolish the tax, since the tax 
remains without an object after the school district has been 
abolished and that a tax without an object is a legal impos­
sibility. Thus, It was established that vhere a district has 
been dissolved, the special tax levied for it falls and must 
not be collected; otherwise, the proceeds would accumulate in 
the treasury from year to year without its being possible to 
put them to any use.
The Law Governing the Issuance of Bonds for School Purposes
Since the beginning of the present century the is­
suance of bonds for "acquiring lands for building sites and
^^^Moore V. Board of Directors of Sabine Parish, (1912) 131 
La. 757, 60 So. 234.
lêlj^Qts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 15.
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playgrounds, and for purchasing, erecting, enlarging or im­
proving school buildings and teachers* homes, and acquiring 
the necessary equipment and furnishings therefor"^42 become 
an established practice,143 The parish school boards, as they 
are authorized by the law and directed by the qualified voters 
of their respective territories, are the governing bodies in 
boM issuing procedures.^44 significant this phase of
educational finance has become is shown by the facts that the 
state sold only $268,673 worth of such bonds In 1910-1911 as 
compared with $4,633,749 in 1929-1930, and that In 1931-1932 
her total indebtedness for outstanding bonds was $28,076,286.^45 
Constitutiona 1 authority. The constitutionality of 
school bonds in general and of the accompanying tax levy was 
attached in 1913.^46 The court, in establishing the validity 
of the bonds and in answer to the contention that article 281 
of the Constitution of 1898 did not authorize school districts 
to incur debt and issue bonds at all, presented article 281 as 
originally enacted, and explained the successive amendments 
proposed through Acts Nos. 186 of 1904, 122 of 1906, and 197
^4®Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 14, sec. 14(b).
^4®opinipns of the Attorney General of Louisiana; May 1, 
1906, to May 1, ltfl6, pp.™ 280, 1&64; Iky 1, 1930, to April 30, 
1932, p. 471.
^44jy^,s May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 479; May 1, 1930, 
to April 50, 1932, p. 474.
^4®gtate Deuartment of Education of Louislana. Eighty-fourth 
Annual Èêuort. for the Session 1"5?2%33T in. 14-15.
^46goard of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Lincoln 
V. Huston State Bank, (1913) 133 La. 109, 62 So. 492.
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of 1910, The act of 1906 added school districts to the list 
of districts that might avail themselves of the opportunity to 
issue bonds; the act of 1910 amended to the extent that the 
article was practically recast. Since many of the contested 
points in bond issues have foundation or explanation in the 
revision according to the 1910 act, the part p^taining to 
the authorization of bonds and their accompanying tax levy is 
quoted in full, as by the court:
Municipal Corporations, parishes or school, 
drainage, subdrainage, road, navigation, "or sewerage 
districts, the City of Hew Orleans excepted, herein­
after referred to as subdivisions," when authorized 
to do so, by a vote of a majority in number and 
amount of the property taxpayers, qualified to vote 
under the Constitution and laws of this State, who 
vote at an election held for that purpose, after 
due notice of said election has been published for 
thirty (30) days in the official journal of the 
munieipal corporation or parishes, and where there 
is no official journal, in a newspaper published 
therein, may "through their respective governing 
authorities," incur debt and issue negotiable bonds 
therefor, and each year while any bonds Issued to 
evidence said indebtedness are outstanding, the 
governing authorities of such subdivision shall 
levy and collect annually, in excess of all other 
taxes, a tax sufficient to pay the interest, annu­
ally or semi-annually, and the principal falling 
due each year, or such amount as may be required 
for any sinking fund provided for the payment of 
said bonds at maturity provided, that such special 
taxes, for all purposes, shall not in any year ex­
ceed ten (10) mills on the dollar of the assessed 
valuation of the property in such subdivisions.
No bonds shall be issued for any other 
purpose than that stated in the submission of the 
proposition to the taxpayer, and published for 
thirty (30) days as aforesaid, or for a greater 
amount than that therein mentioned; nor shall 
such bonds be issued for any other purpose than for 
constructing, improving and maintaining public roads 
and highways, paving and improving streets, roads 
and alleys, purchasing or constructing systems of 
waterworks, sewerage, drainage, navigation, lights,
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public parka and buildings, together with all 
necessary equipments and furnishing, bridges and 
other works of public improvement, the title to 
which shall rest in the subdivision creating the 
debt, as the case may be; * , ,*47
The conclusion of the court was that school districts have
constitutional authority to incur debt and issue bonds.
Although the issuance of bonds is recognized as a
constitutional privilege, an issue is valid only as long as
it meets the requirements of the constitution under which it
was made. By 1921 there was no constitutional specification
of the limit of special taxes to be levied for bonds. Charges
presented in 1928^48 were against the attempted levying of a
special property tax of two mills in addition to an admitted
ten-mill special property tax to pay certain bonds issued in
1920, The court’s decree upheld the plaintiffs* contention
and there was the explanation that since the bonds were issued
under the authority of the Constitution of 1913,149 which
specified a ten-mill limit, that limit continued with the
bonds in question,
Unoonstitutionality of bonds based on a tax levy for
another purpose. The right and duty of the legislature to
provide for the administration of the issuance of bonds is
recognized constitutionally, but its enactments must not be
in conflict with the constitution. One act dealing with bonds
^4^Const!tution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 281, as amended by 
Act No. 197 of 1910, adopted November, 1910,
^48Tremont Lumber Go. v. Bond et al,, (1928) 166 La, 125, 
116 So, 723; Tremont & Gulf Railway Co, v, T, H, Bond et al., 
(1928) 166 La. 128, 116 So, 724,
149
Constitution of Louisiana, 1913, art. 281.
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seemfi to have been the eause of much confusion end mi sunder- 
standing. This was Aot No. 04 of 1906 which authorized parishes, 
municipal corporations, and parish boards of school directors, 
Orleans Parish excepted, to issue bonds for certain public pur­
poses to be secured by special taxes voted under article 23S of 
the Constitution of 1898. That article provided for special 
taxes to give additional support to public schools and to meet 
the cost of the construction of public schoolhouses when voted 
by a majority of the property taxpayers of the school district*
In several cases the unconstitutionality of this aot 
was alleged, but it was not acted upon by the court because 
of various technical errors in the presentation of the con­
tention.^®® Finally, in May, 1911, the attack was properly 
presented to the court* The objection which was charged was 
that the aot conflicted with article 361 of the Constitution
of 1898 which alone authorized the issuance of bonds by school
I
d i s t r i c t s A f t e r  presenting the pertinent parts of each 
article, the court gave the comparison:
Construing these provisions as parts of 
the same instrument, it is clear that, although 
article 232 permits property owners by a majority 
vote to impose taxes on their property to an un­
limited extent, for the support of schools and the 
building of schoolhouses and other works of public 
improvement, article 281 confers upon the corpora­
tions and quasi corporations, of which such property 
owners may be members, the power to incur debt and 
to issue bonds by an affirmative grant, which im­
plies that they would not possess that power unless
Folse et al. V. Polloe Juiy et al., (1210) 125 La. 603,
51 So. 650; Waggnep et al. t . Felloe Jury of Parish, of Jefferson 
et al., (1910) 125 La. 863, 51 So. 1016.
IGlfoiae et al. t . Felloe Jury and School Board of Iberville 
Parish, (1911) 128 La. 1080, 55 So. 681.
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it was so conferred I and idiloh power, as thus con­
ferred , is restricted and regulated in several im­
portant particulars, so that no one could reasonably 
argue that the power of the corporations and quasi 
corporations to incur debt and issue bonds is as 
broad as the power of the property owners to impose 
taxes on their property.*®®
Continuing, it showed the conflict of the aot in question as
follows:
The Act No. 84 of 1906 appears, however, 
to ignore that difference, and purports to confer 
on "parishes, municipal corporations and parish 
boards of school directors" the power to fund into 
bonds the proceeds of all taxes which the taxpayers 
may impose upon their property under article 232 
of the Constitution; and, as that article does not 
purport to deal with the questions of the incurring 
of debt and the issuing of bonds by such bodies, 
and hence imposes no restrictions with regard thereto, 
neither does the aot impose any restrictions, save 
that it limits the interest on the bcmds which it 
authorizes to be issued (up to the amount to be 
realized from the special tax, whatever that amount 
may be) to 5 per cent., requires the interest to 
be paid emnually, or semiannually, and requires 
that the special tax shall be dedicated to their 
payment^and shall not be diverted until they are
Therefore, it was concluded that Aot No. 84 of 1906 was in 
irreconcilable conflict with the constitution and void. In 
general, this meant that bonds could not be issued upon the 
basis of a special tax authorized by the taxpayer, but that 
the issuance of bonds must be according to controlling or­
ganic law.
Necessity for legal creation of district. Prior to 
the issuance of bonds the school district must have been 
definitely created and identified as such. In article 381 of
IG&ibid.. 188 L a . 1088.
pp. 1088-1089.
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the Constitution of 1913 eohool dletriots are expressly named 
as authorized to issue bonds, and under an act of 191S^®4 
school board has authority to divide a parish into school 
districts with limits fixed as its discretion deems best. 
However, the mere conferring of the power upon the school board 
does not within itself create districts— definite action must 
have been pursued and records made to establish the fact that 
a territory is a school district. In one contest^®® on this 
point the court admitted that the term, "district," is broad 
enough to include a ward, in the sense that the limits of a 
school district may be as extensive as those of a ward, but 
explained that a police jury, or justice of the peace, or 
municipal ward, cannot possibly be brought within the meaning 
of the term, "school district," and emphasized that it is the 
"school district" which is authorized to issue bonds.
In another case the court decreed of no effect the 
election held in, and the bonds Issued by, an illegally created 
district. The districts involved overlapped existing districts 
within the parish; districts thus located were held to be 
violative of section 2 of Act Ho. 152 of 1920.^®®
When the validity of bonds has been questioned, the 
court has placed upon the defendant school board the respon­
sibility of proving the legal creation of the district which
®^4j^ots of Louisiana, 1912, No. 214, sec. 13.
^®®Eemler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La. 
133, 76 So. 585.
l**Elnton et al. v. Winn Parieh School Board, (1984) 155 La. 
666, 99 So. 583.
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it was u p h o l d i n g o n  the other hand, plaintiffs have h e m  
held responsible for proving the illegality of creation after 
they had recognized the district in their petition.
Valid purposes for bond issues. The court’s theory 
seems to have been that since laws authorizing a debt to be 
created against the taxpayer, or his property to be taken, 
without his consent, are in derogation of common right, they 
are to be construed strictly. In 1913 legal sanction was given 
to the issuance of bonds for the purpose of financing the con­
struction end equipment of an agricultural and domestic science 
building and for purchasing a site for it. The court held 
that this purpose, "school buildings," was sufficiently im­
plied in the statute authorizing the issuance of \)onds and 
that the authority for construction necessarily carried with 
it the authority to buy the site.I®# Again, in 1922,^®® the 
school building was decreed as a valid puxpooe for a bond 
issue.
Adherence to the law in the opposite sense— that is, 
in forbidding bond issuance for an unauthorized purpose— was 
upheld by the oourt^®^ in its refusal to recognize the purchase
^®%#mler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La. 
133, 76 So. 585.
^®®Milton et al. v. Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922)
152 La. 761, 94 So. 386.
^^Boerd of Directors of Public Schools of Perish of Lincoln 
V. Buston State Bank, (1913) 133 La. 109, 62 So* 492.
^®®Mllton et al, v* Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922) 152 
La. 761, 94 So. 386.
^®%©mler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La. 
133, 76 90. 585.
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Of an agriouXtwal faim as a valid basis of a bond issue,
%ere m s  the explanation that the levying of taxes for such 
purposes was granted neither hf article 261 of the Constitu­
tion of 1913, authorising bond issues, nor by article 232 of 
the same constitution, providing for giving additional support 
to publie schools. The principles of agriculture as a 
quired subject^®® was interpreted to have reference to the 
theoretical part as contained in the scdiool books, and this 
requiremwit was held to be no more justification of the Issu­
ance of bonds to purchase an agricultural farm than the teaching 
of zoology would justify the purchase of a zoo for instructional 
purposes. In the court’s expression of its views there was 
nothing to indicate that it did not see the merit of highly 
specialized equipment for public school instruction; it merely 
stated, "The time may come when these extensions will be in­
cluded in our public school system but It has not yet ar-
riT,a."l*3
limitations pertaining %o bond issues, ^ e  bond 
issue article of the Constitution of 1896 as amended in 1910^®^ 
provided that the governing authority issuing bonds should levy 
and collect annually in excess of all other taxes a tax suffi­
cient to pay the principal end interest falling due each year, 
such special taxes not to exceed in any year ten mills on the
162
Acts of Louisiana, 1910, Ho. 306, sec, 1.
^^Eemler v. Richland Parish School Board, (1917) 142 La. 137,
^®*Constitution of Louisiana, .1696, art. 281, as amended by 
Act Ho. 197 of 1910, adopted November, 1910.
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dollar of the assessed valuation* This provision was legalized 
in 1913 in the decree that there was no violation in a levy of 
seven and one-half mills laid for such purposes, although there 
was in existence a five-mill tax for schools levied under ar­
ticle 238. The bond issue provision was held not affected by 
a levy under another organic authorization*^®® The regulations 
of the amendment were continued through incorporation In the 
Constitution of 1913*^®® The annual bond issue levy on this 
basis was not affected by the constitutional amendments of 
1918 delimiting special taxes, for, as interpreted by the 
attorney general, the first of the amendments specifically 
excepted a levy for this purpose, and the second dealt with 
taxes authorized under another article of the constitution*!®?
Before the passage of the 1910 amendment electors 
were duly authorized to specify the annual levy at the time 
they authorized the issue. When as a result of increase in 
the valuation of the property, this levy produced a surplus 
sufficient to retire the bonds, the authorities were advised 
to discontinue the levy although the term had not expired—  
the purpose of the levy had been served and the fund could not 
be diverted*!®® However, in the Instance of a surplus acou-
!®®Board of Directors of Public Schools of Parish of Lincoln 
V. Ruston State Bank, (1913) 133 La. 109, 62 So. 492.
IddConetitution of Louisiana, 1913, art* 281.
!®?Ibid., as amended by Acts Nos, 191 and 218 of 1918, adopted 
November, 1910; Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana* 
U a j 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. %95*
IdSp-piniona of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1910, 
to May 1, iéÏ2, p. 466,
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mklated on an issue authorized after tbs 1910 enactment, the 
governing officials were told that they had violated the law 
in specifying an annual levy— that had the "sufficient amount" 
been laid each year there would have been no surplus* As a 
solution for the situation, they were advised to apply the sur­
plus to payment of the first bonds that matured and to modify 
the method of levying so as to provide only the amount needed 
annually,!®®
The amount of bonds which a district may vote upon 
itself is regulated by the constitution of the state— the 
maximum must not exceed ten per cent of the assessed valuation 
of the taxable property of the school district according to 
the current assessment,!?® This provision was the basis of 
an attack on a proposed bond issue of #60,000, Evidence sub­
stantiated the valuation of all the property within the dis­
trict to be #710,000, Consequently, the court held the amount 
of issue as clearly within the constitutional limits,!?!
Interpretations of bond elections, Many controver­
sies on various phases of the bond election seem to have been 
brought both to the courts and to the attorneys general of 
the state. Some of the adjudications based thereon have been 
merely that there must be compliance with the governing statute; 
in other oases the decision has depended almost entirely on
May 1, 1914, to Mey 1, 1916, p. 390.
^ Ooastltutlon of louiaiane, 1921, art. 14, see. 14(f)
l^^Gauthlar et al. ▼. Farlah Sehool Board of Farlah of 
ATOyalles, (1928) 165 La. 256, 115 So. 479.
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the oourt’s view of the point in contest. The following are 
those which seem to he the chief laws on this subject as thus 
established.
The official publication of the voting date for 
thir^ days prior to the time of the election is an essential 
feature.!?® In fact, this notice "is so indispensable that 
the absence of it is not a mere irregularity, but a nullity."!?® 
On the other hand, harmless errors, such as the use of the 
wrong year in the notice when there were several indications 
of the correct date, have received no consideration in deter­
mining the validity of the election.!?^ The designation of 
certain small settlements as polling places without naming 
any particular house or lot is sufficient notice of place of 
election idiere it is not shown that this method resulted in 
confusion for anyone who wished to vote.!?®
Upon the registrar of voters rests the responsi­
bility of furnishing the official list of voters for a bond 
election. When the law required merely that the registrar 
should furnish such list, the attack that the list was not 
signed by the registrar tut by one who prepared it and signed 
as "deputy registrar" received no consideration from the court
!?®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 
1918, to gay lT"!5M, p. l78^.
!?®St. Landry Parish School Board v. Laroade, (1921) 148 
La. 785.
!?^Ibid.. 148 La. 738, 87 So. 726.
!?®Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1923) 
154 La. 242, 97 So. 430.
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after it was determined that no harm had resulted therefrom.!?® 
The governing statute declared as follows in regard to such 
irregularities j
No defect or irregularity in or omission 
from the list of voters furnished by the registrar 
of voters hereunder shall affect the validity of 
the election, unless it be established that voters 
were thereby’deprived of votes sufficient in number 
and aigoÿnt to have changed the result of the elec-
Whenever the registrar examines a list prepared by another—  
for example, an abstracter^-then makes the necessary corrections 
end additions, and signs it, his signature is considered as 
sufficient evidence of his approval^ and such action is held 
to comply with statutory requirements,!?®
The qualification of residence of those who vote 
at bond elections is that required by the statute In force at 
the time, A voter who spends a considerable part of his time 
within a precinct and retains his citizenship there is entitled 
to vote at an election therein, although he may remain the 
greater part of the time outside the precinct.!?® The time 
limit of residence must be that required by statute, but the 
territorial limits of a voting precinct for a bond election 
may vary at the discretion of the governing board, for in 
that body’s power to name polling places is Implied the power
l?*Ibid.
!??Acts of Louisiana, Extra Session, 1921, No. 46, sec. 14*
^^®8ylvestre et al, v. St, Landry Parish School Board, (1927) 
164 La. 804, 113 So. 816.
!?^Ouimlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1922, 
to Ifey 1, Ï9S4 , p, 461.
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to define the preoinots therefor. He who has the required 
residence in the territory of the improvised precinct is en­
titled to vote, even If the polling place is outside his police 
Jury precinct.!®® This applies only when the polling place 
is within the parish in which one has residence, for neither 
is the school hoard empowered to create a precinct composed 
of parts of two parishes nor is the voter permitted to leave 
his parish to vote.!®!
Several occurrences at the polls have been upheld, 
condemned, or treated as minor irregularities. With respect 
to the oath of commissioners, one decree was; "The failure of 
the commissioners to take an oath before the proper officer, 
or to take one at all, will not vitiate an election; it is a 
mere irregularity."!®2 The statement on the ballot of a propo­
sition to levy a special tax for the issuance of bonds is 
considered single and to be voted for or against as a whole.!®® 
The court pointed to the error of submitting such a question 
in two propositions thus:
While it is true as an abstract proposition that 
the tax may have been authorized without the bond 
issue, such a tax without a bond issue would have 
defeated the purpose of the taxpayers to provide 
funds for the immediate construction of a high 
school building.!®4
^®8ylvestre et al. v. St. Landry Parish School Board, (1927) 
164 La. 204, 113 So. 816.
!®^Milton et al, v. Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922) 162 
La. 761, 94 So. 386.
!®®Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1923)
134 La. 242, 97 So. 430.
!®®McWilliams et al. v. Board of Directors of Iberville 
Parish et al., (1911) 126 La. 488, 54 So. 928.
128 La. 425.
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Advice relative to the eomtemt of the proposition for a bond 
issue has been to the effeet that it must state with regard to 
the debts the object, the number of years it is to run, and 
the Mste of interest.!®® He who votes mist own the property 
voted at the time of the election*!®® One who does not know 
how to sign the ballot may vote a valid ticket by having his 
vote properly signed by another in his presence#!®?
A bond issue requires for its passage the affirmative 
majority vote of both the qualified taxpaying electors and of 
the valuation of the property voted# The policy of the court 
has been to decide upon the validity of contested votes when 
a change in the status of those votes could in ax%y way affect 
the results of the election# In the Milton case corrections 
by the court changed the results to the extent that a question 
vhich had been announced as having carried was pronounced as 
defeated.!®® On the other hand, the validity of contested 
votes has not been passed upon udien those votes were so small 
in number and property valuation and so cast that the results 
of the election would have remained the same regardless of the 
decision about the validity of the various votes.!®* The
Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1. 1916. 
to Meÿ ïrWïa7"pTT2&;' "
^®Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1923) 154 La, 
842, 97 So. 430.
^ *Ihid.
^^Mlton et al. ▼. Linooln Parish School Board, (1922) 152 
La. 761, 94 So. 386.
!®^Bradford et al. v. Grant Parish School Board, (1935) 164 
La# 242, 97 So. 430% ^Iveetre et al. v. St. Landry Parish 
School Board, (1987) 164 La# 804, 113 So# 818*
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failure of the hoard to execute the formal prooese verbal at
the time the return a are canvassed and promulgated does not
annul the election. Mandamus would lie to compel the board
to perform such duty but only after the failure to perform in
the time stated*!^®
Legal limitations of oomnlaints. Persons who vote
for bond issues have no right under the law to complain later
of illegal!ties therein,!®! The legal policy in this respect
has been thus explained:
Thie court has often recognized, as a sound princi­
ple, that it would be inequitable and unjust to the 
public to allow one who has voted or petitioned for 
the levy of a special tax to complain afterwards 
that the proceedings were illegal,!®8
Before a parish sehool board determines the tax levy necessary
for a certain year to pay the principal end interest falling
due, complaints that the tax is excessive cannot be considered,!®^
When bids to purchase school bonds have been accepted
by the sehool district as a contract, the law compels the pur-
Aaeer to cosily with his bid. The purchaser’s right to refuse
compliance on the basis of illegalities involved is granted,
of course, but in that, even, there must be conformity to the
law. Thus, did the court reason in a case on this issue where
the bidder for the bonds did not bring his charges within the
!®®Bradford et al, v. Grant Pariah School Board, (1923) 154 
La, 242, 97 So, 430.
!®!pya2 ler et al# v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of 
Parish of Franklin, (1923) 163 La, 1083, 97 So. 199.
^ Slbld.. 153 La. 1086,
Gauthier at al. ▼. Parish Sohool Board of Parish of 
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La. 256, 115 So. 479.
211
sixty days prescribed for that purpose and thereby lost the 
opportunity of resoinding his purchase.!®^
Preaeription on bond elections. Legal provision 
lAiah would make bonds secure after a reasonable length of 
time— that is, by prescription— is but fair to those who issue 
them and those who buy them. In the absence of suoh provision 
a bond election is definitely promulgated only after it has 
been adjudicated by the court* The number of protests which 
have reached the courts is clearly indicative of the need for 
clarification of the law by fundamental provision rather than 
by supreme court decisions.
In a case of lOSS^^® the court took opportunity to 
review the development which led to the prescriptive provisions 
of the 1921 Constitution with respect to bond Issues; according 
thereto the following were the chief contests and legislative 
measures which seem to have prompted organic action on this 
question. In 1909 a bond issue for a certain railway enter­
prise was declared null and the collection of the taxes was 
thereby forbidden after a lapse of more than two years from 
the date of election and after the railway was in operation.
In this connection, the court said: "Thus the railroad did
not get its taxes; but the people of the ’police jury ward’ 
got the railroad, since it could not move away*"!®® The next
!®^St. Landry Parish School Board v. Laroade, (1921) 148 La. 
733, 87 So. 728.
!®®Roberts et al. v. Evangeline Parish Sohool Board, (1923) 
155 La. 331, 99 So. 280.
!®®Ibld.. 156 La. 334.
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year the legislature attempted to prevent such occurences in 
the future by providing a prescriptive term of sixty days from 
date of promulgation of the election*!®? Recognition of this 
statute by some court oases and disregard of it by others when 
the constitutionality of a tax was involved were pointed out. 
Although it was not included in the court's summary, another 
ruling in point was when the plaintiffs contesting a school 
bond election In 1921 were met with the decree that they had 
delayed too long in bringing their charges against an election 
held in January, 1919.!®® with respect to the problem which 
thus confronted the Constitutional Convention of 1921 and its 
action thereon, the 1923 court said:
It was in this condition of uncertainty, 
and of vacillation on the part of the court, that 
the convention of 1921 met. It was as well known 
to the members of that convention as it is to the 
members of this court that no bond issue by any 
public body in this state could be negotiated unless 
and until this court has passed finally upon that 
particular bond issue; as fully appears from corre­
spondence in this transcript and in others that have 
come before us.
Accordingly, that body, vdiich alone had 
power to give jurisdiction or withhold it from the 
courts, adopted paragraph (n) of section 14, art,
14, aforesaid. And that paragraph, in terms too 
plain to be mistakable, clearly withholds Juris­
diction from the courts of this state after 60 days.
The Constitution therefore declares in 
plain terms that after 60 days the bonds and taxes 
shall be conclusively held to be valid, that no one 
shall have the right to question their validity, 
that no court shall have authority to entertain 
any controversy over their validity.
!®?Acts of Louisiana, 1910, Ho. 256, sec. 17.
!®®St, Landry Parish School Board v, Laroade, (1921) 148 
La. 733, 87 So. 728.
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And it seems to us that language oould 
not be used to express more strongly the very patent 
intention of the constitutional convention, to wit, 
that after 60 days have jslapsed without any attack 
upon a bond issue and tax voted by property taxpayers 
under color of law. any person may safely purchase
such bonds and feel secure that the taxes levied to
pay them will be sustained by the courts of this 
state. The constitutional convention had the right 
to say this: it did say it, end that is the end of 
the matter.!*®
This review of the development of prescription as 
a measure of safety came by way of explanation when a major­
ity of the supres» court sustained the plea of prescription
made by a defendant school board to bar the action, of plain­
tiffs idiose suit against an election and bond issue was
#
brought more than sixty days after the promulgation of the 
results of the election.®®^ Thus, it seems that the pro­
visions for protection end permanence of special levies and 
bonds were not satisfactorily made until the action by the 
Constitutional Convention of 1921, but that the organic law 
idiich came into existence thereby is unhesitatingly recognized 
by the courts as a definite means to prevmt the Jeopardizing 
of the bonding interest of the state.
SOMMAST
Sohool funds authorized by the taxpayers have con­
tributed a large portion of the revenue for the support of 
public education. % e  underlying principles governing this
!®®Roberts et al. v, Evangeline Parish Sohool Board, (1923) 
156 La. 336-337.
200Ibid.. 155 La. 331, 99 So. 280.
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apeoial typa of sohooX fuad appear to be the following?
1« looaX autoaoffly in the support of public education 
has been a legalised principle in the state for more than a 
century.
S. Since 1879 the organic laws of the state have 
provided for special school tax levies at the discretion of 
the qualified voters of a district, and consistently the courts 
have upheld the constitutionality of such levies.
S. That the people of Louisiana believe in special 
revenues for the maintenance of public schools is evidenced 
by the fact that this type of support for the year 1930*1931 
amounted to $6,047,128.
4» Â local district has the right to tax itself for 
the support of junior college work as a part of the program of 
public education; this was established by the courts in 1932.
5. In the levying of special taxes districts are 
considered as separate and distinct entities.
6. The controlling statutory requirements must be 
met in levying and collecting the voted tax.
7. Â special tax levy be authorized any time 
during the year.
8. %ose who are eligible to vote in a special tax 
election are those «dio meet the general voting requirements 
of the state and who are property taxpeyers at the time of 
the election.
9. A reasonable opportunity to register preparatory
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to a spécial election ia considered sufficient compliance 
with the law*
10, A special tax election is considered carried only 
when it receives a majority of both the votes and the property 
correctly voted*
11, Mere errors in the judgment of oommlssioners are 
not sufficient grounds alone for invalidating an election,
12, The parish school board has a right to order a 
special school tax election without a petition from the voters, 
hut when a petition is presented by the legally required num­
ber of qualified voters, the board nrust order the election*
13* Elections may be contested but only on specific 
grounds and within the prescriptive period in force at the 
time*
14* Funds raised by special tax levies in a partic­
ular district must be spent as the voters have directed, and 
in the event of unforeseen irregularities the expenditure 
must be as the lev/ prescribes*
15, A school board may issue certificates of in­
debtedness for building purposes where the special tax there­
for has already been voted*
16. Irregularities which seem to have been con­
sidered sufficient to invalidate a proposed tax levy are;
(a) ill-defined voting districts; (b) failure to observe the 
constitutional maxima for various levies; (c) ambiguous 
statements of the purpose; (d) failure of the petition to
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specify the amount accessary to be realized from the tax 
aaaually; (e) minority board proceedings in the issuance of 
the resolution ealliag a special election; (f) inconsistences 
in petitions, resolutions, and notices; (g) failure to desig­
nate definitely the place and time of an election; (h) lack 
of compliance with the law in the choice of election officials; 
(1) the opening and closing of polls Irregularly to the extent 
that voters are prohibited from exercising the suffrage right 
suffleient to change the results of the election; (j) use of 
an inoorreotly prepared list of voters; (k) use of incorrect 
form of ballot lâien there is a form prescribed by statute;
(1) determining the amount of property voted by inference 
rather than by valid statements from the voter; (m) incorrect 
decisions by commissioners regarding ownership of property to 
the extent that correction thereof would change the results 
of the election; (n) promulgation by an authority other than 
the police jury; (o) significant omissions In the levying or­
dinance; (p) attempt of a school board to contimxe collecting 
a tax after the district has been abolished.
17. The bond issue as a means of support of public 
education has become a significant move of the present cen­
tury, as is shown by its rapidly increasing use,
18. Taxpayers may vote bond issues upon themselves 
for the purpose of building schoolhouses and teachers* homes,
and purchasing the necessary grounds and equipment therefor,
19. Bonds for school purposes have constitutional
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authority and an iaaua continue# to he governed hy the pro- 
vialona of the oonatitution under which it was voted#
20. Bond# iseued on a tax levied for another pur­
pose are null and void m ù  # e  statute proposing to authorize 
such action is o<m#idered unconstitutional.
SI. the legal creation of a district is a prerequisite 
to a bond issue.
SS. Strict interpretation of the law seems to govern 
the purposes f o r  which bond issues are sanctioned.
£3. The amount of bonds a district may issue is based 
on the assessed valuation of the property end the limitation 
as fixed by the constitution. The annual levy is determined 
by the governing authority on the basis of what is necessary 
to produce the principal and interest falling due.
24. The failure to make public the voting date thirty 
days prior to the election invalidates a bond issue #
25. The required qualifieati<ms of those wdio partic­
ipate in bond elections are determined by the laws of the 
state.
25. Precincts smy be improvised at the discretion of 
the school board, but the arrangement must not require voters 
to go into another parish.
27. A bond issue to be valid must receive a majority 
vote of both the qualified taxpaying electors and of the 
valuation of the property voted.
28. Minor irregularities such as the failure of 
commissioners to take the oath of office will not vitiate an
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election unless it can be shown that results were changed 
thereby.
29. Persons who vote for a bond issue have no right 
under the law to complain later of irregularities therein.
30. Protection and permanence of special levies
and bond issues are attempted to be provided for through pre­
scription which denies recognition of complaints after the 
expiration of a specified period.
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EDUCATIONAL CONTROL BY NONPROFESSIONAL AGENCIES
The interpretation of the Federal Constitution and 
of other legal documents, as presented in the previous chapters, 
shows oonolusively that education is one of the reserved powers 
of the state. Since the state has the right to establish and 
maintain a system of free public schools, it may reasonably be 
assumed that the state is empowered to provide for the necessary 
agents to execute properly that function of government and to 
entrust to them the organization and administration of the 
state's program of public education. The functioning of such 
officials, fTcm the local trustees of a small school to the 
legislature in its relation to public education, is influenced 
by the court’s interpretation of the law. The purpose of this 
chapter is to show what effect those adjudications have had 
in A s  ping the policies of control pursued by the non- 
professional agencies of public education.
POLITICAL AGENCIES
The Legislature
The legislature la the principal agency throu^ which 
the state executes the mandates of the organic law providing
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âsi
for the establishment and maintenance of a public school 
system,^ In the absence of constitutional restrictions the 
"legislature may determine the types of schools to be estab­
lished throughout Uie state, the means of their support, the 
organs of their administration, the content of their curricula, 
and the qualifications of their teachers,
That the lawmakers of early Louisiana held similar 
views is evidenced by their provisions for public schools^ 
long before the organic law sanctioned education as a function 
of government.
Constitutional mandates and restraints. In 1845 
the legislature was directed by the constitution to create a 
system of free public education.^ At the same time it was 
authorized to prescribe the duties and emoluments of the 
state superintendent's office^ and by the Constitutions of 
1852* and 1864^ it was given discretionary power to abolish
Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public school 
as a State institution (Blooming16n%^ STT P# SUI
%ewton Edwards, The Courts and the Public schools 
(Chicago, 1955), pp. F-6.
®Acts of Louisiana; 1819, "An Act to amend the several 
laws enacted on the subject of Public Schools within this 
State, and for other purposes," pp. 52-54; 1820-21, "An Act 
to extend and Improve the system of Public Education in the 
State of Louisiana," pp. 62-68; 1027, "An Act to provide for 
the support and administration of parish schools and for 
other purposes," pp. 80-08; 1855, "An Act supplementary to 
the several acts relative to public Education," pp. 141-144.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art. 154.
^Ibld., art. 153.
^Ibld., 1852, art. 155.
?Ibld.. 1864, art. 140.
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said office, in 1879 the general assembly was authorized to 
provide for the creation of parish school boards who were to 
provide for parish superintendents at a salary not to exceed 
two hundred dollars annually,® while in 1898 it was directed 
to provide for a state board of education.®
Another aspect of indirect control by organic law 
is the restraint placed upon legislative enactments, for 
example, in 1845 the constitution limited the controlling 
power of the legislature \Tlth respect to support by requiring 
that the proceeds from school lands remain a trust fund and 
providing that only the income might be used for public 
schools;!® in 1864 it prohibited the support of any private 
school by public funds,!! while in 1679 schools of a sectarian 
nature were added to the prohibited list.!®
Delegation of powers. The Supreme Court of the 
United states has held that "one of the highest attributes 
and duties of a legislature is to regulate public matters 
with all public bodies, no less than the community, from 
time to time, in the manner which the public welfare may 
appear to demand."!® One method which the legislature has 
used in regulating public school matters with public bodies
^Ibia.. 1879, art. 225.
9lbla.. 1898, art. 250. 
lOlbld.. 1845, art. 135. 
lllbld., 1864, art. 146. 
l^lbld.. 1879, art. 228.
IS^he Town of Eaet Hartford, Plaintiff In Error, v. The 
Hartford Bridge Company, (1850) 10 How. 534.
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has been to delegate to those bodies certain designated 
powers* For example, the court has recognized that the 
power of taxation has been delegated largely to local author­
ities— the school directors and the police juries,!& The 
qualified voters themselves possess the sole power of levying 
special taxes for school purposes.
Police juries
In the early history of the state these corporate 
bodies were empowered by the legislature to assume control of 
the public schools in their respective parishes,!® Later 
this power was partially transferred to parish school boards 
who were appointed by them,!* In 1847 police juries, in 
collaboration with the parish superintendents, were given 
the right to divide perishes into school districts,!? In 
1877 they were authorized by the legislature to levy in their 
parishes a maximum of two mills for school purposes,!® and in 
1879 organic sanction was given for such levies*!® The
! ^ illeneuve Bordelon et el, v* Thomas H, & W* B, Lewis, 
(1852) & La. Ann. 472.
!®Àcts of Louisiana, 1819, "An Act to amend the several 
laws eiuieted on the subject of public schools within this 
State, and for other purposes," secs, 1-5, p, 52,
!*Ibid,, 1827, "An Act to provide for the support and 
administration of parish schools and for other purposes," 
secs, 2, 5, pp. 80, 82.
!?Ibid., 1847, No, 225, sec. 18,
!®Ibid,, Extra Session, 1877, No, 23, sec. 28.
!®Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 229.
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legislature in 1888 required them to levy at least one and 
one-half mills on the parish assessment for public education,^® 
but the Constitution of 1921 raised that amount to three mills. 
Also, they were the governing bodies for special tax elections 
until 1914 when this responsibility was transferred to the 
parish boards.®® Thus, it may be seen that although they are 
not considered as educational officials, the police juries of 
the state have wielded an Influence in shaping the policies 
of educational control.
BOARDS OF EDUCATION 
State Board
The people of the various states, through appropriate 
legislation, have delegated to their boards of education a 
large share in the making of educational policies. The 
significance of this practice has been evaluated as follows;
The fundamental character of public 
education in the United states is, in the last 
analysis, determined by the board that controls 
the school. To be sure, back of the board stands 
the state, but to the board the state has dele­
gated the practical control of public education.
Within the wide limits created by legislative 
enactment, the broad outlines of policy are shaped 
by the members of this body. . . .  To a degree 
and in a fashion seldom grasped, the content.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1888, No. 81, sec. 54.
®!constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 15. 
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1914, No. 17, sec. 1.
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spirit, and purpose of oublie education must 
reflect the bias, the limitations, end the 
experience of the membership of this board* The 
possibilities which the school possesses as e 
creative and leavening social agency are set by 
the good will, the courage, and the intelligence 
of that membership* The qualitative advance of 
public education must depend as much on the 
decisions of the board of education as on the 
development of the science and philosophy of 
education*®®
That the public school system of Louisiana was established 
without organic sanction of this particular type of centralized 
control is evidenced by the fact that no constitution prior to 
the War for southern Independence dealt with the subject of 
the state board of education*
Constitutional end statutory provisions* This agency 
of educational control in Louisiana was given legal recognition 
in 1869, when its personnel was specified as being composed of 
the state superintendent, one member appointed by the governor 
from each of the congressional districts, and two members 
from the state at large, with the power to supervise the 
school system and to appoint parish and municipal boards.
AS a pert of the plan of Reconstruction, this act was amended 
the next year so as to provide that the membership should 
consist of the governor, ex offioio, the state superintendent, 
and the six divisional superintendents appointed by the 
governor; the duties of the board were to include the selection 
of parish, incorporated town, and village boards of education,
®®George s. Counts, The Social Composition of Boards of 
Education (Chicago, 192Vy,' p. 1."
®^ACts of Louisiana, 1869, No* 121, sees. 1, 9, 10, 22.
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and general supervision of the schools of the state.®* In 
1877 the personnel of the board changed again to consist of 
the governor, the lieutenant-governor, the secretary of state, 
the attorney general, the state superintendent of public 
education, and two members appointed by the governor.®* In 
the Constitutional Convention of 1879 an unsuccessful effort 
was made to embody in the organic law provision for a state 
board to consist of the governor, the auditor, and the 
secretary of state.®? However, the next convention granted 
constitutional approval for a state board whose creation was 
to be provided for by the legislature.®®
The power of this board was expanded by the Burke 
Bill which added to its duties the control of certification 
of teachers.®* However, it seems that there were too many 
ex-officio members, for the Johnson Act provided for a board 
to consist of the state superintendent and five members 
appointed by the governor so as to have overlapping terms.*® 
Tne Constitution of 1921 reorganized the state 
board of education end increased its power to control the, 
public schools of the state as follows:
®*Ibid., Extra Session, 1870, No. 6, secs. 1-8, 4-5, 16-18. 
®*Xbid.. 1877, No. 23, sec. 1.
®?Offlcial Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of Louisiana, Ï Ü 7 ^  pp. T75-T74.
®®Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 250.
®*Acts of Louisiana, 1912, No. 214, secs* 47-51.
*®Ibid., 1916, No. 120, sec. 1.
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Section 4. There is hereby created a 
State Board of Education to be composed as follows; 
three members to be appointed by the Governor for 
terms of four years, one each from districts co­
extensive with the present Railroad Commission dis­
tricts, and eight to be elected for terms of eight 
years, except as herein provided, from districts 
corresponding to the present Congressional districts. 
The Legislature shall provide for the organization 
of said board so that two of the elected members 
shall be chosen at each Congressional election.
The first board shall be elected in 1922 and begin 
office the second Monday in January, 1923, and the 
term of two of whom shall expire in two, four, six 
end eight years respectively.
The members appointed by the Governor 
shall be persons experienced in educational matters, 
and all members âiall serve without pay, except such 
per diem and traveling expanses as shall be fixed 
by the Legislature.
The Legislature shall prescribe the duties 
of said board end define its powers; provided, that 
said board shall not control the business affairs 
of parish school boards, nor the selection or removal 
of their officers and directors.
Section 6. The State Board of Education 
shall have supervision and control of all free public 
schools.
Section 7. . . .  It shall prescribe the 
qualifications, and provide for the certification 
of the teachers of elementary, secondary, trade, 
normal end collegiate schools; it shall have author­
ity to approve private schools end colleges, whose 
sustained curriculum is of a grade equal to that 
prescribed for similar public schools and educa­
tional institutions of the state; end the certificates 
or degrees issued by such private schools or insti­
tutions 80 approved shall carry the same privileges 
88 those issued by the state schools end institutions.
Section 8. It shall not create or main­
tain any administrative department in which salaries 
or expenses are payable from State funds, unless 
authorized by the Legislature. The Legislature shall
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prescribe the terms under which funds offered for 
educational purposes shell be received and disbursed.^!
Acting upon this authority, the legislature declared that;
The state Board of Education shall prepare courses 
of study, rules, by-laws and regulations for the 
government of the Public Schools of the State, which 
shall be enforced by the parish superintendents 
and the several parish school boards.®®
Established power. Seldom has the vested power of 
the state board of education been questioned seriously enough 
to demand the attention of the supreme court. Almost Imme­
diately after the board was authorized by the legislative 
acts of 1869 and 1870 a contest involving the allocation of 
the right of removal of subordinates recognized its power.
The law established was that school directors may be removed 
from office by the state board of education only and that 
such removal must be preceded by a due hearing and a fair 
trial on charges of negligence, incompetency, or violation 
of law.
An illustration of the extended powers of the state 
board is an opinion by the attorney general in 1950 to the 
effect that no public high school may be established, or 
the building therefor be constructed, without the approval 
and supervision of the state board of public education.**
In general, it is legally recognized that the state board 
has broad powers in the development of a program of public
^^constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12.
*®AOts of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 4.
**Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1930, to AprTl307 l9M, p. 402.
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education for the state,
Parish Boards
Legal developments. Parish school hoards existed
in the state prior to constitutional sanction, for in 1821
police Juries were authorized to appoint five trustees to
aastme supervision of public education in their respective 
35parishes, six years later, these school boards were 
authorized to select parish treasurers and ward trustees to 
assist la the organization and administration of public 
education in the various parishes and wards,** By 1833 they 
were required to report regularly to the secretary of state, 
as state superintendent of public education at that time, 
the educational conditions of their parishes,*? There was 
curtailment of their power, in 1847 by the transfer of the 
selection of district trustees to the people living within 
tbs parish,*® In keeping with the centralizing policy of 
control during Reconstruction, the state board of education 
in 1870 was given the right to select both the parish and
^Ibld.. May 1, 1926, to April SO, 1928, p. 284.
^^Aota of Louisiana, 1820-21, "An Act to extond and Improve 
the system of Public Education in the State of Louisiana," 
secs, 1-2, p, 62.
**Ibid., 1827, "An Act to provide for the support and 
admini si rat i on of parish schools and for other purposes," 
sees. 3, 5, pp. 80, 82.
*?Ibid., 1833, "An Act supplementary to the several acts 
relative' to public Education," sec, 4, p, 142.
38Ibid., 1847, Ho. 226, sec. 20.
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tk# district boards.** In 1877 the parish school boards 
assumed the responsibility of oertifioation of teachers and 
the general control of the public schools of their respective 
parishes;^ in 1879 each was given organic authority to 
select a parish superintendent of schools who should serve 
as secretary of the board.Resolutions and petitions were 
presented to the Constitutional Convention of 1898 recommending 
"that the Board of Directors of the public achools of each 
parish" be elected by the voters of the parish.4® To some 
extent this resolution was reflected in the constitution, 
for provision for the creation of parish boards was left to 
the legislature.48
In 19IS parish school board members were made 
elective by the qualified voters from each of the police jury 
wards, one to be chosen for each police Juror in said ward,44 
and in 1914 the board was mde the governing body of all
special tax elections for school purposes.4*
That the parish school boards have been given from
time to time increasing opportunity to influence the type of
39Ibid.. Extra Session, 1670, No. 6, secs. 16, 18.
4®Ibid., Extra Session, 1877, Ko, 23, sec, 4.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art. 885,
4®0fficial Journal of ^ e  Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention of the Atate of IcSTsi an a. M 9 8 . pp. 40 , 58,
4®Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art, 850.
44Aets of Louisiana, 1912, No. 214, sec. 5.
4*lbid.. 1914, No. 17, sec. 1.
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person selected as parish superintendent may he indicated by 
the salary ranges authorized by statutory and organic law.
In 1902 the parish board had the right to pay a superintendent 
anywhere from $200 a year to $1200,46 while In 1912 the range 
was from a $600 minimum to an unlimited maximum.4? Under the 
Johnson Act that officer might be paid from $900 to $4000 per 
year.4® in 1981 the board was given complete freedom In the 
selection of a parish superintendent with no mention of 
salary stipulations.49
Pertaining to the complete status of the parish 
sehool board the Constitution of 1921 authorized;
Section 10. The Legislature shall pro­
vide for the creation and election of parish school 
boards which shall elect parish superintendents 
for their respective parishes, and such other offi­
cers or agents as may be authorized by the Legisla­
ture. The state Board of Education shall fix the 
qualifications and prescribe the duties of parish 
superintendents, who need not be residents of the 
parishes. Wherever a parish contains a municipality, 
the population of wnieh is more than one-half of that 
of the entire parish, it shall have representation 
on the parish school board proportionate to its 
population.
Section 11. Municipal or parish school 
boards and systems now in existence by virtue of 
special or local legislative acts are hereby recog­
nized, subject to control by and supervision of the 
State Board of Education, and the power of the Le{ 
lature to further control them by special laws,50
4*lbid., 1902, No. 214, sec. 35
4?ibid., 1912, Ho. 214, sec. 27
4Qlbid., 1916, No. 120, sec. 27
49oonstitut ion of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 10. 
*®lbid., art. 12.
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Composition end selection of personnel, in 1908 the 
legislature provided that in each parish of the state having 
a population of lesa than 50,000 there should be in each ward, 
"in addition to the police juror to which said ward is entitled, 
an additional police juror for each 5,000 inhabitants which 
said ward contains; also, one additional police juror for each 
additional 5,000 Inhabitants or part thereof in excess of 
2,500 inhabitants."*! An act of 1922 provided that there shall 
be elected by the voters of each police jury ward of the various 
parishes of the state a member of the school board of the 
parish for each police Juror in said ward and whose term of 
office shall be six years.*® Section 18 of the same act 
incorporated the organic provisions for the representation of 
municipalities®* but limited the total parish school board 
membership to fifteen,
k legal interpretation of the law governing the 
method of Increasing school board membership was sought in 
1927.*4 In the cese brought before the court an effort was 
made to oust a school board appointee who, by virtue of the 
ward’s increased population, was entitled to membership by 
the provisions of the acts as stated above. The court held 
that the formal finding of the police jury to the effect that 
the ward was entitled to an additional school board member by
®!Aots of Louisiana, 1908, No. 279, sec. 1.
52ibld.. 1922, NO. 100, seo. 17.
^^constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 18, see. 10. 
S^homas et al. v. Doughty, (1927) 165 Le. 815, 111 So. 681.
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virtue of Its increased population gave the person appointed 
by the governor prima feole right to membership.
In another case** a vacancy had occurred in the 
Orleans Parish school board and the governor, acting under the 
law, filled such vacancy by appointment. At the regular 
Congressional election in November another would-be member 
was elected for the balance of the unexpired term. Suit was 
brought by the attorney general and the elected member to 
oust the member appointed by the governor. The former claimed 
that under section 64 of Aot No. 120 of 1916 the appointment 
of the latter was for the period before the Congressional 
election only, and that he--the one chosen by the people at 
the election— was therefore entitled to the office for the 
remainder of the regular term. The governor's appointee based 
his refusal to surrender the office on his having been named 
under authority of section 1 of Act No. 236 of 1916, which 
provided that a school board member appointed under such 
circumstances as in the situation Involved was an appointee 
for the remainder of the term. Since the later statute 
declared, in section 2, that all laws or parts of lews in 
conflict with the act were thereby repealed, and since the 
parish of Orleans was not expressly exoopted, t ho court held 
that the member appointed by the governor under the later act 
was the rightful possessor of the office.
55State et al. v. Schaumburg, (1921) 149 La. 470, 89 So, 536,
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More recently, 1931, the right of the governor to 
fill vacancies on parish school boards was upheld. The 
controlling statute states; "All vacancies in the membership 
of parish school boards caused by death, resignation, or 
otherwise, shall be filled by appointment by the Governor."®* 
The court established this by declaring as legal office 
holders the members appointed by the governor when the 
offices had been rendered vacant by the acceptance of some 
members of postmasterships and by the failure of another 
member to qualify within thirty days from the date of his 
commission.*? Other legal counsel has been to the effect 
that whenever a vacancy occurs, regardless of the cause, the 
governor has the power to fill it by appointment.*®
The secretary of the parish board is the parish 
superintendent by virtue of his office, and, as may be seen 
from the section dealing with the parish superintendent in 
Chapter VIII of this study, this officer of the board has 
been involved in several controversies sufficiently serious 
to reach the supreme court.
Concerning the president of the board, however, 
there have been fewer litigations. In 1909 the court had
®*Acts of Louisiana, 1932, No. 100, sec. 17.
*?3tate ex rel. Kimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel. 
Gray v. pipes et el. state ex rel. White v. Mason et al. 
(1931) 173 La. 488, 137 So. 862.
1932
58opinlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
, ---------------------
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occasion to establish some regulations pertaining to the 
presiding officer os follows; "The president of the board 
must be elected from among the members, end the expiration 
of his term as president is necessarily synchronous with the 
expiration of his term as a member.** His duties are those 
of the chairman of any ordinary board, but he does not possess 
dual voting privileges.*®
Status of a body corporate. Two years after Louisiana 
became a member of the Union her supreme court was called upon 
to determine the legal status of the school board.*! The 
plaintiffs* attorney pointed to the corporate existence of 
the school administrators as provided in the statutory enact­
ments pertaining to public education, thus;
This act enlarges and extends the first act of 
incorporation to the schools in the different 
counties, and constitutes them an integral part 
of the first body corporate, vested with all the 
privileges, capacities, and powers over the 
subjects committed to their administration, in 
as full and perfect a manner as was given to the 
original institution, and consequently they can 
proceed in the discharge of their functions in 
the same manner as the first body corporate can 
do.G®
The cause which had brought interpretation on this subject was 
a suit by two of the school administrators to recover from the 
third administrator money which had been borrowed from the school
*®State ex rel. Wilson v. Hardin, (1909) 123 La. 741.
*®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana : May 1, 1928,
to April 3(), l930, p. 4 9 È ; May T, 1932, to April X, 1934, p. 306.
*!paillette et al. v. Carr, (1814) 3 Mart. (0. S.) 489.
*®Ibid., pp. 490-491.
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fund for his privets use. The borrower contended that action 
must be taken by the whole board— that two members could not 
act against the third member. The court held that: "in all
bodies corporate, the majority must rule, end there is no 
doubt that two of the three administrators of this school had 
a right to sue in the name of the board."*® The immediate 
outcome was that the third board member was required to 
return all money borrowed with interest, concerning which the 
court said:
In a case of this nature, where the deposit 
of public funds, destined for the most useful of 
purposes, has been unwarrantably detained— where the 
obligation to return them at sight has been eluded 
during such a length of time, it is Just that we 
should allow to the plaintiffs, not only the interest 
of the money since the judicial demand, but also the 
full amount of damages which the lew permits to give.64
Most important was the establishment at this time of the school
board as a corporate body in the law end thereby vested with
the right of majority rule.
Many years later, 1871, the court had occasion to
refer to the fact that the perish board Is constituted a body
corporate and politic in law, with powers to sue and be sued.**
Since the parish school board is a corporate body,
one such board may stand in court to recover from another any
®®Ibld., p. 495.
*^Ibia.. p. 496.
®*Thlrd Ward school District of New Orleans v. City Board 
of School Directors. Van Norden, Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas 
W. Conway, State Superintendent. Thomas Vif. Conway, State 
Superintendent, v. The City Board of school Directors. Van 
Norden, Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas v/. Conway, State super­
intendent. (1871) 23 La. Ann. 156.
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funds illegally obtained. This principle was established by 
a case** dealing with the efforts of one school board to 
recover from another a sum of money which had been paid by 
the state to the defendant when it should have been paid to 
the plaintiff. The defendant board had invested the funds 
in a school lot and building. The court held that the plaintiff 
board was entitled to recover the money in question, even if 
it became necessary to seize and sell the property which had 
been purchased by such funds, and that action to recover under 
the circumstances was not barred by the prescription of five 
years or less.
In a legal decision in 1909, which confirmed an 
appointment to parish superintendency, it was held that parish 
boards "are corporations, and a corporation is a body which 
’continues always the seme notwithstanding the change of the
an
individuals who compose it’ (Rev. Civ. Code, art. 42?)."
That school boards are quasi corporations and that 
they must stand in court as such were indicated in the White 
Hall Agricultural Company case,*® in which the president 
instead of the board itself was cited. Chief Justice Joseph 
A. Breaux referred to decisions previously rendered which were 
consistent in maintaining that a corporation should be
**Sohool Board of East Carroll Parish v. school Board of 
Union Parish, (1864) 3Ô La. Ann. 8ÛÔ.
*?3tate ox rel. Wilson v. Hardin, (1909) 123 La. 740.
*%hite Hall Agr. Co. et al. v. Police Jury of Concordia 
Parish at el,, (1911) 127 La, 1022, 54 So. 337.
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represented ia court by its corporate name or by some one 
designated by law to represent such corporation.**
A case in 1927 maintained that the parish school 
board is a corporate body with power to sue and be sued and 
that when judgment has been obtained against it by proper 
procedure, taxpayers have no right to attack that judgment, 
although the execution of It may involve the sale of the 
school building to satisfy a creditor’s legal rights and 
demands.?®
Rank of member as an officer under the state. For 
many years the parish school board member has been considered 
an officer under the state.?! This status was upheld by the 
court in a combination case which reviewed three court of 
appeal cases pertaining to dual office holding.?& The four­
fold purpose of the case, as based on the merits, was to 
determine;
. . .  whether or not a member of e parish school 
board is an officer under the state within the
**State ex rel. New Iberia Telephone Exchange Co. v. Voorhies, 
Judge, et al., (1898) 50 La. Ann. 671, 23 So. 671; State ex rel. 
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company v. James A. Montegudo, 
Justice of the Peace for the Fourth Ward of the Parish of East 
Baton Rouge, (1896) 48 La. Ann. 1417, 20 so. 911; Gubel v. Town 
of Lafayette, (1907) 118 La. 494, 43 So. 63.
?®Hewthorne et al. v. Jackson Parish School Board et al.,
(1926) 5 La. App. 508.
?!opinions of the Attorney General of Loulsiane; June 1,
1900, bo May 1, l9UH, p. ill; May X,^11JI4to 'May 1, 1916, 
p. 367; May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 495.
?^State ex rel. Kimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel.
Gray v. pipes et el* State ex rel. White v. Meson et el.
(1931) 173 La. 4 8 8 , 137 So. 852.
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oontaiaplation of section 4 of article 19 of the 
Constitution of 1921; whether a person may qualify 
lawfully as a member of the school board while 
holding the office of postmaster; the effect of 
accepting and holding a postmastership after one 
has qualified as a member of a parish school board, 
and while he is still holding such membership; and 
the effect of resigning as postmaster upon the 
right to continue to hold membership on the school 
board, the resignation being accepted after the 
institution of an ouster suit, but before the 
rendition of judgment therein by the trial court. ^
In response to the four questions presented, the court analyzed
closely the constitutional and statutory provisions and the law
previously interpreted by itself.
In determining that the school board member is an
officer the court said:
A member of a parish school board is also an officer#
Ha exercises a part, though small, of the sovereign 
power, in the interest of the public, under authority
vested in him by the state. He is elected by the
people, save when, by reason of a vacancy caused by 
death, resignation, or otherwise, it is made the duty 
of the Governor to appoint some one to fill the 
vacancy. His qualifications are prescribed by law.
The Legislature refers to his position as an office. 
Section 17 of Act 100 of 1922.
To show that the school board member is an officer
under the state the court reasoned as follows:
AS each parish school board constitutes part of the 
educational system of the state, which is a state 
institution, it would appear that the members of 
each such board, who, as we have seen, are officers, 
their offices being created by the Legislature, 
under a constitutional mandate, are officers under 
the state, laboring In the service of the state, 
although their duties as members of the respective 
parish boards are confined to limited territories.
This conclusion finds support, by parity of reasoning,
In state ex rel* Smith v, Theus, 114 La. 1097, 36 
So, 870, . , ."9
?5lbld.. 17S La. 492-493. 
?*Ibia., p. 493.
, p. 495.
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With respect to dual office holding the principle 
included In section 4 of article 19 of the Constitution of 
1921 was upheld and-the Interpretation was made that since 
a postmaster is an officer under the United States and a 
parish school board member is an officer under the state, 
one person cannot be both officers at the same time.
In determining whether a person may qualify lawfully 
as a member of the school board while holding the office of 
postmaster— the second question brought by the oases— tha 
court relied upon decisions under similar conditions'^^ and 
upon other legal explanation to the effect that one holding 
a Federal office of profit is not ineligible to election to 
a state office but that he cannot qualify for the state 
office as long as he retains the Federal position. The 
conclusion was that the act of qualifying as a member of the 
school board was ineffective and null because the person did 
not surrender his office as postmaster before attempting to 
qualify as a school board member.
In the reverse situation— the third question of 
office holding involved— it was maintained that if one accepts 
and holds a postmastership after having qualified as a member 
of the parish school board and while still holding that 
membership, such action renders the office of school board 
member vacant, since the holding of a position under the
76state of Texes v. J. C. De Grass, (1880) 53 Tex. 307; 
Bunting V. Willis, Judge, (1876) 27 Gret. (68 Va.) 144, 21 A 
Rep. 388; Foltz v. Berlin, (1886) 105 Ind. 221, 5 N. E. 672, 
55 Am. Rep. 197.
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Federal Government automatically vacates an office held by 
the same person under a state government.
The law concerning the time limit for qualifying 
as a school board member from the date of one's commission 
was handed down In answer to the fourth question involved.
It was to the effect that one may not qualify legally after 
the expiration of thirty days from the date of one's commission 
and that a failure to qualify within the time limit renders 
the office vacant.
Established and forbidden powers. The law of 
Louisiana confers almost unlimited power upon the parish 
school boards of the state in matters pertaining to public 
education. After delegating to the parish boards such powers 
as the creation of districts, determining the location and 
number of schools therein, specifying the number of teachers 
and their salaries, making final selection of teachers, 
election and removal of the parish superintendent, and 
enforcing compliance to the state school laws, the legis­
lature , in section 20 of Act No. 100 of 1922, as amended by 
Act No. 110 of 1928, declared that: "Each school board is
authorized to make such rules and regulations for its own 
government, not inconsistent with law or with the regulations 
of the Louisiana State Board of Education, as it may deem 
proper.*' Also, the school board is empowered to watch over 
the school funds, serve as custodian of the school property, 
and establish with the state board of education schools of 
whatever nature necessary for providing adequate school
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facilities for the children of the perish.??
prom tin» to time various phases of the school 
board's power have been questioned to the extent of requiring 
Judicial interpretation. As may be seen from the following 
principal phases dealt with, the courts have established many 
powers but have declared some as definitely unauthorized and 
forbidden.
1. Records of proceedings. That records of school
board proceedings be in writing has been declared essential.
7ÔIn 8 ruling on this phase, it was pointed out that the 
president of the school board with whom a verbal agreement 
was claimed to have been made had no authority to make verbal 
grants of any kind affecting the school land sections— that 
the sections are not in his charge but in the trust of the 
board of school directors of which he is only the presiding 
officer. With respect to the board’s method of keeping 
records, the court summarized: "Their proceedings are
required to be in writing— and a record should be kept."?®
Constitutional and statutory legislation empowering 
school boards to meet for various purposes has included 
regulations as to the acceptable places of meetings and as 
to records thereof. Those who contest the legality of a 
place of meeting must definitely establish that the meeting
??Acts of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, secs. 19*21.
?®Frenoois D. Broussard v. Anatole Verrat et al., (1891) 
43 La. Ann. 929, 9 So.. 906.
?®Ibid., 43 La. Ann. 930.
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was held as claimed— the court will not presume that a 
meeting was held at an unauthorized place. Also, when 
minutes of the proceedings of a board are offered as 
evidence of a place of meeting, the record thereof must be
officiel.80
2. Selection of parish superintendent. The state's 
policy has been to clothe the parish school board with broad 
discretionary power in the employment of the parish superin­
tendent of s c h o o l s . T h e  term of office Is fixed®® but; the 
date mining of the amount of salary is left to the judgment 
of the parish school board.®® An important controversial 
question has been: How long may a parish school board elect
a superintendent before his term of office actually begins?
This principle was Involved in the Russell case®* 
in which the court; declared premature the selection of a 
superintendent made approximately one year before the 
expiration of the term then current, endorsed as proper 
action the rescinding of the election some six months before 
the beginning of the new term end advised that the time for 
selection should be just prior to the beginning of the new
®®HIilton et al. v. Lincoln Parish School Board, (1922)
158 La. 761, 94 So. 386.
®^Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana; June 1, 
1912, to lia y 1, 1914, p. 338; M y  1," 1FE8, to April 30, 1930, 
p. 497.
82lbld.. May 1, 1930, to April 50, 1932, p. bOl.
83it>ld., May 1, 1914, to May 1, 1916, p. 368.
®*State ex rel. Ruasell (La Salle parish School Board 
Intervener) v. Richardson, (1934) 170 La. 1029, 152 So. 748.
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term. The court gave Interpretation of the controlling 
fiBatatttte and pointed to the dangers of holding otherwise 
as follows:
However, we are satisfied it was the legislative 
intent that a parish school superintendent should 
be elected or appointed at some reasonable time 
before the beginning of his term of office.
While it may be true that a school board 
is a continuous body because of the overlapping 
terms of its various ward members, that fact does 
not authorize the board to elect or appoint a parish 
superintendent so far in advance of his term, as 
was done in this case. If this were permitted the 
board could elect or appoint a parish superintendent 
at any time the majority of its members saw fit to 
do 6 0 , and thereby perpetuate a favored person in 
the office. We think the better practice would be, 
and one more in consonance with the purpose of the 
law, to impose the duty of timely electing or 
appointing a parish superintendent upon the school 
board as constituted just prior to the beginning of 
the new term.®®
Also, it was pointed out in this case that the bond 
a superintendent gives is no concern of hia predecessor but 
that the form, manner, and regulations pertaining to the bond 
lie wholly within the province of the school board.
3. Employment of assistant parish superintendent 
discretionary with school board. By section 43 of Act n o.
100 of 1922 the parish school board is empowered to appoint 
such assistant superintendents and other employees as may be 
necessary for the proper and efficient conduct of the schools, 
with which objective it Is charged. No mention is made of
85 A^Cts of Louisiana, 1922, NO. 100, sec. 19.
®®Stat© ex rel. Russell (La balls Parish school Board, 
Intervener) v. Richardson, (1934) 178 La, 1039.
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the power to prescribe e term of office. The strength end 
the effect of this omission were tested by e plaintiff employed 
as assistant superintendent for s period beginning January 15, 
1932, end ending June 30, 1933, but who was discharged July 14, 
1952, because there was no further need of his services.®?
By fixing, through resolution, the tenure of office of the 
assistant superintendent, the school board tended to divest 
itself of its discretionary power, conferred upon it by stat­
utory law, to terminate plaintiff's employment before the 
expiration of the term, in this regard the court said:
The universally accepted rule is that, 
where the tenure of the office is not prescribed 
by lew, the power to remove is an Incident to the 
power to appoint. The tenure not having been 
declared by law, the office is held during the 
pleasure of the authority making the appointment.
22 R. 0. L. Sec. 266, p. 562; 46 C. J. Sec. 146, 
p. 985.
The implied power to remove cannot be 
contracted away so as to bind the appointing author­
ity to retain a minor officer or employee for a 
definite, fixed period.8#
Various decisions®® were cited as controlling in these respects.
The court pointed out that the legislature, in conferring the
power of such appointments on the school board, certainly did
®?Potts V. Morehouse Parish School Board, (1933) 177 La. 
1103, 150 So. 290.
. 177 Le. 1106-1107.
®®Peters T. Bell, (1898) 51 La. Ann. 1621, 26 So. 442; 
Short V. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson, (1915) 136 La* 
391, 67 So. 176; Kirkpatrick v. City of Monroe, (1925) 157 
La. 645, 102 So. 822.
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not intend that a board through oohtraot with an employee 
fihould delimit its own power of removal end perhaps deprive 
its suocessor of the specified power of appointment, of the 
incidental power of removal, end to this extent of the 
general supervision and control of the schools as granted by 
statute.
4. Administration of the public school fund. Con­
cerning the power of the parish board with respect to the 
school funds, Justice John St. Paul warned against accepting 
as a precedent a certain decision in which the action of a 
parish school board in the disbursement of funds was not 
upheld.^® He concurred in the opinion of the case as decided 
in the main issue, but called attention to the adjudications 
and constitutional provisions in which It had been affirmed 
that the board of school directors in each parish is charged 
with the control, administration, end disbursement of school 
funds and is the body empowered to order the treasurer to pay 
out these public funds.
The court had opportunity in 1910®® to specify 
definitely one forbidden power in the administration of funds
®®Orleans Parish School Board v. Murphy, Commissioner of 
Public Finance, (1924) 156 La. 925, 101 So. 268.
®^Charles N. Laler, President, at al. v. Abraham Millspaugh 
et al., (1880) 38 La. Ann. 901; The State of Louisiana v. IJV. F. 
games, (1887) 39 Le. Arm. 986, 3 So. 93; Mrs. M. M. Fisher and 
Husband v. Board of Directors of City schools of New Orleans 
et el., (1092) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 So. 494; Constitution of 
Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec. 16.
®®Luchini et al. v. Police Jury et al., (1910) 126 La. 972, 
65 So. 68.
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by the sehool board— that la, the offering of rewards for the 
détection and punishment of orime, although the fines derived 
from tha convicted violators were to be paid into the school 
fund. Rather, the court said: "School boards are created for
the purpose of furthering the education of the youth of the 
state," and that they are not authorized to offer such rewards. 
In a case which dealt with an attempt at garnishment of a 
teacher's salary®^ the court again pointed out that the board 
is forbidden to divert school funds from their created purpose. 
It was reasoned that the responsibility of maintaining public 
schools in the parishes must be assumed by the parish school 
boards* The state has entrusted to them all the school funds 
provided for tha support of public schools. They are especially 
charged with the responsibility of employing capable superin­
tendents and teachers for whose salaries they dedicate a 
portion of the school funds entrusted to them. Funds so 
dedicated cannot be diverted to any other purpose except as 
authorized by the boards themselves.
5. Creation and abolition of districts. Power to 
create school districts In connection with the exercise of the 
power of special taxation was conferred on the parish school 
boards by the legislature in Act No. 152 of 1920. In 1927®^ 
court interpretation revealed that the school board has by 
implication the power, where circumstances permit, to abolish
®®Benk of winnfield v. Brumfield et al., (1929) 11 La. App. 
647, 124 so. 628.
®*8ylvGStre et al. v. 3t. Landry Parish school Board, (1927) 
164 La. 204, 113 So. 818.
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a district created by It. Also, it may extend Its power to 
include such action as the creation of districts of smaller 
area and amending boundaries so as to enlarge or contract a 
district, as long as controlling statutory requirements are 
not violated.
6. Location of schools. For many years the parish 
school board in cooperation with the perish superintendent 
has been given broad discretionary power in tha location of 
schools within its created districts.®® This power was 
endorsed by the court in 1933 in a case dealing with the 
consolidation of schools in De Soto Parish,®® which consoli­
dation was in accord with the suggestion of a special state 
committee of investigation requested to recommend changes 
and consolidations in order to save expenses. The plaintiffs 
entered suit to enjoin the parish school board from consoli­
dating the two high schools involved. Because of technical 
errors the appeal was without merit, but the court explained 
that since the involved issue was of interest to the public, 
the case would receive attention.
The court presented the pertinent parts of the law 
relating thereto— chiefly Act No. 100 of 1982 and Its amendments— 
end held: (1) that the establishment and the location of high
schools are left entirely to the discretion of the parish boards, 
subject to state board limitations; therefore, the functions
®®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana: May 1, 1908,
to May 1, 1^0, p. 282; May 1,~K10, 'to May T, 19X2, p. 326.
®*H111 V. De Soto Parish School Board, (1933) 177 La. 329,
148 So. 248.
249
of the parish boards la such capacities will not be interfered
with by the courts unless the manner thereof was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or fraudulent; and (2) that there was no abuse
of discretion, the board having taken action when compelled
by an emergency, end having afforded to the children of the
consolidated school district represented by the plaintiff
educational advantages as good as, if not better than, before
the consolidation.
7. Proceedings by de facto and minority boards, it
is generally admitted by legal authorities that the acts of a
de facto school board member are as legal with respect to
third parties end the public as the acta of a de jure board 
97member. De facto school board members are officials of the
board and empowered to participate in all the duties thereof.
The court upheld this principle in answer to a charge that
majority action was lacking in the passage of a certain
resolution because one of the five members voting affirmatively
98was not a legal member. In the records touching upon this 
member's right to sit on the board, there was nothing to 
show that he had secured same illegally or that his commission 
was issued irregularly. In this absence of such proof, the 
court held that the particular member must be recognized, at 
least as a da facto member, end that effect must be given to 
his vote.
®?Newton Edwards, op clt., p. 98.
®®State ex rel. Floyd v. Hodges, (1920) 165 La. 552, 115 
So. 747.
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The attempt of the minority of a board to repeal a 
resolution adopted by the majority was pointed to by the 
court as a type of action which carries no power. The 
explanation to the contending parties was that since a 
majority of the board passed the resolution, it could be 
repealed only by majority action and that the attempted 
repeal by the minority was of no effect.®®
Relationship with parish treasurer. For more than 
a century the parish school treasurer, although ho may have 
been another official, has been legalized as an accountant 
for the receipt and expenditure of the school funds as 
directed by the parish school board.^00
1, Responsibility of sureties on official bond. To 
assure the faithful performance of his duties as this accountant, 
the parish treasurer is required to give official bond. The 
sureties on his bond are solidarity responsible for his ac­
counting for and paying over all school funds coming into his 
hands as parish treasurer. A ruling in 1874 held that they 
were thus bound and that the parish board could not release 
them, either directly or indirectly, before the treasurer had 
fully complied with the requirements of properly accounting 
for all funds.101
of Loulsicua, 18B7, "An Act to provide for the support 
and administration of paridi schools and for other purposes," 
sec. 5, p. 80.
l^ljohn Clements, President of the Police Jury of the Parish 
of Rapides, v. Eugene R. Siossat ©t als., (1874) 86 La. Ann, 843,
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In 1361 seme sureties on e parish treasurer's bond 
pleaded that tha failure of the board of school directors to 
require regular accounts and settlements from their treasurer, 
who had defaulted in the handling of the funds, discharged 
them as sureties. The court saw no merit in this and declared 
also that mere failure to sue while the treasurer was in office 
did not discharge the sureties. 1®® In the same case it was 
established that the school board had a right under the law 
to sue on the official bond of a deceased treasurer for money 
improperly accounted for by him, even when the claim extended 
to the curator of the treasurer and to the widow of one of 
the sureties who had accepted the community of her and her 
deceased husband.1^® Another feature which fails to release 
a surety of his responsibility to the school board is that he 
is a citizen of another s t a t e . legislative act pro­
viding for the bond requires that the sureties be residents 
of the state. At the time of the acceptance of the bond the 
beneficiary may object to a nonresident as surety, but after 
acceptance, the surety himself will not be heard to claim this 
irregularity as releasing him from the bond.
2. Financial settlements. It is generally admitted 
that since the school treasurer is a product of the parish 
school board and subject to its direction, a settlement between 
the two should be final. The question at bar in a case in
lO&Boerd of School Directors of the Parish of Madison v. 
A. V. Brown et al., (1881) 55 La. Ann. 585,
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1881^®® was: May su oh settlement be reopened and declared
null and void because of alleged irregularities? in this 
oonneotion the court aaid:
This being an action for the rescission 
of a settlement between a school board and an officer 
thereof, and of a discharge given the officer after 
such settlement, it is clear that, as these acts 
and proceedings of the board related to a matter 
within the scope of its authority, the settlement 
and discharge in question must be presumed correct, 
and held as conclusive, both as to the board making 
t M  settlement and its successors, unless the acts 
complained of were in violation of the provisions 
of the law bearing thereon, or done in fraud or 
error; and to annul them on such grounds, the 
causes of nullity must be clearly and satisfactorily 
established.10®
However, it was conclusively shown that the board abused its 
power of discretion and failed to take cognizance of the 
positive prohibitory laws directing it in making such settle­
ments. For example, it was shown that claims for contingent 
expanses and compensation were paid from the general school 
fund, since there was no local fund; this was considered a 
palpable infraction of the law. Another error was that the 
board allowed credit for amounts evidenced by receipts given 
by the treasurer to himself, vhen the law plainly states 
that such disbursements must be evidenced by warrants drawn 
by the president of the board on the treasurer. The defendant 
pleaded estoppel on the grounds that the accusing board was 
basing its complaints without his books, papers, and vouchers 
used while he was treasurer. He was refused estoppel on this
lO&phe school Board of Union Parish v. J. E. Trimble, (1881) 
35 La. Ann. 1075.
. p. 1076.
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claim because the records of the settlement left It a matter 
of dispute as to whether any, books and vouchers were produced 
at that time. The court criticized the authorities for this 
laxity in the preservation of records end refused to hear the 
defendant on any such claim. The final result was that 
Judgment was granted for the recovery of the money improperly 
credited to the treasurer.
In 1890 the supreme court was called upon to decide 
if the school .board was acting within reasonable bounds of 
its discretionary power to accept a settlement with its treas­
urer when the bookkeeping was irregular but in which all 
moneys were accounted for. It had been held previously 
that faulty bookkeeping alone does not invalidate settlements 
with the parish t r e a s u r e r . I n  the case at bar the treas­
urer had made settlements at various times. His action was 
upheld by the court thus:
The evidence convinces us that the 
defendant honestly and faithfully accounted for 
all the school funds received by him, and the 
quietus granted him by the school Board was given, 
after careful end patient examination of his 
accounts as treasurer of said board.10®
Removal of members and vacation from office. Pro­
visions have been made, and interpreted when necessary, not
10?Pari8h school Board of East Feliciana v. George H.
Packwood at als., (1890) 42 La. Ann. 466, 7 So. 537.
A. Simmons, President Police Jury, and Charles Leroy, 
Treasurer, Parish of Natchitoches, v. D. H. Boullt, Tax 
Collector, (1874) 26 La. Ann. 277.
lOGparish school Board of East Feliciana v. George R.
Packwood et als., (1690) 42 La. Ann. 471.
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only for tha so curing of membership on the parish board but 
also for the removal of members by those in authority, those
whom they serve, and by acts of vacation whether through
acceptance of another office or by their own volition. Judi­
cial interpretation has been required at times to assure
removal when advisable and to protect members from unfair 
removals.
Parish school boards are subject to removal under
tha provisions of an act of 1902 which states:
Be it further enacted, etc., that for incompetenoy, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, the 
Governor may remove a member or members of the 
parish boards of school directors, subject to the 
ratification of the State Board of Education.
However, this does not give the governor the right to remove
the members of a parish school board from office and appoint
a new board without a legal hearing where the members of the
old board are unwilling to surrender their rights; the court
has ruled in such situations that ejection may be made only
through an intrusion into office suit.^^^ Similarly, if
two persons hold commissions from the governor for the same
office as school board member, the one who is a de facto
wsmber and whose commission has not expired is entitled to
the office; the one Who holds a commission by competent
authorities but of subsequent date has recourse only to an
ouster suit and until decision thereon has been made by the
ll^Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 6.
Hljackson et al. v. Powell at al., (1907) 119 La. 882, 
44 so. 689.
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courts the ^  facto member may seoure protection by an 
Injunction restraining the later claimant from Interfering.^^® 
A closely related ruling involved principally the question 
of whether the right to appoint implied the right to ascertain 
the existence of a vacancy. The court decided affirmatively 
and explained that if an incumbent concludes that no vacancy 
existed at the time of appointment, he has recourse to the 
forcing of a judicial interpretation, each claimant to abide 
thereby.113 Other interpretations of the removal statute 
have bean that the causas named therein are restrictive and 
not to be replaced by "the deplorable condition of the school 
affairs of the parish" and that the state board of education 
does not have the power of removal, although the governor 
may have voted as a member thereof— removal must be a respon­
sibility of the governor.114 Also, a petition presented by 
residents and taxpayers to have a school board member removed 
on the charge of his being in illegal possession was not 
granted; the court declared that citizens of a ward without 
a claim to the office in question and having no special 
interest therein had no right to oust or to petition for a
l^%îaxwell V. Randall, (1928) 8 La. App. 686.
Hastate ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham et al. State ex rel. 
Gray v. Pipes et al. State ex rel. White v. Meson et al. 
(1951) 175 La. 486, 137 So. 862.
Hastate ex rel. Muller, List. Atty., et al. v. Cyr et al., 
(1909) 124 La. 603, 50 So. 595.
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re straining order to an appointee who had an apparent title 
to the office of parish school board member.
The right of resignation of a member appointed by 
t W  governor has been held^^® to be based on section 17 of 
Act No* 100 of 1922 which reads in part: "All vacancies in
the membership of parish school boards caused by death, 
rqsignation, or otherwise, shall be filled by appointment by 
the Governor." After resignation is accepted by the governor, 
the member's claim to the office is finally terminated. How­
ever, this member who has resigned, if having been holding 
Office legally, is duty bound to continue the exercise of the 
functions thereof until his successor be inducted into office, 
for the pertinent organic provision is:
All officers, state, municipal and parochial, 
except in case of impeachment or suspension, 
shall continue to discharge the duties of their 
offices until their successors shall have been 
inducted into office.11?
Although he is required to function thus in official capacity,
this school board member is not considered as an "usurper or
intruder into office" so as to be required to litigate a case
involving the right to such office, as for example, when a
former occupant attempted to gain reinstatement by injunction.
The court ruledH® that the contest should have been brought
^l®Thomas et al. v* Doughty, (1927) 163 La. 213, 111 So. 681.
ll®State ex rel. Bolin v. Webster Parish School Board et al.,
(1953) (La. Crt. of App.) 150 So. 446.
11?Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 19, sec. 6.
ll%tate ex rel. Bolin v. Webster parish school Board et al.,
(1954) (La. crt. of App.) 157 So. 142.
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while ths one who resigned was a ^  faoto claimant to the 
office.
Local Boards
General bases. The school board of a local nature 
was significant in the early development of public education 
in the state. In 1627 the parish school administrators were 
authorised to appoint three trustees for the schools in each 
of the police jury wards of the parish. These boards were 
entrusted with the employment of teachers and the performance 
of other detailed duties pertaining to supervision of the 
schools in %elr respective wards.H®
Provisions were made in 1847 whereby each school 
district in mass meeting assembled was privileged to elect a 
district school board with general supervision of the school 
or schools therein.180 In 1869 the state board of education 
was empowered to appoint at its discretion local school 
directors to assist in the detailed management of their 
particular schools.1®1 By 1904 the power of the local boards 
was on the decline,1®® and since 1912 such boards have had a 
nominal existence with advisory responsibilities.1®®
11 Acts of Louisiana, 1827, "An Act to provide for the 
support and administration of parish schools and for other 
purposes," sec. 5, p. 82.
, 1847, No. 825, sec. 80.
. 1869, NO. 181, 8.0. 10.
 ^ 1904, NO. 167, aeo. 8.
, 1918, NO. 814, 8.0. 18.
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In 1916 a complaint against the creation of over­
lapping districts was presented to the effect that confusion 
might arise from having three visiting trustees from each 
d i s t r i c t . T h e  court called attention to the provision 
for three auxiliary visiting trustees in each district, to 
he selected hy the patrons thereof, in the manner provided 
hy the board, and expressed belief that the selection would 
soon be made for the newly created district. The attorney 
general had previously held that the aot^®® requiring the 
selection of such trustees was practically directory#!®® The 
duties of the visiting trustees were held by the court to be*
"They shall visit the schools of their 
respective district and shall make quarterly 
reports to the board of directors of the actual 
condition of the schools, and shall make needful 
suggestions in all matters relating to the schools 
of which they are trustees."!®”
An act of 1922 made provision whereby local school boards
might be appointed by the parish boards.!®®
Thus, it may be seen that the local boards of
trustees or directors influenced the early development of
public schools in the state, but that toward the close of
the nineteenth century their influence was being replaced
by the increasing power of the parish school boards.
!®4jbfouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of 
Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So. 191.
!®5Aetg of Louisiana, 1912, Ko. 214, sec. 18,
!®®Onlnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. June 1. 
1912, 'T O . ------------
!®?Drouln et al* v. Board of Directors of Public Schools 
of Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 400,
!®®Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Ko, 100, sec, 24.
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The Constitution of 1981 rooognized the nominal existence of 
suoh local boards but circumscribed their power, thus:
Municipal or parish school boards and 
systems now in existence by virtue of special or 
local legislative acts are hereby recognized, 
subject to control by and supervision of the 
State Board of Education, end the power of the 
Legislature to further control them by special 
laws.!®®
Issuance of warrants. Local school directors may 
issue warrants for the disbursement of funds belonging to 
their particular district. This power was questioned In the 
Miahle caaelBO where the treasurer had refused to honor a 
warrant drawn by the school board in one of the districts of 
St. Martin Parish on the grounds that the school director® 
subscribing and delivering it were never elected, and, if 
elected, never qualified as directors* The law governing 
the issuance of warrants declares, "That the money which 
may be received by the several parish Treasurers, shell be 
held by them and paid out to the various school districts 
upon the warrant of a majority of the School Directors in 
each district,"!31
In ordering the treasurer to honor the warrant in 
question, the court held that district school directors had 
a right to issue warrants for their respective districts and 
that such warrants were legal whether the trustees were or 
were not de facto.!38
!®®Constitution of Louisiana, 1981, art, IS, sec. 11,
Miahle v. a. 0. Fournet, (1058) 13 La, Ann. 607,
^®^Aets of Louisiana, 1855, Mo. 381, sec, 9,
Miahle V. 0. 0. Fournet, (1868) 13 La. Ann. 607.
Special oit y boards. It has been the policy of the
state to grant exceptional privileges to some of the larger
centers in matters pertaining to their local school systems.
For example, since 1826 New Orleans has had special boards
to administer the operation of her public s c h o o l s , !33
That such special boards have existed with 8 standing
in court since 1871 is evidenced by a consolidated case to
determine tha allocation of powers between two constituted
school boards of New O r l e a n s . !®4 The court recognized these
boards and described the case as being;
, , , 8 controversy between two sets of functionaries 
deriving their powers from the same source and holding 
their offices under the act of the Legislature ap­
proved March 16, 1870, entitled "An Act to regulate 
public education in the State of Louisiana and city 
of New Orleans, and to relae a revenue for that 
purpose." These contestants are styled "The City 
Board of school Directors," and "The Ward Boards of 
School Directors." The contest relates to priority 
of Jurisdiction over the public schools of the city 
and the right to receive and disburse the school 
funds apportioned to the city schools.!"©
After a careful investigation of the power granted to the two
corporate bodies under the existing law, the court held that
the ward boards of school directors were given primary control
and supervision of the public schools of the city, since the
IB^Acts of Louisiana, 18S6, "An Act establishing two primary 
schools and one central school in the City of New Orleans, and 
for other purposes," sec. 2, p. 146.
!^Third Ward school District of New Orleans v, City Board 
of school Directors. Van Norden, Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas W. 
Conway, State superintendent. Thomas W. Conway, state Superin­
tendent, V. The City Board of School Directors. Van Norden, 
Treasurer, etc., v. Thomas U'. Conway, State Superintendent. 
(1871) 23 La. Ann. 152.
IGSibld., p. 163.
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oity board of school directors was subordinate in its powers 
and functions to % e  ward boards, it was not legally authorized 
to make contracts with teachers, and to receive or disburse the 
school funds belonging to, or coming to, the oity for public 
school purposes.
SUMMARY
Political agencies— the legislature and the police 
Juries— and boards of education— state, parish, and local— are 
tha principal nonprofessional agencies which participate In 
the control of the state's educational system.
Political Agencies
The influence that the political agencies have had 
on the development of public school policies appears to be the 
following:
1. On the theory that a legislative body may enact 
laws which are not prohibited by the state or national consti­
tutions the legislature in early statehood put into effect 
laws which controlled public schools.
2. The legislature is the principal agency through 
which the educational mandates of the state's organic laws are 
executed.
3. The legislature may be restrained by organic lews. 
For example, in 1879 the lawmakers were prohibited from author­
izing support of any schools of a sectarian nature.
4. In some instances the legislature has delegated
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its powers— the right of the qualified taxpayers to vote 
BpeelaX levies for sehool purposes is an illustration,
5. police Juries were the chief controlling agencies 
of education in their respective parishes during the early 
history of the state. Later their powers included the dis­
cretionary ascertainment of the amount of tax levies for 
schools and the supervision of special tax elections.
Boards of Education
Since the beginning of the state's public school 
system the powers delegated to various boards of education 
have influenced the development of the educational policies.
The facts pertaining to such policies seem to be mainly as 
follows:
1. From the historical point of view the state 
board must have been preceded by some other directing factor, 
for this centralized control received no legal recognition 
until after the War for Southern Independence,
2. The personnel of the state board during its 
early history included many ex-offlolo members; apparently, 
this was unsatisfactory, for the Johnson Act of 1916 eliminated 
all such members and specified the personnel to consist of
the state superintendent of public education end five appointed 
members.
S. The constitution of 1921 provided for the reorgan­
ization of the state board of education so as to consist of 
eight members elected by the voters and three appointed by the 
governor. This board Is clothed with broad discretionary
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powers and is given supervision and control of all free public 
schoolst the certification of teachers, and the adoption of a 
program of studies fbr the public schools,
4. Notwithstanding the almost unlimited powers of 
the state board of education, the courts have rarely been 
called upon to interpret its actions,
6. The parish school board, as an agency of control, 
had its inception in the public school system in 1821,
6. Since the beginning of the present century the 
powers of the parish school board have been broadened to the 
extent that this board now plays for the parish a role similar 
to that which the state board plays for the state,
7. The personnel of the parish board consists of 
one person elected for each police juror of the various wards 
for overlapping terms of six years,
8, Vacancies for unexpired terms of parish school 
board members are filled by appointment by the governor.
9, The secretaryship of the parish board is filled 
by the parish superintendent by virtue of his office,
10. The parish school board is a corporate body with 
all the legal standing appertaining,
11. school board members are classified as officers 
of the state, for each board constitutes a part of the public 
school system, which is a state function,
12. Since a school board member ia an officer under 
the state, he can hold no other state or Federal office at 
the same time.
13. The broad discretionary powers of the school
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board are Indioeted by its general jurisdiction over the 
schools of the parish* The court's policy has been non- 
Interference with the board's discretionary action except in 
case of abuse*
14. The records of school board proceedings must 
be in writing to be valid*
15. The parish school board is granted discretionary 
power in the selection of a parish superintendent of echools 
but not to the extent of re-election of a superintendent a 
year before his term expires.
16. Assistant superintendents of parish schools may 
be employed and removed at the discretion of the parish school 
board*
17. The parish school board's discretion in the 
dlsbursemant of the school funds is circumscribed only by 
general laws pertaining thereto.
18. The creation and abolition of school districts 
and the location of schools therein are discretionary powers 
of the pariah school board.
19. The official acts of ÿM facto school board 
members are legally sound, but minority board proceedings 
carry no value.
20. In transactions with the parish school treasurer 
the board must hold the sureties on the treasurer's official 
bond responsible until final settlements have been made. The 
board's settlement with the treasurer is accepted as final
and may be annulled only in case of established fraud or error.
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81. School Board members may be removed from office 
for the restrictive causes specified by statute but only after 
a legal hearing.
88. The local school board was a significant agency 
of control in the early development of public education, but 
toward the close of the nineteenth century its influence was 
being replaced by the increasing power of the parish school 
board. The Constitution of 1921 continues to recognize the 
local boards but circumscribes their powers.
23. A few special city school boards of a local 
nature with broad powers have been in existence from an early 
date.
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CHAPTER VIII 
EDUCATIONAL CONTROL BT PROFESSIONAL AGENCIES
In the organization and administration of the state's 
program of public education many responsibilities have been 
entrusted to professional agencies of control— the various 
types of superintendents and the public school teachers* It 
may be expected that the accompanying rights and duties have 
been the bases of controversies requiring legal interpretation. 
The present chapter is an attempt to show Louisiana's law 
relative to the professional agencies controlling her public 
school system.
SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS
State Superintendent
General supervision of public education by some one 
who represents the state is a natural consequence of state sup* 
port. "The state must maintain supreme control of the public 
schools, otherwise there will always be the danger that the 
state purpose in establishing them may be d e f e a t e d , T h e  
chief educational officer is the principal professional agency
Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public School 
as a State Institution (Bloomington, P* 33.
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of eontrol In initiating and executing the public school 
policies of the state<^ In Louisiana this officer who must 
direct the general supervisory program is the state superin­
tendent of public education*
Legal bases* The office of superintendent had Its 
legal Inception in Louisiana in 1833 when to the office of 
secretary of state was added the office of state superintendent 
of education.3 The first subject reported by the committee 
on education in the first constitutional convention of the 
state which gave attention to the question of education was 
the urgent necessity of establishing some system of state 
control,4 As finally adopted the organic provisions were; 
"There shall be appointed a Superintendent of Public Education, 
who shall hold his office for two years. His duties shall be 
prescribed by law, fie shall receive such compensation as the 
Legislature may direct."3 in response to this constitutional 
mandate, the legislature in 1847 amended its act of 1833 by 
making the state superintendent of public education a separate 
and distinct officer,®
In the next constitutional convention the majority 
report from the committee on public education included no
®Frank P. Graves, The Administration of American Education 
(Hew York, 1932), p, 541,
»
Acts of Louisiana, 1833, "An Act supplementary to the 
several acts relative to Public Education," sec, 1, p. 141.
^Official Report of Debates in the Louisiana Convention. 
1844-4b, p. "^ 16,
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1845, art, 133.
®Aots of Louisiana, 1847, No, 225, sec, 7,
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provision for the offios of superintendent of publie éducation,^ 
On the other hand, the minority report pointed out that "the 
abolition of the Superintendent of the Public Schools would 
have a had effect upon all our system of public education."®
When the question came up again, having been called from the 
minority rather than the majority report, an unsuccessful 
attoftpt was made to vest the police juries of the respective 
parishes with the power of control. By a slight majority the 
report retaining the superintendent's office was adopted, with 
the provision that this officer be elective by the people,*
Later the whole section pertaining to state control of public 
education was under consideration in the adoption of a sub­
stitute which abolished the office of state superintendent and 
transferred its duties to the secretary of s t a t e , A l m o s t  
immediately the substitute was called up for reconsideration; 
the final result was that the original article was adopted 
with amendments to the effect that the office be elective and 
its retention optional with the legislature,^^ From the above 
it may be seen that in the Constitutional Convention of 1852 
there were different opinions concerning the control of public 
education. The next convention made only the revisions that
^Journal of the Convention to Form £ New Constitution for 
the fita'ïe o? loulaïana". p, 53,
%bia.. p. 87.
'ibid., p. 85.
^'ibld.. p. 86.
lllbia.. p. 87.
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the term of the state superintendent be Inoreased from two to 
four years and that the salary be fixed at four thousand 
dollars per annum until otherwise provided by law rather than 
left to the direction of the legislature,^^
Various proposals concerning the state superintend­
ent were made in the Convention of 1867-1868, chief of which 
dealt with; The placing of private schools under his super­
vision,^® method of selection,salary,delegation of the 
whole proposition to the legislature,^® and supervision,^*^ 
Some were included and others failed in passage, as is 
indicated by the following adopted provisions;
There shall be elected by the qualified voters of 
this State a Superintendent of Public Education, 
who shall hold his office for four years. His 
duties shall be prescribed by law and he shall 
have the supervision and the general control of 
all public schools throughout the State, He shall 
receive a salary of five thousand dollars per 
annum, payable quarterly, on his oiivn warrant,
Again, in the Constitutional Convention of 1879, it
was evident that the people had not become reconciled to state
agencies of public school control. The minority group of the
C(mmlttee on education emphasized the need of such control and
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1864, art. 140,
Inofficial Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention for 
Framing a ConstitutTo^n for the 6tate of Louisiana. 1867-1868, 
p, it, “
Itlbld.. p. 60.
ISlbld.
l*Ibld.. p. 94. 
l?Ibia.. p. 208.
Constitution of Louisiana, 1668, art. 137.
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supervision,on the other hand, some recommended that the 
State superintendent's office he abolished and the duties 
aeeumed by the secretary of s t a t e , b u t finally en amend­
ment retaining the office of state superintendent was adopted 
by & email m a r g i n , T h o s e  who would lower the status by a 
reduction in salary were successful to a certain extent, for 
the maximum annual expense of the office was noLied at three 
thousand doliars,
The theory of state control of public education 
seems to have been accepted without protest in the Constitu­
tional Convention of 1898,^^ The provisions for a state 
superintendent of education were brought forward from the 
constitution of 1879 with the revision only that the maximum 
amount which might be used as office expense was fixed at 
two thousand dollarshowever, an amendment to this article 
in 1908 raised the salary of this officer to five thousand 
dollars, payable monthly on his warrant, and removed the 
provision concerning e x p e n s e s , ^5
Inofficial Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention o lf the Ata^ te of Louisiana, 3379. pp, 168-169*
*"lbid.. p, 173.
^4bld.. p. 17B.
"ibid.. pp, 202-203; Constitution of Louisiana, 1879, art, 
223.
Offioial Journal of the Prooeedlnaa of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of Loui si ana, 1§96,
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art, 349,
^®Ibid,, as amended by Act No, 38 of 1908, adopted November, 
1908.
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The policy of etate control having been accepted, 
there were no controversial issues on this subject in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1921 except relative to the method 
of selecting the chief educational officer. Some members 
thought the voters of the state should have the privilege of 
electing this officer,while others believed that the state 
board of education should make the s e l e c t i o n F i n a l  pro­
visions were:
Tho board shall elect for terms of four (4) years a 
chairman and a State Superintendent of Public 
Education. The latter shall be ex officio secretary, 
and his salary shall be fixed by the board at not 
less than five thousand 000.00) dollars nor more 
than seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) 
per annum, payable monthly on iiig ovm warrant, and 
he may be removed by the board,
This section was amended the next year so as to make the officer
elective by the voters of the state and not subject to removal
by the state board of education,&*
Official rights in court, It is remarkable that for
more than e century the chief educational officers of the
state have conducted the affairs of that office in the interest
of publie education without interference from the judicial
branch of government. However, the superintendent of public
education, as a ministerial officer of the state, is assured
^®Offlqial Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention o t the 6tate of louisiana. 192T7 PP* 44, 128,
2?Ibid.. p. 688.
28Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, sec, 5.
^^Ibid., as amended by Act No, 105 of 1922, adopted November, 
1922.
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the benefit of the state's counsel In court cases or other 
legal procedures in connection with the functions of the 
office* He is prohibited from appearing in court in his 
offioial capacity except through one of the state's attorneys* 
This principle was clearly demonstrated in the Edwin E, Fay 
case,®® where the plaintiff, in his official capacity, entered 
suit through the assistance of private counsel to enjoin the 
disbursement of certain sums of appropriated money. The 
supreme court interpreted that part of Act No. 21 of 1872 
%Aioh controls the case as follows;
The first Section of the Act positively 
prohibits the Auditor, the State Treasurer, or any 
other ministerial officer of the State, from appear­
ing in court, either in person or by private counsel 
in any suit in which such officer may be a party or 
may be interested in his offioial capacity, but in 
all such oases he must be represented by the Attorney 
General, if the suit is Instituted in New Orleans, 
or by the local District Attorney in any of the 
parishes of the State. It authorizes the Governor 
or Attorney General, in case of necessity, to have 
such officer represented by an at tomey-at-law.
The second Section prohibits any court of 
the State from maintaining any suit in which such 
officer may appear in person or by private counsel, 
and requires the dismissal of such suit "ex officio 
or on motion," as in case of nonsuit, and provides 
that notice of such dismissal be served on the 
Attorney General or proper District Attorney, who 
may on motion reinstate such action, if he deem it 
expedient so to do.®^
Edwin E. Fay, Superintendent of Public Education, v. Allen 
Junel, Auditor, and 1, A. Burke, Treasurer, (1885) 35 La. Ann. 
5*8.
pp. 366-889.
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Division Superintendent
Heoonstruetion legislation in 1869 provided that the 
state hoard of éducation, which had been appointed by the 
governor, should appoint six division superintendents of public 
education. Their duties were to supervise and control the edu­
cational systems of their respective districts.®^ Statutory 
provision for this type of superintendent was continued in the 
general school act of 1870 with the change that the appointive 
power was transferred to the governor,®® However, these offi­
cials and their system of supervision went out of existence 
with the termination of the Reconstruction Period.
Removal from office. A check of the court records 
reveals one significant case dealing with division superin­
tendents.®^ Since the ease is self-explanatory and very 
briefly reported, its record is quoted in full;
On the twenty-ninth of March, 1870, the 
relator was appointed Division Superintendent of 
Education, first division, in pursuance of the 
third section of act No. 6 of 1870, entitled "An 
act to regulate public education in the State of 
Louisiana and city of New Orleans and raise a 
revenue for that purpose." His term of office 
was three years, and salary #2500, payable quarterly 
upon his own warrant. This proceeding was insti­
tuted on the twenty-first of September, 1872, to 
compel the State Auditor to issue to him a warrant 
on the State Treasurer for #1770.55, for amount of 
salary from the first of December, 1871, to the 
thirty-first of August, 1872, and from a judgment 
making the mandamus peremptory this appeal is taken.
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1869, No. 121, sees. 46, 55.
®®Ibid.. Extra Session, 1870, No. 6, sec. 5.
®^State of Louisiana ex rel. R. 0. Richardson v. James 
Graham, State Auditor, (1875) 26 La. Ann. 73.
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The above act which created the office 
authorized the removal of the division superintend­
ents upon certain contingencies* and the mere fact 
of relator's removal* which Is admitted, is pre­
sumptive evidence that it was made for a proper cause#
See the case of Dubuc v* Voss, 19 An* 210 (92 Am*
Dec* 526) euad Vincent v. Populus* Opinion Book 37, 
p. 584* It was incumbent on and in the power of 
relator to show that the removal was without cause 
or not in conformity to law* This has not been done*
In the cases cited by the relator, provision was not 
made for the removal as was effected, or no proof of 
a removal was adduced, and they are therefore not 
applicable to this case*
It is therefore ordered that the Judgment 
appealed from be reversed, and that there be Judg­
ment in favor of defendant rejecting the application, 
with costs in both courts*^®
Therein legal recognition was given to the office of division
superintendent, appointment to and removal therefrom, and the
end of the state's responsibility to pay that officer after he
had been removed for cause*
Parish Superintendent
Legal developments of office# It seems that the 
idea of professional supervision of the parish schools did not 
develop until after the Constitutional Convention of 1844-1845, 
of which one result was the enactment of a general educational 
law of the state. This law included provisions for the elec­
tion of a parish superintendent by the voters of the parish 
and fixed the maximum remuneration for his services at three 
hundred dollars per year*®®
"iMd.
Acts Of Louisiana, 1847, No. 225, sec. 11.
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Apparently the people were not ready for this type 
of control, for In 1862 the office was abolished*®? In 1077 
the parish school board was authorized to elect a secretary 
at a salary of #100 per year*®® Not until 1862 was the office 
re-established, after having had organic authorization;®^ at 
that time the parish school board was empowered and directed 
to select this officer at an annual salary of not more than 
#200 for the double function of serving as secretary of the 
board and parish superintendent*^® The Constitution of 1898 
required the same double function and provided that the salary 
and qualifications of said offioial should be under legisla­
tive control.*^ Since the beginning of the present century 
the parish school board has been given considerable latitude 
in the annual salary schedule of the superintendent; the law
of 1902 fixed the minimum at #200 and the maximum at >42
idiile the act of 1904 increased the lower limit to #600 and 
abolished the upper limit * ^  In 1916 the minimum was increased 
to #900 and the maximum was fixed at #4000*^^ The Constitution
®?Ibid*. 1852, No. 310, secs. 1-3.
®®Ibid.. Extra Session, 1877, No. 23, sec. 7.
®*Oonstitution of Louisiana, 1679, art. 226. 
^Acts of Louisiana, 1882, No. 70, sec. 2. 
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 250. 
^®Aots of Louisiana, 1902, No. 214, sec. 35.
1904, No. 167, see. 36.
**Ibld., 1916, No. lEO, seo. 27.
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of X921 placed the qualifications and duties of the incumbent 
of this office under the supervision of the state board of 
education and left certain phases of control, such as the 
selection of the official, to the parish school board* Also, 
it was provided that the board need not confine Itself to 
any particular political subdivision of the state in finding 
a suitable official,*® At present the parish superintendent, 
under the direction of the parish school board end in cooper­
ation with the state department of education, has become the 
chief agent in supervision and control for promoting the 
educational policies of the state In his particular parish.
Official status. It is generally admitted that the 
parish superintendents of the state are integral elements of 
the public school system, but their status seems to have been 
a variant, concerning which the courts have been called upon 
to give several interpretations.
In a suit in 1905,*® occasioned by the refusal of 
a district attorney to institute removal from office proceed­
ings against a parish superintendent on the grounds that this
superintendent is not a public officer, the court decreed;
We find in this position every element 
which the courts have decided it takes to make a
public office. It is a public station or employ­
ment provided for by the Constitution of the state.
The manner by which the person who is to fill this 
station is to be chosen is fully designated end 
declared both by the Constitution and by statute,
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 12, seo. 10,
*®State ex rel. Smith et al, v, Theus, District Attorney, 
(1905) 114 La. 1097, 38 So, 870,
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and the title of the officer Is given in the same 
way. The tenure of office, its duration, and the 
duties of the officer are all specifically prescribed, 
and there can be no question that a parish superin­
tendent of public education is a public officer—  
a state officer Whose duties are limited within the 
bounds of the parish for which he is elected. "
Another point established In the instant case was that citizens
and taxpayers have a legal right when properly united to demand
that the district attorney bring suit against an incumbent who
is Charged with having illegally usurped and intruded into, or
with unlawfully holding and exercising, the office of parish
Biq^rintendent of public education.
As was shown in the legal developments pertaining to 
this school official, the Constitution of 1921 provided that 
the parish school board need not confine itself to any partic­
ular political subdivision when making the selection of a
parish superintendent. An interpretation of this provision 
was rendered by the court in 1931*® in a case concerned
primarily with removal of the superintendent from office.
The pertinent provisions of the constitution of 1921 and their
repetition in section 19 of Act No. 100 of 1922 were cited.
It was interpreted that these were the equivalent of saying:
. . .  a parish superintendent of schools need not 
be an elector of the parish; because, according 
to section 1 of article 8 of the Constitution of 
1921, a person cannot be an elector of a parish 
unless he is, and has been for a year, an actual 
and bona fide resident of the parish, and unless 
he is and has been for two years an actual and 
bona fide resident of the state. Hence, when the
4?Ibla.. 114 La. 1104,
«X rel. Harrey t. Stanly, (1931) 173 La. 807, 138
So * 845.
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Coaatltutlon of 1921 declares that a pariah superin­
tendent of schools need not be a resident of the 
parish, it, in effect, declares that a parish super­
intendent of schools shall not be deemed a public 
officer, because he cannot be a public officer 
without being a resident of the parish#*^
In the meantime, the court of appeal in 1928®® 
treated the parish superintendent as a public officer in 
connection with proceedings for the garnishment of his salary. 
However, this case did not mention the new provision concern­
ing the residence requirements of this official and it based 
its reasoning on a case decided before the late constitution. 
The Harvey case of 1931®^ which held that the superintendent 
is not a public officer under the Constitution of 1921 would 
seem to control, since it is a supreme court case, is of more 
recent date, and makes specific explanation that the court of 
appeal case did not apply because it based its decision on 
a previous constitution.
Thus, although the parish superintendent of schools 
was correctly considered a public officer in the early history 
thereof, that status was changed with the Constitution of 1921 
and at present this school official is not legally considered 
a public officer.
Viva voce vote required in election. In a case 
concerning the election of a parish superintendent the question 
of whether the school board should elect this offioial by
173 La. 814-813.
SOodom ▼. Hodge-Hunt Limber Co., Ino., (1928) 9 La. App. 418, 
121 So. 237.
®^Stat. ex rel. Harvey v. Stanly, (1931) 173 La. 807, 138 
So. 845.
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secret ballot or by viva vooe vote was the principal issue*®® 
In the controversial situation the school board of Winn Parish 
proceeded to elect by secret ballot a parish superintendent.
The count showed a vote of 6 to 4 in favor of Jesse J* Mixon; 
later 5 of the 9 members declared to have voted for the in­
cumbent, Asa Leonard Allen* The board met the next day and 
after deciding that an error had been made the day before in 
announcing the election results, proceeded to elect by viva 
vooe vote, which resulted in the selection of Allen* Suit 
vas instituted to compel Mixon, the defendant, who was pre­
viously superintendent, to surrender the office to Allen who 
was last elected.
The court confirmed Allen's right to the office 
and explained its action in terms of article 208 of the Consti­
tution of 1918, which declares that the vote shell be viva 
voce in all elections by persons voting in a representative 
capacity. More recently the state's legal adviser has rendered 
the same interpretation®® of similar provisions in the Const!- 
ttttlon of 1921.54
Fixed term of office. The questions of «hat consti­
tutes the legal term of office of the parish superintendent 
and the relation thereof to changes in the personnel of the
®®State ex rel. Long, Diet, Atty. et al. v. Mixon, (1918)
142 La, 714, 77 So. 512.
®®Oplnlona of the Attorney General of Louisiana* May 1, 1932, 
to April 1, 1934, p. 3Ï0.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1921, art. 8, seo. 7.
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pariah board were presented in a case in 1909*®® The test was
oeoasioned by a change in the statutes to the effect that
parish school boards should be elected by the voters of the
various wards,®* where formerly they had been appointed by
57the state board, and by the provision in the later statute 
that the incumbents would hold office until their successors 
were elected «hioh elections were to be at the time of the 
Oongressional elections* Each board was authorized to elect 
a parish superintendent for a term of four years*®® Conformity 
to the revised statutes produced the situation that the out­
going board elected a superintendent whose term would extend 
practically throughout the official period of the incoming 
board.
In the case®® which sought interpretation of this 
condition the superintendent appointed by the new board insti­
tuted an ouster suit against the superintendent appointed by 
the old board* The incumbent's terra had expired shortly before 
the new board was elected and the old board had reappointed 
him. Attention was called by the court to the corporate 
existence of the board, which signifies that the change of the
®®State ex rel. Wilson v. Hardin, (1909) 123 La. 736, 49 
So* 490*
®*Acts of Louisiana, 1906, No. 60, seo. 1*
5^1bld.. 1888, Ho. 81, sec. 3.
"ibid.. 1908, Ho. 49, seo. 8.
"state ex rel. Wilson v. Eardln, (1909) 123 La. 736, 49 
So. 490.
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individuals who compose the hoard does not affect the status 
of the hoard. It was recognized that the parish board had the 
authority to appoint a superintendent for four years but for 
no shorter or longer term end that, therefore, the outgoing 
hoard performed its mandatoiy duty at the expiration of the 
superintendent's term by appointing a successor for a period 
of four years. Thus, this decision reserved to the superin­
tendent appointed by a board legally constituted the right to 
serve four years regardless of termination of office of the 
board who elected him, the subsequent board's being bound by 
its predecessor's action. Removal could have been secured 
through authorized means but not because the governing board 
for the majority of the term was not the appointing board, 
Naturally, complications might arise between a superintendent 
and a board serving under such conditions as in the Instant 
case; in this connection the court said:
Whether it would be more agreeable or 
convenient, or would better subserve the interest 
of the public, that the matter should be so arranged 
that the members of the board should at all times be 
able to control the appointment of the superintendent 
of education of the parish, in order to control, or 
as incidental to the control of, the appointment of 
the secretary of the board end of the treasurer of 
the school funds of the parish, is a matter for the 
consideration of the General Assembly, We can only 
say that the existing laws do not so arrange It, . ,
Salary determination. The Constitution of 1981, by 
omitting any reference to the salary of the parish superintendent,
"ibid.
*llbid.. 123 La. 741.
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left that responsibility with the legislature. That body 
delegated the duty to the perish school'board; in Act No.
ISO of 1916 it was specified that the maximum salary should 
be $4000, but in Act No. 100 of 1988 no reference was made 
to salary. In view of the latter statute the Webster Parish 
School Board, which had been paying its school superinten­
dent an annual salary of $4000, increased the said superin­
tendent's annual salary $1000, beginning July 1, 1985* Certain 
taxpayers*® attacked the legality of such action by the school 
board.
The principal issue for the court to determine was 
if Act No* 180 of 1916 was superseded by Act No* 100 of 1988,
A similar principle was Involved in a suit carried to the 
Supreme Court of the United States and in another case to a 
state supreme court; both decisions maintained the theory 
that where two laws dealing with similar subject matter were 
enacted at different times, the latter covering the whole 
subject matter of the first and embracing new provisions, the 
former was repealed or superseded by the l a t t e r . I n  uphold­
ing the school board's discretionary power to fix the salary 
of the parish superintendent, the court said:
Our conclusion is that the provision 
limiting the salary of parish superintendents 
of education as contained in Act 120 of 1916 was 
repealed or superseded by the Act 100 of 1982, and
*®Knight V. Webster Parish School Board, (1927) 164 La. 482, 
114 So. 104.
®®Onlted States v. Tynen, (1870) 11 Wall. 88, 20 L. M .  153; 
Wood et al. t. Bateman, (1921) 149 La. 290, 88 So. 824.
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that the authority to fix the salary of ouch super­
intendents is vested in the parish board of school
directors.64
De facto superintendent required to function. The 
law is self-explanatory in prescribing that parish superin­
tendents are to execute contracts with teachers as directed 
by the school boards of their respective parishes. One perti­
nent point at issue, however, has been to determine if a 
school superintendent under the law may be compelled to execute 
a contract vdien he refused on the ground that he had been 
alleged to be a facto superintendent by the plaintiff.*®
The courts have been consistent in maintaining that officers 
whether ^  facto or de .lure have a right to discharge the 
duties of their office as prescribed by law as long as posses­
sion is maintained.*® In the instant case the court pointed 
out the possible results of holding otherwise as follows;
If one in possession of office, under color of 
title, could not be required, during his incum­
bency, to discharge the duties of the office, 
the public might suffer until his title to it 
could be ascertained in a proper proceeding. The 
acts of an officer de facto are valid as to third 
persons and the public.*?
In ordering the defendant to sign the contract in question,
the court said that according to section 23 of Act No. 100 of
*4Khight V. Webster Parish School Board, (1927) 164 La, 487,
*®State ex rel. Floyd v. Hodges, (1928) 165 La. 552, 115 
So. 747.
**State V. Sadler et al,, (1899) 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 
390; Williams et al* v. Police Jury of Concordia Parish et al., 
(1926) 160 La. 325, 107 So, 126; State v, Moreau et al,, (1923) 
153 La. 671, 96 So. 527.
®'^State ex rel. Floyd v, Hodges, (1928) 165 La. 656.
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1928 it beoaise "the duty ot the parish superintendent to sign
all contracts with teachers,"*® and further:
* , . section 49 provides that no person shell be
appointed to teach without a written contract for 
the scholastic year in which the school is taught.
The duties falling upon relator, as we appreciate 
them, include teaching, Relator has been selected 
by a majority of the membership of the board, and 
not to require defendant, as superintendent, to 
sign the contract would be to permit him to over­
ride the law. In this instance the duty he is to
perform is merely a ministerial one,*®
Thereby the court held that the parish superintendent
de Jure or ^  facto must perform the duties of his office.
Removal causes restrictive. The power to remove a
parish superintendent is vested in the parish board, which
board may remove him, at its discretion, for Incompetency,
inefficiency, or unworthiness— such was the interpretation by
the state's legal adviser,?® The court's viewpoint on this
was sought in the Harvey case,?! in which a newly appointed
superintendent instituted suit to compel an incumbent to
surrender office— the incumbent had been notified by the board
that his services were terminated because the majority of the
board was out of harmony with him.
The constitutionality of removal by parish boards
was upheld by the court in the following explanation relative
®®rbld.. p. 558.
"ibid.
70Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 1928, 
to May X, 1984” pp'7"4b0-4bi • —
?!state ex rel, Harvey v, Stanly, (1951) 173 La. 807, 138 
So, 845,
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to the controlling act; *
The legislative act includes but one 
broad comprehensive object, and that is the admin­
istration and supervision of the public schools of 
the state. Its provisions embrace the means for 
the accomplishment of that object* Tlie removal of 
parish superintendents, as well as their election, 
by perish school boards, constitute an important 
and necessary part of the administration and super­
vision of the state’s school system. And the section 
of the legislative act authorizing such removal falls 
within Its title.
Since the office of superintendent is not a public office under 
the Constitution of 1921, the question to be decided was whether 
or not the reasons for removal were in compliance with the 
controlling lew which provides that parish superintendents may 
be removed only on proof of "incompetency, inefficiency, or 
u n w o r t h i n e s s T h e  court maintained the soundness of the 
contention of the respondent to the effect that the specifica­
tions in the controlling law "of the causes authorizing the 
removal of a parish superintendent of schools are restrictive, 
and that consequently a removal for any other cause is unauthor­
ized Further, the court pointed cut that the Ieoh of
harmony might have been brought about without any irregularity 
in the superintendent’s performance of his duties.
In handice down this decision the court continued 
its policy of holding ouster suits to the strict interpretation
?®Aots of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, seo. 19.
?®State ex rel. Harvey v. Stanly, (1931) 173 La, 016* 
74Acts of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, seo. 19.
?®State ex rel. Harvey v. Stanly, (1931) 173 La. 819.
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of the law and diseotiraged school boards from attempting to 
remove parish superintendents because of petty differences, 
or in a manner otherwise than that directed by the legislature*
PUBLIC 3CE00L TMCHIHS
In the last analysis the teacher is the chief agent 
for the Individual development of the youth* "The real work 
of the school as an instrument for carrying out the purpose 
for which the school was established is done by the teacher,"?* 
Then, the state and the public must be concerned about the 
teaching personnel of the public schools,
Employment of Teachers
Necessity for certification. The policy requiring 
certification of teachers in some form had its beginnings with 
the establishment of the public schools* The police juries, 
as managers of the parish schools,?? parish school boards,?® 
ward trustees,?® parish superintendent® of schools,®® or some
?*Hermann H. Schroeder, op. cit.. p. 66,
??Acts of Louisiana, 1819, "An Act to amend the several laws 
enacted on the subject of Public Schools within this State, and 
for other purposes," sec* 2, p. 52.
?®Ibid., 1820-21, "An Act to extend and improve the system of 
PublicTSuoation in the State of Louisiana," sec* 2, p. 64,
?®Ibid.. 1827, "An Act to provide for the support and adminis­
tration of parish schools and for other purposes," sec* 5,
pp* 80, 82.
"ibid.. 1847, No. 828, seo. IS.
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local authorities®! were empowered at various periods to certify 
to the eligibility of teachers until 1912, since which time 
the state hoard of education has had complete authority in the 
certification of teachers.®®
The question of whether the possession of a certifi­
cate is necessary to validate a contract was one of the 
principles involved in the Gauthier case,®® in which attempt 
was made to recover a salary. One provision with which the 
claimant did net comply was the requirement that a teacher 
must hold a certificate issued by the Louisiana State Board 
of Education, vdaieh certificate must be of a grade sufficiently 
high to meet the requirements for the s c h o o l . ®4 Those teaching 
at the time of the passage of this regulation were differently 
provided for,®® but this did not apply to the person in ques­
tion. The plaintiff possessed a diploma from the State Normal 
College; he contended that this was the equivalent of the 
required certificate and that the parish superintendent should 
be permitted to recognize it as such, for the document read,
"it entitles the holder to a State Teacher's Certificate."
The court held that to sustain this contention would be to
81lbid.. 1852, No. 310, sec. 6.
62
Ibid.. 1912, No. 214, sec. 47; Opinions of the Attorney 
General of Louisiana. May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 439.
®®Gauthier v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Board et 
al., (1927) 5 La. App. 570.
®4Aots of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 49,
®®Ibid., eeo. 56.
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violate the whole tenor of the governing aot end place the 
Imagsient of the parieh superintendent heyond that of the legis­
lature and thereby nullify the provision: "After this aot goes
into effeot, me person shall be appointed as teacher in the 
publie sehools of the state, unless he or she holds a proper 
eartifioate."®*
Thus the court established very definitely that a 
teacher must be certified according to the governing act; this 
means that all who did not hold certificates prior to the 
passage of Act No. 100 of 1928 must be the possessors of 
eextifioates issued by the Louisiana State Board of Education, 
Method of selection» The selection of teachers Is 
made by the school board, and the parish superintendent has 
no legal right to contract with a teacher not named by the 
board— his power extends to nomination only* This was estab­
lished in the Gauthier oase®^ where an attempt was made to 
collect a salary on an alleged contract entered into with the 
parish superintendent. The court referred to the governing 
act which provides that, "The parish school board shall • « • 
select such teachers from nominations made by the parish 
superintendent, provided that a majority of the full membership 
of ^ 0  board may elect teachers without the endorsement of the 
superintendent.
o«
Gauthier v. St. John the Baptist Parish Bohool Board et 
al., (1987) 5 La. App. 570.
66‘Acts of Louisiana, 1982, No. 100, sec. 80.
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Trm, this it may be seen that the law governing the 
ehoiee ef teaehers is mandatory to the effect that parish 
s^oeX boards shall aaleot teachers from nominations made by 
the parish superintendent è The court believed that this power 
of seleetion ooald not be delegated to the superintendent; 
eonseuuently, it held that a selection made by other than the 
parish school board is of no effect*
The same policy was upheld by a later decision®® in 
vAieh the court refused to legalize claims based upon a teach­
ing contract entered into between a teacher and a parish 
superintendent without consent of the school board. In 1935 
the court u]^eld the latter part of section 80 of Act No* 100 
of 1922— teat is, a majority of the full membership of the 
parish school board may elect teachers without the endorsement 
of the parish superintendent.®®
Control by employing board » .Differences of opinion 
have arisen between parish school boards as to the control of 
teachers where a school district is made up of territory from 
two parishes. In 1926 the court of appeal^^ was called upon, 
in a case transferred to it by the supreme court, to determine 
teieh school board governed the employment of teachers in the 
Fairview-Alpha High School, The facts In the case seem to 
show that the school in question was maintained at the joint
®®Brown v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, (1930) 14 La. 
App. 460, 131 So. 760.
®®Cupit V. Vernon Parish School Board, (1933) (La. Ort. of 
App.) 145 So. 391.
®^Parish School Board of Bed River Parish v. MoHaney, (1926) 
S La. App. 696.
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•xpenae of the parishea of Red River and Hatohitoohes, and that 
by egre«B»nt, the management and control of the school was to 
belong to them alternately. For the session in question,
Natohitoohes Parish was in charge and had employed 
tee defm&dant as principal. Red River Parish Bchool Board 
brought suit against the said principal to restrain him from 
exercising any control in the Fairview^Alpha High School, 
teerging that he had assumed his position without legal 
authority*
The court maintained that such agreement between 
school boards was under the authority of the school laws and 
that the board in charge for 1982-1923 had exclusive control 
during that year over the teachers whom it had employed and 
must not be interfered with by the other board.
The Contract
Indefinite duration prohibited. That the time element 
is an essential feature of the teacher's contract was evidenced 
in the Golden case,®® According to the following resolution 
teioh was adopted in 1877, New Orleans made an effort to extend 
her teachers' contracts to an indefinite periods
"Resolved. That the following named 
teachers in the pub'lic schools of the City of New 
Orleans are appointed subject to a probation of 
three months' service, and all those who may not be 
removed for cause within three months, are hereby 
declared permanently selected, subject to removal
®®F. A, Golden v. Board of Directors of the Public Schools 
of New Orleans, (1882) 34 La. Ann. 354.
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only on written charges and after trial and con­
viction by this Board, in the manner and for the 
causes specified by l a w . " ® 3
the plaintiff had been dismissed by the New Orleans Board of
itehool Directors* On the basis of compliance with the fore-^
going resolution, he filed suit to collect his salary on the
ground that he was employed for an Indefinite period of time.
In disapproving the claim for the alleged salary, the court
explained— after stating the legislative provisions pertaining
to employment of teachers by the parish board and by the city
board— that there seemed to be no inconsistency between the
two sections but that the limitation of the term of employment
of all teachers is fixed at one year. It pointed out the
possible danger of employment according to the resolution,
which could mean practically a life tenure.
Fairly recently legislative sanction has been given 
to the effect that those teachers who were properly certified 
and employed in the New Orleans system at the time of the 
passage of the act®* would be regarded as permanent and that 
later employees were to be contracted with annually for three 
years, after which time appointment might be made permanent 
by the board.®® This provision received endorsement by the 
attorney general in 1922.®*
pp. 355-356. 
of Loulaiana, 1922, ao« 100,
8*0' 66.
*6oainlone of the Attorney General of louiaiana. l£ay 1. 1922. 
to Itay 1. 1924, p. 4BIT '
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jsd Z S Z W r - I S S S l *  It Is generally 
eoneedad that written contracts are legally sound, especially 
teere at least a scholastic year is under consideration, With 
regard to the employment and the contracts of teachers the 
eentrolling legislation provides that the parish hoard may 
employ teachers by the month or hy the year and fix their 
salaries®^ and that, "Ho person shall he appointed to teach 
without a written contract for the scholastic year in Which 
the school is to be taught, . , The results of reading
these provisions together was the interpretation sought in the 
Oupit case#®®
The court held that the requirement of a written con*
tract, as stated in the act, had reference to those persons
teo were appointed to teach for the scholastic year in which
the school is to be taught and that the correct inference is
that a written contract is not required where the teacher is
employed to teach by the month as was the plaintiff. On the
principle the court said:
It can readily be conceived why a written contract, 
in the teaching profession as well as in any other 
profession or occupation, teere the employment is 
for a long period of time, would be desirable in 
order to protect the rights of both parties, whereas 
in an employment for a short period at the time it 
may not be necessary,
®®Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Ho, 100, sec, 20,
*ec. 49.
99Oupit V. Vernon Parish School Board, (1935) (La, Ort. of 
App*) 143 So, 391,
IQOltia.. pp. 391-892.
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Also, in the explanation it was pointed out that the provision 
in the controlling act^®^ to the effect that it is the duty of 
the parish superintendent to sign all contracts with teachers 
has reference only to contracts entered into for the scholastic 
year in which the school is to be taught#
Length of period for acceptance# In the oonsunaaation 
of a contract, the sending of an official notice to a teacher 
to inform her that she has been appointed to a teaching position 
brings up the question as to how much time may elapse before 
acceptance without the invalidation of the contract in question. 
An illustration of this principle was involved in the Picou 
case^®® in which a teacher, after having been duly employed to 
teach a certain colored school was prohibited by the school 
board and superintendent from teaching said school. When the 
suit was filed for the permission to teach said school or to 
collect the salary as agreed upon, the school board claimed
that the contract was rendered invalid because of a lapse of
twelve days in the teacher's acceptance# In view of the fact 
that the plaintiff had complied with all governing regulations, 
the court maintained:
It is inconceivable from consideration 
of all the facts involved in this case, and partic­
ularly that the plaintiff had for ten years been
teaching in the parish of St, Bernard as a public 
school teacher, and had been so doing even up to
^®^Acts of Louisiana, 1928, Ho, 100, sec# 83.
^®®Picou et al, V, St, Bernard Parish School Board, (1984) 
(La, Ort# of App#) 138 So, 130,
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the year previous to the «Igning of the foregoing 
oontraot, that the eohool hoard oould have expected 
of her an Imediate reply to or acceptance of her 
appointment, Oertainly the twelve days taken up ^  her for deliberation was in no manner unreason^ 
able I and constituted such delays under the provi­
sions of our code as are to be contemplated as 
reasonable, and within the intention of the parties 
making the offer,^^
Oonsequently, the perish school hoard v^aa ordered to pay the
plaintiff the full salary for the complete term, since the
time for actual performance of the duties had long since
elapsed.
Grounds for nullity. A teacher's contract protects 
both the employer and the employee and only under rare circum­
stances may such documents be nullified,^^^ except when 
teachers have been selected contrary to the mode and manner
1 A R  1 A a
prescribed by law, or without the proper qualifications.
In the Picou case the board pleaded nullity of contract because 
the married teacher was not authorized by her husband to sign 
the written acceptance of employment ; the court held that if 
a married woman is contracted with as a teacher, the contract­
ing board cannot later claim nullity of the agreement on the 
baeis of lack of her authority to contract, especially teen 
the husband joins the wife in the suit,^^^ One cause held to
l O B i b l d .. p .  1 3 2 .
Ouinlons oî the Attorney General of Lpulaiana, May 1, 
1 9 1 4 .  t o  1, 1 9 1 6 ,  p. iS88.
May 1, 1920, to May 1, 1922, p. 1037.
l O G l b l d .. p. 523,
at al. V. S t .  Bernard Pariah Sohool Board, (1924) 
(La, Crt, of App. ) 138 60, 180,
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justify ths nullity of eontraet was involved in the Neilson 
oaso,^®® in whieh an effort was made to oolleet a salary 
balanee. After the plaintiff had taught about six weeks, the 
steool was elosed beeause the attendance was less than the 
minimm requirement of an average of ten pupils*^®® There- 
upon, the board paid the plaintiff two months' salary but 
refused to pay more* The court held that when the school 
attendance fell below the average required by law, it was no 
longer legal to keep the school in progress and that the ful­
fillment of the contract for the scholastic year was condi­
tioned upon the ability of the board to keep the sohool open* 
Express and Implied conditions in contracts were differentiated 
as follows:
"They are express, when they appear in the 
contract ; they are implied, whenever they result 
from the operation of law, from the nature of the 
contract, or from the presumed Intent of the parties
Conditions in the contract were shown to be Implied through two 
sources: the governing law forbidding operation without the
minimum average attendance, and the knowledge of both contract­
ing parties that there was danger of the school's being closed. 
Since it was impossible to keep the sohool open, the court 
declared the contract null on the basis that if a thing is 
isqpossible or prohibited by law, every condition of it and any 
agreement depending on it are void*
^®%eilson V* Lincoln Parish School Board, (1989) 18 La, App, 
179, 18$ So* 458*
^®®Aets of Louisiana, 1928, Ho, 100* sec* 56,
^^Sleilson V, Lincoln Parish Sohool Board, (1989) (La. Ort, 
of App*) 180 So* 459*
397
In another the sohool board had refused
payment of salary on tee ground that the dost motion of the 
sohool building hy fire was a fortuitous event, which closed 
t#e sohool and voided the contract. The refusal of the hoard 
to meet Its legally assumed obligations was not well taken, 
for numbers of controlling decisional^* were cited to establish 
the facts that the destruction of the building by fire was not 
a fortuitous event and that, even if it had been so considered, 
the contract would not have been nullified, unless the execu­
tion thereof had been rendered impossible# Accordingly, the 
court held that the destruction of the building was not suffi­
cient cause for nullity of the teacher's contract.
The Salary
Bases for determining. Salaries are generally pro­
vided for in the law or stipulated in the contract, or they 
may be determined on quantum meruit. In the Of fut ease^^® a 
teacher sued for the value of his services on the principle 
of quantum meruit# which method woe opposed by the employing 
board* By reference to a former case^^^ the court sa ids
^^Hughes V, Grant Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La* Ort, of 
App.) 145 So# 794.
^^Lehman, Stem & Go,,Ltd,, v, Morgan's La, A Tex, R, A S# ë# 
Go., (1905) 115 La. 1, 38 So# 073; Dejean v. La, Western Ry, Go#, 
(1936) 167 La, 111, 118 So# 823; Noel Bros, v# Texas and Pao* Ry, 
Co., (1981) 16 La# App, 622, 133 So, 830; Dallas Cooperage A 
Wdodenware Go, v. Creston Hoop Co#, (1926) 161 La, 1077, 109 So, 
644; Sugster A Co# v« Joseph West A Go#, (1683) 35 La# Ann# 119#
^^Felix G# Of fut V, Séraphin Bourgeois et als#, School 
%reetors, (1661) 16 La, Ann. 163.
Miahle V, G, G, Foumet, (1858) 13 La, Ann# 607,
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fhe law has not fixed the amount to he 
paid to the teaehere for their aervioee; and, if 
this matter he not regulated hy contract between 
them and the school directors* the former's services 
must be tested-on a quantum meruit, and accordingly 
remunerated•
Final disposition was not made, for the record did not show 
sufficiently the value oTthe services; for that reason the 
ease was remanded for new trial# However, the court did estab* 
lish that quantum meruit is the basis upon which remuneration 
must be made teen specification is lacking in law and contract, 
Another aspect of the fixing of salaries developed 
in 1906 when the court of appeal was called on to ascertain 
tee had the authority to fix the salary of the superintendent 
of the public schools of New O r l e a n s . T h e  main facts in 
the case were that the salary of the superintendent had been 
raised by the school board but that the city treasurer, who 
was also the school board treasurer, refused to honor the 
increase on the ground that the board was not authorized 
under the law to make such raise# The court called attention 
to the requirements that the superintendent be a competent and 
an experienced educator,11? and it was reasoned that the law­
makers could hardly have intended that such official would be 
required to discharge his duties without pay# The implied 
power of the school board to fix the salary in question was 
maintained by the court as follows:
llBfelix G# Offut V# Séraphin Bourgeois et als#, Sohool 
Directors, (1661) 16 La# Ann# 164#
lldgtate of Louisiana ex rel# Warren Easton v# Treasurer of 
Board of School Directors of New Orleans, (1906) 3 Orl# App# 383,
ll?Acts of Louisiana, 1902, No# 814, sec# 35#
399
Where the power to do any given thing 
la granted hy the law, the means whereby this power 
amy be ezereised la likewise granted. Besides this 
the oontemporaneona cone tract ion of the law by the 
offices cherged with Its execution, as also by the 
entire city authorities and Its law officers, has 
b e m  that the School Board had the authority to pay 
a salary to its Superintendent# The weight which 
la to be given to such oont^poraneous" construction 
is expressed in State vs. Owptoir National, etc., 
51 A. 1361# In that case the Court saldt "In this 
state it has been more than once held: 'Common 
interpretation of statutes which have existed for a 
length of time will be considered, as it generally
is, the correct Interpretation. To the same 
effect is State ex rel# etc# vs. Board, etc., 52 A#
335; and cases cited#^^
fheret^on the court upheld the discretionary power of the board
of school directors of Hew Orleans to fix the salary of the
superintendent of the public schools of the City, and in the
instant case the treasurer was ordered to pay the salary as
teteified by the board's pay roll for the month in question.
Concerning the fixing of salaries of teachers in 
general, this oase^® also maintained that Aot Ho, 167 of 1904 
emended and re-enacted Act Ho. 314 of 1903 so that the parti- 
n n t  seetion reads
' That in addition to the powers and duties herein­
before granted to and imposed upon parish boards, 
the powers and duties of said board of directors 
of the parish of Orleans shall be as follows:
First, It shall adjust and fix equitably 
the salaries of teachers and janitors, secretary, 
employees, and of such assistant superintendents as 
it may deem necessary for an efficient supervision 
of the school.^*®
^^State of Louisiana ex rel, Warren Easton v. Treasurer of 
Board of Sohool Directors of Hew Orleans, (1906) 3 Orl, App. 391.
p« 308.
^®Aots Of Louisiana, 1904, Ho. 167, sec. 73,
300
% d # r  m t i w  1 of Aot No, llO of 1928, parish sohool 
boerda a n  oloteed with the authority to fix teaohers' salaries 
bat t h v  dfe required to develop an equal basis schedule for 
both mem and womem*^*^
S r » , 4 m  at yfMimtn M. â m s m æ ; *  seems not to 
have beam queatiomed that the eohool directors have power to 
issue warrante on the parish treasurer for the payment of 
teaelters' salaries and that the jarish treasurer is legally 
bound to honor suoh warrants, but the question has been raised 
as to teether a de faeto board has suoh power* This principle 
was involved in the Miahle oase^®® in which a suit was insti­
tuted to collect a salary from the school board treasurer of 
St* Martin Parish, which official had refused to honor the 
warrant because it was authorised by a board whom he charged 
as not having been elected and not having qualified* The court 
held that the members of the board were d£ facto directors and 
recognized as such, and that "the treasurer would have been 
Justifiable in paying the warrant, for it would have been a 
valid voucher for the payment of the money represented by it,”^*® 
In approving the teacher's right to collect his salary accord­
ing to the order of the de facto board, the court maintained 
as directory the law which provided;
13%, Ml#hle ▼, 0. O, 7o a m 0t, (1888) 13 La. Ann. 607.
I33lbia.. p, 606.
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That each warrant drawn for the salary of any Teacher 
hhall he aeee#pamled hy a statement of the directors * 
showing the ntther of schools in the district, the 
nwmher of children taught, the number of children 
teo do not attend school, and«the monthly rate of 
compensation to the Teacher,
Ms statwent of the described nature accompanied the warrant, 
and for this reason also the treasurer refused to payv The 
court desiganted the statement as not being an adjunct so 
SCeCdsary to the warrant that payment could not be made with­
out it.
Ihrther, the treasurer accused the teacher of exact­
ing from the parents extra compensation of one dollar per 
month per pupil. Since this complaint was not properly brought 
interested parties, the court held that it did not consti­
tute a defense to payment of the salary. It was pointed out, 
hcwever, that such action by the teacher furnished good grounds 
for complaint to the directors.
Protection from garnishment. The salary of a teacher 
in the public schools is exempt from seizure to satisfy a 
judgment. Section 1 of Act Ko. 166 of 1908 has been inter­
preted to fix the status of a teacher in the public schools 
as an officer| thereupon the salary of this individual is held 
exmspt from garnishment.^®® In 1989 the court of appeal was 
called upon to decide if public school funds set aside to pey 
teachers' salaries may be legally garnisheed by a teacher's
184
Acts of Louisiana, 1855, Ko. 381, sec. 11.
^®Fifth Avenue Library Society v. Miss Hortense Kilshaw, 
(1910) 7 Orl. App. 496.
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creditor teile said funds are in the possession of the board.
In rendering the deeision, which protected the teacher's salary 
from garnishment and allowed the hoard to resist successfully 
any action against salaries, it was shown that such decision 
is in keeping with the view held in other oases^®? which have 
maintained that as a matter of public policy it is generally 
held that salaries of public officials are exempt from 
garnishment.
Pertaining to teachers proper and not to officials 
in general, the court gave as the final besis for its decision 
an explanation made by the supreme court of Utah and stated 
that it included the reasons generally assigned for holding 
Wmchers' salaries exmnpt from seizure under garnishment 
process. The rather lengthy excerpt was as follows:
"But there is another reason why the con­
tention of counsel cannot avail the appellant. In 
the case at bar the defendant Watters was a teacher 
in one of the public schools In the city of Ogden, 
regularly employed by the board of education, which 
board was created by authority of the legislature 
for the benefit of the public. Thus employed, he 
was a public servant, receiving a stipulated salary; 
and no portion of such salary, so long as the money 
remained in the hands of the board, was subject to 
the process of garnishment. There is perhaps no 
class of persons more intimately connected with the 
welfare of the municipality than the teachers in the 
public schools. Their labors are of interest to the 
entire body of the people. As a general rule they 
belong to that class of persons who depend upon their 
salaries for the support of themselves and families. 
As a class, they are honorable, industrious public 
servants, and are generally poorly paid. If their 
wages Intended for the support of those dependent
^®*Bank of Winnfield v* Brumfield et al., (1929) 11 La. App. 
647, 124 So. 628.
^?Fischer v. Dubroca, (1927) 163 La. 292, 111 So. 710; Dunbar 
V. Binkgravc et al., (1655) 10 La. Ann. 545; Fifth Avenue 
library Society v. Miss Sortense Kilshaw, (1910) 7 Orl. App* 496,
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upon them were s u b t o  the process of garnishment, 
the public might be deprived of their services at any 
time I end suffer greet inconvenience because of inter­
ruptions in the ménagement of the schools which would 
thus occur. The children of the country cannot be 
educated without competent teachers, end those 
teachers, usually devoting their whole time to their 
vocation, must have the necessaries of life; and 
their salaries ough^ not to be subject to process 
which will tie them up, in the hands of a board of 
education, for an indefinite length of time, in dis­
regard of the public interest. The territory has 
undertaken te establish, at great expense, a system 
of public schools, and it cannot allow the wages of 
the teachers to be intercepted, at the risk of the 
efficiency of the system being thereby impaired."1*®
Prescriptive periods of collection, in a case in 
1933 the basis claimed for refusal to pay a teacher's salary 
was prescription of one and two y e a r s . T h e  court found 
so two-year prescription applicable to salaries of school 
teachers. The one-year prescription was pleaded on the 
ground that actions of masters and instructors in the arts 
and sciences for lessons by the month are prescribed by one 
year. The court's reply was;
The fact that the employment in the present 
case was for a term of eight months end not by the 
month makes the one-year prescription inapplicable, 
and relieves us of the unpleasant necessity of decid­
ing whether or not a grade sohool teacher is a master 
and instructor in the arts and sciences.
91th respect to three-year prescription applicable to actions
for salaries of certain employees, among whom are teachers of
^*®Bank of Winnfield v. Brumfield et al., (1989) (La. Crt. 
of App.) 124 So. 330-631.
^®®Hughes V. Grant parish school Board, (1933) (La. Crt. of 
App.) 143 So. 794.
5. 7*6.
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te# #elen##m who glv# lemsona by the year or quarter, and eon- 
emmteg te# disposition of tee preseription plea, the oourt 
stated:
tee three-year preeeriptlon, not having 
been pleaded and not having aocnaed, need not be 
eensldered* tea plea of preseription was properly 
overmled.^^
Removal
Only legal method justified. The law^®* governing 
tee reroval of teachers states that upon the basis of a proper 
hearing a teacher is subject to be discharged for incompetence, 
inefficiency, or unworthiness. Under the law the school board 
is the final authority in completing the process of employing 
teachers, but when once a contract is duly executed the board 
has no right to remove a teacher without c a u s e . S i n c e  the 
causes for dismissal are named In the statute, the court has 
held that no other cause is sufficient except one recognized 
by law as avoiding all c o n t r a c t s . T h e s e  standard© for dis­
charge were maintained in answer to a sohool board's contention 
that the words, "unless sooner discharged," included in the 
contract made the contract terminable at their will and thereby 
gave them authority to discharge the teacher at any time. The 
court explained that the contract was in no way enlarged by the
I00A«tfl of Loaialftna, 1922, Ro« 100, seo. 48*
T« St. Bernard Parish Sohool Board, (1930) 14 La. 
App, 460, 181 So. 760.
^^^ fBkghes T. Grant Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La. Ort. of 
App.) 148 So. 794.
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additional words, for they were not equivalent to specifying 
eteer than legal grounds for discharge*^®®
OoMlMtaft FU9Hi£ia& payment of .salary . In 1924 
the oourt of appeal^®® was oalled upon to decide whether a 
teacher rmeoved from her teaching position during the scholas­
tic year without cause was entitled to the balance of her 
contracted salary. It seems that the teacher in question had 
been duly wployed, under Act No. 120 of 1916, as principal 
in the colored school of Verretville and that after having 
tau^t for a short while at said school she was ordered by the 
boMPd to discontinue her services* Since the facts revealed 
that the teacher had been removed without any legal cause 
whatsoever# the court decreed judgment in her favor for the 
year's salary as agreed to in the contract*
A similar principle was Involved in the Sessions case 
of 1954.^^ In this controversy the plaintiff, whose teaching 
service was discontinued because of the scarcity of funds, 
entered suit against the school board for the balance of her 
contracted salary. In approving of her right to collect said 
salary for the school year with interest from date of Judicial 
demand, the court held that the discretionary powers of the 
school board did not imply the right to discharge a teacher 
under contract merely because of lack of funds but only under
I00IMd.
^^Fieou et al. t . St. Bernard Parish Sohool Board, (1924) 
(La. Ort* of App*) 132 So. 130.
lS?SessicaiB v* Livingston Parish Sohool Board, (1934) (La. 
Crt. of App.) 153 So. 484.
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te# eonditiOB# a# provided^®® by statut©— that before the
teaeher was employed there should have been determined the
#mteer of teachers to be used.
lae
In 1933 the oourt was confronted with the question
ef tee amount of salary that a teacher could demand when
employed W  the monte# the teacher Involved had been employed
by the monte îàr tee session of 1931-1938, but the board re-
seinded Its action employing her and notified her to that
effect four days before tee opening of tee school term, the
district court had awarded tee teacher one month's salary. In
affirming this ju%ment the court of appeal said:
Her payment having been stipulated at so much, and 
the employment being by the month, her compensation 
became payable by the m)nth, telch was the period 
fixed, and it cannot be construed into a question 
of monthly payments for a longer period, from the 
testimony admitted by the lower oourt to show the 
reason which actuated the school board in rescinding 
her appointment, it would appear to us that Miss 
Oupit was dealt with a bit harshly, but still under 
the nature of her employment, which was by the 
month, the board had the right to dispense with her 
services without any cause, at the end of any month, 
tee presented herself at the Pickering High School 
to which she had been assigned, on the opening day 
of the term in September, 1931, end offered her 
services teieh were refused. She had relied on being 
ex^loyed there, and had not attempted to secure 
another position. The district judge held that she 
was entitled, therefore, to recover the salary due 
for that month, end aceordingly^rendered Judgment in 
her favor for the sum of
^®®Acts of Louisiana, 1988, Ho. 100, seo. 48.
^®6upit V. Vernon Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La. Ort. of 
App.) 145 So. 391.
p. S9S.
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In the same year the g our t of appeal rendered judg- 
WÊmt for a teacher who had a written oontraot to recover the 
remainder of a session's salary. The hoard contended that the 
j^visiom, "for a teym of el#t months, unless sooner dis­
charged, at #60.00 per month of actual employment payable 
monthly," placed responsibility for them to pey the teacher 
tely teen she was actually teaching, but the court held that 
the tern "actual mployment" as used meant legal employment, 
and that since she had been dismissed without cause, she was 
entitled to recover her salary with legal interest from time 
ef her discharge for the unexpired term of legal employment
Oheamed salary matured by dismissal without cause «
It has been shown that under certain conditions a teacher's 
contract may be nullified and the teacher be removed without 
the board's having to pay the balance of the contracted obli­
gation; in other oases where teachers were removed without 
cause, the salaries were collectable for the duration of the 
oontraot or for the unexpired term, teether any teaching had 
or had not been done. Also, the question has arisen as to what 
effect the discharge of a teacher has on that part of the 
salary not earned prior to dismissal. The oourt of appeal was 
confronted with this question in the Hughes case;^^® it was 
held teat the discharge of the teacher without cause matured
^®^Kughes V. Grant Parish Sohool Board, (1933) (La. Crt. of 
A]^.) 146 So. 794.
S08
ter unpaid salary fine her— that she was entitled to recover 
at date of diseharge the entire salary, as if she had taught 
the sehool as per contract#
Certificates of Indebtedness
Certificates of indebtedness issued to teachers for 
their services in the public schools of New Orleans during 
approximately the last quarter of the nineteenth century seem 
to have gone fairly well into circulation as commercial paper# 
Attempts by the holders to liquidate these certificates were 
the bases of several litigations, some of which were of long 
duration and carried through not only the state supreme court 
but also tee Federal District end the United States Supreme 
teurt# The judicial judgments rendered established various 
characteristics, methods of liquidation, identification require* 
msnts, and protective rights,
Henresnonsibilitr of the citv for liquidation. The 
certificates were not liabilities of the city of New Orleans ; 
the whole system of public schools during that period was 
decidedly a state institution— a natural result of the central­
ising policies of Reconstruction,
Bonds issued for the purpose of liquidating the in­
debtedness of the city were adjudged as not a source of liqui­
dation of the certificates for the years 1674, 1675, and 1676;
^Caroline Labatt v, City of New Orleans, (1866) 38 la, Ann. 
233; Mrs# M# M# Fisher and Husband v. Board of Directors of 
dity Schools of New Orleans et al., (1892) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 
So, 494.
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im fact* the etatute^^ which attempted to place the unpaid 
salarie# of teachers subsequent to 1878 and prior to January 
Xi 1880, with the indebtedness to be secured by the issuance 
of city bonds was declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , ^45 According to 
a lower court decision confirmed by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, the board of liquidation of the city 
was not permitted to issue city bonds for the amount of the 
certificates for which the holders had obtained judgment 
against the sehool b o a r d . 1^6 Also, a claim to have the certif- 
isates redeemed out of the surplus bond fund levied under Aot 
Ho. 186 of 1894 m s  denied and the act itself, which attempted 
to divert from its created purpose the tax of one-half of one 
per cent for the support and maintenance of the Hew Orleans 
schools, was declared unconstitutional.^^?
With respect to the payment of teachers for services 
rwdered in 1882, 1683, and 1864, the city seems to have 
accepted more responsibility. Acting under and by virtue of 
the provisions of articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Constitu­
tion of 1696, the city council assumed payment of the teachers 
for these years and through the city comptroller issued 
certificates of indebtedness for this purpose to the amount
3^ 44A@te of Louisiana, 1880, Ho. 74, see. 3*
lA8o^Q2j[^jj0 Labatt v. City of Hew Orleans, (1886) 38 La.
Ann, 283.
^®®%ited States ex rel. Fisher et al. v. Board of Liquida­
tion of City Debt of Hew Orleans, (1094) (Oir. Ct. of App.) 60 
Fed. 367.
147||jps^  M. M« Fisher v* Board of Sohool Directors, (1896) 48 
La. Ann. 1077, 20 So. 163; United States ex rel. Fisher v. Board 
of Liquidation of City Debt, (1696) (Oir. Ot. of App.) 75 Fed. 
343.
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«t 938*53* Aeoordlng to organic provision, the funds 
mwemasW to pay thaaa claims were to be secured through the 
sale of a suffieiemt number of the constitutional bonds based 
on a tax of one per cent provided for by "Aot Ho* 110 of the 
@eamMtl Assembly for the year 1890, and by the amendment to 
the Constitution of the state submitted to the people by said 
act ate adopted at the general election in 1898**148 when 
such certificates were presented for payment, the city board 
ef liquidation refused to remit the respective amounts on the 
ground that the sale of bonds for this purpose violated the 
obligations of contracts; thereupon the soundness of this plan 
was brought to the courts for test,149 Again the court said 
that these certificates did not represent debts of the city 
and explained; "The effect of the adoption of that amendment 
was not to constitute those claims ipso facto debts of the 
city* The city only became committed to payment of the same 
by its subsequent voluntary act,"!®® !Phe board of liquidation 
was ordered to pay the sums requested by the city council with 
the provision that the teachers' claims be held subordinate to 
the claims of creditors vested with contract rights at the
151
date of the adoption of the Constitution of 1898# In 1905,
14®Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 317*
14Dstate ex rel. Wilder et al, v* Board of Liquidation of 
City Debt et al,, (1699) 51 La, Ann, 1849, 86 So, 679,
150'Ibid,. 51 La, Aim, 1867,
l®lstate ex rel. Wilder at al, v. Board of Liquidation of 
City Debt, (1905) 119 La* 471, 39 So, 448,
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similar alalma ware presented for the year® 1885, 1886, and 
iiSf* %  that time the #10,000,000 of bonds provided for in 
let Me# 110 of 1890 had been issued in full, and the plain- 
tiff#* request was that the need be met by a sal© of bonds 
drawn against the surplus of the one per cent tax* In response 
the court showed where the constitution^®® had specially ded- 
ieated this surplus and thereby indicated that the redemption 
ef sush eertifieates was to come from the sale of a particular 
issue of bonds. The creditors in the instant case were told 
ttet their remedy would have to be legislative and not Judicial, 
for the court was not empowered to order the city to issue and 
sell additional bonds under the circumstances, when the city 
had not agreed to Bake provision for the liquidation of certif­
icates for the particular years#
In a later attempt to secure payment of certificates 
throute the city it was pointed out that in the city council 
was vested the discretionary power to determine the annual 
levy of not less then one-fourth of one per cent necessary to 
provide for the support of the public schools, and that tee 
courts would not compel the city council to levy a special tax 
to liteidate a judgment previously granted for an alleged 
indebtedness against the sohool board of the city#^®®
^®%enstitution of Louisiana, 1898, arts# 254, 513-314#
^®%tate ex rel# Fisher et al, v. Mayor, etc., of City of Hew 
Orleans, (1908) 181 La# 768, 46 So, 798; John B, Fisher, James 
H# Fisher, William G, Fieher, et al,, Plaintiffs In Error, v. 
foyer and Oouneil of City of Hew Orleans, (1910) 818 tJ, S. 438, 
81 S# C# 57, 54 X# Hd# 1090.
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RwiaonalliiAlteP M  %M Ward of aobool airgotora for 
ilimiâfttlte. The holders of the eertifioatea were exclusively 
#p#ditora of the New Orleans Board of Directors of the Public 
Uhools by wh<m the certificates were issued; therefore, claims 
few the years 1072 to 1B79, inclusive, could be presented only 
against the uncollected taxes representing the appropriations 
ef the respective years of the issues. The ext mat of the 
citera responsibility was the collection by its treasurer, who 
was also «  officio treasurer of the school board, and the 
proper distribution of the amounts r e c e i v e d *!®4 Consequently, 
JadgsoBta were granted against the school board but not against 
tee city for the amounts of valid certificates teen the claims 
ted been properly presented, the judgments to be paid only 
teas sufficient amounts had been collected.!®® In one of the 
attention was oalled to the statute!®® which made school 
eertifieates previously issued receivable for any taxes due 
^ior to 1879 and to the fact that this had the effect of creat­
ing one fute for liquidating school indebtedness prior to 1879.^®?
"^Caroline Labatt v. City of New Orleans, (1886) 3$ La. Ann. 
9; Mte* M. M# Fisher and Husband v, Board of Directors of City 
S^ols of New Orleans et al., (1698) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 So. 
494: F. J. Oasquet v. Board of Directors of City Schools, (1695) 
te La. Ann. 348, 18 So. 306.
^®Mfs. M. M. Fisher and Husband v. Board of Directors of City 
Steoola of Hew Orleans et al., (1898) 44 La* Aim. 184, 10 So* 
494; F. J. Oasquet v. Board of Directors of City Schools, (1893) 
te La. Ann. 348, 18 So. 306; Mrs. M* M, Fisher v. Board of 
Sehool Directors, (1696 ) 48 La. Ann. 1077, 20 Bo* 163.
^®Aots of Louisiana, 1380, No. 49, seo. 1.
^?tes. M. M. Fisher and Husband v, Board of Directors of City 
Sehools of New Orleans et al., (1698 ) 44 La. Ann. 184, 10 Bo, 
494.
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When the verioue eertlfieate holders who had been
granted judgments for the amounts of their claims attempted
to eolleot, a Judleial accounting of the amount which the city
was dhe the school board from taxes collected for 1871 to 1679,
both inclusive, was occasioned# The chief point at issue was
the city's refusal to include in the amount due the school
beard the funds derived fr<m the penalties of delinquency#
This controversy was appealed from the circuit court to the
united States Oiycuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit!®®
and was called by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
ISCthe United States» In the various decisions it was held 
teat the interest as penalty was an accessory of the principal 
and belonged to tee same authority as the principal; tee amount 
thus found to be due the school board by the city was #71,938#78# 
In addition, the city was ordered to pay five per cent Interest 
an the majority of that amount from judicial demand until paid 
and on the remainder from the time it was collected— subsequent 
to the filing of the suit— until paid»
A change in the status of certificates of indebted­
ness as a responsibility of tee Orleans Parish School Board 
seems to have been accomplished by legislative enactment in 
1918 through the provisions:
^®®City of Hew Orleans v# Fisher et al,, (1899) (Oir# Ct, of 
App.) 91 Fed. 374.
^®®City of Hew Orleans, Petitioner, v. John Fisher, Tutor, 
etc., et al., (1901) 180 U, S. 183, 81 S, 0# 347, 45 L, Ed. 485.
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. , * la the parish of Orleahs the budget of expend*
Itures shall not exceed (93 per cent) nlnety*flve 
per sent of said budget of revenues; * * •
Be It further enacted^ etc.# That In the 
Barish of Orleans at the end of the year after pay­
ment of all the Indebtedness budgeted, the school 
board shall apply said surplus of (5^ / five per 
cent to any Indebtedness of previous years reduced 
to final judgments liquidating and fixing the 
amount of indebtedness# whether the judgments be._. 
absolute or limited to the revenues of any year.l&O
With referenee to this statute the court has said*
Whatever may have been the status of 
these school certificates under the statutes and 
jurisprudence prior to the year 1912# it seems 
clear that a radical change was produced therein 
by the enactment of Act No, 214 of that year.
Section 68# paragraph (b) of the act plainly gave 
(or recognised) a cause of action on such certif* 
ieates before the funds might be collected * .
Similar statutory provision in 1916 merely reduced the percent* 
age to be applied for this purpose,
Regulations pertaining to endorsements and prescrip­
tion, When certificates of indebtedness were endorsed they 
often passed from one person to another as marketable securities 
and both the state and the city followed the policy of recog­
nizing the holder of a certificate as the one entitled to 
collect therefor, without any particular proof of the genuine­
ness of the endorsement. The custom of the city and state not 
to pay without the production of the certificates was a protec­
tion against double demands. The courts have taken a different 
attitude and have demanded that there be proof of the assignment
^^®Aets of Louisiana# 1912# No. 214, sec. 68.
161|iiftytinez V. Orleans Parish School Board# (1924) 155 La. 118,
l^^Acts of Louisiana# 1916# No. 120# sec. 56; Martinez v. 
Orleans Parish School Board, (1924) 155 La. 116# 98 So. 860,
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or endorsement of oertlfio&tee of indebtedness In the récog­
nition of a claim or in liquidation through judicial d e m a n d . Ï&& 
At times the defendant school board has pleaded pre­
scription as a reason for nonpayment. When in 1893 it was held 
that the certificates for 1892 to 1879# inclusive# were payable 
only out of the revenues of the years for which they were issued# 
the school board was refused protection through prescription# 
since it was not shown that there had been at any particular 
time funds in the school board treasury applicable to the pay- 
m&Bt of such claims.^** In the second appeal of the Martinez 
caae^*® the former decision^®® pertaining to prescriptive rights 
was held to be the law of the latter case. The plaintiff in 
1924 sought liquidation of certificates issued in 1874# 1675# 
mad 1876; the basis of his claim was the provisions of the con­
trolling legislative act of 1912.1** The défendant board 
pleaded prescription of tm years# but the court explained that 
the plaintiff's right of action did not arise until the adoption 
of the act of 1912 and held that since the suit was brought 
within ten years after the passage of the act# prescription 
would not hold to prevent the plaintiff's presentation of his 
claim.
J. Gasquet V# Board of Directors of City Schools# (1895) 
45 la. Ann. 342, 12 Bo. 506s Martinez v, Orleans Parish School 
Board# (1981) 173 la. 114# 136 So. 267.
lC4y^ J, Gaaquet v. Board of Directors of City Schools# (1893) 
45 la. Ann. 342# 12 So. 506.
^**Martinez v. Orleans Parish School Board# (1951) 173 la#
114# 136 So. 287.
^^®Martinez v. Orleans Parish School Board# (1924) 155 la.
116# 96 So. 860.
l**Acts of louieiana# 1912, Ho. 214# sec. 68.
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Professional agencies of control in the publie sehool 
system of the state have been presented in two main groups* 
the superintendents— state# division, and parish— and the 
teachers#
Superintendent a
The superintendents seem to have served as a connect­
ing link between the nonprofessional agencies of control, 
state and puish, and the schools proper# The chief policies 
pertaining to them in their capacity of professional agencies 
appear to be the following:
1. The state superintendent of public education as 
an agency of control originated through the secretary of state*: 
office in 1633 when the holder of that office was charged with 
the direction of the public schools of the state#
8* The Constitution of 1643 provided for the appoint­
ment by the governor of a state superintendent of public edu­
cation with such powers and duties as the legislature might 
prescribe; this authorization was enacted in the general edu­
cation law of 1847#
3# Apparently the state reluctantly accepted central­
ized supervision, for in the constitutional conventions until 
near the close of the nineteenth century many efforts were 
made to abolish, or restrict the powers of, the state superin­
tendent.
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Since approximately the beginning of the preaent 
eemtnry the theory of state control of education seems to have 
Wen well adopted and with it the state superintendent has 
been accepted as the chief agent. Since 1852 this officer has 
been elective by the people.
5. It seems significant that the state superintendent, 
clothed with his many vested powers, has functioned for more 
than a century with only very little interference from the 
Judiciary.
6. As a ministerial officer of the state the superin­
tendent has a standing in court only through the state's 
attorneys #
7. The division superintendent of public education 
functioned in a supervisory capacity, but since this office 
was a product of Reconstruction, it passed with that period.
8. The parish superintendent of schools became a part 
of the controlling force of public education in 1847 but appar­
ently the state was not ready for this form of professionalized 
supervision of its schools, for the office was abolished in 
1652 and did not appear again in any form until 1877, at which 
time the parish board was directed to select a secretary which 
officer in 1682 assumed through statutory authorization the 
duties of parish superintendency.
9. One indication that the populace was reticent to 
accept professionalized supervision of public schools was the 
meager salary of parish superintendents until after the begin­
ning of the present eentury.
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10# Biaee the perish superintendent Is a product of 
the peri^ eehool heard, he is expeoted to earry out its 
polieies in oooperation with the state hoard of eduoation#
11. The parish superintendent is legally and generally 
eeeepted as an integral part of the supervisory program of 
publie eduoation, but his status has not been that of a publie 
officer since the Constitution of 1921 removed the requirement 
that he be an elector of the parish in which he serves#
12# It has been establit^d that the parish superin­
tendent must be selected by viva yooe vote of the parish board 
and that his election must be for four years, but the board 
has been granted discretionary power in fixing the salary of 
this employee#
12# The official acts of ^  facto parish superinten­
dents are legally sound#
14# The parish superintendent may be removed only on 
the established charge of incompetency, inefficiency, or 
unworthiness#
Teachers
Public school teachers are accepted as the chief 
professional agency through which the educational policies of 
the state are finally carried out# The dominant principles 
which have directed the work of the teachers appear to be the 
following;
1# Certification of the eligibility of teachers was 
early recognized as a necessity# This feature was locally
3X9
controlled until the present century since which time the state 
bemrd of educetion has been clothed with complete authority.
2# The en^ ployment of teachers is discretionary with 
the parish school board after nominations have been made by
^ e  parish superintendent, and teachers are subject to the con­
trol of their employing boards.
2* Indefinite duration of contracts has been disap­
proved, although recent legislation for such special provision 
in New Orleans has been endorsed by the attorney general*
4. The teacher's contract is an essential feature 
for both the employee and the employer* Employment by the month 
may be through verbal contract, but a valid contract for a year 
or more must be in writing. Â reasonable length of time for
acceptance must be granted the teacher.
5# Rarely have the courts consented to the nullity 
of contracts and then only upon the establishment of good reasons 
therefor.
6. Specification of the amount of salary is generally 
included in the contract between the teacher and the employing 
board, but if no salary is mentioned In the contract, the 
teacher may secure remuneration through the method of evalua­
tion of services by quantum meruit. Since a recent date boards 
are required to fix salaries on an equal basis schedule for 
both men and women.
7. Warrants for teaching service are drawn by the 
school directors on the parish treasurer and said official must 
honor these warrants whether the issuing board be ^  facto or 
d£ jure.
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6 « The salary of a teacher is not subject to garnish- 
meat by the teacher's creditors while the funds are in the 
possession of the school board*
9. Attempts to prevent the collection of teachers* 
ssleries on the basis of prescription seem to have been unsuc­
cessful*
10* The state's policy has been that of reluctance 
in removing teachers under contract* Where removal has become 
necessary, it has been legally executed only after proper 
hearing, and the causes as specified by statute have been held 
restrictive.
11* The policy which requires payment of the contracted 
salary, whether earned or unearned, when a teacher has been 
dismissed without cause has been consistently upheld. This 
principle refers to a sesslOn+s or a month's salary, according 
to employment by the session or the month.
IE. In the comparatively large number of suits seeking 
liquidation of the certificates of indebtedness issued to New 
Orleans teachers during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, several principles pertaining to the certificates, 
which had become practically commercial paper, were established 
as follows: (a) they were not responsibilities of the city,
and payment could be expected of the city only through its 
voluntary act; (b) they were responsibilities of the board of 
school directors issuing them, were payable out of the taxes 
of the respective years of issuance only, and were receivable 
for the payment of taxes of specified dates; (o) by 1912
sax
legislative enaotment ohanged the status by providing a speci­
fied surplus for the liquidation of certificates of any dates 
reduced to final judgments; (d) legal transactions with certif­
icates required authentic endorsements; and (e) prescriptive 
claims must date to the time that funds were actually available 
or i^en satisfactory provision for liquidation was made*
GBAfTSH IX
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CHAPTER IX 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND PROPERTY
Since the state hae a right to establish, maintain 
and control a system of public schools, it has by implication, 
as a means of administration thereof, the right to organize 
the state into districts which may act as bodies politic to 
deal with such problems as the building program and its main­
tenance, the supervision of school property, and the direction 
of other educational functions of the state system.^ The pur­
pose of this chapter is to determine the Louisiana law vdiich 
deals with the organization of school districts and the con­
trol of the school property therein. An attempt is made to 
^ow how court decisions and legal opinion on constitutional 
and statutory provisions have influenced the shaping of the 
policies ediich have been pursued by those in charge of school 
districts and the property used for school purposes.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Constitutional provisions pertaining to school dis­
tricts were chiefly implied. In the Convention of 1652 one 
of the substitutes offered for the majority report of the
committee on public education included:
Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public School 
a State Institution (Blobiington,192877 PP*a s __________________
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The Legislature ahall provide for a 
eyetwR of Conmon Schools, by vdiieh a school shall 
be kept up and supported in each District, at least 
three months in every year; and any School District 
neglecting to keep up such a school, may be deprived 
of its proportion of the interest in the school 
fend during such neglect.&
In the constitution adopted by the delegates to this convention 
the parish was recognized as a school district by the provision 
that the school funds were to be distributed "to each Parish 
in proportion to the number of free white children between 
such ages as shall be fixed by the General Assembly."^
A desire by taxpayers for more autonomous privileges 
was evidenced in the petitions presented to the Constitutional 
Oenvention of 1898; one petition which bore fourteen signatures 
reeosmended "That the Constitution should provide more latitude 
for local taxation for school purposes, and that each parish, 
ward, and mmicipality should be allowed to tax itself for 
such purpose#"^ In this convention an unsuccessful attempt 
was made to "provide for the creation of boards for school 
districts in the several parishes,"* However, in the final 
draft of the constitution, the general assembly was authorized 
to provide for the creation of "Parish Boards of Public Educa­
tion,"* and it was directed that the funds derived from the
o
Journal of the Convention to Form a New Constitution 
for the state of houiaiana. l8*5S. p, 847
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1852, art. 156.
^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention of the États oFTouisiana. 18*9§T p. 40,
%>id.. p. 290,
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1898* art, 250.
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eellectlem of the poll tax in each parish be paid to the local 
oAool board for aahool purposes,^ Also, in the provisions 
for bond iamm# and apeoial taxes, the school district was 
raoogniped,®
ikom the foregoing it may be seen that the consti­
tutions of the state have been silent, except hy implication, 
with regard to the school district. Consequently, its anthori* 
nation is based on the theory of law whereby a state legisla­
ture nay enact any measure which violates neither the state 
nor the federal Constitution,* and to the statutory acts and 
their interpretations by the courts one must look for the law 
pertaiming to school districts.
Nature and Purpose
Various studies involving the nature of the school 
district have determined it to be a quasi corporation,^* In 
a treatment of public school eaipend!tares, Joakim f, Weltzin 
eweluded with respect to the nature of the public school 
district:
Public corporations may be divided into three 
groups, quasi-public, municipal and quasi corpora­
tions, School districts and school boards belong 
in the last group. The statutes of many states ex­
pressly make the school districts and boards bodies
'ibid.. art. 852.
®Ibld.. art. 281.
*Balph Takel, The legal Control of the Administration ^  
3^ 1 i e  3cteol Expeiwturcs (Hew York, lol#), p, 10,
^%evton Sdwards. The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago, 
1933), p, 54, ------
326
cwperate: othara maraly Infer that oharaeter,
Judlalal axpraasioB with practical universality 
tarm the aahoal district and hoard a quasi corpo­
ration, which means that they are not complete 
aarporations tat are bodies granted corporate 
eharaetar for the limited purpose of their crea- 
tita aaiy.^
As generally considered the school district 1# the "intrusted 
agent of the state,"1% formed for the purpose of maintaining 
public schools • Its corporate power extends only to such 
matters as are necessary to assure the fulfillment of its 
created purpose.^*
lenisiana's theory of the purpose of the district 
was explained in the following reply to a complaint that the 
resolution creating a certain district did not state the pur- 
peee thereof:
As a matter of law, and of common experi­
ence, it is well known that school districts are 
created for the purpose of levying special taxes, 
and of incurring debt and issuing bonds for the 
various school purposes enumerated in the Consti­
tution of the state. Const, 1913, arts. 832. 281;
Const. 1981, Sec, 10, art, 10, sections 14(e) and 
14(b), art, 14; Act 46 of 1981 (Ex. Sees,} Sec. 8.^*
Also, it was maintained In this ease that, since the
governing statute^* placed no limitation concerning purpose
^Joakim f, Weltzin, The Legal Authority of the American 
Public School (Grand forËs, 1930), p. 29.
^Rpcd Engelhardt, Public School Organization and Adminis­
tration (Boston, 1931)7^p. 88*
^^ H^arvey C* Voorhees, The Law of the Public School System 
of the taited States (Boeicm,"TSieT, p. sST
^*Gauthier et al. v. Parish School Board of Parish of 
AveyeUes, (1988) 165 La, 860,
^Aots of Louisiana, 1980, Ho. 158.
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and did not require a statement of the purpose in the résolu- 
ticm of creation, an established dietrlot muet he recognized 
ae having been created for all purposes enumerated by the 
constitution •
Establishment
In carrying out Louisiana's program of public educa­
tion the state has provided, mainly through statutory enactments, 
for the incorporation of school districts in order that the 
people residing therein may, as an associated body, establish 
and maintain free public schools as authorized by the law,
Parish school board's discretionary nowe^ rs. For many 
years the incorporation of school districts has been one of 
the discretionary powers entrusted to the perish school boards 
of the state.
An illustration of this power concerning districts 
is shown in the Burnham case;l? therein the authorization of a 
special levy was attacked on the ground that the school board 
was without power to create the district in which the tax was 
levied until the parish had been divided into districts, Plain­
tiffs based their contention on the statutory provision;
That it shall be the duty of the parish 
board with the parish superintendent to divide the 
parish into school districts of such proper and 
convenient area and shape as will best accommodate 
the children of the parish. The parish board shall, 
as soon as practicable, proceed to the work im­
^*Oauthier et al, v. Pariah School Board of Parish of 
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La, 256, 115 So, 479,
^*Bamham et al, v. Police Jury of Glaiborne Parish, 
(1902) 107 La, 913, 32 So, 87.
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posed upon thorn, and upon completing this work, 
they shall make a report to the parish superinten­
dent, whieh report shall eontain the boundary and 
deseription of the said distriot designated by 
number* The parish superintendent shall record 
the same in a well bound book, kept by him for the 
tarpose, taieh book shall be held by said parish 
superintendent and be at all times open to inspec­
tion, The parish board, if they deem it to the 
best interests of the schools, may divide the 
parish into districts without reference to the 
wards in the parish.^®
It appears that the way in which the school board of Olalbome 
Pariah complied with this law was to pass a resolution each 
year designating the schools by wards and authorizing the 
apportionment of funds accordingly. The court held this to 
be sufficient compliance, if only the distribution of funds 
was concerned, but labelled the method as extremely informal 
and slipshod, Bince those tao brought this suit were not 
interested parties, the court gave no heed to them, but indi­
cated its philosophy concerning the creation of the district 
thus:
It will be time enough to consider the question 
taen the parents or guardians of the excluded 
children complain, though we surmise It will then 
probably be found that the matter of fixing the 
limits of school districts has been confided by 
the statute to the school boards, and that the 
discretion thus confided cannot be controlled by
the courts,At
This principle is maintained also in the Drouin 
case** in which an attack was made on the action of the school 
board in carving one district out of another. The authority
^Acts of Louisiana, 1806, No, 81, sec. 11. 
leBnrnhasi et al, v. Polie, Jiiry of Claiborne Parish, (1902)
107 la. 516.
*®Droula
Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 398, 67 So. 191.
aô in et al. v , Board of Directors of Public Schools of
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md#r itaich the board aeted was the 1912 statute whleh states: 
"It shall be the duty of the parish board with the parish 
•aperintendent to divide the parish into school districts of 
saeh propw and convenient area and shape as will beet acooimo- 
date the children of the Parish."*^ Before rendering final 
Jurisdiction the court reviewed its policy of recognizing 
abhool boards as quasi corporations and of interpreting broadly 
taeir power in advancing the educational welfare of their re­
spective districts.** This policy was further upheld in the 
ease at bar as follows:
And this power to create districts includes the 
power to create new districts out of old ones or 
to consolidate two or more districts already 
fmasd, and to repeal the ordinance creating any 
one or sore districts. The discretion vested in 
the parish board in forming school districts can­
not be controlled by the courts, where it is not 
shown that this discretion has been grossly
abused.**
Although the parish board of school director© Is 
conceded as having broad discretionary power in the establish­
ment of school districts, it must recognize enacted prohibitory 
law pertaining to the creation of such districts, By the en­
actment of a law in 1920,*^ the creation of districts which 
were to be overlapping with respect to other created districts, 
composed of parts of the parish, wee prohibited. Ordinances
^^Aets of Louisiana, 1912, No, 214, sec, 15.
^Burnham at al. v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1902) 
107 La. 512, 22 So, 87; Moore v. Board of Directors of Sabine 
Parish, (1912) 151 La, 757, 60 So. 234,
®*Drottin et al, v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of 
Pariah of Avoyelles, (1915) 156 La, 396.
^^Acta of Louisiana, 1980, No, 152, sec, 2,
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Of toe Wian Pmrlah tahool Board purporting to create certain 
districts contrary to this provisicn were declared null and 
void.*®
Again, in 1987, the school hoard's discretion in the 
creation of districts was upheld idien, in answer to charges 
concamlng the condition of roads, the designated limits of 
the district, and the board's proceedings,*® the court said: 
"It would require proof of a gross abuse of discretion to 
Justify a court in interfering with the creation of a school 
distriot . . . The record in this ease does not disclose such 
an abuse.
The school board's use of its power in the creation 
of districts may be questioned by those who have a constituted 
right, but it is the court's policy to place responsibility 
for proof of statement upon those who complain. For example, 
if thwe is the charge of illegal creation of a district, the 
plaintiff must prove his allegation rather than expect the 
school board to prove the legality of its use of power in the 
particular action.**
Thus, it mey be seen that the state's legal inter­
pretations have been consistent in maintaining a very high 
regard for the discretionary power of the parish school
^^inton et al. v, Winn Parish School Board, (1984) 155 
La. 666, 99 So. 583.
86Sylvestre et al. v. St. Landry Parish School Board, 
(193?) 164 la. £04, 115 So. 818.
164 la. 311-313.
^%aiton et al. v. Unco In Parish School Board, (1933) 
153 la. 761, 94 So. 586.
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beard and have nullified the hoards ’ ordinances of creation 
emly when they ware prohibitory of the governing statute.
Creation of iater-nariah districts. Adjudications
eenearning the power to create Inter-parish school districts
eeem to have been sou^t mainly from the attorneys general
of tae state• The policy of the state's legal counsel toward
this question was traeed by one attorney general as follows:
* . • while there was contained in the various 
general educational bills up to the passage of Act 
152 of 1920 a provision to the effect that ad­
joining parishes might, vdien convenience required 
it, lay off school districts composed of portions 
of two adjoining parishes, these provisions had 
always been interpreted by this office as con­
ferring no authority for special school tax elec­
tions and bond issues in such Inter-parlsh school 
districts, but as authorizing the creation of same 
for the purpose of convenient school administration, 
OBly.*®
With reference to the supreme court's having held that the
legislature was authorized to provide for the creation of
school districts, and in endorsing the constitutionality of
the act permitting districts to be composed of parts of two
parishes, he said:
The matter was then, as we see it, one of legis­
lative discretion as to the manner of creating 
school districts, and, exercising that discretion, 
the Legislature provided that school districts 
should be composed of property situated wholly 
within one parish, and later modified Its views 
by the adoption of Act 152 of 1920, which per­
mitted and authorized inter-parish school dis­
tricts.*0
**Oniaions of the Attorney General of Louis3.ana, May 1, 
1922, to May 1, 19&4, p. %94.
p. 898.
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An inter-parlsh distriot may vota a school maintenance tax 
tat the part lying In one pariah may not take this action 
alme#*^
@ia# dietriet. A  eehool distriot may ineluie the 
entire parish, as is shorn in the MoOune ease,®* in which man* 
damns proeeedings were instituted to oanoel a tax levy for 
liquidating bonds on the ground that the school board had no 
authority to inolude the entire parish in a school district, 
Wsm court reasoned:
There is no merit in the contention that 
the school board was without legal authority to 
create one school district embracing the whole 
parish# Act 158 of 1C80, in express terms, confers 
this right, There is no constitutional inhibition 
of this power# The Constitution does not create, 
nor dees it designate, the method of establishing 
school districts.^ The matter is left entirely to 
the LeglslatxoHNr**
It was concluded tant the board was "well within its legal and
constitutional powers in creating the whole pariah into one
school district."*^
Also the board, by authority ^ f Act No, 81 of 1918,
is permitted when it creates a parlsh*wide district to declare
all previously existing districts as subdistricts.®®
*^33^., p. 419.
state vx ral, MOCtma Board of Sohool Dlreotora of 
Pariah of faffarson at a l ( 1 9 B £ )  IBB la. 1008, 95 So. 104.
” lM,d.. IBS la. 1009-1010.
^ M d .. p. 1010.
 ^^  kaiHtsa*. «« 1.
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In another ease*® the size of the distriot was on© 
ef the controlling issues. The school district involved had 
been created out of the territory of the entire parish by the 
school hoard in 1919, under the provisions of Act No. 81 of 
1918* That act was repealed by Act No. 152 of 1920, but in 
the latter act it was provided that the existence of districts 
created under the laws in force at the time of the repeal of 
the act of 1918 was not affected. Further, the court main­
tained; "In fact, it may be said that the Act of 1920 provides 
for the creation of parish-wide sohool districts in the same 
manner and for the same purpose as did the Act of 1918. Sec­
tions 1, 2, and 4 of Act 152 of 1920."*? In answer to the 
plaintiffs* contention that the existence of a parish-wide 
school district created tor taxing purposes is inconsistent 
with section 10 of article 10 of the Constitution of 1921 the 
court explained;
We, however, see no inconsistency between 
section 10 of article 10 of the Constitution and the 
existence of a parish wide school district. The 
section expressly mentions school districts and sub­
school districts as being among the political sub­
divisions authorized to levy taxes under the section, 
and while it does not mention parish wide school 
districts, yet it does not indicate how large or 
small the districts must be, but impliedly leaves 
the size of them to the legislative branch of the 
government.**
*®louisiana & A. Ry. Co. et al. v. Sohool Board of Webster 
Parish et al., (1925) 157 La. 1046, 103 So. 318.
187 La. 1057.
®®lbl4., pp. 1057-1058.
354
S9
Again, in 1928, the court upheld Its policy of 
decreeing that since the constitution did not make any attempt 
at defining the territorial limits of a school district, the 
pwislone therefor were left to the legislature. The pro- 
vislens governing the case at bar were contained in Act No.
198 of 1980. That act gave the parish board power to create 
districts at any time and to use limits set at its discretion 
with a prohibition against overlapping districts. The distriot 
in question had been properly created by resolution, the lines 
had been surveyed, and there was no overlapping on another 
created distriot. The court held the creation legal and again 
maintained that to the legislature was left the duty of making 
specifications emceming the territorial limits of a school 
district.
Regulations concerning boundaries. In the creation 
of districts the location of the boundary lines is a factor 
with which the board has wide discretion, but In its designa­
tion of them there must be no uncertainty, as is shown in the 
following decisions.
When the EaynesviUe School District, Ho. 11, 
Olalbome Parish, was created, the description of its north 
boundary designated the termini and a section line on which 
it was to run# Attack was made that the section line referred 
to was impossible with the termini specified— that quarter- 
seetion line was meant. The court held that the quarter-
®*Gauthier et al. v. Parish Sohool Board of Parish of 
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La. 856, 115 So. 479.
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itetloB line meaning was so evident that the reference to 
section line could impart no ambiguity to the other desorip- 
tiw  given— that the phrase "on the section line" had the 
meaning of "parallel with the section line."^^
% e  creation of district Ho. 50 in the parish of 
AveyeUes was objected to on the ground that one of the 
beesdazy lines was "indefinite, tortuous, end u n f a i r , " * !  
deaee showed only that the boundary was tortuous; witnesses 
had no difficulty in locating it, thereby establishing it as 
not indefinite. With regard to its being unfair, the court 
said:
The crooked boundary complained of is not shown to 
be unfair to the educable children of district No,
50; on the contrary, it is shown that the majority 
of property owners in that district were desirous 
of establishing a high school for the children of 
the distriot, which high school is shown to have 
great advantages over the ordinary graded school; 
and the board, to accommodate the children of the 
parish residing in district No, 50, in providing 
a high school for them, ran the boundary line com­
plained of in such way as to embrace within the 
district the property of those who were desirous 
of taxing themselves for the improved school con- 
diti<ms. The citizens of the state have a right 
to tax themselves for such purpose, and it is the 
duty of the sohool board to establish and create 
school districts and achoolhouses whidi will best 
acetmmodate the children of the parish,**
In the district involved in the Deblieux case** the
^Bomhaa et al* v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, (1908) 
107 La* 513, 38 So* 87.
^Drouin et al. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of 
Parish of Avoyelles, (1915) 136 La. 393, 67 So. 191.
*®Ibid*. 136 La. 399.
*®Peblieux et al. v« Board of School Directors of 
Natchitoches Parish, (1917) 142 La. 147, 76 So, 590.
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boundary was found to be very uncertain. In this district 
#m election for a special tax had been defeated. Thereupon, 
tae eehool board attempted by resolution to define the dis­
trict 80 as to eliminate certain parts of the existing district, 
A surveyor found it impossible to describe upon the official 
parish map the boundary lines specified in the resolution pur­
porting to establish the new district. The court held that 
the distriot was not created according to law, and explained 
the basis of its decision to annul the resolution thus:
Where, as in this case, the resolution 
for the creation of the district is so vague and 
uncertain in its calls that no surveyor can locate 
one of its boundaries, the defect is fundamental, 
as it affects the location and extent of the tax­
ing district.**
Feralssible minor procedures. Among the charges 
brought against the establishment of school districts there 
have been various complaints which the court has considered 
minor but on some of which it has rendered decisions,
A census end an enumeration assessment of an antici­
pated district prior to the election for its creation are not 
necessary If there has been compliance*® with the act which 
provides:
The registrar of voters shall furnish to 
the election commissioners appointed to hold such 
elections a list of the taxpayers entitled to vote, 
together with the valuation of each taxpayer’s prop­
erty, as shown by the assessment roll last made and 
filed prior to such election, • . .*®
14S U .  160.
^Qaxithler ,t al. ▼. Barish Sohool Board of Parish of 
ATOjrsUes, (196$) 166 la. 666, 115 So. 470.
of Louisiana, Bxtra Session, 1961, No. 46, see. 14.
337
Xn mmamr to an attack against the creation of a 
ttatriet on the ground that the resolution was not entitled, 
ta# eowt said:
The contention that the resolution cre­
ating the Sessmer school district No. 6 should 
have a title indicating its object# like a legis­
lative act# is not well founded. The constitutional 
requirement that every law shall have but one ob­
ject# and shall have a title indicative of such 
object applies only to the Legislature, and not 
to police Juries# town councils# or school boards# 
talters V. Duke# Tax Collector# 31 La. Ann. 666; 
Galla^an v* Town of Alexandria# 58 La. Ann# 1013#
87 So. 540; Town of Mansfield v. Herndon, 134 La#
10# 65 So. 606.4?
Since the statute*® which names January 1 as one of 
the legal holidays does not include the transactions of a 
SCheel board among the list of things unlawful to be done on 
that day# an ordinance creating a school district is not 
censidered void mereiy because it was passed on January 1.**
The claim that roads for certain times of the year 
are impassable to the extent that children cannot travel them 
to school will not interfere with the power of the school 
board to create and alter school districts# where evidence 
shows that the time lost to pupils thereby is not sufficient 
to render the board's action gross indiscretion.®® In the 
session under discussion only 6 days out of 178 were lost 
from this cause.
*?Oauthier et al. v. Parish Sohool Board of Parish of 
Avoyelles# (1988) 165 La. 864.
*®Acts of Louisiana# 1986, No. 49# sec. 1.
*%oodard et al* v. Biehvllle Parish Sohool Board, (1930)
169 La# 631# 186 So# 807.
®®Sylvestre at al. v. St. Landry Parish Sohool Board, (1927) 
164 La. 804, 113 So. 816.
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The Governing Authority
Parish school hoard as governing body. It has been 
shown that the court has consistently recognized the power of 
the parish sohool hoard to create districts and that it has 
been hesitant to annul the hoard's action unless there was 
gross abuse of discretion. The extent of the authority which 
a board has over the district it creates was one of the inter­
pretations sought in a suit®^ in 1925# in which the plaintiffs 
questioned the right of the sohool board to call an election 
for voting a special tax levy. In reply the court upheld the 
theory expressed in section 3 of Act Ho, 158 of 1980# as fol­
lows: "The sohool board of a parish is the governing authority
of school districts created by it, end has authority to call 
elections for the submission of propositions to the taxpayers 
to authorize their respective districts to levy taxes under 
eeetion 10 of Article 10 of the Constitution,"®®
In 1928 the court outlined the purpose of the whole 
act pertaining to the creation of school districts to be "to 
provide for the creation of school districts, end for the 
governing authorities of such districts and to define their 
powers# as a necessary incident to the levy of special taxes 
for school purposes."®* Section 3 of the act®* was interpreted
®^uisiana & A, Ry. Go, et al, v. Sohool Board of Webster 
Parish et al., (1925) 157 la. 1046, 103 So. 318.
'^Ibld.. 157 La. 1056.
®*Qauthier et al, v* Parish Sohool Board of Parish of 
Avoyelles, (1928) 165 La. 262-263.
®^Aeta of Louisiana, 1920, No, 152.
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AWllahm#nt and Modification
AWIlahmmt of .dijatriot and change of houndaries.
Since parish school hoards have the rl^t to create school 
districts# it may rcasonahly he cnpèeted that they are em­
powered with the right to aholish or modify the districts of 
their creation. In 191S it was held that these bodies have 
the right to district and redistrict the lands in the parish 
at their discretion, provided there is no abuse of this right.^8 
Eowever# the revision of a district cannot result in the ex- 
peaditnre of fends other than in that district,®^ and it has 
he«a maintained that a district may be abolished or changed 
only after a voted levy or maintenance tax has expired.@0 
Im  1927 the gnestion of the changing of boundaries was brought 
te the courts for interpretation.^^ The school board involved, 
after failure of a tax election in a newly created district, 
had proceeded to abolish said district end create another with 
slichtly changed boundaries. %is action of the board was 
attacked partly on the ground that the ordinance creating the 
new district was Invalid because it attempted to contract the 
limits of the district created by the first ordinance and be-
^^^^^O^ii^ns^of^the Attorney General of Louisiana. June 1,
®*Ibld.i May 1, 1924, to May 1, 1926, p. 461; May 1, 
1988,'Tô-Appil 1, 1934, p. 291.
, May 1, 1928, to Itoy 1, 1924, p. 423; May 1,
l984,^EcTiiay 1, 1926, p. 474.
*4^1v..tr. #t al. T. St. l<andry Pariah School Board,
(1987) 164 La. 804, 113 So. 818.
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famés it «as meraly a schéma to eliminate a part of the tax­
payers Who were opposed to the bond issue. In interpreting 
the governing statute Justice Winston Overton said:
Act 152 of 1920 authorizes parish school 
hoards to create school districts in connection with 
the exercise of the power of special taxation. Since 
a school hoard has such authority# it has# by impli- 
catiou# the power# where circumstances permit, to 
aholish a district created under this authority# 
and since the power expressly granted is a continuing 
one# to create, if it sees proper# another district 
of smaller area# idtich does not include some of the 
territory of the one abolished, or# if it deems best 
and circumstances pemit . to amend an ordinance cre­
ating a district# so as to contract or enlarge its 
boundaries# avoiding# however# the creation of over­
lapping districts,8*
Previous decisions®^ on a similar principle but different 
statutes were cited as bases of this interpretation, The court 
held that since the first district had contracted no indebted­
ness and had refused to sanction the bond issue submitted to 
it# there was no reason for continuing its existence. Also# 
it held that the procedure in abolishing the district was 
legal# and that since the former district was abolished# there 
was no reason that a new district of smaller area should not 
be created for the purpose of ascertaining the will of the 
residmit taxpayers pertaining to the levying of a tax to 
issue bonds for building purposes.
Consolidated and overlapping districts. Several 
statutes pertaining to the modification of school districts by
**Ibld.. 164 La, 210.
^^KSoore V. Board of Directors of Sabine Parish# (1912) 131 
La, 757# 60 So, 254; Drouln et al. v. Board of Directors of 
Public Schools of Parish of Avoyelles# (1915) 136 La. 393# 67 
So, 191.
342
teMOlidatiom have been enacted and their provisions seem to 
have been gaite variant. When litigations involving this phase 
ef wheel dlatrlcta have been brought to the state's legal 
Mttneel tmû the courts# it has been the policy to uphold the 
previsiws of the governing statutes.
In answer to an Inquiry concerning the legality of 
^ e  ereatlcn of coextensive districts, or a district which 
imludes a part of a district already created, it was explained 
that such creation was permissible if the ten-mill limit of 
taxation as provided in article 261 of the Oonstitution of 
ItlS was observed; the governing legislation was traced as 
fellows:
The creation of School Districts was 
authorised by Section 16 of Act 214 of 1902, 
and that same authority is repeated in Section 
13 of Act 214 of 1912. It is only made more 
specific in Act 17 of 1912. The provisions in 
Act 17 of 1912 that these Districts may Issue 
bonds, etc., la merely a repetition of the 
existing law, in Article 281 of the Constitution 
of 1919 and Act 256 of 1910 and amendments. In 
short, the School Board may create School Districts 
and say order elections therein, but it all must 
be done under limitation of Article 281.®*
While Act Bo. 17 of 1914, which did not seem to 
authorize the division of a school district into subdistricts, 
was in force, it was suggested to one board that instead of 
its creating a parish-wide district the police jury might 
levy a parish-wide maintenance tax and thereby prevent what 
might prove a hindrance to creation for taxing purposes
^Opinions of the Attomev General of Louisiana. May 1. 
1916,% % y l ,  l W , T u 4 l 5 7  -----------
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## districts smaller than the parish.®^
Pertaining to Act No. 81 of 1918 the court said that 
Wmpsunder **it was permissible for parish school boards at 
way time to create a school district composed of a part or 
parts of one or more existing school districts, and to estab­
lish even subdistrlcts, i, e.# a district within a district.”®® 
When the next legislative act, No. 152 of 1920, came 
Inte force, the overlapping districts created under the act 
ef 1916 and prior to the passage of the 1920 act remained un­
affected and their existence was recognized. Ordinances 
attempting to create overlapping districts under the pro­
visions of the act of 1920 were declared null and void# since 
such creation was prohibited by section 2 of that statute.®^ 
Some exceptions were provided in this enactment prohibitory 
of overlapping districts; one which was upheld was the creation 
of a district out of a portion of a parish although there was 
in existence a parish-wide districts®^
1922 there seems to have been another change in 
the policy concerning overlapping districts, for the legis­
lature of that year "specially authorized and empowered school 
boards upon their own initiative to merge or consolidate two 
or more school districts into one, . « Since the act
®®ÎSid., May 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. 415.
®®Hinton et al. v. Winn Parish School Board, (1924) 155 In. 678, 
®^Ibid.. 155 La. 666, 99 So. 523.
®®OplnloM of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1924, 
to Mhy 1# l9S6, p. 40?%
®^oodard et al. v. Bienville Parish School Board, (1930)
169 La. 896.
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fVpealtd all law» in oonfllet therewith^® and since the dis­
trict in question was created after the passage of the 1922 
act, attacks to the effect that the enlargement of the district 
would take in a formerly created district were held as of no 
m»m»equwoe.^ ^
Responsihility of debt of districts consolidated.
The consolidation of school districts has often presented the 
question of the disposition of tax levies existent in the 
smaller districts. Opinions handed down have been to the 
effect that such levies must continue during the full time 
for which they were v o t e d . A n o t h e r  opinion endorsed one 
hoard’s solution of the problem through the conduct simul­
taneously of an election to vote a school tax for the entire 
parish— the new district in question— and to determine the 
will of the people on the retention or the abrogation of the 
original district tax.^®
In some instances v^ere the consolidation of a school 
district has been legalized it has become necessary to deter­
mine vdiether the property in the new district may be assessed 
te refund outstanding bonds of one of the original districts. 
in the Consolidated District Bo, 2 of Catahoula Parish, which
70Acts of Louisiana, 1922, Bo. 53.
^^Hoodard et al. v. Bienville Parish School Board, (1930) 
169 La. 831, 126 So. 207,
^^Oninions of the Attorney General of Louisiana î May 1, 
1910,"“to Ky"ÏT1?I2#’T* 4lïV lEyT7"l9T8, to May 1, 1920, 
p« 411.
May 1, 1916, to Ifey 1, 1918, p. 445.
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ÜMi mmwWK. lu 1930 by the eonfiolldatlon of three distrîats, 
fee* 3# 3# nnà 4, the teypayers voted to Issue refunding bonds 
ÈS the sum of #33*000 to he identified with the outstanding 
bwde of the original aohool district Bo* 3 and to be paid 
fsr iWr a levy on all the propwty in the consolidated distriot. 
This action was attacked and the lower court rendered judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff* The supreme court affirmed the 
division and quoted the interpretation of the district court 
as follovs:
"There can be no doubt of the right of a 
political subdivision to refund its outstanding 
indebtedness# Including bonds supported by special 
taxes, by following the provieims of Act 318 of 
1934# The Constitution and the Act of 1924 use 
the possessive pronoun ’its* in referring to the 
indebtedness of bonds to be refunded. A bonded 
indebtedness of a particular district does not 
automatically beo<me the indebtedness of a larger 
district, in which it is included, from the act 
of larger or consolidation, Therefore, in granting 
the ridit to refund its outstanding or bonded in­
debtedness under certain conditions, the lawmaker 
must have had reference to the subdivision or dis­
trict originally incurring the debt and issuing 
the bonds# To construe this law otherwise, we 
necessarily would have to say that when a consoli­
dated district is formed of two or more districts, 
one or more of which has outstanding bonded in­
debtedness, that such indebtedness automatically 
becoMs its (the consolidated district’s) indebted­
ness and therefore may be refunded# We do not 
think this the correct ocnstruotlcai to place on 
the laws on the subject as they presently exist#"^*
further, the lower court showed the danger of approving such
policy to be:
"If the law be construed as contended 
for by defendant, we can conceive of cases where 
great injustice and financial wrong could be in- 
fiieted upon some taxpayers, for instance, a
^®aruoe et al# v, Oatahoula Parish School Board, (1932) 
174 La# 434-455.
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mskll but thickly populated district with a bonded 
indebtedness outstanding could be merged with large 
tracts of valuable# unimproved lands, inhabited by 
few people# and at an election for the purpose the 
bonded debt could be fastened for payment upon the 
entire new district# almost entirely by the vote of 
the populous district# Such a procedure would be 
tentamcunt to enlarging the original district and 
securing Indirectly vdiat cannot be accomplished 
legally directly# via#: a reduction in the millage
rate necessary to pay the bonded indebtedness by 
adding more taxable property to the original dis­
trict,"™
Thus# it was held that the indebtedness created by 
a particular district remains the indebtedness of that dis­
trict as a distinct entity regardless of the fact that the 
district be later merged with others; the new district# even 
thou^ It be willing# as expressed by the voice of an elec­
tion# is not permitted to assume the indebtedness of one of 
the original districts. To follow a contrary policy could 
be the means of permitting a great injustice to citizens 
under certain conditions,
SCHOOL PROPERTY
Some of the responsibilities which the quasi-corporate 
districts of the state assume, through their authorized agents# 
are the purchasing of property# the building program# and 
general supervision of the property within their respective 
jurisdictions
p. 488.
*Harr^ 0. Toorbees, 0£, clt.. p. 59.
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School Building Constraotion
The eonstruotion of sohool bulldinga through some 
legitimate ehazmel ie as old as the institution of public 
éducation itself# but the eonstruotion financed by the levying 
of taxes on the property of a school district# preparatory to 
issuing bonds for the puzpose of erecting buildings# is of 
recent development.
Since the funds derived from the latter source are 
funds specially designated# it becomes a responsibility of 
the school board# as the governing authority of the district# 
to supervise the use of those funds in such way that they will 
not be diverted from their original purpose, but that their 
expenditure will result in the buildings expected by those 
furnishing the f u n d s , S o m e  of the main features involved 
in securing these objectives are the correctness and the proper 
execution of a contract# the responsibility of the committee 
Immediately in charge# liquidation of obligations# and the 
protection from# or correction#of# the diversion of funds.
The contract, In the construction of school buildings 
the contract is of specific vahie. Some assurance from both 
the school board and the contractor is necessary in order that 
all agreements may be subject to enforcement. The content of 
the contract is left to the discretion of the contracting 
parties# but fulfillment of whatever provisions may be in­
corporated therein has usually been held mandatory# when judi­
cial interpretation has been found necessary.
^^Oplnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1# 1906# 
to May 1# 1908# p7^E3, "
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1. BmeesÆlM Hog material to meet speolfleatlona, 
the material used la the eonstruotion of school buildings 
meat comply eaaeatlally with the standards provided by the 
ecmtraet# Failure of contractor to furnish material of the 
required standard entitles the school board to refuse to honor 
the warrant therefor or to recover after the warrant has been 
iMtued under fraudulent statement of facts,^®
2. Strict interpretations upheld. It has been the 
policy of the courts to place strict interpretations upon 
building contracts, when contested questions arise. This 
j^pinciple is illustrated in a case?* in vdiioh a contracting 
daapaay had agreed to erect a high school building by February 
7, 1985, "no allowance to be made for bad weather," but failed 
to comply therewith. A clause in the contract provided that: 
if the building was finished prior to the date, February 7, 
set for delivery, the contractor would receive a bonus at the 
rate of $150 per day, but for every day after February 7 
wtil actual date of delivery he would be penalized at the 
MBS rate.
Although an extension of sixty days was granted by 
the board, vdiich made the parmissible date of completion April 
#, the building was not substantially completed until June 11, 
at which date it was accepted by the board. When the work was 
completed in all respects, the board, in answer to the contracting
Parish Board of School Directors v. Alexander, (1910) 
185 La. 808 , 51 So. 906.
79
Stewart-McGhee Const. Co. v. Caddo Parish Sohool Board,
(1988) 165 La. 800, 115 So. 458.
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eewmmy’# éemmâ tor the balance due, authorized payment of 
# # t balance leee the penalties for the time from February 7 
#  June 18# Thereupon, the construction company sued the 
beard for the full amount of the balance, the cost of heating 
the building during construction, and the expenses incurred 
in relaying rubber tile flooring made necessary by the climatic 
àmditioM at that time#
As in a prerioue e a s e the losses alleged because 
ef elimatie eon dit ions were held to be the contractor’s risk.
If beat was neeessary and was not provided by contract, it was 
ineumbent upon the contractor to supply that in the same way 
as it was his responsibility to supply the tools necessary for 
the carrying out of his contract, Evidence did not establish 
that it was the custom of the owner to furnish heat during the 
CMistruetioa of the building.
Since it was conclusively shown that the defendants 
did not contribute to the delay in the completion of the 
building, the plaintiff was required to accept the deduction 
of $150 per day, as agreed upon, from the termination of the 
extension of time until the building was officially accepted, 
Re heed was given to the plaintiff’s contention that penalty 
bhould not hold Wien the school board had suffered no damages 
trcm the delay.
3. Importance of the time element. Another aspect 
of adjudications ooncexning building contracts is the time
®*Fieard Const. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Caddo Levee List,, 
(1986) 161 La# 1008, 109 So. 616.
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element for the deliverenee of all material. In one building 
leegrem the eomtrmetor relied on terra cotta prices received 
#  telegraph and made hie bid accordingly, ohly to be notified 
•eon thereafter that there had been an error to the amount of 
15000 in the tranamiseion by the telegraph company and that 
far that cause the ctmpamy was refusing to carry out the con- 
tract. Thereupcm, a new a#eemeht was entered into between 
#&e terra cotta company and the contractor, whereby the con­
tractor agreed to a price #1000 more than the original price 
on the conditions that all the material be delivered by the 
date specified in the telegram and that the company fail in 
collecting the #9000, amount of error, from the telegraph 
company.
It was shown that the maximum liability of the tele- 
gra^ company for error in transmission by its employees is 
#00; therefore the condition in the contract of the materialman 
with the supply compary became one of time only. Time had be­
come a condition of remuneration and a very important phase of 
the contract.
The material was not delivered completely by the time 
specified in the contract; thereupon, the court sustained the 
contractor’s refusal to pay the additional sum of $1000, for 
idiich the terra cotta o<e|q»any had brought suit against the 
contractor, the school board, and the surety#®^
Terre Gotte Co. v. Butler et al. (1928) 166 la. 
241, 117 So. 184.
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4# melrnWm M t m m  eontractor and euretv. Judgments 
èmdered a^imst a building oontraotor and bis surety are 
#4#Mmta In aollM. Dnder a u #  conditions, # e n  there has 
ban judgment in favor of lienholders, "the surety is entitled 
to the same judgsmnt against the oontraotor, who was called in 
warranty, as was rendered against it."®® The supreme court 
tmm eorreeted judgments to that extent when such omissions 
have been made by the lower court,®®
In ease of judgment rendered against a subcontractor 
m û  his surety, an appeal made by the surety alone must be 
confined to certain limitations: the judgment against the
subc^tractor is not sub ject to review when that individual 
did not appeal, the surety is limited to defenses made by the 
principal, and the burden of proof that the subcontractor has 
discharged the obligations is with the surety and not the 
materialmn in whose favor jud^aent was rendered,®^ The sub­
contractor as debtor has the right of imputation of payments 
as h# pleases in the absence of fraud and his surety cannot 
cotttirôl him therein, although there may be controlling stip­
ulations in the contract between the general contractor and 
him and in his bond, signed by the surety. In a case in which 
a subcontractor was debtor to a materialman for material used 
in two school buildings at different places, and evidence was
**Ibld.. 166 La. 248-244.
I*. 241, 117 So. 134.
0, ITalaoa Mfg. Co. ▼. Wllkerson et al., (1934) (La. 
Crt. of App.) 192 Bo. 157.
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mot «uffleieiit t© # © w  that th© payments were imputed to the 
debt in questioa rather than to the other debt. Judgment was 
held againet the aabeoatraotor and his surety, and the surety 
m e  not entitled to use as defense that payment had been made.®® 
3* Disposition of fraudulent procedures. %at the 
Warts have protected th© rights of the taxpayers against 
t e m M l m t  proeedures oonneeted with oontraots for the oon- 
straatloa of sohool buildings Is avid ©need by the Ooreil ease 
ef ISSd,®® la which the purchaser of the sohool district bonds 
had exacted of the school board the following condition:
"'Award of contract for construction 
iavolviag this issue, and issue which it supple- 
meats, to be a ooatraotor mutually satisfactory 
to the School Board and ourselves
The execution of this condition was the bonding
ecmpaay'e demand of the bidding contractors that to the amounts
of their respective bids #13,000 be added for the benefit of said
cos^aay. Accordingly, the contract was let for the work to be
done at a cost to the sohool board of $99,444» About three
months before the building was completed, plaintiffs brought
suit against the school board and the contractors to enjoin
payment of the #13,000, which was alleged to be in excess of
the true considérât i m  and to be a fraud perpetrated upon the
taxpayers of the district. Before the date of the case the
final payment involving the #13,000 had been made, but evidence
Jbid.
®®Ooreil et al» v. Evangeline Parish Sohool Board et al», 
(1986) 160 La. 1011, 107 So. 783.
160 La. 1018.
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##wed that it was not authorized by the sohool board and 
m m  not known to # #  president of the board until after it 
had been made# thereupon, the court held the final payment 
unauthorized.
The oourt found that the testimony established the 
alleged fraud; consequently, it decreed the true consideration 
ef the contract to be $86,444, and annulled the contract to 
the extent of $13,000.. Judgment for this amount was granted 
##inet the school board and the contractors. The school 
board prayed for amendment to the effect of its release, but 
the court held that the pleadings did not warrant such an 
amendment. However, it explained to the board that this 
Judgment did not preclude it from asserting in a proper pro­
ceeding any action against the oodefendant.
Thus was demonstrated the court’s policy of protecting 
the taxpayers in the expenditure of their money for school 
buildings, even though the school board had seemed to abuse its 
discretion by accepting a contract which had been made Immorally 
and A%udulently.
While the courts have held consistently to the policy 
of strict interpretation of the law in protecting the taxpayers 
from fraudulent building contracts, they have been equally 
consistent in demanding that accusations of fraud In the ex­
penditure of the building fund be definitely established* To 
certain petitioning taxpayers®® explanation was made as follows:
®^6uillory et al* v. Fontenot, Parish Superintendent of Public 
Mucation, et al., (1986) 161 La. 67, 108 So. 127.
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While it is true that the Jurisprudence of the 
state authorizes taxpayers, in proper oases, to 
sue for the reoovery of public funds or property, 
in which they have an interest in common with all 
ether citizens similarly situated, when it is 
alleged that the governing authority ehich is 
charged with its administration has illegally or 
fraudulently disposed of it, such a suit is not 
based upon any contractual relation, and, in the 
absence of a showing in the petition that the 
governing authority, which, in this case, is the 
school board, was a party to the alleged fraud and 
refuses to act in the premises, the taxpayers’ 
suit is, at least, prmoature.G®
Responsibility of the building committee. The parish 
board is the governing authority of schools within its Juris­
diction, but often it becomes necessary for the supervision of 
building projects to be delegated to local committees. Con­
troversies as to the responsibility of such local boards may 
be expected. In one instance*® a local committee which was 
appointed to contract for the building of a schoolhouse ac­
cepted a purchase of bricks, the warrant for the payment of 
#lch was honored by the school board. Subsequently, the 
board was advised officially that the bricks were of inferior 
quality; thereupon, it repudiated the action of the committee 
and brought suit against the chairman of the committee for 
recovery of the price paid for the bricks with interest from 
Judicial demand and for the expenses of inspecting, separating, 
and moving the bricks.
Evidence showed that the chairman of the committee 
held the decisive vote and cast it in favor of the purchase,
®*Ibid.. 161 La. 69,
*®Parish Board of School Directors v. Alexander, (1910) 125 
La. 606, 51 So. 906.
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he knew of the provisions of the omtract to guard 
##lnat the aeeeptaaee of Inferior bricks. He induced some 
«mber# of the emmittee to sign the warrant ty representing 
to t h m  that he was the rightful owner of the bricks, since he 
was ereditor for more than the price of purchase to the one 
who made the bricks, and that he would be responsible for any 
diffmpenee in the quality.
The court held that the defendant, chaixman of the 
ecmmittce, having knowingly accepted bricks of such inferior 
quality as to be valueless, was responsible to the board for 
m e  price of the purchase with intwest. %  way of explana­
tion, it established the responsibility of a local building 
committee to its governing board as follows s
The building committee, of which 
the defendant was chairman, was the agent of the plain­
tiff board, and as such was responsible to their 
principal for damages resulting from the nonper­
formance of their duty, or from unfaithfulness in 
their management, or from their fault or neglect.
Civ. Code, arts. 3002, 3003. The bricks being 
unsuitable for the purposes intended, the com­
mittee was in fault for warranting on the plain­
tiff board for the ocmtract price, and the 
defendant, having unduly received the proceeds of 
the warrant as a creditor of the contractor, is 
bound in law and equity to make restitution to
his principal.**
Liquidation of coat of construction. #ienever there 
is the construction of a school building, there is likewise 
the responsibility of some agency to pay the expenses right­
fully incurred. From early to recent times various litigations 
have become necessary concerning the methods of last resort
188 La. 818.
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to liquidât# sohool building eonstruotion indebtedness,
1. Levy umMmrizod by speojal statute. The power 
of th# otet# to ooBOttuot and maintain sohool buildings through 
it# authorized #%#at# is so obvious that its legal existence 
is aooeptod without question. One of the early suits*® dealing 
with this subject sought to compel the sheriff of Avoyelles 
Parish in 1836 to assess and collect a special tax In a certain 
district for the payment of a building obligation. The relator 
# 0  built th# schoolhouse in question had obtained judgment 
against the school directors about six years previous but had 
been unsueeesSful in his efforts to collect; the legislature 
case to hi# rescue by the statutory provision:
Be it enactedI &c. That it shall be the 
duty of the Sheriff of Avoyelles, to assess and 
levy a tax in addition to the State tax, equally on 
all taxable property within the Second School 
District of said parish of Avoyelles, sufficient 
to pay the Judgment in the case of W. H. Bassett v*
Behool Directors of the Second District, in the 
Thirteenth Judicial District Court of the parish 
of Avoyelles, together with the costs of collec­
tion, and to collect the same and pay to the 
plaintiff or to hie assigns, the amount of said 
judgment and costs; and the fees of collection to 
be th# smae as the fees for the collecting the 
State tax, and thereafter, if any balance remains, 
to pay the same over to the School Directors of 
said Second Sohool District.*®
The sheriff attacked the constitutionality of the 
act on the ground that the legislature’s organic right to pro­
vide for the support of public schools by general taxation
*®W. H« Bassett v. L. Barbin, Sheriff, (1856) 11 La. Ann. 
678.
*®Acts of Louisiana, 1855, Ho, 889.
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excluded its right to authorize special taxation, as in this 
instanoe. However, the oourt held that the act was oonstitu- 
tioual and that the sheriff must levy the prescribed tax* 
Thereby the oourt upheld the legislative action which had 
considered the liquidation of a building debt of sufficient 
importance to warrant special statutory provision therefor,
S« Oertificates of indebtedness. What may be ac­
cepted as consideration In liquidating the cost connected with 
a building program is often a question necessary to be settled. 
In 1924 the school board of Jackson Parish, under authority 
of lew,®^ called an election for voting a special tax of two 
mills for two years to be used in reroofing and repairing a 
school building. The election was promulgated favorably and 
a contract was made with a merchant to furnish a certain amount 
ef roofing. % e  merchant refused to deliver because the board 
had nothing but a certificate of indebtedness to offer in pay­
ment until the taxes could be collected, Ultimately the board 
purchased the needed material from another party. The first 
seller then entered suit*® to collect from the said school 
board for the roofing which he contracted to sell* but #lch 
he had refused to deliver on the payment basis offered by the 
board, although it was understood by all parties that the 
certificates of Indebtedness would be used to pay the debt.
The school board recognized that the required amount could not 
be taken from the general fund, and it was unsuccessful in its
1916, Mo, 180, B.C. 9,
®®H. C, Walsworth v, Jaokson Pariah Sohool Board, (1924) 
1 La. App. 57.
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ettwte to got the oertlfloatea cashed. The court admitted 
that ia theory the school hoard violated a contract but stated 
that alBoe both parties knew that the money was to come from 
a special tax which had not been collected— and particularly 
when the fund was to be created in accordance with a specific 
law— the case was taken out of the general rule. Also, the 
court pointed to the fact that most of the material in question 
was standard and could be sold easily ty the plaintiff without 
lose.
Thereby it was held that certificates of indebtedness, 
properly issued, are suitable for fulfilling the payment part 
ef a contract; upon that basis the plaintiff's demand to desig- 
mate # e  defendant's failure to pay cash as the breaking of 
ecmtract was rejected.
8. Sale of building for indebtedness. A school 
building is not exempt from seizure and sale for defaulted 
payment on the material used in Its construction, when judgment 
therefor has been properly secured. This policy was followed 
in a litigation*® concerning a school building debt, for 
liquidation of adiich, a judgment had been obtained by a manu­
facturing company. The district court granted the company 
a lien and privilege to seize and sell the building at any 
time for the satisfaction of the judgment, V/hen four years 
later the company was about to seize and sell the building, 
the board made an unsuccessful attempt in district court to
*®Hawthome et al. v. Jackson Parish Sohool Board et al., 
(1985) 5 La. App. 508.
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the procedure. Shortly thereafter some taxpayers attempted 
to attack the part of the Judgment granting the privilege on 
the building on the alleged ground that the judgment was con­
trary to law.*^ The court failed tc maintain the mere ground 
of error ae a cause for annulling a judgment, and held that 
since the Judgment had become final e long time previous, 
idiether right or wrong, it was binding, and that the citizens 
had then "no cause or right of action to annul a judgment ob­
tained against the board as governing authority of the district, 
the board being properly cited and represented.”*®
Thus it was legally established that by proper pro­
cedure a building may be sold to liquidate a debt thereon 
created by the governing board, when that board does not ful­
fill the obligation of payment.
Use of Sohool Property
Diversion from created nurnose -prohibited. A public 
school building erected at the expenses of the taxpayers may 
not be converted into a business enterprise as long as it is 
needed for school use. One building in controversy** had been 
built with a $20,000 levy and $60,000 contribution from the 
city of Monroe; taxpayers charged that a part of it was being 
used as a public theater by city authorities under a pretended 
lease. The taxpayers' right to come into appeal oourt on this
p. *18.
*®SugMr «rfc al, ▼, City of Monro, at al,, (1908) 108 la. 
677, 38 So. 961.
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question was upheld aeeording to previous decisions,1®® as 
fellows:
. # # upon • $ • the question whether the munioipal 
authorities are diverting or making an illegal use 
of the building in question, whioh is public prop­
erty, any taxpayer has the right to come into court, 
and, quoad the amount, the Jurisdiction is deter­
mined by the value of the property or of the interest 
therein represented by the money specially voted for 
a school building; the case not being materially 
different from what it would have been if the mayor 
and council had originally proposed to devote the 
#0,000 raised for that puzpose to the construction 
of a theater, and had been enjoined from so doing**®i
Much and varied testimony was presented concerning
the effect that the operation of a theater in a part of the
building would have upon the attainment of the educational
purpose for #ioh the building was established* The court did
not attempt to rule on this phase of the question but said:
Considering the case in the light of this testimony, 
the least that we can say is that, whereas we know 
that the qualified voters of the city of Monroe 
voted to tax themselves for the purpose of erecting 
a schoolhouse, we have no assurance that they would 
have so voted if they had been informed that the 
building to be erected would be used as a theater 
as well, and that we should not consider that they 
were fairly treated if the property for #ich they 
are still paying, year by year, should be permitted 
to be used for a purpose not intended by them, and 
of idiieh, in all probability, some, if not a major­
ity, of them would disapprove.*®®
^Thomas H. Handy et al. v. The City of Hew Orleans et ale., 
(1887 ) 89 La. Ann. 107, 1 So. 593; Edward Cenéry, Jr., et al., 
V, The Hew Orleans Waterworks Company et ale., (1887) 39 La. 
A m.  770, 2 So. 555; State ex rel. Orr v. City of Hew Orleans 
et al. (kotestant Orphans’ Home et al.. Interveners), (1898)
50 la. Ann. 860, 24 So. 666; City-Item Co-operative Printing 
Go# V. City of Hew Orleans et al., (1899) 51 La. Ann. 713,
85 So. 813#
^^Sugar at al. v. City of Monroe et al., (1902) 108 La. 681. 
lO^Ibid.. p. 684.
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In giving its complet© policy upon the right to us©
ft part of a school building as a theater the court explained:
In expressing this conclusion, we do not wish to 
be understood as going to the extreme of holding 
that the city authorities may not make such casual 
and incidental use of the building in question, 
not inconsistent with or prejudicial to the main 
purpose for which it was erected, as they may deem 
advisable, nor as holding that changed conditions 
in the future may not Justify them in devoting it 
to some other purpose* The question here presented 
is #cthcr they have the legal right at this time 
to make use of it, or any part of it, for the pur­
pose of maintaining a theater therein, or of giving 
theatrical performances, as a business; and this 
question we decide in the negative**®®
Likewise, the school board is without authority to 
use or utilize any sohool property for purposes other than 
those of public education* This applies to the construction 
of a swimming pool on the school grounds for the benefit of 
the children of the municipality or to the leasing of a por­
tion of the grounds to individual citizens for the purpose 
of constructing a public swimming pool*^®^
Illegality of leases to business enterurlses. A 
similar principle as in the previous case was involved in 
the Presley suit,^®® with the lease for a different purpose*
In the instant case the parish school board had leased a por­
tion of certain school grounds for the proposed purpose of 
the establishment of a cafeteria for the teachers and pupils* 
Relative to the board's lack of power for this action the court 
of appeal quoted from Ruling Case Law:
“ “a a -
^*Oulnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana * May 1, 1930, 
to April W ,  ilS^ S, p, 4 # V
^®®Preslcy V. Vernon Parish School Board, (1932) 19 La. App* 
217, 159 So. 698.
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# # . vol# 84, subject Schools, P* 585, Sec. 34: 
"Unimproved school lands are subject to the same 
restrictions as sehoolhouses, and the school board 
cannot permit them to be used for collateral pur­
poses, even though profitable# This is on the 
ground that school boards have power only over 
educational matters, and so have no power to lease 
or grant school property for other purposes
hereupon It was maintained that a school board may 
not divest itself of its authority over school property. The 
dangers of endorsing a policy to the contrary were pointed 
out as follows:
It looks reasonable that while a cafe­
teria on the ground might be a convenience to the 
pupils and teachers, the business conducted « . • 
may beemme a nuisance, %&ich, for the welfare of 
the pupils and teachers, should be suppressed.
And such power must be preserved.*®?
The discretion %Aich the board may exercise in the 
use of the property was described thus:
A school board does not have power, 
under the law, to lease ground acquired for school 
purposes, on which a school building has been 
erected, and a public sohool is being therein 
conducted, unless as stated in 108 La. 677, 32 
So. 961, 59 L« H* A. 783, it is for some casual 
use, not prejudicial to nor inconsistent with 
the main purpose for whioh the property was 
acquired. And such an exceptional situation does 
not exist in the present case.*®®
Sale of luncheons under certain conditions permis­
sible . The sale of refreshments during hours of intermission 
for the convenience of teachers and pupils is not considered
13« So. 694. 
p. 696.
Th. .... r.f.rr.d to a. 108 La. 677, 32 So. 961 
89 L. B. A. 783, 1. Sugar at al. v. City of Monroe et al., 
(1902), aunr*.
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esL unlawful usa of the sohool buildings. In a contest^®® of
# i #  use of sohool property the plaintiff alleged that the
sohool hoard of Mow Orleans had entered into a contract whereby
eertain parties were given permission to sell merchandise on
the sohool grounds in violation of constitutional provisions
to the effeet that: "The funds, credit, property or things
of value, of the State or of any political corporation thereof,
shall not he loaned, pledged or granted to or for any person
or persons, association or corporation, public or private;
* • The decision handed down was;
• • • the mere sale of luncheons, etc., on the 
school premises, during lunch hours only, to 
teachers and pupils only, under the circumstances 
and for the purposes set forth In defendant’s an­
swer, is only incidental to the main purpose of 
said schools, and is in the interest of the safe, 
sanitary, and efficient conduct of said schools, 
and that same is not an unlawful use of said 
buildings under such oircumstancea.
Authority of school board to sell old site. Sohool 
b^irds amy sell school property idiich is no longer needed for 
school purposes with a view of using the proceeds thereof for 
the purchase of more suitable property. The law governing 
this principle is interpreted in the Henderson case^^^ in which 
the school board of Caddo Parish was enjoined from selling 
to the city of Shreveport a lot idiich had been purchased for
^^Ralph V. Orleans Parish Sohool Board, (1925) 158 La. 659, 
104 So. 490.
^^Oonstitution of Louisiana, 1981, art, 4, sec. 18.
T. Orl.am. ParlBh Sohool Board, (1925) 158 La. 662-«68.
*H«id«p.on at al. t, City of Shrareport et al., (1926)
160 la. 860, 107 So. 189.
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a aohool building site but never used for such purpose. The
oourt held that since a school board has no right to acquire
lands for any other than school purposes, it follows that:
« • * it cannot hold lends indefinitely for other 
than school purposes; and hence it is the plain 
duty of the school board to divest itself of any 
land which admittedly, according to the Judgment 
of the board itself, is unnecessary or unsuitable 
for school purposes; end mandamus would certainly 
lie to compel the board to divest itself of land 
so held.11»
Such sale was held authorized by the statutory pro­
vision: "The parish school board shall determine the number
of schools to be opened, the location of the sohool houses,
, . . they may change the location of a school house, sell or 
dispose of the old site, and use the proceeds thereof toward 
procuring a new one."H^ It was explained that "old site" 
means "any site" whioh is no longer used, or necessary, or 
suitable for a school. The purchase of new property for the 
same purpose does not have to be made simultaneously with the 
sale of the old.
In sunmary, the court upheld the right of sale as
follows:
In the case at bar we have shown, we 
think, that the legislative branch of the govern­
ment has expressly consented to the sale by a 
school board of the "old sites" of schools, and
that any site which is unused and unnecessary 
or unSltaSIe for school purposes la an old site, 
within the meaning of the statute.**®
160 La. 567.
Of Louisiana, 1988, Bo. 100, seo. 80.
^^^^BMidOTson at al. t. City of Shrorsport et al., (1986) 
160 La. 571.
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The legal ooimael seems to have Interpreted
a# an implied power ^ e  authority to use the proeeeds from 
tâie sale of property for the purpose of, improving or equipping 
.«tistent sehoolhousee However^ after the enaotment of the 
#vemlng statute^^^ of 192S, school hoards were advised to 
have such use of the funds endorsed the supervisor of pub­
lie aeoounts before taking definite action* for there is 
statutory specification of the use which may be made of these 
funds.
Protection of school nronertv. Since the early his- 
tmpy of her educational system, Louisiana seems to have attempted 
to safeguard the interest of her public schools. Prom 1664^^^ 
to 1679 the legislature was empowered to exempt from taxation 
all property actually used for school purposes, and since
ISO1679^ such property has been exempt by organic provision. 
Hhether the exemption is granted by authorized statutory en- 
aetment^^^ or by the constitution, exemption from all taxation, 
mmieipal as well as state, is m e a n t , T h i s  exemption does
^ ^Opinjons of the Attorney General jgf Louisiana; m y  1, 1980, 
to m y  1, TéSS, p. S£y 1, iSis to may 1, idAd, p. 444.
^^Aets of Louisiana, 1988, Ho, 100, sec. 80,
"^^^Ouimioms of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1986, 
to Ap^lao, IWlB, p. 8#^
^^Oonsti tut ions of Louisiana: 1664, art. 184; 1868, art, 116.
^ ^Xbid., 1679. art, 807,
^^Acts of Louisiana, 1868, No, 196, sec, S.
^®Kp, & m s ,  Lefrano v. City of New Orleans, (1875) 87 La.
Ann, 188.
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met include property merely owned by tbte sohool and not aotu- 
elJ^ r uee, although that property produces no revenue or 
its revenue Is used for school purposes; however, it does in­
clude lets used in oonneotion with a school, such as play- 
grounds Uhen property used for sohool purposes is owned 
by some individual or company deriving rent therefrom exemp- 
t l m  from taxation does not hold;^^^ on the other hand, if 
the use of a building belonging to other than school authori­
ties is granted for school purposes without receipt of profit 
er income, such property is exempt on the grounds of being 
actually in use for sohool p u r p o s e s , T h i s  privilege per­
tains to ordinary taxes but does not exempt school property 
from local assessment or special taxation, such as on pavements 
and s i d e w a l k s P r o p e r t y  which belongs to the school board 
and is used for sohool purposes is considered public property 
and is not subject to be sold for taxes,
Parish school boards are considered as engaged in 
the exercise of essential governmental functions; consequently, 
gasoline and lubricating oil purchased by them from the manu-
^ ^Oninione of the Attorney General of Louisiana., May 1, 1980, 
to May 1, X988, p, é07,
^^^aroline Armand azid Husband v, £• Dumas, State Tax 
Collector, (1876) 88 La, Ann, 403; Oninions of the Attorney 
General or Louisiana. Mhy 1, 1988, toTprll 30, 1930, p, 693.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1981, art. 10, sec, 4; Opinions 
of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1988» to April 30,
^®^Onittions of the Attorney General of Louisiana. May 1, 1930, 
to x i p H r W T i ^ ^ T v
127ibid,. May 1, 1980, to May 1, 1988, p, 830.
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Êaeturer are exempt from the tax Imposed by the Federal Govern-
The state has endeavored to protect the pupils of 
imhUe schools from the presence of intoxicating drink by 
prohibiting the operation of a saloon near the school build- 
Ijng^ lfiO jji X909 It %Mie definitely established that a liquor 
dispensary could not be operated within three hundred feet of 
a school,^®® Similar regulation may be made forceful now by 
legislative enactment i^oh names a radius for a particular 
school, or by municipal ordinance,
m m m Y
The School District
Th9 underlying principles governing the school dis­
trict as it has functioned In the state*# program for the 
development of a system of free public schools appear to be 
the following:
1. The legal basis for the school district is implied 
in the power to establish, for the district was a recognized 
entity many years before it was provided for in the state's 
organic law.
2. The school district is a quasi-corporate sub­
division of the state created for the purpose of maintaining
May l, 1988, to April 1, 1934, p. 906.
189 
130
May 1, 1898, to Itoy 1, 1900, p. 137.
Ibid.. May 1, 1908, to May 1, 1910, p. 255. 
^^Ibia., May 80, 1988, to April 1, 1934, p. 609.
368
r
the public schools within its jurisdiction.
3, The establishment of the school district is author­
ised by law but the parish school board is clothed with broad 
ileeretionary power in the creation thereof.
4^  The size of the district is not a factor, for any 
pert of a perish, the idiole parish, or portions of two parishes 
may be included within its limits as defined by the parish 
beard.
3# The location of bcmndariee of districts is subject 
to a wide discretion of the school board, but the designation 
thereof must permit of no uncertainty.
6« The parish board of school directors is the 
governing authority of the school district.
7. The parish school board which has the power to 
create school districts may in its discretion alter, abolish, 
er consolidate the districts of its creation, if prohibitory 
statutes are not violated.
8. The obligations of debt assumed by a district 
through bond Issues or any other legal channels are not affected 
by the consolidation of that district with another,
Sohool Property
The principal policies pertaining to the administra­
tion of public school property as upheld by the law are as 
follows;
1. The parish school board as the governing authority 
of the district is custodian of all public school property 
therein.
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S, A building program may be financed through the levy 
of special taxes by the qualified taxpayers of the district.
S. The contract is an integral feature of the building 
program; strict interpretation thereof and adherence thereto are 
held for all parties concerned. The law serves to protect the 
taxpayer against fraudulent procedures in making or executing 
contracts,
4. Surety companies are held responsible for the faith* 
ful performance of their clients, as agreed to in the contract.
5. Parish sohool boards often appoint auxiliary local 
building committees, who are held accountable for all trans­
actions made under their supervision.
6. Contracted obligations for a building program 
must be liquidated, even if the liquidation necessitates 
special legislation or the sale of the building for recovery 
of the amount of indebtedness.
7. Certificates of indebtedness vdiioh have for their 
security an authorized tax levy are suitable for satisfying 
the payment part of a contract,
8. Diversion of sohool property from its established 
purpose is contrary to the interpretation of the law,
9. The parish school board may, at its discretion, 
dispose of sohool property which is no longer needed for pub­
lic school use,
10. It has been the policy of the state to safeguard 
the interest of public schools by exempting their property from 
ordinary taxation and by protecting schools from contaminating 
influences.
CHAPTER X
ADMINISTRATION OP PUPIL PERSONNEL AND THE CURRICULUM
OHAPTSH X
AiailNISTRATION OP PUPIL PERSONNEL AND THE OUHRICULUM
The Constitution of the u&lted states, the organ!o 
lavs of the state, common lav theory, court decisions, legal 
opinions, and common practice are in accord on the theory 
that the state has the power to provide for the establishment 
of a system of free public schools. Since pupils and 
programs of study are essential elements of a school system, 
it is axiomatic that the state has a right to establish, 
through its duly authorized agents, a legal basis governing 
the pupil personnel end the organization and administration 
of the curriculum as they relate to the public school system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the lav of the 
state pertaining to the pupil personnel and the curriculum 
as revealed by the organic laws and statutory enactments 
relating thereto and as interpreted by the courts and legal 
counsel of the state.
PUBLIO SCHOOL PUPILS
"Under the English common lav a father had almost 
unlimited control over the education of his child, and in the 
American colonies the same principle applied until modified
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Statute.*1 The Supreme Court of the United states has 
held that a reasonable amount of education for all children 
is aeoesaary to promote the public welfare of the states and 
that legal provisions enforced by a state with such objectives 
in vie* are not in violation of the principles of personal 
liberty, which the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti­
tution assures to every Individual.® Then, the foundation 
for the promotion of the general welfare of the state through 
education was made possible for the American youth when free 
public "schools were established end when the states of the 
tmdLen assumed the responsibility for protecting children 
against the elements which tended to deprive them of this 
rightful heritage.
Legal Foundations
The power to establish public schools obviously 
implies a basis for the administration and supervision of 
those who are to attend such institutions. That Louisiana 
assumed the right to control pupil personnel is evidenced 
by her establishment of a school system long before there 
was any organic provision on the subject* what may be termed 
the first implication was the mere suggestion of state direction
^Newton Edwards» The Courts and the public schools (Chicago» 
1953), p. 480.
®Ibid.» p. 401.
®Fred Engelhardt, public school Organization and Adminis­
tration (Boston, 1951), p. 3 4 8 . ^
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in the provielon that school funds be distributed to the 
parlAea eooordlng "to the number of free white children 
between aaoh ages as shall be fixed by the General Assembly."^ 
In the Convention during the War for Southern 
Independence there was much quibbling over whose children 
the constitution should provide for.® It was finally agreed 
to include "all children of the state, between the ages of 
six and eighteen years,"® with no mention or race or color.
The Constitution of 1868 extended the upper age limit to 
twenty-one years and provided for admission of all pupils of 
such ages "without distinction of race, color or previous 
c o n d i t i o n . I n  1879 the age limits were put back to six 
and eighteen years for all children,® with no mention of 
race or color. These limits have remained unchanged with 
the exception that where kindergarten schools exist, children 
may be admitted between the ages of four and six years.^
Also, since 1896 provision for separate schools for the white 
and colored races has been in effect.
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1688, art. 136.
^Debates in the Convention for the Revision and Amendment 
of the ConstiTutTSn of ibe' ëïiate of Louisiana» làdi, pp.roiTTsg;-wr:------------------- ----------------
^Constitution of Louisiana, 1864, art. 141.
"^Ibid.. 1868, art. 135.
®Ibid.. 1879, art. 824.
*Ibid., 1898, art. 248.
^®Ibld.s 1896, art. 248; 1981, art. 18, sec. 1.
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Separate Sehoole for White and Colored Hacea
Since the expiration of the period of the war for 
Southern independence and Reconstruction the state consti­
tutions, the oourts, sohool authorities, and common practice 
have maintained the policy of separate schools for white and 
colored children. In 1881 the question of separation of 
pupils of color was presented for judicial interpretation in 
a suit^^ to compel the New Orleans School Board to admit 
colored children In a sohool of white children. The supreme 
court upheld the policy of separate schools for the white 
and colored races by rendering a decision adverse to the 
relator and maintaining the school board's right to refuse 
admission of colored children in a school of white children.
A much more recent controversy^® shows a continuation 
of the policy of separate schools for children of color. The 
act which brought the issue to the oourts was the expulsion 
of the plaintiff's daughter from a white school on the ground 
that she had negro blood. Her father was white and she and 
her mother appeared to be white. After she had attended the 
white school from the age of seven to fourteen years she was 
excluded by the sohool hoard. From the decision of the 
district court, which refused to reinstate the child as an 
eligible pupil for the white schools, the plaintiff appealed 
to the supreme court; he was met with the explanation that
^^State ox rel. u. Dellande v. New Orleans school Board, 
(1861) 33 La# Ann. 1469.
l^Oberly v. Calcasieu Parish School Board et al., (1918) 
142 La. 788, 77 So. 600.
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%he district court ham Jurisdiction of suits Involving civil 
or political rights, under which classification the issue 
falls. Gonsequently, the appeal was dismissed and the 
décision of the district court was left controlling, in 
refusing to force reinstatement of the child the court upheld 
a dcmeatic regulation, "which one state in its sovereign 
judgment may require to be different from the regulation of 
another.
permission for Transfers to Another Parish
The state has provided a public school system for 
its youth and it is the duty of the administrators to make 
this opportunity for education available to those for whom 
it is provided, k pupil who does not live within reach of 
a suitable sohool may be permitted to attend a school in an 
adjoining parish.^* Deteiminetion of the source of authority 
for such transfers was sought in 1925.^® In the situation 
involved, the school board of Jefferson parish had adopted a 
resolution permitting the son of the plaintiff to attend a 
school in an adjoining parish but the parish superintendent 
had refused to issue t h e  permit. The court pointed out that 
Act No. 100 of 1922 governed the case and that nowhere in the
^®Harry R, Trusler, Essentials of sohool Law (Milwaukee, 
1927), p. 46.
l^Opiaions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, June 1,
1912, to Tiay "I— 1WÎ, --------------------
Instate ex rel. Oharles Pourroux v. Board of Directors of 
the public Schools for the Parish of Jefferson and j« C* Ellis, 
Supt., Appellants, (1926) 3 La. App. 2.
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«ttttuto vas the sohool hoard given power to act in the matter, 
fha pertinent statutory provision was to the effect that:
Children for whom adequate schools of 
suitable grade have not been provided in their 
home parish may attend schools in an adjoining 
parish* In such eases permits shell be secured 
from the parish superintendent of the children's 
home parish, and after they have been approved by 
the pariah superintendent of the parish in which 
the schools that the children desire to attend 
are located they shall be presented to the princi­
pals of the schools which the children wish to 
attend, who shall be required to admit the chil­
dren and provide for their instruction the same as 
if they were resident a of the p a r i s h . 16
The exoerpt of the statute quoted shows the valid reason for 
the transfer of a pupil to be that there are no schools of 
suitable grade to meet his demands in his home parish. This 
reason wee not assigned in the instant case; the father 
claimed the privilege merely because "of the advance studies 
and desiring to complete the education of his said child,"
In upholding the sole right of the parish superin­
tendent to issue such permits, the court maintained that 
"the Parish school Board and the superintendent of the public 
Schools are treated as separate and different persona and 
are vested with different rights and subjected to different 
duties and obligations separate and distinct. The functions 
of each are clearly d e f i n e d . s i n c e  the law prescribes that 
the parish superl ntendent issue the permits, the court was 
neither empowered to substitute the board of school directors
^^Aets^of Louisiana, 1928, No. 100, sec* 59.
State ex rel. Charles Fourroux v. Board of Directors of 
the public schools for the Parish of Jefferson and J. o* Ellis, 
Supt., Appellants, (1925) 5 La. App* 4.
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la t M a  oapaoity nor to control the exercise of discretion 
by the designeted officer unless he had made abuse thereof, 
consequently, the parish superintendent was not ordered to 
iseue the permit petitioned.
The state's legal counsel has ruled^® that after 
atwh transfers are granted there must be adherence to the 
provision: "The Superintendent of the children's home parish
Shall settle monthly for the instruction of such children as 
shall take advantage of the provision of this section, the 
settlement to be on the basis of the monthly per capita cost 
cdT instruction in the children's home p e r i s h .
Transportation of Pupils
A comparatively recent educational development, 
which has ccsae particularly with the consolidation of schools, 
is the transportation of children who live at an inconvenient 
distance from the school center. Formerly those pupils not 
living within walking distance of a sohool of the necessary 
grade boarded in the school community, furnished their own 
means of travel, or resignedly remained at home. For obvious 
reasons most school boards have found transportation a solution 
to many of their problems concerned with assuring necessary 
educational opportunity to all pupils alike end, although its 
proper execution continues to present many novel problems,
^®Opinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1930, t o April"?0Tl[93#, ÿ . 467.
^^Aota of Loulciane, 19B2, No. 100. aeo. 59.
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adoption has become a fairly well established policy 
throughout the state,
practically all types of pupil transportation are 
now in uae, school boards may contract with common carriers®^ 
and owners of motor t r u c k s , o r  they may purchase trucks as 
school property and employ operators therefor,®® but they are 
not empowered to spend money fbr the transportation of children 
except In a manner prescribed by law,®®
Many of the questions which transportation has 
presented are settled by the school board under whose juris­
diction they CŒce, but in a few instances the board's ad­
judications have not been acceptable to all parties and the 
state's legal advisers and courts have been requested to 
interpret certain pertinent policies.
Discretionary power of school hoard to furnish 
transportât ion. By section 50 of Act Ho. ISO of 1916, as 
re-enacted in section 29 of Act No. 100 of 1922, parish 
school boards were given authority to provide for the trans­
portation of pupils who live more than two miles from school. 
The extent of the board's discretion In this respect was 
tested in 1925 by the Wall case,®* Therein the plaintiff
1 ,®®OpinlonB of the Attorney General of Louisiana, 
1 9 1 8 , T o  Bay 'iT'lW, p, 633.
®^Ibid,, May 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p, 724.
®®Ibld,. May 1, 1926, to April 30, 1928, p. 883,
®®Ibld.. May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 640.
®*Lorrin wall v. Livingston Parish Sohool Board, (1985) 
1 La. App. 730,
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collection of a balance claimed to be due according 
t© a recolution of the board to allow him a stipulation per 
daily attendance of his children in lieu of transporting 
them to school. The per diem payments had been made until 
the board, by resolution, discontinued the practice and 
thereupon refused to meet the plaintiff's demands# The 
court maintained that under the governing acts the authority 
conferred is merely permissive and in no way compulsory#
The compulsory attendance law, Act Ho# 117 of 
1928, contains a proviso for the exemption of those children 
living more than two and one-half miles from school and for 
idira transportation is not provided by the school board#
This is further recognition of the school board's discretion­
ary power in furnishing free transportation to pupils#®®
Deleaatlon of discretionary power of transportation 
forbidden. The parish school board has complete jurisdiction 
in matters pertaining to the transportation of pupils and 
under no circumstances may it delegate such discretionary 
power to others# It is a public board constituted to function 
in the interest of public welfare and must finally determine 
every subject committed to its judgment# An example of this 
policy is shown in the Johnson case®* in which the court of ap­
peal was called upon to decide if the sohool board could delegate 
one of its members to contract with a school bus driver* In
T. Sabine Pariah Sohool Board, (1932) 19 la. App. 
248, 140 So. 87.
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holding to the theory that the school board could not 
#legete Its disoretloaery power, and In declaring, Illegal 
the oontraot which one of the board members made with the 
driver, the court was merely being consistent with other 
decisions concerning the delegation of discretionary power# 
gummarily, the opinion handed down was:
Clearly, the action of the defendant 
board in delegating ite power to contract with 
reference to a matter In which it was necessary 
to exercise a discretion, and in referring the 
exercise of that discretion to an individual, Is 
without statutory authority or other legal sanction.
AS Mr. Cates was without legal authority 
to bind the defendant school board, the contract 
which he made with the plaintiff was without legal 
effect and the plaintiff Is not entitled to the 
relief sought in the premises.®®
Availability of funds as basis of transportation 
term. When a school board contracts for the transportation 
of pupils to a school within its Jurisdiction and designates 
the length of the period, the contracting parties are subject 
thereto. The expression,"session months," as used In a con­
tract with a bus driver in St. Helena Parish was interpreted, 
in view of parol evidence, to mean the general fund term.®^
®^City of Shreveport v. Herndon, (1925) 169 La* 115, 106 
do. 244; The State of Louisiana v. Lewis C. Garibaldi, (1892) 
44 La. Ann. 809, 11 So. 56; State ex rel, Thurmond v. City of 
Shreveport, (1909) 124 La. 178, 50 So. 3; Gauthier v. St, John 
the Baptist Parish Sohool Board et al,, (1927) 6 La. App. 670.
®®Johnson V. Sabine Parish Sohool Board, (1932) (La. Ort. 
of App.) 140 80. 87.
®%ataon v. St. Helena Pariah sohool Board, (1932) 19 La. 
App. 764, 141 So. 482.
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Expiration of the time during which funds were available 
f@p financing the transportation was to terminate the contracts 
in the particular situation, for the board realized that the 
funds were limited and uncertain and that after the exhaustion 
of the provided funds there could not be operation of transfers 
on anticipated revenues. The court held that, although the 
session was of nine month's duration, transportation as a 
liability of the school board ceased after the expiration of 
two months and thirteen days, and that truck drivers were 
entitled to remuneration for that period, as per contract, 
but for no longer time. Further transportation became a 
responsibility of the parents.
Thus not only the discretionary power of the school 
board pertaining to transportation was upheld, but also the 
stability of its contractual power in this relation, although 
% e  term specified was rather incomparable to the length of 
the school session.
Legalized as a trade. The increased prevalence of 
the operation of transportation vehicles presents the need 
for determining whether the work has become a profession and 
to what extent the driver of such vehicle is entitled to legal 
protection. Judicial recognition has been given to the facts 
that a school transportation vehicle must be operated five 
days per week on a fixed schedule in the mornings and after­
noons, and that the driver is personally responsible for 
efficient operation accordingly.®^ The importance of this
& Co., Umlteû, v. Johnson, (1931) 16 La. App. 
580, 135 SO. 77.
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m r k  and the rank which it has ooma to take were established
thus in 1931:
The school bus is an important adjunct In the 
successful carrying on of the high school© of the 
state, in fact, an indispensable factor therein, 
and the operation of such busses now may be 
properly oaXJLed a trade or profession on the part 
of those engaged therein, . • ,&1
The driver in the Hamner ease was given legal protection 
from the sheriff's seizure and sale of the transportation 
truck for debts, since the truck we© held to be the tool or 
instrument necessary for the exercise of the trade or pro­
fession by which the owner and operator earned his living.®® 
Accidents of school bus drivers# Operators of 
transportation vehicles are responsible to the school board 
for the faithful performance of their duty. On the other 
hand, there is the question of the extent of the liability 
of the board for the action of such employees# In one 
litigation®® the board was sued by the plaintiff to recover 
damages for his child's injuries, which were alleged to be 
the result of an accident caused by the negligence of the bus 
driver. As the basis for its refusal to hold the school 
board responsible for such accidents, the court referred to 
other d e o i s i o n s ® d  to ©how that shhool boards are only agencies
Gllbid,. 135 So. 78.
®®Ibid., 16 La. APP. 580, 135 So. 77.
®®Horton V. Bienville Parish School Board, (1926) 4 La. 
App# 123.
®*8herman et ux. v. Pariah of Vermillion et al., (1899) 
51 La. Ann. 880, 25 So. 538; Fisher Land and Improvemsnt Go. 
V. Bordelon, President Police Jury, (1099) 52 La. Ann. 429, 
27 so. 59.
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Qt the state for the administration of public education in 
their respective parishes and, although authorized to provide 
for transportation, are not liable in damages for injuries 
eaused by their officers and employees*
Another aspect of law dealing with drivers of trans­
portation vehicles was established in a 1934 case®* in which 
the court, having found the,bus driver innocent of any 
negligence, refused to hold him responsible for a collision 
with a reckless car driver, who received personal injuries 
and a wrecked automobile as a result of the accident* The 
wrecked automobile contained an occupant besides the driver; 
this person also filed suit against the insurance company 
for damages, but since the driver of the automobile rather 
than the bus driver was held responsible, this claim was not 
allowed,®*
Thus, the courts have legalized the operation of 
school transportation vehicles as a trade. Also, it has 
been the legal policy to relieve the employing school board 
of all liability in oonneotion with the action of transpor­
tation vehicle drivers and to assure to such drivers 
decisions in keeping with the evidence presented concerning 
accidents.
®*pate V. American Employers» Ins. Co., (1934) (La. Ort. 
of App.) 152 So. 365.
®*Lewts Edwin Bounds v. American Employers» insurance 
Company, (1934) (La. Ort. of App.) 152 So, 364*
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school Attendance
Since the public school is established for the 
ehlld and since the state has a right to compel the taxpayer 
to contribute of his earnings in order that the children of 
other parents may be given equal educational opportunities,
It is reasonable to assume that the state’s power would 
include the right to require the presence of the child at 
school in order that the purpose of public education may be 
executed#®^ Through statutory enactments the state has 
provided for compulsory school attendance and has entrusted 
the parish school board with its enforcement.®®
The governing act provides that children shall be 
in school not later than two weeks after the opening of the 
session; parents who do not comply therewith may be prosecuted 
for the violation.®* Exemptions for certain classes of chil­
dren have been provided and to the parish school board is 
delegated the final determination of which children may be 
so classified.*® In fact, the parish board has come to be 
considered the legal source of Initial procedures in devel­
oping the policies of compulsory school attendance.
®^Hermann H. Schroeder, Legal Opinion on the Public school 
as a state institution (Blooralngton, I92sT7 P* 7137” *“
®®Qpinions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1914, t T B s y  1T~19I3, 'p. 364:
U.7 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 429.
40lbld.. way 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. 419.
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Administration of Pupil Disciplina
It has bean the policy of the state to clothe the 
publie school teachers with the power and authority to hold 
pupils accountable for disorderly conduct "in the school or 
on the playgrounds, or on the street or road while going to 
or returning from sohool," but there is no statutory author­
isation for the infliction of corporal punishment as a means 
of discipline.*! The legalized method of punishment seems to 
be restricted solely to suspension for a limited or indefinite 
term, this to be administered by the principal of the school, 
subject to the approval of the perish superintendent.*®
With the parish superintendent rests the final power in 
determining what arm good causes for suspension; he may 
appeal to the state superintendent for advice and assistance, 
but the latter official is not warranted In interfering on
his own volition.*® Where the system of incidental fees
is ra^ployed, pupils who refuse to pay such fees may be 
mispended only if the parish board of school directors 
authorizes such penalty.**
*^Ibia.; tlay 1, 1910, to May 1, 1918, p. 404; May 1, 1988, 
to April 30, 1930, p. 452.
4*Ibia.
, May 1, 1916, to May 1, 1918, p. 485.
**Ibia.. May 1, 1914, to May 1, 1916, p. 369.
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The Physical welfare of Pupils
By Acts Nos* 150 of 1908 and 79 of 1921, the state 
hoard of health, in cooperation with the municipal end parish 
authorities, is empowered to provide for a health program 
to safeguard the physical welfare of the sohool children of 
the state.*® It has been legally advised that no child 
attending the public schools may be exempt from vaccination 
because of religious beliefs,** but that pupils may not be 
subjected to physical examination without the consent of 
their parents.*?
THS PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM
The fundamental principles of curriculum organization 
for a dynamic society are susceptible to change according to 
changes in the social order. That a state has the right to 
prescribe the program of studies for its public schools is 
generally admitted.*® However, the states have been very 
liberal in prescribing what shall be included in their 
currioulums— most of them prescribe only the "fundamental 
subjects which must be taught in the elementary schools"—  
and in delegating to the school board the power to prescribe
*®Ibid.; May 1, 1918, to May 1, 1920, p. 551; May 1, 1924, 
to Maynrr 1986, p. 86.
**Ibid., May 1, 1988, to April 50, 1930, p. 561.
*?Ibid.. May 1, 1930, to April 30, 1932, p. 435.
*®Hermann H. Schroeder, 0£. cit., p. 63.
387
a particular oourse of study,** Court oases bearing on this 
subjeet maintain the public school's right to offer any 
seeular subjeot not prohibited by the statutory laws.®®
Organic Basis
According to Louisiana's organic provisions the legal 
basis of a curriculum for the public school system is Implied 
in the right to establish, This assumption may be sustained 
by the fact that this subject is not expressed in any of the 
state's constitutions prior to the War for Southern Independ- 
imce. However, the first constitutional committee on public 
education, functioning in the Convention of 1844-1845, seemed 
to iag^ ly very much the theory of a public school curriculum, 
as may be seen by the following excerpts from its chairman's 
r^ort;
"Another cause of the failure has been that large 
es^endltures have been made for building colleges 
and academies for the promotion of the higher 
branches of literature, before providing the means 
for teaching.the first rud iments of a common 
education.
"The necessary steps ought first to be 
taken to place within the reach of the mass of the 
children throughout the State, such an education 
as will fit them for the higher branches, and in 
such a manner as to place all on an equal footing 
in the enjoyment of the benefits to be derived 
fyom the funds of the State,
*®ftred Sngelhardt, 0£, cit., p, 442,
®®Otto T, Hamilton, the Oourts and the Curriculum (New York, 
1927), p. 24,
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"Provision ought to he made by the state 
for . . # fund . • . large enough if possible to 
afford the means to all the children In the state 
of obtaining a knowledge of reading, writing, and 
arithmetic; branches which are indispensably nec­
essary to every citizen in his intercourse with 
his fellow men * .
The report proper of the committee included;
The legislature shall encourage the 
institution of common schools throughout the 
State for the promotion of literature and the 
arts and sciences, and shall provide means for 
that purpose and for their support."®
The first attempt of a constitutional convention 
to specify the regulatory principles of curriculum offerings 
was made in 1664 when the committee on public education 
recommended that "The English language only shell be taught 
in the common schools in this state,"®® Various substitutes 
were presented®* and the compromise finally agreed upon became 
article 142 which read: "The general exercises in the common
schools shell be conducted in the English language,"®® This 
provision, with no additions, was incorporated in the consti­
tution by the 1867-1868 Convention,®*
®!official Report of Debates in the Louisiana Convention, 
1844-^37 — 517 : ^ ------------------------------------------
p. 319.
®®Official Journal of the Proceedings of ^he Convention for 
the Re via ion and Amandment of tüe Const ftuFlon of the state"'"of 
libuisTaneT T864, p.
®*Ibid., p. 138; Debates in the convention for the Revision 
and Amendaeat of t he dons tit u7i on of' the St aie "of Louisiana,
m d f f : r o g : ----------------------- -------------------------------
^^Constitution of Louisiane, 1064, art. 142,
®*Ibid,, 1068, art, 158.
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In the Constitutional Convention of 1879 resolutions 
and committee reports were presented explaining "the necessity 
for extending the course of study in the public schools, beyond 
the mere rudiments of an elementary English Education,*»®? so 
as to Include "reading, writing and arithmetic, with, perhaps, 
some knowledge of geography, grammar and history*"®® "A broad 
course of study in schools of every grade, from the primary 
to the state University" was recommended.®* The provision 
for a regulated curriculum as incorporated in the adopted 
constitution was:
The general exercises in the public 
schools shall be conducted in the English language 
and the elementary branches taught therein; provided 
that these elementary branches may be also taught 
in the French language in those parishes in the 
State or localities in said parishes where the 
French language predominates* if no additional 
expense is incurred thereby.*®
The Convention of 1898 brought forward curriculum regulations*!
very similar to those embodied in the previous constitution.
In the constitution adopted by the Convention of 
1921 the implications pertaining to à curriculum are found 
in the sections which provide that all work offered in the 
educational institutions from the elementary sohool to the 
university shell be integrated and that "only fundamental 
branches of study, including instruction upon the constitutional
®?Offioial Journal of the Frpoeedings of tjm constitutional 
Convention of the' State of Louisiana, 18797 p. 16Ô.
S8lbld.
®*Ibld., p. 170.
^^Constitution of Louisiana, 1870, art. 826.
*llbld.. 1898, art. 261.
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Ay Stem of State enA national government and the duties of
eltlsenshlp^ shall be taught In the elementary schools,@2
This organic heels was executed through the enactment of the
1988 statute which provided that:
The branches of spelling, reeding, writing, drawing, 
arithmetic, geography, grammar, United states his­
tory, and health, including the evil effects of 
alcohol and narcotics, shell he taught In every 
elementary school « in addition to these, such other 
branohes shall be taught as the State Board of Edu­
cation, or the provisions of the state Constitution 
may require.65
Relative to prohibited teachings In the schools of
the state system the organic provisions have reflected a
consistent attitude. In the Constitutional Convention of
18Ô4 efforts were made to prohibit the teaching of religious
or sectarian doctrine of any nature in the public schools.^4
This theory was indirectly reflected in article 146 of the
constitution adopted by that convention,, and a similar theory
has been expressed in every constitution since that time
through the definite provisions that no public school funds
shall be appropriated for the support of private or sectarian
institutions of learning.@5
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the
organic law of Louisiana has not rendered inflexible the
42ibld,, 1921, art. 12, secs. 2-3.
4®Aots of Louisiana, 1922, No. 100, sec. 60.
G^Offieiai Journal of the proceedings of the Convention 
for tke RevlTsion and Amendment of the constitution of the 
giate of Louisiana. 1864, pp. lTS-143.
^^constitutions of Louisiana: 18Ô4, art. 146; 1868, art
140; 1879, art. 228; 1898-1913, art. 253; 1921, art. 12, 
sec. 15.
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organisation and administration of the curricular program, 
which aeama to be a procedure quite opposite from that in 
many states.®®
Heading of the Bible a Violative Procedure
The constitutions of Louisiana have assured to every 
person the inherent right to worship God according to the 
dictates of his conscience;®? the constitution of 1981 provides 
further: "nor shall any preference ever be given to, nor any
discrimination made against, any church, sect or creed of religion 
or any form of religious faith or worship*"®® That such under­
lying principles have been upheld by the courts of the state In 
protecting the pupils of the public schools from the teachings 
of sectarian principles is evidenced in the Kerold case of 1915.®® 
In this suit the plaintiffs included two Jews and one Catholic 
who complained of the parish school board's action in adopting 
and undertaking to put into practice the following resolution;
"Whereas, it is a fact well established 
among us that the children in our public schools 
are at the most impressionable age for receiving 
and retaining good or evil; and
"Whereas, the lessons and truths contained 
within the Holy Bible are acknowledged by right- 
thinking people as being of paramount value in
®®Ralph Yakel, The Legal Control of t M  Administration of 
Public school axpenSTtures (Hewlfork, l W 9 ) / p* iSO"*"
®?Constitutions of Louisiana; 1868, art. 12; 1379, art.
4; 1898-1915, art. 4; 1921, art. 1, sec. 4.
^ b l d .. 1921, art. 1, sac. 4.
®®H.rold et al. t. Perish Board of school Directors et al., 
(1919) 139 Le. 1034, 98 So. 116.
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creating and maintaining a better moral atmosphere 
In every community and also in the individual life: 
Therefore, be it
"Resolved that the principals and teachers 
be requested to open dally sessions of the public 
schools of Caddo parish with readings from the 
Bible, without note or comment, and, when the leader, 
is willing to do so, the Lord's Prayer shall be 
offered,"?0
It was alleged that there are too many religious philosophies 
and different interpretations of the Bible to permit the use 
of that book by the public school teachers as a part of the 
daily school program.
The court's analysis of the various religious dogmas 
and the principles of organic and statutory law which were 
Involved included an explanation of the theory of religious 
freedom and of the ways in which this attacked practice of 
the school board might or might not be violative. After 
showing both legal and organic recognition of the Bible, the 
court expressed the theory of equal religious rights as follows;
Therefore, while we are grateful to God 
for religious freedom, with other blessings, we 
may not interfere with any citizen's natural right 
to also worship that same God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience. The Jew will be 
permitted without interference to worship God 
according to his conscience, and so will ell others,
Concerning the alleged discrimination against the Jew, It
was held:
And, as he is guaranteed "the natural 
right to worship God, according to the dictates 
of his conscience," and as the resolution in 
question permits "lessons and truths" to be read
18* Le. 1035. 
^^Ibld.. p, 1049.
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oar tooght from the New Testament, particularly 
oaneemtiig the son of God and His resurrection from 
th# âeàd, etc., it gives a preference to the chil­
dren of the Christian parents, and discriminates 
against the children of the Jews. The resolution 
Is therefore violative of the Constitution.?®
A request by the parish board of school directors 
is practically equivalent to a cozmand. Relative to the 
compulaory character of the resolution the court said:
The general policy of the government 
always la to avoid with care any compulsion which 
Infringes on the religious scruples of any, however 
little reason may seem to others to underlie them. 
Oooley, p« 685. The reading of the Hew Testament 
as the Word of God infringes on the religious 
scruples of the Jews. The discrimination against 
them, and the inequality of rights and privileges, 
are manifest by such requirement*
The subjection by school authorities of 
Jewish children to Christian worship Is forbidden 
by the Constitution, which guarantees to every 
person the natural right to worship God according 
to the dictates of his conscience.
"Before the constitution Jews and Gentiles 
are equal; by the law they must be treated alike; 
and the ordinance . « . which gives to one sect a 
privilege which it denies to another, violates both 
the Constitution and the law, and is therefore null 
and void." Shreveport v. levy, 26 La. Ann. 671.73
Judge Thomas M* Cooley's views were quoted as 
follows to show that the teaching of religion is not a 
responsibility of the schools:
"The more enlightened opinion of the 
present day denies the duty (to teach religion 
in the public schools), and affirms that any step 
in that direction is in greater or less degree a 
specie8 of persecution of those who are not 
favored, and therefore incompetent, in any country 
whose political institutions are based upon the
'Bibia.. p. 1047. 
?8lbia.. p. 1048.
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prlnoipXes of equality before the lew. Religious 
inatruetion is, therefore, referred exclusively to 
the voluntary action of the people." Cooley on 
Taxation, 197.?*
Dismissal of certain pupils from the exercises was 
held to be an unsatisfactory means of correction, thus:
The answer made by defendants that "in 
all of said schools the said teachers might with 
due propriety have excused from attendance on 
such exercises the children of said plaintiffs 
and others of similar belief, if so requested by 
the students or their parents or guardians," is 
an admission of discrimination against the children 
of those citizens whose consciences would not 
permit them to worship God as taught in the 
particular portion of the Scriptures selected and 
read by the teacher of the class in which the 
children of said citizens happened to be#
Under such circumstances, the children 
would be excused from the opening exercises of the 
school because of their religious beliefs. And 
excusing such children on religious grounds, 
although the number excused might be very small, 
would be a distinct preference in favor of the 
religious beliefs of the majority, and would work 
a discrimination against those who were excused.
The exclusion of a pupil under such circumstances 
puts him in a class by himself; it subjects him 
to a religious Stigmd; and all because of his 
religious belief, Equality in public education 
would be destroyed by such act, under a Consti­
tution which seeks to establish equality end 
freedom in religious matters. The Constitution 
forbids that this shall be done.?8
The court's decree was that a judgment be Issued:
• • . enjoining the board of school directors of the 
parish of Caddo and the parish superintendent from 
enforcing or carrying into effect the resolution of 
said board requesting the principals and teachers 
to open the morning sessions of the public schools 
of Caddo parish by reading from the Bible, without 
note or.comment, and the offering of the Lord's 
Prayer."®
^*1919.. p. 1049.
. pp. 1049-1080. 
. p. 1050.
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several years later the state's legal counselor 
oo&tlaued to uphold this policy by declaring that "any attempt 
to teach, or comment upon, the Bible in the public schools of 
Louisiana would be contrary to the Constitutional provisions" 
which guarantee to every person religious freedom.??
While the constitutions have contained comparatively 
few provisions concerning the curriculum of the schools of the 
state, herein is illustrated a means of curriculum control 
through negation— that Is, school authorities have not the 
constitutional right to teach the Bible to the pupils through 
reading or in any way that can discriminate against any 
branches of any religion.
State's Right to furnish Textbooks free 
to All School Children
It is generally conceded that a state has the power 
to furnish free textbooks to pupils who attend the public 
schools, but it has been a mooted question as to whether a 
state has a right to furnish free textbooks to all children 
regardless of the schools attended by them.
Louisiana's earliest provisions on this subject 
seem to have been the organic regulation for the Parish of 
Orleans;
All pupils in the primary grades in the 
public schools throughout the Parish of Orleans, 
unable to provide themselves with the requisite 
books, an affidavit to that effect having been made 
by one of the parents of such pupils, or If such
??Opinlons of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1, 
1920, io APfir^07T9S5, p. 15Ù#
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parents be dead, then by the tutor or other peraou 
in charge of such pupils, shall be furnished with 
the necessary books, free of expense, to be paid 
for out of the school fund of said parish; and the 
school Board of the Parish of Orleans is hereby 
directed to appropriate annually not less than two 
thousand dollars for t M  purpose named, provided 
such amount be needed*?#
This local privilege was recognized and upheld in 1906 by
the attorney general in the ruling that the parish of Orleans
should not be barred from the benefits of exchange prices for
used books, as arranged by the state with the various book
companies, on account of its power to furnish textbooks free
to certain children*?®
In 1988 the Louisiana legislature enacted the Free
Textbog* Act which had for its purpose the furnishing of
textbooks without cost to all children who were attending any
school Wistsoever, immediately after the enactment of this
law several suits attacking the legality of such measure were
instituted by citizens end taxpayers,®® citizens, taxpayers,
and patrons,81 and by school boards and parish superintendents.®®
These litigations began in the Nineteenth Judicial District
?®Qonatitution of Louisiana, 1898, art. 861*
?*ODlnions of the Attorney General of Louisiana, May 1,
1904,To T g g y T *  itgt ---------- - -----
®®3orden et al#* v. Louisiane State Board of Education et
al., (1989) 168 La. 1005, 185 So. 666.
®^Ooohran et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education et
al., (1989) 168 La. 1050, 123 So. 664.
®®Bossler parish school Board at el. v. Louisiana state 
Board of Education et al* Caddo Parish School Board et al. 
V. same. (1929) 168 La. 1055, 125 So. 665.
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Court and the final dispoaltlon of one case was a decision 
handed down by the supreme Court of the United states.®®
f r o m  adverse dédisions in the district court, the
various plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court* in dealing 
with the first suit this court denied a motion by the defend­
ants, for a dismissal, overruled the defendants' plea that 
the plalntiffa— oitizens and taxpayers— had no right of action, 
a ad proceeded with the ease on its merits*®*
The pertinent features of the law governing this
ease are based on Act No* 100 of 1926 which reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Legislature of 
Louisiana, That the Severance Tax Fund of the 
State, as levied by Act 140 of 1922, as amended, 
shall be devoted after allowing funds and appro­
priations as provided by the Constitution of the 
State, first, to supplying school books to the 
sehool children of the State of Louisiana, and that 
thereafter such further sums as remain in the said 
Severance Tax Fund shall be transferred to the 
State public School funds.
That the State Board of Education of 
Louisiana shall provide the said school books 
for school children free of cost to such children 
out of seid tax fund, end thereafter apply the 
remaining sums out of the said severance Tax Fund 
to the State public school funds*
That this act shall not apply to persons 
attending colleges and universities*#^
GGgmmett Cochran, w. M. Ouice, Jr., Henry stelnau, et al. 
Appts., V* Louisiana State Board of Education et al., (1930) 
281 U. S. 370, 30 S* C. 335, 74 L. Ed* 913*
®*Borden et el* v. Louisiana State Board of Education 
at al., (1929) 168 La* 1005, 123 So. 655.
*®Acts of Louisiana, 1926, No. 100, secs. 1-3.
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Act No. 143 of 1928, the other act attacked, le
the General Appropriation Aet, which provides for various
appropriations and specifically states that seven hundred
fifty thousand dollars shall be appropriated for 1988-1929
and 1989-1930 out of the severance tax fund, to be applied
for the "purchase of free school books for the use of school
children of this State, to be expended by the State Board
of Education of Louisiana as provided by House Bill m *  90
of 1928, or so much thereof, as may be necessary."®®
The plaintiffs alleged that these measures were
unconstitutional on various grounds and emphasized that:
# • . the expenditure of the severance tax for such 
illegal purposes is the taking of their property 
for private purposes, without due process of law, 
in contravention of section 8 of article 1 of the 
Constitution of this state, end of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 
and is an act contrary to the republican form of 
government, guaranteed to each state by section 4 
of article 4 of the constitution of the United 
States.
In handing down the opinion on the unconstitution­
ality charge, Justice Winston Overton said:
Act NO* 100 is not, and does not purport to be, 
an appropriation act. It does not authorize the 
drawing of anything from the treasury. It merely 
dedicates a part of the severance tax fund, without 
even specifying the amount to the purchase of 
school books, standing alone the act could have 
no practical effect, save as a basis for specific 
appropriations. That such an act is not an 
appropriation act, but merely an act of dedication, 
see Fisher v. Steele, Auditor, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 
So. 682; Board of Administrators v. Hiohhart, 139
®^ yald.. No. 148, seo. 1.
®^Borda& .i al. t. Louisiana State Board of Bduoatlon et 
al., (1929) 168 La. 1016.
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La. 446, 71 SO, 735; Lionel's Cigar Store v.
McFarland, Supervisor, 162 La. 956, 111 so. 341.
Sinoe the act is not an appropriation act, it was 
unnecessary that the Legislature, In passing it. 
comply with the constitutional provisions relative 
to the mWcing of appropriations, by making them 
for specific purposes end specific amounts and 
for a period not exceeding two years.#®
The attack that the title of Act No, 143 did not
indicate the Intention of the act to make appropriations for
the purchase of school books was met by the decision:
The title of the act is similar to the titles 
usually used in General Appropriation Acts in this 
state, and in fact follows the constitutional 
requirements as to mAiat may be contained in such 
acts. We think that the title suffices to cause 
one to anticipate that, upon investigation, some 
appropriations may be found in the body of the 
act. we therefore conclude that the title is 
sufficient.#*
In upholding the discretionary right of the legis­
lature to include the appropriation for the purchase of school 
books in the General Appropriation Act the court reasoned;
The Legislature evidently considered that the 
appropriations for the purchase of school books 
were sufficiently connected with the ordinary 
expenses of government to Justify their Inclusion 
in the General Appropriation Act. The purpose 
had in view, in making the appropriations— that 
of reducing, and if possible of obliterating, 
illiteracy in this state— was a purpose in which 
the state was vitally interested, and the necessity 
for the continuance of the appropriations to accom­
plish that end was such as to give reasonable 
grounds to consider the matter an ordinary obliga­
tion and expense of government. We are not prepared 
to say that the Legislature erred in so treating 
the matter.90
®®Ibld.. p. 1017. 
®*ibia.. p. 1010.
p. 1019.
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It was charged that the two acts are violative of 
certain sections of the Constitution of 1921— section 4 of 
article 1, section® 8 and 12 of article 4, and section 13 
of article 12. To this the court answered:
In our opinion, which is the view of the 
majority of the court, these acts violate none of 
the foregoing constitutional provisions, one may 
scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money 
Is appropriated for the purchase of school books 
for the use of any church, private, sectarian, or 
even public school. The appropriations were made 
for the specific purpose of purchasing school books 
for the use of the school children of the state, 
free of cost to them. It was for their benefit and 
the resulting benefit to the state that the appro­
priations were made. True, these children attend 
some school, public or private, the latter, sec­
tarian or nonseotarian, and that the books are to 
be furnished them for their use, free of cost, 
whichever they attend. The school®, however* are 
not the beneficiaries of these appropriations.
They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved 
of a single obligation, because of them. The school 
children and the state alone are the beneficiaries.
It is also true that the sectarian schools, which 
some of the children attend, instruct their pupils 
in religion, and books are used for that purpose, 
but one m ay search diligently the acts, though 
without result, in an effort to find anything to 
the effect that it is the purpose of the state to 
furnish religious books for the use of such children. 
In fact, in view of the prohibitions In the Consti­
tution against the state's doing anything of that 
description, it would be legally impossible to 
interpret the statute as celling for any such action 
on the part of the state, for where a statute is 
susceptible of two constructions, one of which makes 
it unconstitutional and the other constitutional, 
the interpretation making It constitutional must be 
adopted, what the statutes contemplate is that the 
same books that are furnished children attending 
public schools shall be furnished children attending 
private schools. This is the only practical way of 
interpreting and executing the statutes, and this is 
what the state board of education is doing. Among 
these books, naturally, none is to be expected, 
adapted to religious instruction.
As relates to the contention that the 
statutes violate section 12 of article 4 of the 
Oonstitution, we do not find this contention well 
founded. The school books are not granted or donated
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to the children# , • « It is only the use of the 
books that is granted to the children, or, in other 
words, the books are lent to them, which implies 
that they are to be returned. , . , where the 
granting or lending of anything o f value, belonging 
to the atate, or any political corporation thereof, 
is necessary in the reasonable exercise of the 
police power, section IS of article 4 of the consti­
tution was not intended to prevent the granting or 
lending . « • The furnishing of school books to the 
children of the state, for their use, in attending 
school, tends directly to promote the education of 
the children of the state and to obliterate illit­
eracy, thereby Improving the morals of the children 
and promoting the general welfare and safety of the 
people, and hence comes within the police power.
Of. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357,
38 L« Ed, 933. Our conclusion is that the foregoing 
pleas,^directed against both acts, should be over­
ruled.*^
In answer to the allegation that the state board of 
education was not empowered under the constitution to dis­
tribute the general school funds according to the educeble 
children of the various parishes of the state, which in 
principle was provided in the Free Textbook Act, It was 
explained that the money used to purchase said textbooks was 
appropriated from the severance taxes which were not considered 
a pert of the public school fund. It was further contended 
that the measure violates the "due process clauses of the 
Constitutions of this state and of the United States, and 
also section 4  of article 4 of the constitution of the united 
States,"*® In answer to these charges the court said;
The contention, as to the violation of the due 
process clauses, is based on the ground that taxes 
may neither be levied nor expanded for any but a 
public purpose, and that to do either for any but
. p p .  1 0 8 0 - 1 0 8 8 .  
p. 1 0 8 8 .
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such e purpose amounts to a taking of property 
without due process of law. It Suffices to say 
that we do not understand that plaintiffs question 
the legality of the levy, hut they do question the 
legality of the proposed expenditure. We have 
found, however, that the taxes, here appropriated, 
ere to he spent legally for a public purpose, and 
this, we think, disposes of the question here 
presented. As to the violation of section 4 of 
article 4 of the Constitution of the United states, 
it is certainly difficult, end we think impossible, 
to see how the expenditure of public funds for 
textbooks for the use of the children of the state 
has any tendency to destroy the republican form 
of government, enjoyed by the state. However, 
the question here presented Is e political one, 
which does not fall within the Jurisdiction of the 
courts. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
V. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 8. Ot. 284, 66 L. Ed*
377; South Dakota ex rel. Wagner v. Summers, 33
S. D. 40, 144 N. W. 730, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206,
Ann. Cas. 1916B, 860.*5
Summarily, the supreme court of the state defended 
the statute in every significant point raised by the plaintiffs 
and held that the state under the law has a right to furnish 
free textbooks to ell children for their use while in school 
regardless of the school attended.
Companion cases on this subject resulted in very
similar decisions. Of one case the court said:
The issues presented in this case are 
the seme, in all essential respects, as those this
day decided in the case of Silas p. Borden et al*
(No. 89,669 of the docket of this court), ante, 
p. 1005, 183 So. 656; the only difference between 
the two oases being that plaintiffs, besides suing 
as citizens and taxpayers, are also suing as patrons 
of the public schools.
For the reasons given in the case of 
Silas P. Borden et al. v. Louisiana state Board 
of Education, the judgment of the trial court, 
refusing to issue the injunction, is affirmed. ^
'®Ibld.. p. 1088.
**Ooohr.n «1. T. Louisiana state Board of Bduoatlon et 
al., (1989) 188 La. 1088.
403
In another case which dealt with consolidated suits 
Instituted hy school boards and parish superintendents the 
court failed to recognize cause of action of the plaintiffs, 
as is shown by Justice Overton's decree;
Â8 we held in the Borden Gas®, Act No.
100 of 1928 is merely an act that dedicates funds, 
and is not an appropriation act. of end by itself 
it has no practical value, save, perhaps, to serve 
as a basis fbr future appropriations, if Act No.
143 of 1928, or, for that matter, if Act No. 100 
of 1928, were declared unconstitutional, or if both 
of them were so declared, in so far as they relate 
to the purchase of text-books for the us© of the 
children of the state, plaintiffs would gain nothing 
by the decree. The declaring of these acts unconsti­
tutional, to the extent mentioned, would leave the 
$750,000 in the treasury, subject to appropriation 
by the Legislature, and would not, as urged by 
plaintiffs, cause this sum, or any part of it, to 
pass to the public school fund, subject to dis­
tribution smong the parishes.
We therefore think that plaintiffs dis­
close no right or cause of action. They have no 
Interest to sustain these suits, and were properly 
diamiseed.*®
One of the companion cases on the textbook question*® 
was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for 
further adjudication.*? In upholding the decisions of thb 
supreme court of Louisiana, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes 
of the Federal Supreme Court said:
®Bossier Parish School Board et al. v. Louisiana State 
Board of Education et al. Caddo Parish School Board et al.
V. same. (1929) 168 La. 1035.
*®Cochran et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education et 
al., (1929) 168 La. 1030, 123 So. 664.
*?2ffimett Cochran, W. M. Ouice, Jr., Henry steinau, et al., 
Appts., V. Louisiana State Board of Education et al., (1930) 
281 U. S. 370, 60 S. 0. 335, 74 L. Ed. 913.
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No substantial Federal question is pre­
sented under See. 4 of article 4 of the Federal 
Constitution guaranteeing to every state a republican 
form of government, as questions arising under this 
provision are political, not judicial, in character.
Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist. 
decided March 18, 1950 (281 U. S. 74, ante, 710, 66 
A. L. H. 1460. 50 Sup. Ct. Hep. 828), and oases 
there cited.*#
In reply to the complaint that the acts in question 
would aid private and other schools not in the public educa­
tional system by furnishing textbooks free to the children 
attending those schools, the United States Court quoted from 
an interpretation of this legislation rendered by the supreme 
court of Louisiana and concluded:
Viewing the statute as having the effect 
thus attributed to it, we can not doubt that the 
tiaxing power of the state is exerted for a public 
purpose. The legislation does not segregate private 
schools or their pupils, as its beneficiaries, or 
attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively 
private concern. Its interest is education, broadly; 
its method, comprehensive. Individual interests Q. 
are aided only as the common Interest is safeguarded.
Thus, it may be seen that the Free Textbook Act 
withstood all attacks made upon it, regardless of the personnel 
of the plaintiffs, or the jurisdiction of the courts in which 
it was tested. Hereby every school child of Louisiana is 
definitely granted the right to receive from the state free 
use of textbooks.
®®rbia., 281 Ü. s. 374. 
'•ibid., p. 378.
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SUMMARY
Pupil Personnel
The supervision of the pupil personnel is one of 
the essential functions of the directors of a public school 
system, pertinent policies revealed hy the state's organic 
provisions and judicial interpretations are mainly the 
following:
1# The administration of the pupil personnel is 
implied in the power of the state to establish public schools.
£. To legislative enactment and the ministerial 
officers of education have been left largely the provisions 
for aupervlaion of the school pupil. No organic bases for 
this function were recognized until the Convention of 1852 
and then only by implication.
3. The establishment of public schools for all the 
children of the state without race or color distinction was 
provided for in the Reconstruction constitutions.
4. Since 1679 separate schools for the white and 
colored races have been established in theory and practice.
5. Ordinarily pupils attend the schools of their 
parish, but those pupils not within reach of a suitable school 
therein may, through mutual consent of the two parish superin­
tendents involved, attend school in an adjoining parish.
6. Parish school boards may administer the problem 
of transportation according to their discretion but may not 
delegate that power to other officials.
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7* The business of transporting pupils is reoognized 
as a trade or profession and the school board is in no way 
liable for damages in accidents of Its bus drivers.
8. Children in Louisiana shall attend the schools 
provided for them. To the parish board is entrusted the 
enforeemnt of statutory law to this effect.
9. Pupils must render account for conduct considered 
disorderly or indiscreet by the teachers in charge, and with 
the parish superintendent is vested the final jurisdiction in 
applying punishment, of which the only drastic method approved 
ia suspension.
10. A state health program operates to safeguard the 
physical welfare of pupils; its provisione in some respects 
are mandatory, while In others they are directory.
The Curriculum
The administration of its curriculum is one of the 
Implied functions of the state's public school system. That 
Louisiana's populace has believed in the theory of a dynamic 
course of study is evidenced by the fact that the state cur­
riculum has had its development without very much legal basis 
except such powers as were delegated to the educational agents 
of the state. Leading facts and outstanding policies in the 
development of the state's public school curriculum are:
1. The theory of a curriculum was present in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1844-1845; however, there was no 
expression on it in any of the state's constitutions prior 
to the War for southern independence.
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2* From the time of the Constitutional Convention 
of 1664 efforts have been made to give organic sanction to 
the bases of a eurrioulum. However, the various constitutions 
in their final form have included only a recognition of the 
essentiality of instruction in the English language and of 
an integrated course of study from the elementary school to 
the university, to be developed by the educational officers 
at their discretion with but a few fundamental subjects 
specified as required,
3, To assure absolute religious freedom to the 
pupils of the public schools no teacher or school official 
is permitted to teach the Bible through reading, or to use 
it in any way in the exercises of the school,
4. The state grants the free use of textbooks to 
all school children regardless of the school attended by 
them, Louisiana is a pioneer in this particular phase of 
educational development and her action has been completely 
upheld by the Judicial system of both the state and the 
United States,
OmPTBR XI
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS
The United States of America Is established on the 
theory that a federated democracy can best serve its consti­
tuency hy providing for three separate and distinct branches—  
law-making, explaining, and enforcing. The three branohes 
not only have functions peculiar to their particular divisions 
but also each branch tends to circumscribe the power of the 
other in the development of governmental policies, Louisiana, 
in accord with the other states of the Union, has established 
a state government based on the fundamental principles of the 
Federal Government,
The American system of free public schools as a 
function of the state reflects the underlying principles of 
this form of federated democracy. That Louisiana recognized 
her educational responsibilities is evidenced by her legal 
foundations for a program of public education prior to her 
admission to the Union,
The controversial issues arising from the organiza­
tion and administration of Louisiana's system of free public 
schools have been an influential factor in the development of 
the educational policies of the state. Many of those issues, 
having been carried to some phase of the judiciary for legal 
interpretation, have occasioned the determining of the law of
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the publie eehool s y s t m . That judiolal interprétations based 
on organic and statutory laws, as well as on established 
custom, have been contributory to the development of education­
al policies is indicated by the facts that the courts have 
rendered approximately two hundred fifty decisions including 
interpretations on almost every underlying principle of the 
educational law of the state and that the attorneys general 
have supplemented those interpretations with approximately 
nine hundred fifty opinions. .
In the present chapter of this study no attempt is 
made to summarize all the educational principles and policies 
established by judicial interpretations, for that information 
may be found in the various chapter summaries. However, as 
circumscribed by the limitations of the problem, the funda­
mentals of educational law which it is found to have been estab­
lished seam to justify the following conclusions concerning the 
policies of Louisiana's public school systmm:
1» As a result of the transplanting of educational 
theories from France and Spain, the schools of the colonial 
period were primarily a product of the Catholic Church. Also, 
there were some reflections of an increasing Interest in the 
development of a program of public education under the auspices 
of regal orders.
Zm Toward the close of the territorial period the 
legislative assembly, under the leadership of Governor William 
0, C. Claiborne, laid statutory foundations for the theory of 
a public school system as a function of the government.
411
3* The Ordlnanoe of 1787 and the Federal Oonstltu- 
tloh, reflecting the laissez-faire attitude of its framers 
toward the suhjeot, recognized the responsihillty of puhlio 
education to be one of the undelegated powers reserved by the 
states. That Louisiana was cognizant of this right is shown 
by her various provisions for a system of public education 
many years before the organic laws of the state made any 
aeticm thereupon mandatory,
4, The constitutions of the state, except the first, 
reflect a growing interest in broadening the scope for a 
comprehensive system of free public schools. Provisions for 
educating the children of color was a controversial issue 
during the period of Reconstruction, but since the Constitutiom 
of 1879 it has been the policy of the state to provide educa­
tional facilities for all children of school age in separate 
schools for the white and colored races,
5, It is maintained judicially and legally that the 
state has the right and duty to establish and support a system 
of free public schools for the purpose of disseminating knowl­
edge and promoting the general intelligence of the citizenry* 
Legal recognition has been given to the authority of the state 
for extending the system upward to include the secondary school 
and junior college and downward to include the kindergarten*
6, Louisiana accepted the Federal Government'a grant 
of the sixteenth sections of land to develop a permanent source 
of revenue for the support of public education. It has been 
the policy of the state, as the legally recognized trustee 
thereof, to preserve the school lands through strict adminis­
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tration and to aae the funds derived in various ways therefrom 
only for the support of the public schools of the township 
idkereln the particular section is located*
7# The free school fund accumulated as a result of 
the administrative policies pertaining to the sixteenth section 
lands. The state accepted this fund as a trust and proposed to 
distribute its accrued interest proportionately to the schools 
of the townships concerned* The legislature in 1872 attempted 
to abolish the state's responsibility for the entrusted debt, 
but its action was overruled by the supreme court decision 
idàieh maintained the perpetuity of the fund#
8# That the responsibility of maintaining a system 
of free public schools was readily accepted by the state is 
evidenced by the legislature's appropriation of approximately 
one and three-fourths million dollars for this purpose before 
the oonstitution made such support mandatory*
9# A state-wide property tax has supplied one of the 
chief sources of the general school fund since 1847* Also, 
the administration of a general property tax for schools has 
been delegated to local authorities* For many years the police 
juries were authorized to levy such tax in their respective 
parishes; in 1886 the authorization was made mandatory, but 
since 1908 this tax must be included in the regular budget to 
be valid#
10# It has been a policy of the state to supplement 
the general sehool fund by the revenue from various minor 
sources#
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11* % e  state has adhered to the policy of holding 
parish school treasurers strictly responsible as custodians 
of thé general school fund and for the disbursement thereof 
according to orders from their respective school boards as 
prescribed by law*
IS* A cash basis system of defraying expenses is 
practiced I and only in the exceptional case has the current 
educational expenditure been permitted to exceed anticipated 
revenues for the fiscal year. However, the liquidation of 
school indebtedness by means of funding it into interest- 
bearing certificates has been legalized*
If* Special tax levies authorized by the qualified 
voters of a particular school district, considered as a sepa­
rate and distinct entity, have been legally recognized for 
approximately a century as a source of public school support* 
That the people of Louisiana have made use of this autonomous 
privilege is indicated by the fact that more than six million 
dollars of educational revenue was collected through this 
process in the fiscal school year, 1930-1931*
14* It has been the policy of the state to adhere 
strictly to the organic provisions and controlling statutes 
in levying and collecting the special school tax*
16* The calling of a tax levy election is discretion­
ary with the parish school board, except vhen it is legally 
petitioned by the qualified voters of the district concerned* 
16* A valid tax levy election must comply with the 
governing statute and, if carried, must receive a majority of
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both the votes and the property valuation by correct count*
17* The courts have been called upon to adjudicate 
80 many contested tax levy elections that they have advised 
mot only that the laws be clarified but also that policies he 
adopted by the administrators to prevent the many types of 
irregularities which have culminated in litigations*
18. The Judiciary has maintained definitely that all 
special school funds ^all be disposed of as prescribed by 
the qualified voters of the district*
19. The bond Issue as a method of raising revenue 
for the construction of school buildings and teachers' h<mes 
and the purchase of necessary grounds and equipment therefor 
is one of the recent educational developments.
20. Sinoe a bond issue Is liquidated through deferred 
payments derived from funds predicated on the levying of a 
special tax by the qualified voters of the district, the 
policy of adhering to special tax regulations for school main­
tenance purposes is applied— that is, the proposed bond issue 
is required to have a specific purpose and to comply with all 
organic end statutory law governing the bond issuing process 
at the time of issue. If the special basis tax for the bond 
issue has already been voted, the funds may be made more quickly 
available through the issuance of certificates of indebtedness.
21. As a means of protection to all who may be con­
cerned with special tax levies and bond issues the ri^ts of 
prescription are legally recognized and employed.
22. The legislature is the chief nonprofessional agency 
through which provisions for the control of a free public school
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ffjrstm have bean made#
£3# Powers delegated to the polioe jurisa during the 
formative period made them one of the oontrolXlng agenoles of 
pablie edueatlon,
S4i Since the beginning of louisiana*s public school 
system the powers entrusted to various boards of education 
have influenced the development of the state's educational 
policies*
25* That Louisiana was reluctant to adopt the policy 
of centralized educational control through nonprofessional 
agencies is indicated by the late development of the state 
board of education# which had primarily a personnel ex officio 
with limited powers until the present century# However* the 
Constitution of 1921 clothed this board with broad discretion* 
ary powers of control and supervision of the free public school 
system of the state.
26. The parish school board * which had its beginning 
in 1821* has been a potent factor in the development of educa* 
tional policies# JProm the time of the present century this 
agency has been granted extensive discretionary powers pertain* 
ing to the educational affairs of the parish, for example# it 
gevems all special school tax elections, selects the parish 
superintendent of education, affirms the nominations of all 
teachers and fixes their salaries, creates and abolishes 
school districts, and cooperates with the state board of edu­
cation in the development and execution of the school policies 
ef the state#
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£7«The local school board was one of the principal 
c^trolling factors during the formative period of public 
education, but by the close of the last century its influence 
was being replaced by the increasing power of the parish school 
board*
28* The state superintendency as a means of central» 
ised professional control of public education had its inception 
through the secretary of state's office in 1883, but in 1845 
it was legally established by the constitution as a separate 
and distinct agency of control. Louisiana's hesitant accept- 
tnae of the centralization of educational power is evidenced 
by the efforts which were made to abolish the office of state 
superintendent or to circumscribe the duties pertaining thereto 
until the latter part of the last century. Since that time 
the powers and responsibilities of this officer have been 
expanded to include general control and supervision of the 
entire free public school system.
29. The divisional superintendent**a product of 
Beconstraction*»was eliminated from the educational program 
with the passing of that period*
80. The office of parish superintendent was tempora­
rily established as an agency of control in 1847, The slow 
development of professionalized supervision of public education 
is indicated by the abolishment of this office or the delimi­
tation of its sphere of activities until near the close of the 
nineteenth century. From the beginning of the present century, 
however, the powers of the parish superintendent have been
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extended* Since this offloer is a creature of the parish 
eehôol board, there is wholesome cooperation between him and 
the school board in the execution of the policies of public 
education within the parish.
31. It has been the legal policy to consider school 
board members and superintendents as officers of the state, 
but due to the organic change in residence requirements in 
1921 the parish superintendent is not now thus classified.
52. The public school teacher of Louisiana Is the 
chief agent throu^ which the educational policies are finally 
applied.
35. Oertification of the eligibility of teachers by 
eome delegated authority was one of the state's earliest 
educational policies.
54. Teachers are employed by the parish superintendent 
vi'Ui the approval of the parish school board»
55, The teacher's contract is very significant to both 
the employer and the employee and only in the exceptional case 
is it subject to cancellation without the fulfillment of all 
finanoial obligations therein.
36» Various holders of certificates of indebtedness 
which were issued to teachers in the New Orleans school system 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century have found it 
necessary to carry their efforts at liquidation to the district, 
state, and sometimes the Federal courts.
37. The school district is legally recognized as a 
quasl«corporate subdivision of the state, created by law at
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the discretion of the pariah school hoard, for the purpose of 
carrying out the state's policies in establishing and maintain­
ing public schools within its jurisdiction#
3@« In financing a building program the parish school 
board is required by statute to assume corporate responsibilities# 
The contract la an integral feature of this program end the 
courts have maintained strict adherence to the law for all 
parties concerned therewith#
39. To the parish school board is entrusted the super­
vision of public school property, but it is the policy of the 
state to safeguard the use of this property and to exempt it 
from ordinary taxation#
40# The administration of pupil personnel is implied 
in the right to establish end maintain public schools for the 
welfare of the youth of the state#
41# Only in exceptional oases are pupils permitted 
to attend schools other than in their respective districts#
42# compulsory school attendance and transportation 
of pupils are recent developments In educational law, and the 
parish school board is held responsible for the execution 
thereof#
43# Pupils are subject to discipline end may be 
suspended from school for disorderly conduct, but corporal 
punishment Is prohibited by the lew#
44# The curriculum is one of the implied essentials 
of the public school system. The state's policy has been to 
prescribe the fundamentals and leave the development of the 
curriculum proper to the ministerial officers of education.
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45# In accord with Louisiana's policy of assuring 
religious freedom to all within its jurisdiction, the teaching 
or reading of the Bible in connection with public school work 
la definitely prohibited#
48# Recently the state adopted the policy of granting 
to every school child the right to receive from it the free 
use of textbooks#
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